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ABSTRACT 
This study is concerned with recent developments in international investment and the 
theory of the firm. The proposition that markets and hierarchies are alternative 
governance structures for completing related sets of transactions is less contentious. 
Although the literature recognizes that the choice of an appropriate organizational 
mode is a frontier issue in international business, however, the view that foreign 
direct investment is the most efficient governance structure, in transaction-cost 
economizing terms, remains controversial. This research identifies with this 
contention. 
The premise of the study is that the governance structure of foreign transactions 
cannot be confined to or decided within the framework of hierarchy alone. The study 
presents a number of market (non-FDI) mechanisms that are being used to accomplish 
foreign investment transactions. Termed "New Forms of International Investment" 
(NFl), these strategies involve non-equity (Le. contractual! cooperative) and minority-
equity arrangements. 
Hypotheses concerning the transaction cost nature and the impact of managerial 
perceptions of several explanatory factors (identified from the literature) were 
developed and tested using data gathered from a questionnaire survey of executives 
from 47 UK MNCs, 19 Foreign MNCs (from 6 developed countries), 10 UK MNBs 
and 21 Foreign MNBs (from 12 developed and 3 developing countries). This was 
supported by interviews with 26 corporate executives drawn from 12 UK MNCs, 5 
Foreign MNCs, 5 UK MNBs and 5 Foreign MNBs. 
The results of the research provide evidence that while firm-specific characteristics 
offer firms opportunities to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses in relation to 
given overseas markets, host country-specific characteristics provide a complementary 
platform for assessing the optimum mode of entry. Also, managerial perceptions of 
the nature and importance of these factors and their impact on the diversification 
strategy of the firm were found to be significant in entry mode choices. Thus, the 
greater firms perceived the distortion propensities of potential host countries, the 
more likely resources, insofar as they would be transfered at all, would be transfered 
via new forms rather than via hierarchy. There was not much evidence to support 
the literature contention that the use of the new forms is a particular or general 
phenomenon of developing countries. In the main, the evidence suggests a 
correspondence between entrepreneurship or corporate management and foreign 
investment decisions. The impresssion gained from interviewing selected corporate 
executives suggests that managerial influences and perceptions are very crucial to 
whether or not an overseas operation will be embarked upon and, if so, what 
modality it should take. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.1. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
Since the 1960s and 1970s, the very nature of multinational enterprises (MNES) and the 
general perception of their "power to overcome government restrictions in their pursuit 
of profits, control of resources, operations, and markets" (Rugman et aI., 1986, p. 253) 
have made conflict with governments and multilateral regulatory agencies inevitable. 
Within this period also many governments have increasingly realised that any economic 
arrangement in which the share of the indigenous citizens is no more than supplying 
cheap labour force or distributing consumer goods imported by expatriate firms is the 
antithesis of development. With growing political independence, nation states evolve 
policies that tend to increasingly shift the realms of economic power from foreigners to 
indigenous inhabitants. 
The pattern of foreign investment which has dominated the international scene, and one 
which has generated much controversy, is foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI has been 
seen to epitomize the multinationality of international production. It has also been 
perceived by some host governments as a potential surrogate vehicle for the infusion of 
'alien' cultural, political and economic values from their home nations. Alternative 
investment strategies may have the potentials of mitigating these vast country concerns 
while providing firms with wider entry options. 
The intellectual leadership for this research was kindled by exchange of correspondence 
with Dr. Charles Oman, Director of the Development Centre of the Organization for the 
Economic Co-operation and Development. In the event Dr Oman also provided some of 
the Centre's latest research on the phenomena of interest. 
1.2 THE SETTING OF THE STUDY 
The contextual background to the study of new forms of investment (Nfl) is traceable to 
international business concern of at least three antecedent kinds. First, Williamson's 
(1975) "markets and hierarchies" dichotomy of the study of economic organizations is the 
3 
basis of the argument of alternative governance structures. Under this tradition, the 
transaction - rather than technology or commodities - is emphasized as the basic unit of 
analysis, and governance structures, of which firms and markets are the alternatives, are 
assessed in terms of their capacities to economize on transaction costs (1981a). Over the 
years, the level of analysis has focused on the efficiency properties and superiority of the 
firm over other modes of microeconomic organization. For the past decade there has been 
a growing interest in these modes, both at firm level and macroeconomic level. Assessing 
the organization of economic activity via alternative governance structures requires that 
their identity be specified and transaction cost economizing properties be described. This 
task is one problem with which this study is concerned. 
The second antecedent background to this study relates to Dunning's (1977, 1979) clarion 
call for the need to identify and/or redefine the main forms of international production 
or resource transfer. Addressing a meeting of European International Business Association 
in Sweden in 1977, Professor John Dunning stressed the need for a detailed and critical 
study of alternative modalities of international resource transference. About the same 
period, Professors Yoram Wind and Howard Perlmutter (1977) characterized entry mode 
choice as a "frontier issue" in international business. According to Robinson (1978) the 
problem stems from the fact that few firms actually make a conscious, deliberate analysis 
of the costs and benefits of entry mode options. 
The growing consensus in the international business literature that, in recent years, the 
boundaries between equity and non-equity or contractual! cooperative forms of 
international production have become blurred (Oman, 1984; Dunning, 1981; Hood and 
Young, 1986) constitutes the third antecedent this study. In particular public policy 
concern of multilateral bodies such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) is critical in the study of new forms of international investment. 
The OECD, like other multilateral government bodies, has been concerned about the 
controversy surrounding the behaviour of foreign multinationals, principally Western 
MNEs, within the North-South context (see, for example, Hyson and Weigel, 1970). The 
controversy relates to the extent to which the fundamental objectives and operational 
strategies of the MNEs correspond to, impinge upon, or interfere with host country 
national goals and aspirations. The magnitude of this controversy and concern led to a 
4 
meeting of 'international experts' in 1979 under the auspices of the OECD. One of the 
topics most actively debated at the meeting was that "in the North-South context, FDI was 
becoming obsolete and being replaced by 'new forms of investment'" (Oman, 1984). In 
his preface to Dr. Charles Oman's (1984) treatise, Mr Justin Faaland, then President of 
the OECD Development Centre, stressed the ". . . importance and timeliness of 
undertaking a study of the new forms of international investment." 
These considerations must be seen as both important and necessary for the reasons stated. 
However, both the descriptive literature and empirical investigations have concentrated 
on "new forms of investment in developing countries", apparently because the contextual 
genesis of the term "new forms of investment" (and of the source of the controversy) is 
developing countries. While the trend towards new forms may seem to be prevalent in 
less developed countries (LDCs) perceived to have a high degree of regulation over 
inward foreign investment, a considerable body of evidence pointing to the increasing use 
of new forms in the developed countries exists (langer, 1980; Beamish, 1984, 1985; 
Harrigan, 1985; Contractor and Lorange, 1987). Thus, the notion that the use of new 
forms is specifically a phenomenon of LDCs (Oman, 1984; Franko, 1989) must be 
questionable. Some writers (e.g. Contractor, 1981, 1984; Buckley and Casson, 1985) 
have looked at the dimensions and empirical applicability of new forms from a wider 
context, rather than from a North to South perspective. 
Furthermore, received theories of foreign investment have largely concentrated on 
equilibrium analysis of the firm (Teece, 1984) as well as the firm as a production function 
rather than as a governance structure (Williamson, 1975, 1981b). In both respects, not 
only are the economizing properties of non-hierarchical modes ignored but, more 
importantly, the role of entrepreneurship has been grossly suppressed (Teece, 1984). It 
is only recently that the assignment of transactions between firms and markets in 
discriminating ways has been acknowledged as the central task of corporate management 
(Casson, 1985; Buckley, 1989). 
A study of the kind envisaged here offers the prospects of integrating entrepreneurship 
with the dynamics of received microtheory (e.g. the eclectic paradigm) under a 
transaction cost approach. This requires that the role of corporate management (as 
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decision makers) be made central to the analysis of foreign investment decisions. This in 
turn requires that management be aware of, and incorporate into entry mode equations, 
the circumstances limiting or favouring intrafirm (as well as interfirm) transactions (Le. 
ownership-specific and internalization-incentive advantages), host country characteristics, 
and assess the net benefits (or net costs) of using alternative governance structures in a 
given foreign investment operation. 
1.3 THE SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
This study is concerned with recent developments in international investment and the 
theory of the firm. Extant foreign investment theories have concentrated on FDI and have 
been projecting hierarchy as the most economical foreign governance structure. Although 
the elegance and comprehensiveness of FDI reasoning has provided researchers with a 
powerful logic (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Caves, 1982; Dunning, 1980, 1981; Hennart, 
1982; Rugman, 1981; Teece, 1981, 1985), it is still deficient in some respects as a 
general institutional framework for deciding the integrity of foreign transactions (see also, 
Beamish, 1985; Beamish and Banks, 1987). 
The premise of this study is that the governance structure of international transactions 
cannot be confined to or decided within the framework of hierarchy alone. Conceptually 
and practically, there are a number of alternative modes which firms can, and do, adopt 
in servicing foreign markets (see Vaupel and Curhan, 1973; Janger, 1980; Oman, 1984, 
1986; Beamish, 1984, 1985; Harrigan, 1985; Contractor, 1985; Davidson and 
McFetridge, 1985; Contractor and Lorange, 1987; Franko, 1989; Welch, 1990). These 
studies indicate that firms often employ several different modes either separately or 
simultaneously in entering any particular foreign market of interest. 
The focus of this study is on the alternative organizational forms, other than FDI, by 
which economic enterprises can, and do, sustain international private investments. A 
growing number of foreign investment activities are being conducted under a mix of 
market (inter-firm) mechanisms, involving non-equity (i.e. contractual and cooperative) 
and minority-equity arrangements. The importance of these forms has been kept 
subliminal either by research design or they were deemed too commonplace to be 
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veritable alternative strategic avenues for sustaining foreign investments. The scope of 
this study is neither country-specific nor limited to a single component study. In other 
words, it is not intended to focus on the foreign investment behaviour of a particular 
country's MNEs nor is it delimited to say licensing or joint ventures. The study is also 
not limited to or focused on LDCs. The reason is that being an exploratory study, it is 
intended to elicit factors that should be included in the theorizing and research on the 
subject of new forms of international investment in general, as economic modes of 
organizing foreign transactions. 
The study is different from previous studies in three respects. The first is the exploratory 
content just mentioned. Being an exploratory study it is not unique, rather the fact that 
it is an attempt at investigating empirically the phenomenon of new forms in one study 
differentiates it from others. As far as published literature is concerned, there has been 
no empirical study prior to this. Extant investigations have been largely descriptive, 
relying purely on archival data or anecdotal evidence (e.g. Oman, 1980, 1984a, b, 1986; 
Dunning and Cantwell, 1982; Franko, 1989). Some represent the subject matter as a 
complementary chapter of textbooks, again based on archival or anecdotal evidence (e.g. 
Buckley and Davis, 1981; Rugman (ed), 1982; Buckley, 1983; Ch. 3 in Buckley and 
Casson, 1985; Casson, 1986; Dunning, 1988 Ch. 6). Other studies which are empirical 
in nature are single component investigations (e.g. Killing, 1983; Beamish, 1984, 1985; 
Contractor, 1984, 1985; Harrigan, 1985; Davidson and McFetridge, 1985; Franko, 1989; 
Welch, 1985, 1990). 
The third area of difference is the fact that this study extends the notion of new forms of 
investment to the banking industry. Both in its present formulation and extant analyses 
of its dimensions, the term "new forms" has been restricted to manufacturing enterprises. 
Yet, banks operate in foreign countries via other organizational modes than foreign 
branch network (which is the FDI counterpart of wholly owned subsidiary of 
manufacturing enterprises). It is hoped that in these three areas, this study may 
contribute to an understanding of the ramifications of new forms of investment. 
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1.4 A TAXONOMY OF NEW FORMS OF INVESTMENT 
The various alternative investment strategies are termed 'New Forms of International 
Investment' (Oman 1984, 1986). The term itself is an OEeD concept applied generically 
to international investments in which foreign held equity is either nonexistent or, where 
it exists, does not constitute majority ownership. More specifically, new forms 
encompass: (1) joint international business ventures in which foreign-held equity does not 
exceed 50 per cent, and (2) international contractual arrangements which may involve no 
foreign equity participation but the nature of which constitutes an investment, as is the 
case with licensing, technical assistance contracts, management contracts, franchising, 
turnkey and product-in-hand contracts, production sharing and risk-service contracts, and 
international subcontracting (Oman, 1984, 1986). 
The new forms are heterogeneous and are better understood by what they are not. 
Precisely, they are not investments in majority or wholly - owned foreign subsidiaries -
which constitute the traditional FDI. They are not portfolio investments either - which are 
purely financial operations. They are rather characterised by some 'unbundling' of the 
package of resources that normally accompany hierarchical arrangement. Exporting may 
be included in the range of methods which may be utilised in penetrating and developing 
markets abroad. 
1.5 OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH 
The main task of this study can be clustered around five interrelated objectives: 
(1) To determine the identity, and assess the transactional economizing properties, of 
alternative (to FDI) modes of internationalization; (2) To integrate the economic theory 
of entrepreneurship with received FDI theory -namely, the eclectic paradigm, since it 
incorporates the features of other extant theories - under a transaction cost approach. In 
essence, to determine the role of corporate management in the internationalization 
process, using the firm's ownership-specific, internalization-incentive, advantages and 
host country-specific characteristics; (3) To extend the arguments of the phenomenon of 
new forms of investment to international banking; (4) To examine the relationship 
between the stage of country development and the use of new forms of investment; and 
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(5) To evaluate the policy implications of the findings for (i) the MNE, (ii) the host 
government, and (iii) multilateral government organizations. The investigation of these 
objectives entails a wider coverage in scope of the variables affecting new forms than the 
previous studies, in one study. 
1.6 RESEARCH APPROACH 
While there may be no universally agreed theory of international investment, economic 
analysis of FDI have generally relied upon the two main contending theories: the 
internalization theorem and the eclectic framework. Because both frameworks are 
tautological in many respects and because the latter (i.e. the eclectic theory) incorporates 
many of the features of other FDI theories, the approach used in this study embodies the 
attributes of the eclectic theory as enunciated by Dunning (1977, 1979, 1981, 1988). 
Beyond the equilibrium analysis of Dunning's static configuration of ownership-specific 
advantages, internalization-incentive factors and host country-specific characteristics, this 
study attempts to integrate the economic theory of entrepreneurship into a more dynamic 
model for explaining the phenomena of interest than had been attempted by previous 
studies whose approach relied purely on the eclectic or internalization theory. The need 
for an integrated and/or interdisciplinary approach to the study of foreign investment has 
been recognized/advocated (Dunning, 1989). In particular, the omission of the role of 
corporate management in international investment analysis is viewed as a weakness of 
orthodox theory (Casson, 1985, Ch. 8 in Buckley and Casson, 1985). Earlier, Teece 
(1984) had observed that an analysis which incorporated the process of entrepreneurship 
would be of considerable importance to strategic management. The attempt to reflect 
these concerns in this study may be construed as a useful corrective. 
Studies of new forms can be undertaken in either of two ways. One avenue is the single 
component study approach by which the constituents of new forms (e.g. licensing, 
franchising, joint ventures, etc) are studied individually or separately. Studies of this kind 
include the works of Bilkey and Tesar (1977), Wiedersheim-Paul, Olson and Welch 
(1978), Reid (1981), Cavusgil (1984), and Schlegelmilch (1986) for Exporting; Telesio 
(1979), Buckley and Davies (1981), Carstairs and Welch (1982), Contractor (1981, 1984, 
1985), Davidson and McFetridge (1985), Horstman and Markusen (1986), OECD (1987) 
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and Monye (1989) for Licensing; Walker and Etzel (1973), Hackett (1976), Caves and 
Murphy (1976), Brickley and Dark (1987), Norton (1988) and Welch (1989, 1990) for 
Franchising; Killing (1982, 1983), Beamish (1984, 1985), Beamish and Banks (1987), 
Harrigan (1984, 1985), Connolly (1984), Artisien and Buckley (1985), and Franko (1974, 
1989) for Joint Ventures; UNCTC (1982) and Brooke (1985a, b) for International 
Management Contracts; Wright and Kobel (1981), UNCTC (1983) and Lecraw and 
Gordon (1984) for Turnkey Contracts; Dicken (1986) and the editorial work of Germidis 
(1980) for International Subcontracting. 
The alternative avenue to the study of new forms of investment is the composite approach 
by which the new forms are studied as a composite dependent variable. In this respect, 
two or more strategy variants are investigated in one study. Examples of this approach 
include the works of Dunning and Cantwell (1982), Oman (1980, 1984a, b, 1986, 1989), 
Buckley (1983, 1985 Ch. 3 in Buckley and Casson, 1985), Contractor and Lorange 
(1987), Dunning (1988, Ch. 6) and Young et al. (1989). The approach adopted in this 
study identifies with this group. 
1.7 STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
This study is divided into three parts, namely: 
(1) Literature Review of FDI theories; (2) Alternative Strategies to Foreign Investment; 
(3) Research Design, Analysis of Results and Conclusions. 
Part One, the Literature Review Section, comprises four chapters. Theories of foreign 
investment are large, some providing richer explanations than others and some 
overlapping others. While the limitations of a study of this kind (e.g. length) do not 
permit an exhaustive review, if at all possible, this part of the study examines the main 
theoretical candidates and the empirical studies that have been undertaken in relation to 
them. Theories of new forms of investment may be seen as essentially extensions of the 
FDI theories: they are derived basically by relaxing some of the restrictive assumptions 
of orthodox theories. 
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After this introduction as Chapter 1, Chapter 2 opens the review in a three-part synthesis 
of foreign investment theories. Chapter two is a review based on (1) the market 
imperfections paradigm, (2) the product life cycle hypothesis, (3) the oligopolistic 
reaction hypothesis incorporating the behavioural motives notion, and (4) the currency 
area phenomenon. 
Chapter 3 constitutes another set of theories as section 2. Literature review in this section 
is based on (1) international diversification, (2) the appropriability theory, (3) the 
internalization theory, and (4) the eclectic theory. 
Chapter 4 concludes the part with an analysis of the Japanese model of foreign 
investment. Because the Japanese modes of foreign investment have been viewed as 
distinct from Western style (Kojima, 1973, 1975, 1982; Ozawa, 1979a, b) and because 
they embody the features of new forms - which are definitely absent in the above theories 
- it is thought appropriate to examine the theoretical argument of this model in a chapter 
of its own. 
Part two of the study examines the concept of new forms through a review of the 
alternative strategies to foreign investment. Made up of three chapters (chapters 5 to 7), 
chapter 5 sets the context of discussion with an overview of corporate strategy and the 
foreign investment decision process. Chapters 6 is concerned with topical issues in the 
strategy of international investment as they relate to exporting, licensing and franchising, 
contractual arrangements, and joint ventures. Chapter 7 concludes this part with a review 
of the strategic forms of international banking. This review is in the form of an extension 
of the notion of the phenomenon of new forms of international investment as applicable 
to non-financial enterprises to the banking industry. This part also summarises the 
theoretical and empirical studies that have been undertaken in relation to these strategies. 
Part three is the empirical part of the study and concludes it as well. It is made up of four 
chapters (Chapters 8 - 11). Chapter 8 discusses the research design and develops the 
study hypotheses. It also specifies the need for, and purpose, of the research. 
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Chapter 9 deals with the research methodology and statistical procedures. It discusses the 
approaches adopted for field research and the first part of the analysis of the research 
findings. This is the descriptive phase and is divided into eleven sections, covering the 
questionnaire administration and data reliability, description of statistical techniques, 
characteristics of firms (companies and banks) in the survey, and preliminary findings 
based on the field work. 
Chapter 10 presents the second phase of the research findings. Essentially, this chapter 
is analytical, and is concerned with an in-depth statistical analyses of the research 
findings. The analyses are based seriatim on the study hypotheses. A comparison of the 
results is made against relevant previous research findings. The chapter concludes with 
an overall assessment of the relevance of a number of explanatory variables to the use of 
new forms of investment. 
Chapter 11 concludes both this part and the study. It summarizes the study, draws its 
conclusions, and presents the implications of the study for the multinational firm (as the 
principal actor), the host government (as the representative of the recipient country) and 
multilateral government bodies (e.g. the OECD, the V.N.O., concerned about the 
behaviour and regulation of MNEs). The study concludes with recommendations for 
further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FDI THEORIES AND THEORIES OF THE MNE: A SURVEY 
SECTION 1 
A theory is ... more 'fruitful' the more precise the resulting prediction, the 
wider the area within which the theory yields predictions, and the more 
additional lines for further research it suggests. 
Milton Friedman (1953, p.1O). 
I.INTRODUCTION 
An appropriate starting point in discussing the applicability of foreign investment theories 
to the phenomenon of "New Forms of International Investment" (NFl) is to cast the 
framework in terms of a synthesis of extant theories. The growth of literature on foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and multinational enterprise (MNE) might have been inspired by 
the work of Stephen Hymer (1960) published in 1976. The work provoked an immense 
literature and theoretical developments in the broad disciplines of international business 
and industrial economics. While many of the studies have expanded and refined Hymer's 
ideas, his original insights into the relationships of foreign direct investment and the 
multinational firm have nevertheless remained a convenient reference starting point for 
analyses. 
The theoretical foundation underlying the phenomenon of FDI is as vast as the activity 
itself. Although reviews of theories of foreign investment and of the MNE abound in the 
international business literature (Balasubramanyam, 1985; Buckley, 1983, 1985; Buckley 
and Casson, 1976; Calvet, 1981; Cantwell, 1988; Casson, 1985, 1988; Caves, 1982; 
Dunning, 1981; Hennart, 1982; and Rugman, 1982), a study of this kind also justifies the 
need for a critical re-examination of the contending theories. At least, such an appraisal 
may provide general background for assessing their applicability to emerging trends in 
international business. Casson (1984) suggests three reasons why a review of the 
literature on general theories of the MNE is necessary. 
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The first reason is to demonstrate that, despite the volume of literature on the subject, 
"serious errors persist undetected in the theory for a long time" (ibid.). This may be due 
to the general standard of formulating theories in the field, in which the central focus has 
been on FDI as the essence of multinationalization. The second reason for a review is 
to cast extant theories within the historical context of trends in the growth of the MNE 
as well as in the patterns of foreign investment. Such a historical perspective may enhance 
the understanding and assessment of past and present developments in the field of foreign 
investment. For instance, several attempts are being made to revise or expand 
microtheories of foreign investment so as to accommodate emerging trends in corporate 
practice (see for example, Dunning, 1988; Buckley and Casson, 1985). 
The third reason for justifying the need for a review stems from what Casson reckons as 
"a fundamental incompatibility between economic theories of the MNE and the 
managerial literature on the subject". The diversity of FDI theories implies the 
simultaneous existence of competing frameworks for explaining one phenomenon, 
suggesting therefore that one theory cannot claim to explain it all. 
Cantwell (1988) identifies three reasons why there is diversity in the field of international 
investment theory. Firstly, he contends that each of the various kinds of international 
investment raises distinctive considerations and each has differential effects on both home 
and host countries. Accordingly, different theories are expected to be developed to 
explain these phenomena and are therefore bound to reflect some degree of divergence 
from each other. The second reason concerns identifying particular theories with the 
issues addressed and questions asked. Thus, if the empirical concern is with the 
microeconomic issue of the MNE per se, theoretical emphasis tends to be on Coase's 
(1937) institutional theory of the firm and its internationalization capacity. If, on the 
other hand, the interest is on the MNE as an alternative to free trade, theoretical focus 
tends to rely on markets and hierarchies (Williamson, 1975, 1981; Buckley and Casson, 
1976, 1985; Calvet, 1981) or market imperfections (Kindleberger, 1968; Hymer, 1976; 
Calvet, 1981). The third reason why there is diversity in the theory of international 
investment relates to the levels of analysis. Cantwell identifies three principal levels: 
macroeconomic (which examines national and international trends); mesoeconomic (which 
considers inter-firm interactions at industry level), and microeconomic (which looks at 
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the international growth of individual firms). Each of these requires a different set of 
theories to explain the phenomena of interest. Because of this growing diversity, Buckley 
(1985) advocates for theoretical development of the MNE in several directions before it 
can be seen to be adequate. 
2. NATURE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
FDI, as a mode of servicing a foreign market, is distinguishable from MNE, as an 
economic entity vehicle. For one thing, FDI is just one organizational mode of servicing 
foreign markets, albeit the one that offers the firm control over its foreign operations. For 
another, an MNE does not necessarily imply a foreign direct investor (see for example, 
Casson 1982; Buckley 1989, p.6). This distinction is important to permit a treatment of 
FDI as a mode by which firms (large or small) extend their operational strategies abroad. 
FDI AS A FORM OF FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
FDI can be described as a form of foreign private investment (FPI) which confers control 
and ownership over a package of resources in a foreign country. Usually, the package 
consists of embodied or disembodied technology, financial capital, expertise 
(management, financial and marketing skills), etc. This package is then transferred to a 
foreign country via the organization of wholly- or majority- owned subsidiary (WOS). 
Through this mechanism, the firm is able to exercise de jure control over the assets. 
However, control over assets can be obtained without owning them (see, for example, 
Casson 1985). An investor may hire and exercise control of an asset or may secure a 
long leasehold on it. Effectively he has acquired de facto control over its day-to-day 
usage, even though he does not own it. On the other hand, the owner of the asset may 
exercise no control over its daily usage. For example, portfolio investment brings 
ownership interest but not control. Both scenarios do not constitute FDI by definition 
because the crucial conditionalities - ownership and control - do not rest in the firm. 
Therefore, the precise significance of the 'directness' of foreign investment lies in the 
simultaneous presence of both ownership and control over the package of resources in a 
foreign country (Balasubramanyam, 1985; Casson 1985). 
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This definition has implications for the nature of FDI. First, ownership is a passive 
element in FDI. Outright control is an active/crucial element, in the transfer process. It 
is the bargaining power of the investor in a foreign country. In consequence, the 
establishment of WOS ensures that the investor can have the necessary control over the 
resources. It is an internal organizational machinery which potentially mitigates external 
interference in the firm's desire to maximize the advantages of asset ownership and 
control. 
3. A TAXONOMY OF FIRMS 
Another perspective of FDI focuses on firms. It is conventional to associate international 
investment (or production) with MNEs. Sometimes, it is regarded as the essence of 
multinationality (Rugman et aI., 1986, p.7); hence it has been defined as that financed by 
FDI (Dunning 1977, 1980, 1982). In order to delineate the boundaries between domestic 
and international corporations, and hence the novel issues in international management, 
a simple framework for classifying firms is presented (Table 2.1). It categorizes firms 
according to their degree of involvement in both domestic and international markets. 
Table 2.1 Classification of Firms According to their 
Degree of Involvement in International Markets. 
Nature of Firm Degree of involvement in domestic and international markets. 
Product 
Markets 
Domestic I D 
Domestic II D 
Domestic III I 
Multinational I I 
Multinational II I 
Multinational III I 
Factor 
Markets 
D 
D 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Foreign 
Subsidiaries 
I 
I 
I 
Debt 
Capital 
D 
D 
D 
D 
I 
I 
D = High degree of domestic involvement; I = High degree of International Involvement. 
Source: Derived from Holland (1986, p.7). 
Equity 
Capital 
D 
D 
D 
D 
I 
Domestic I type firms refer to sole proprietorships and small family-controlled businesses. 
The value additivity of these firms to the national economy cannot be ignored; they form 
a supporting retail market for large firms. A steady growth in the volume of transactions 
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forces a transition to limited liability status. This brings it into the ambit of Domestic II 
type firms. Business expansion means that the family or private sources of capital may 
now be inadequate to support growth and competition. This group of firms may be 
obliged by their limited liability status to approach both money and capital markets for 
their funding requirements. At this stage there may be no international involvement at 
all. They correspond to the conventional scope of domestic business and financial 
management. However, these firms, especially type II, are in direct competition with 
large firms not only in domestic product and factor markets but also in the market for 
loanable funds. Medium-size firms (domestic II type) are active distributors of 
international products in their domestic markets via manufacturers' representation and 
products intermediation (wholesale activities). 
Domestic III type firms correspond to large private and public liability companies. They 
are active participants in international product and factor markets through importation and 
exportation. These firms are nevertheless restricted in their capacity to borrow from the 
international capital markets. The creeping internationalization of this group brings it 
within the ambit of international financial management problems that ordinarily confront 
MNEs. Active competition with MNEs in the product and factor markets implies that 
domestic III type firms may face cash flow problems on existing investments and on new 
proposals. Second, active participation in the import and export markets brings these 
firms into contact with the foreign exchange market. This in effect makes them 
vulnerable to foreign exchange risk exposure. By affecting future cash flows, the value 
of the firm is thereby affected. The increasing involvement in international product and 
factor markets results in increasing international experience, acquisition of location-
specific knowledge, contacts, etc., and ability to internalize many of the transactions that 
had ordinarily been consummated via external markets. In particular, if the transaction 
costs of arm's length markets are becoming high vis-a-vis growing opportunities in the 
host market, the firm may decide to register its international presence on a more 
permanent and self-controlling basis by establishing a foreign subsidiary. This is the 
threshold level of operation of multinational firm type 1. 
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The decision to establish foreign subsidiaries is a major one and marks a dramatic change 
in the corporate investment strategy. At this stage, the firm appears inexperienced in 
international capital market operations. The complexity of multinationality dictates 
caution in the spread of corporate resources as well as in modus operandi. The 
implication is that the firm will require time and corporate adjustment to cope with the 
incremental problems of foreign production. For instance, in addition to the exposure 
problems, the firm is now exposed to other vagaries of foreign environment, including 
different political, legal and socio-cultural systems. In fact, the complexity of the issues 
involved in managing foreign subsidiaries adds novelty to the task of corporate 
management such that MNC I firms may be predisposed to continue to rely on domestic 
financial markets for their capital requirements. 
Experience comes with time and involvement. MNC II and MNC III represent varying 
transitions in corporate organizational growth and maturity, with the latter type firm 
demonstrating (or completing) the full internationalization process. The foreign exchange 
implications of financing foreign subsidiaries and the volatility of exchange rates, inter 
alia, introduce the need to source from international debt markets as well as from 
unregulated offshore debt markets. At MNC III level, the firm can be regarded as truly 
universal with its group shares quoted and trading in several international stock 
exchanges. At this stage, the firm is even able to develop its own in-house treasury and 
banking operations. Multinationals in this category include Royal Dutch-Shell, Ford 
Motors, UniLever, British Petroleum, etc. The extent of multinationalization of this 
group of companies implies that their foreign investment decisions may not just be 
sophisticated but are intimately related to their global financing, capital structure and 
capital budgeting decisions. 
Incremental international involvement in these markets suggests an organizational 
metamorphosis from domestic to international hierarchy, and clearly demonstrates the 
differential strengths and capacities of firms in the strategic choice of form of entering 
foreign markets. 
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THEORIES OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: A SURVEY 
SECTION 2 
PART 1 
BACKGROUND 
Two distinct sets of assumptions underlie the theoretical explanations of foreign 
investment. One set, the neo-classical theory, centres on the orthodox theory of 
international trade and capital movements with its assumptions of perfect markets. The 
second set concerns assumptions about imperfections in international economic 
environment. 
1. TRADE THEORY AND ASSUMPTIONS OF PERFECT MARKETS 
International trade has historically been a vital component of the growth of nations. It 
serves as a major source of impetus for firms' international investment operations. 
International trade, at the firm level, could potentially lead to other modes of sustaining 
international operations, e.g. licensing, joint ventures and FDI. Up until 1981, both the 
value and volume of world trade far outpaced those of other modes of international 
operations (Rugman, et al., 1986, p.24). In 1981 the total value of world trade was 
about 100,000 times the size of FDI (Le. US$4 trillion versus $40 billion)(ibid). 
Until the late 1950, the received doctrine on international economic development 
consisted of a well-developed formal theory of international trade and a complementary 
theory of international capital movements (Dunning, 1988, p.13). Economic concern of 
international trade theorists was focused more on normative theory of international 
economic involvement -that is, theorizing on what would occur if certain perfect 
conditions were present in the world rather than with explanations of the composition of 
international trade and spatial distribution of economic activities. Essentially, the 
conditions assume a world of full and costless information, perfect competition, identical 
technology between trading partners, and no trade barriers. 
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Trade theory has been criticized in the literature on various grounds, including the 
unrealistic nature and impracticality of its assumptions. Its inadequacy as an explanatory 
power of foreign investment thus stems from three disparate factors. First, trade theory -
rooted in the Ricardian orthodoxy of comparative cost advantage and Walras-Cassel 
factor proposition theorem - places emphasis on the differences in the relative costs of 
production in trading countries as the basis for sustaining trade. The theory sought to 
prove that differential comparative cost advantage of participating countries was based on 
international differences in labour productivity, which, in turn, was due to differential 
national advantages in technology and production functions. This macro-economic 
comparative cost concept offered little help in explaining the fundamental question of 
what determines international differences in comparative costs, or "technological 
inequality between countries" Hood and Young (1986, p.136). 
The second limitation is that it did not explain, as it might not have anticipated it, the 
internationalization of business in other forms than the international movement of goods 
and capital (Robock, et aI., 1977, p.36). Thus, contemporary forms of international 
business (e.g. licensing, joint ventures, FDI, inter alia) were neither anticipated nor 
explained by classical and neo-classical trade theorists. The third shortcoming of the trade 
theory is that it ignores the influence of monopolistic or oligopolistic firms on 
international trade. Similarly, it explicitly fails to recognize the significant influence of 
technology, managerial know-how or marketing skills as production functions which can 
form the basis for comparative advantage (See, for example, Vernon 1974). These 
limitations stem from the main question which the theory posed (Robock, et aI., 1977, 
p.36): 
Trade theory asks the question, 'Why do countries trade?' This is the wrong 
question. Businessmen (and women) trade and, increasingly, they transfer goods 
across national boundaries for their own business activities without selling them 
outside their organization. The question should be, Why are goods and services 
transferred between countries? 
In summary, trade theory provided the first set of neo-classical assumptions about 
international trade and capital movements. These assumptions have enabled international 
economists to develop equilibrium theories about international capital, product and factor 
markets. 
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2. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT IMPERFECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
MARKETS 
The second set of assumptions that form the basis for theoretical explanations of foreign 
investment involves deviations from the idealism of the neo-classical model, and are about 
imperfections in international environment. To develop a framework for interpreting 
patterns of foreign investment (essentially FDI) , international economists sought to 
integrate microtheory of the firm with the macrotheory of international trade and capital 
movements, the basic premise being that the simple model of the international economy -
based on perfect market conditions in which free trade would prevail - was practically 
non-existent. 
The theoretical developments of the market imperfections paradigm are explanatory 
attempts to answer the following questions: 
(1) Why and under what circumstances do firms go international? (2) What operational 
means do they adopt in expanding abroad and why? (3) What advantages do foreign 
investors have over indigenous (and other foreign-competitor firms) that enable them to 
overcome the inherent diseconomies of foreign operations? (4) What locational advantages 
do countries have that make some the main source, and many others the recipients, of 
foreign investment? (5) Why do firms choose to internalize transactions rather than 
operate through markets? 
These questions translate into corporate goals of the following general kind: 
1. To optimize economic rents from a firm's comparative advantage in rent-yielding 
assets; 
2. To avoid or exploit perceived externalities caused by imperfections in domestic 
and foreign markets, e.g. absence or failure of arm's length market for 
knowledge, government-imposed distortions or structural market imperfections; 
and 
3. To meet/service international needs of clients. 
Several competing theories have been developed in an attempt to rationalize these goals. 
For this study, only the major explanatory frameworks will be under scrutiny. The choice 
is based on literature references and empirical applicability. 
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The first of these relates to the theoretical development of Hymer (1960) and 
Kindleberger (1969). The premise of their work was the search for compensating 
advantage which foreign firms possess that enable them to compete with indigenous firms. 
Their approach - rooted in the theory of industrial organization in which the firm is 
viewed as a market agent - can be broadly grouped under the Market-Imperfections 
Paradigm and includes the works of Kindleberger (1969), Calvet (1981) and product 
differentiation hypothesis of Caves (1971). 
The second group of theoretical developments takes a macroeconomic view and consists 
mainly of Vernon's (1966, 1971, 1974) early and later versions of the Product-Cycle 
Model. For continuity, these are discussed under group 1. The third framework consists 
of Knickerbocker's (1973) Oligopolistic-Induced Hypothesis. The thrust of this model is 
that the timing of foreign investment is determined largely by firm reaction to 
competitors' investment strategy. Included in this category is the foreign investment 
behavioral thesis of Aharoni (1966). The fourth strand relates to Aliber's (1970, 1971) 
theory of the MNE as a currency-area phenomenon. His is one of the specific 
frameworks that have not received much empirical support in wider international business 
studies. The fifth is the macro-economic development approach of Japanese firms 
enunciated by Kojima (1978, 1982) and Ozawa (1974, 1979, 1982). Their approach bears 
some semblance of the Ricardian model except that it is couched in absolute advantage 
terms and does not contain the unrealistic assumptions of Ricardo. Because of the 
distinctive nature of Japanese MNEs and of their foreign investment behaviour, the 
discussion will be contained under a separate chapter, chapter 4 as the concluding chapter 
of this part of the study. 
The sixth theoretical development is based on the Risk-Diversification Hypothesis. It is 
postulated that the MNE is able to provide greater benefits to shareholders (Le. reduced 
risk and increased return) through product diversification, size and economies of scale 
and scope. Included here are the works of Argmon and Lessard (1977), Caves (1971), 
Lessard (1979) and Rugman (1979). The seventh, termed the Appropriability theory of 
the MNE, is best represented by the works of Magee (1976, 1977). The central theme 
of the theory is that MNEs represent the best mechanism to appropriate monopoly rents 
arising from sophisticated and less imitable technologies. 
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The eighth - and a well-received one - is the Internalization Theorem. Rooted in industrial 
organization theory and welfare economics, the internalization concept converges upon 
the works of Buckley and Casson (1976), Casson (1974, 1987), Caves (1982), Rugman 
(1980, 1981, 1982), Teece (1977) and Williamson (1975). 
The final framework, and one which has also received wide popularity and adoption in 
a number of research settings, is the Eclectic Paradigm. With Dunning (1977, 1981, 
1988a,b,c) as the protagonist, it is a holistic framework which integrates elements of the 
other theories. These frameworks are discussed below, not necessarily in the order 
outlined. 
2.1 A SYNTHESIS OF MARKET-IMPERFECTIONS PARADIGM 
The market-imperfection hypothesis attempts to justify FDI from the perspective of the 
theory of the market. Earlier explanations of the motive for foreign investment had 
assumed the existence of perfect markets and perfect competition. According to this 
theory, FDI is only feasible in the presence of market imperfections. Imperfect market 
conditions open opportunities for a firm to exploit its competitive advantage in a foreign 
market. 
The conceptual insight of Hymer's work provides the antecedent literature for the market-
imperfections framework. In its original formulation, Hymer was interested in identifying 
the range of structural market imperfections and the role of the firm as an active 
superseding agent. He emphasizes that the MNE is an active creation of market 
imperfections and has the ability to use its international operations to separate markets and 
remove competition, or to exploit an advantage. He makes the following assertions about 
the MNE: 
. .. control of a foreign subsidiary is desired in order to remove competition 
between that foreign enterprise and enterprises in other countries . . . to 
appropriate fully the returns on certain skills and abilities ... The MNE is a 
practical institutional device which substitutes for the market. The firm 
internalises or supersedes the market (1976, p.48). 
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The market-imperfections paradigm presumes that: (1) foreign firms must possess 
compensating advantage over indigenous ones to make investments profitable, and (2) the 
market must be imperfect to enable the foreign firm exploit those advantages. Hymer's 
conclusions about the structural market imperfections have been flawed on several counts 
(see for example, Dunning and Rugman, 1985). First, his exclusive concentration on the 
structural market imperfections viewpoint ignored other forms of market imperfections, 
such as Kindleberger's (1969) elaboration, Williamson's (1975) markets and hierarchies 
or Dunning's (1981) micro-economic imperfections. Second, Hymer's objective appeared 
to be an investigation into why national firms invested abroad, rather than an evaluation 
of the operations of firms. The concern of modern theory of the firm is not necessarily 
with the why, but with the how and where of international business - Le. the way in 
which foreign investments are organized as well as their locational choice (Cantwell, 
1988). 
Further, his thesis totally avoids the issues of market hierarchies as efficient replacement 
structures for imperfect markets. Hymer also neglects the importance of internalization 
and locational dimensions of the MNE (see Dunning and Rugman, 1975). Kindleberger 
(1969) refined and expanded Hymer's work. Specifically, he articulated the following 
taxonomy of market imperfections: (1) Imperfections in goods markets; (2) Imperfections 
in factor markets; (3) Economies of Scale - creating significant competitive advantage 
through size; and (4) Government Intervention in free market forces - through imposition 
of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, taxation, capital market controls, etc. 
However, to encompass new developments in the field of determinants of foreign 
investment, Calvet (1981) proposed a somewhat different taxonomy from that of 
Kindleberger to distinguish among four classes of imperfections: (1) Market 
disequilibrium hypotheses; (2) Government-imposed distortions; (3) Market structure 
imperfections; and (4) Market failure imperfections. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the nature of these imperfections, associated remedial actions and 
organizational responses. 
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Figure 2.1 Classification of Market Imperfections, Market-Making 
Activities and Administrative Response. 
Market Imperfections 
Buyer uncertainty due to 
distance or lack of contact 
between buyer and seller 
Inadequate knowledge of 
reciprocal wants 
Lack of Agreement over 
transactions and prices 
Buyer Uncertainty as to 
correspondence of goods to 
specification 
Mutual Uncertainty that 
restitution will be made 
for default 
Government - imposed 
distortions, ego taxes, 
tariffs etc. 
Market-Making Activity 
Information search through 
establishment of long-term 
links, or development of 
brand name products, or 
advertisements. 
Information-specificity 
and informational symmetry 
Negotiation 
Monitoring through quality 
control measures, warranties 
and guarantees 
Assertive Antitrust Policy 
Compliance with government 
regulations and requirements 
Source: Adapted from Casson (1982, 1985). 
MARKET DISEQUILIBRIUM HYPOTHESES. 
Administrative Response 
Managerial Control ego to 
secure buyer-seller contacts, 
or to establish brand names 
through product differentiation. 
Managerial Control ego to 
secure bilateral knowledge of 
transaction details 
Managerial Control ego in the 
employment of bargaining tools 
Managerial Control ego in the 
provision of quality control 
and other ex post monitoring/ 
assurance devices 
Managerial Control ego in the 
provision of contract reparation 
devices, as in enforcement 
contracts 
Managerial Response to fiscal 
and other regulatory demands. 
According to the first group of hypotheses, FDI is deemed to be a transitory 
phenomenon. It is a reactive arbitrage response by firms to short-term disequilibrium 
conditions in international factor and foreign exchange markets. The notion of market 
disequilibrium makes the firm the centre piece of analysis. International trade is not only 
costly in the presence of market imperfections but is also supplanted by internal 
organization. Short-run disequilibrium conditions in factor and foreign exchange markets 
both question the validity of trade theory and provide incentives to invest abroad. 
Currency overvaluation, national differences in rates of return on real assets, national 
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differences in labour costs, and national variations in technology markets, are aspects of 
this trend. However, this kind of short-term market imperfection does not seem to fit into 
the strategic nature of corporate FDI decisions. FDI is a long-term phenomenon, and 
would, for that matter, not be transitory as this group of determinants tends to suggest, 
a point acknowledged by Calvet himself. 
GOVERNMENT-IMPOSED DISTORTIONS HYPOTHESES 
This group of imperfections encompasses cases where government intervention policies 
distort, destabilize or cause disequilibrium in the markets and therefore create profit 
opportunities. Government disruptive policies/practices are many and varied, and can take 
place in product, factor, foreign exchange or, in domestic markets. Tariffs, import 
quotas, foreign exchange controls, wage policies, immigration regulations, national 
differences in tax regimes, differences in national foreign investment policies, and inter-
firm trade unions, cartels, and inter-national unions (e.g. EEC, OPEC, etc.) are some 
of the many forms of governments' erosion of the free market forces. 
Induced unnatural market imperfections (Rugman, et al., 1986, p.104) engender unstable 
conditions apt to foster foreign investment. This group of imperfections provides two 
reasons for inward foreign investment. Firstly, the raising of tariffs, other trade barriers 
(eg. quotas) and non-trade barriers would make external firms' exports more expensive. 
Secondly, production within the economy would provide access to a large protected 
market. The common feature of this group of hypotheses is that they are not transitory 
in nature. There is no market machinery which would correct the disequilibrium caused 
by government distortions, so as to vitiate the incentive for foreign direct investment. The 
scenario would conceivably arise were all governments to harmonize their policies or 
have none at all (Calvet, 1981). 
Government-induced disruptions also encompass market imperfections of country or 
political risk or uncertainty of the firm's environment. In these instances, the ability of 
the firm to identify the constraints for corporate strategic choices and the ability to 
circumvent (or exploit) them through the mechanism of its internal markets largely 
depend on other conditions. For example, corporate perception of the degree of host 
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government interference and its impact on the profit potentials of the market or on its 
overall global strategy may be important considerations in the foreign investment decision 
making. This in turn may depend on such other factors as size of the market, operational 
presence of competitor firms or their perceived strategy as well as firm-specific 
countervailing advantages (e.g. formal/informal linkages with the political machinery, as 
may often occur in third world countries, or complexity of the firm's operation and its 
importance to the macro-economy, especially where the host country lacks the necessary 
technology and technical manpower). Such monopolistic or oligopolistic advantages 
provide incentives for FDI. 
MARKET -STRUCTURE IMPERFECTIONS HYPOTHESES 
This group of imperfections refers to instances where micro-economic entities deviate 
from perfectly competitive market behaviour because of their power or potentials to 
intervene in (or interfere with) market pricing mechanisms. This explanatory approach 
to FDI, is rooted in the industrial organization theory. 
Oligopolistic/monopolistic behaviour leads to two inter-related situations: first, it 
constitutes entry barriers and thus prevents market competition, and second, it offers the 
few firms opportunities to maximize growth and profitability through speculative 
interdependencies (Calvet 1981; Holland 1986, p.102). The first situation - entry barriers 
- can arise through product differentiation in the home market which offers an incentive 
to go abroad. Caves (1971) discusses the case where product differentiation in the 
domestic market can lead to control of knowledge in servicing the market. Such product 
control, he argues, can be transferred to foreign markets at little or no cost provided such 
protective means as patents and copyrights exist. 
2.2 PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE HYPOTHESIS 
Another important contribution to the oligopolistic feature of FDI is the product life cycle 
hypothesis enunciated by Vernon (1966, 1979). While Caves' product differentiation 
hypothesis helps to explain why barriers to entry/competition are essential in oligopolistic 
market structures (industries), Vernon's model incorporates features of the second 
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situation, namely, the interdependence of firms in the industry. In this case, foreign 
investment is seen as a natural reaction to the threat of losing markets - an interdependent 
market response - as the firm's product matures. 
Vernon characterizes FDI as a by-product of a sequence of events regarding a firm's 
product: a life cycle of a product from its initial launch in the home market, through 
stages of maturity and standardization - at which point it may be profitable to launch it 
in a foreign market - to its eventual decline. In its original formulation, the life cycle of 
a product is conceived into three stages. The first stage marks the product's novelty: it 
is produced by the innovating firm in its domestic market where its market profile is also 
established. This stage is marked by high export demand of the product, especially in 
high level income countries of Europe. In the second stage, maturity in production 
technology coupled with growth in demand, necessitates long production runs. This 
phase witnesses increasing competition from similar products in the domestic market and 
rising costs of production. Both of these factors raise the prospects of FDJ. The third 
stage is characterized by standardization of the product as well as its production 
technology, loss of exclusivity of rights, diminishing domestic profit margins and 
increasing domestic costs of production and marketing. All of these combine to induce 
the innovator-firm to seek overseas production so as to exploit lower costs of production 
abroad and to capture the remaining rent from the product's development. 
In its original form, the model has the virtues of simplicity and directness: it offers partial 
explanation to US investment in other advanced countries (essentially UK and other 
Western European countries) and the phenomenon of offshore production in low-labour 
cost countries (Buckley 1985). However, the predictive utility of Vernon's initial model 
could not justify recent developments in global foreign investment activities. Firstly, it 
was a framework designed to provide explanation for the early post-war expansion of US 
investment into Europe (Hood and Young, 1986 p.61). Secondly, the initial model 
appears to be essentially a defensive strategy in which the US innovator-firm is induced 
by (Le. reacting to) the threat of losing its domestic market by moving abroad to reduce 
production costs and thereby prolong the profitable life of the product (Holland, 1986, 
p.1 02). Thirdly, the intense competition of European and Japanese MNEs in international 
markets can no longer be satisfactorily interpreted within the framework of the original 
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version of the hypothesis. Above all, the programmatic decision process of the theory is 
an oversimplification of the complex structure of the problems facing the MNE and of 
its decision-making process (Buckley and Casson, 1976, p.77). Besides, its applicability 
is restricted to highly innovative industries. 
Vernon (1971, p.65) admits the redundancy of the 1966 product cycle model when he 
calls it "a deliberate simplification of reality" with no pretence of capturing "the complex 
sociological, political and idiosyncratic factors" influencing the foreign investment 
behaviour. Thus, its power to explain FDI phenomenon has weakened (Vernon, 1979). 
To correct these shortcomings, the scope of the product cycle hypothesis has been 
modified and amplified several times (Vernon 1971; 1974; 1977; 1979). The new version 
is largely based on the analysis of competitive interaction in international markets, with 
emphasis now on the oligopolistic structure in which most MNEs operate and create 
barriers to entry by prospective entrants (Buckley and Casson 1976, p.77; Buckley 1985). 
2.3 OLIGOPOLISTIC REACTION HYPOTHESIS AND FDI 
The third scenario within the market-structure imperfections paradigm is an extension of 
the defensive investment strategy initiated by the product cycle theory. Developed by 
Knickerbocker (1973), this hypothesis states that FDI is a function of oligopolistic 
reaction. It implies that in oligopolistic industries, once one firm undertakes FDI, other 
competitors follow with defensive direct investments into that market. Knickerbocker 
argues that the follower-firms are motivated by a desire to counter any competitive 
advantages that the initiating firm may score from its FDI. 
Knickerbocker tested this 'follow the leader hypothesis' by constructing an entry 
concentration index (ECI) for 187 large US MNEs. He found that the initial investments 
of US MNEs in a given market are 'bunched' in time and that this bunching showed a 
greater tendency towards more oligopolistic industries. He compared his ECI across 
industries (using the US industrial concentration index) and found a significant positive 
correlation between the two indices. He also found that profitability of FDI was positively 
correlated with bunching (Le. entry concentration). He thus concluded that increased 
industrial concentration causes increased oligopolistic reaction in FDI, except at very high 
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levels, where the oligopolistic structure is stable and firms are able to avoid the 
overcrowding of a host market. 
The problem with Knickerbocker's hypothesis is that his analysis of FDI as a function of 
oligopolistic reaction is self-destructive, in that the advantages scored by the initial (US) 
FDI are neutralized by the responding foreign investment activities of other countries' 
(e.g. Canadian, European and Japanese) MNEs in the respective host markets (Agarwal, 
1980). There is thus a vicious circle trend in the oligopolistic reaction theory: increasing 
FDI leads to increasing international competition via the process of oligopolistic reaction, 
vice versa. A corollary of Knickerbocker's hypothesis is that this self-limiting 
oligopolistic reaction should lead to a decline in the flow of FDI. 
MARKET FAILURE IMPERFECTIONS 
The first three groups of market-imperfections paradigm concern market disequilibrium 
hypotheses, government-imposed distortions, and market structure imperfections. The last 
strand of market imperfections is characterized by deviations from the technical 
assumptions that underlie perfect markets; that is, perfect market assumptions about 
production techniques and commodity properties (Calvet, 1981). Essentially, market 
failure imperfections refer to situations where it is not possible to create a market in 
knowledge. Knowledge in the context of exchangeable commodity takes the form of 
technical and managerial know-how. 
Calvet identifies three types of imperfections which lead to market failures. The first type 
encompasses those phenomena which forestall efficient allocation of resources via external 
markets, known as EXTERNAL EFFECTS. The second type, termed PUBLIC GOOD 
EFFECTS, refers to the failure of an external market to price knowledge efficiently. The 
last type, called ECONOMIES OF SCALE EFFECTS, refers to those characteristics 
which create disequilibrium in the relationship between social efficiency and market 
performance. 
External effects, include a range of environmental factors which are exogenous to the 
firm. These are generally classified into economic, noneconomic, and governmental 
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variables. The MNE can practically do little to make fundamental changes in the 
economic, political, social, and cultural environment within which it operates (Rugman, 
et aI., 1986, p.100). Apart from host country external effects, MNEs are also confronted 
by those externalities that originate from their home countries. 
The next category of market failures concerns the nature of knowledge as a public good. 
A commodity is deemed a public good if the consumption of it by one party does not 
debar other parties from consuming it. Examples include public roads, parks, bridges and 
schools. An externality exists in them when the consumption actions of one party have 
effects on other parties who are not charged (or compensated) via the price mechanism. 
Any time property rights are invested in them or established to overcome externality 
(ibid. p.106), they lose their public goods image characteristics and thus become private 
goods. The common feature of private goods is the presence of a regular market to price 
them. For example, private goods such as cars, radios, watches, apples, bread, etc., can 
be priced in a regular market. A public good, such as knowledge, public road, bridge or 
school cannot be priced in a regular market, although privatization can create an arbitrary 
assignment of property rights over them. Because of absence of efficient market 
mechanisms to price knowledge, profit-seeking firms attempt to reap rewards for their 
private investment by acquiring property rights over it. Additionally, the idiosyncratic 
nature of firm-specific knowledge in conjunction with competitive disadvantage likely to 
result from dissipation or leakage actively induces firms to internalize rather than 
contracting out. 
Thus, the absence of arm's length external markets for knowledge leads to internalization 
(of the markets) within the firm, the firm's objectives being: (1) to provide channels for 
the transfer of this knowledge at lower costs than via external modes; and (2) to reduce 
the possible leakage or dissipation of this knowledge to competitors. 
2.3.1 BEHA VIORAL MOTIVES FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
Conceptually, the decision to extend corporate investment beyond national borders is not 
a simple one: it results from a complex process that has incremental dimension to that 
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conventionally met in a domestic setting. The decision is governed by a wider and more 
complicated set of considerations: some economic, some behavioral, and some strategic. 
It is difficult to isolate one from the other in an international context. The behavioral 
approach is principally associated with the work of Aharoni (1966). According to 
Aharoni, foreign investment is affected by two sets of motives: external stimuli and 
managerial stimuli. External stimuli motivate serious search for overseas opportunities. 
Individual managerial goals potentially lead to a pursuit of 'undesirable projects'. In 
effect, the proposensity to invest abroad depends on the strength and frequency of these 
stimuli in conjunction with the way management reacts to them (Le. converts them into 
investment decisions). 
Ex hypothesi, Aharoni argues that the behavioral approach is not a search for profit 
opportunities, as suggested by the profit maximization model of the firm (see, for 
example, Cyert and March, 1963; Stevens, 1974). But the 'serious search for overseas 
opportunities' have profit maximising potentials. Clearly, if project opportunities offering 
returns significantly above the cost of capital were not identified, then managerial 
behaviour could not be reconciled into profit maximization. In effect, Aharoni's analysis 
of foreign investment as a behavioral process is broadly consistent with the profit 
maximization hypothesis (Buckley and Casson, 1976, p.81; Hood and Young, 1986, 
p.96). Dunning (1973) characterizes his refutation of profit maximization as "a confusion 
of ends and means"; the behavioral process he describes is not, in general, incompatible 
with the rational choice in profit maximization. 
2.4 FOREIGN INVESTMENT AS A FUNCTION OF DIS-
EQUILIBRIUM IN THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET. 
An important facet of the market imperfections paradigm is disequilibrium in the foreign 
exchange markets. This theory is particularly associated with Aliber (1970, 1971) and 
deals with the influence of currency areas on foreign investment decision. Essentially, the 
MNE is viewed as a 'currency area phenomenon'. The advantage of operating in a 
particular currency area is one which is not specific to particular firms but to all firms 
based in that area. According to Aliber, MNEs with access to international financial 
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markets have an advantage over local firms. He argues then that FDI can take place even 
if the market for alternative modes (e.g. licensing) is perfect. 
Aliber's hypothesis depicts the role of foreign exchange rate in foreign investment 
decisions. While currency fluctuations may influence the timing of FDI and might well 
have predicted the direction of the post-war expansion of US MNEs (to Europe from the 
1950s through to the early 1970s), a number of criticisms have been levelled on the 
currency area hypothesis (see, for example, Buckley and Casson, 1976). 
First, his analysis of FDI is based on the transitory nature of disequilibrium conditions 
in the foreign exchange markets. Yet, such a short-run feature is not consistent with the 
strategic context within which the integrity of FDI is decided. Second, his assumption 
that investors are unable to adjust the risk of a firm's foreign earnings is inconsistent with 
the notion of efficient market hypothesis. Third, while Aliber's theory offers explanation 
to the existence and direction of FDI between currency areas, it does not explain FDI 
flows within the same currency area, as for example, the investment of UK firms within 
sterling area (Buckley and Casson, 1976, p.71; 1985, p.6; Agarwal, 1980). Further, 
it offers little or no explanation to cross-investment between currency areas (ibid), nor 
does it explain the reluctance of large MNEs in maximizing profitability in foreign 
investment by capitalizing on such investors' ignorance. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a brief survey of the literature on the conceptual 
issues of foreign investment and multinationality as a prelude to a brief review of the 
theories of foreign investment. The chapter is divided into two sections. Section 1 deals 
with some conceptual and background issues which form the basis of the issues with 
which Section 2 is concerned. 
The theoretical foundation underlying the phenomenon of foreign direct investment is as 
vast as the activity itself. Several reasons account for this, including changing structure 
of modes of foreign investment, divergence in backgrounds of antecedent literatures from 
which the theories are derived, and divergence of the issues addressed. Most of the 
available literature on international investment has focused on FDI. The precise 
significance of the directness of foreign investment lies in the simultaneous presence of 
both ownership and control of the package over resources in a foreign country. In order 
to establish the boundaries between domestic and international firms, a framework for 
classifying firms is developed. It categorizes companies according to their degree of 
involvement in both domestic and international markets, and allows an identification of 
the novel issues posed for corporate management. 
Section 2 brings the objective of this survey in perspective. It is the first part of the 
survey of foreign investment theories. Two distinct sets of assumptions underlie the 
theories of investment: assumptions of perfect markets under the trade theory and 
assumptions about imperfections in international markets. Because the trade theory is 
impractical by reason of its assumptions, its utility in explaining FDI is grossly impaired. 
Accordingly, theoretical focus has shifted to the market imperfections paradigm. 
Several competing theories have been developed in an attempt to explain fdi phenomenon. 
At least nine major theories can be distinguished: (1) Market Imperfections Paradigm; (2) 
Product Life Cycle Hypothesis; (3) Oligopolistic-Induced hypothesis; (4) Currency-area 
phenomenon, (5) The Japanese model, incorporating features of 'new' forms; (6) Risk-
Diversification Hypothesis; (7) Appropriability theory; (8) Internationalization theory, and 
(9) Eclectic theory. 
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This chapter centred on the first four theoretical frameworks. According to the first group 
of theories, FDI is only feasible in the presence of market imperfections. Under the 
product life cycle model, foreign investment is seen as a natural reaction to the threat of 
losing markets as the firm's product matures. The third set of hypotheses states that FDI 
is a function of oligopolistic reaction - a kind of 'follow the leader' defensive strategy. 
Included here is the behavioral hypothesis which postulates that FDI is motivated by 
external stimuli and managerial behaviour. Finally, foreign investment is thought to be 
a function of disequilibrium in the foreign exchange market. This strand of thought views 
the MNE as a currency area phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
SECTION 1 
3.1.1. BACKGROUND 
A plethora of market imperfections, which weaken incentives to engage in international 
diversification, has been reviewed in chapter 2. These were seen to manifest in both 
goods and factor markets, and range from imperfect correlations between national capital 
markets through environmental uncertainties and government-imposed distortions to 
transaction costs. The imperfections also constitute barriers to free trade as well as inhibit 
private international real assets investment. 
At the same time, extant studies suggest that the potential for investment benefits (in 
terms of risk reduction and/or improved returns) through international diversification is 
large, but that investors exploit it only to a limited extent. Because the capacity of 
individuals and small firms to engage in 'home-made' (that is, self-conducted) 
international diversification is constrained (by these market imperfections), a large 
literature has developed to examine ways by which investors can circumvent the obstacles 
and simultaneously achieve the benefits associated therewith. One mechanism which is 
claimed to be a potential surrogate vehicle for individual international asset diversification 
is the multinational company (MNC). 
The intuitive appeal of the MNC in this regard is attributed to three main factors. First, 
multinationals are claimed to be diversified internationally in their real cash flow streams, 
and can, for practical purposes, serve as a proxy for foreign asset investment (Grubel, 
1968; Levy and Sarnat, 1970; Rugman, 1979; Rugman, et aI., 1986, p.430). Second, the 
MNC is seen as a more efficient institutional mechanism for overcoming many of the 
market imperfections than the private investor (Rugman, et aI., 1986). Finally, individual 
(as well as institutional) investors can secure international diversification benefits at a 
much lower transaction cost by investing in the shares of a multinational (Rugman, 1979). 
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The object here is to review the literature in terms of matching internal governance 
structure of the MNE with the attributes of diversification. Achieving this starts critically 
with the rudiments of diversification strategy. The context of this review and the intuition 
behind it has been sketched as section one. Section two sets out the rudiments of 
diversification, including the various forms in which it is pursued. Applications of its 
dimensions to risk reduction through foreign investment conclude the discussion in section 
three. 
SOME RUDIMENTS 
To diversify assets, means to spread investment/resources over several enterprises, 
markets, products or services. In an international context, this involves a combined set 
of operations, including sales, location of production facilities, raw material sources, and 
financing base. Diversifying a firm's operations internationally predisposes management 
to recognize the occurrence of a disequilibrium and to react competitively (Eiteman and 
Stonehill, 1982, p.195). 
An active diversification strategy may permit the firm to make marginal shifts in sourcing 
raw materials, intermediate, or finished products. Or, if there is idle or spare capacity, 
production runs can be stretched in one plant with demand elasticity, thus curtailing costs 
in unproductive ones. Alternatively, the firm can step up its global marketing efforts 
where the disequilibrium condition has rendered its products more price competitive. In 
all of the conceivable scenarios, the observations of Eiteman and Stonehill are instructive: 
Depending on management's risk preference, a diversification strategy permits the 
firm to react actively or just passively to opportunities presented by disequilibrium 
conditions in the foreign exchange, capital, and product markets. Furthermore, 
such a strategy does not require that management predict a disequilibrium 
condition but only recognize it when it occurs (ibid.). 
The foregoing contrasts with undiversified domestic firm. The difference is this: although 
the pure domestic firm might experience the full impact of international disequilibrium 
conditions (eg. foreign exchange effect even though it does not have foreign currency 
cash flows), the firm is not predisposed to react to it in the same manner as a 
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multinational counterpart, simply because it lacks comparative information from internal 
sources (ibid., p.196). 
3.1.2 PARADIGMS OF DIVERSIFICATION 
Two major types of diversification can be distinguished: (1) portfolio and (2) real. The 
dimensions of the latter include horizontal, vertical and conglomerate diversifications. To 
appreciate how and why this distinction leads to differential forms of foreign investment, 
a brief consideration of each type may be insightful. 
PORTFOLIO DIVERSIFICATION 
The investment distinction here is that portfolio or financial investment is not matched 
with control. Generally, it takes the form of debt or equity, implying a commitment of 
financial capital to a foreign locale with no controlling interest in the foreign facility. To 
the extent that it involves a low level of commitment (and control), portfolio investment 
warrants lower transaction costs than direct investment, where ownership of a controlling 
interest accompanies high level of commitment. Given that firms would prefer to have 
a controlling interest in their foreign investment operations, what benefits are then derived 
from foreign portfolio investment? 
Foreign portfolio investments are important especially for firms operating extensively 
internationally (Daniels and Radebaugh, 1986, p.16). They are used primarily for 
financial purposes, by which firms with extensive international operations routinely 
transfer funds from one currency area to another to secure a higher yield on short-term 
investments (ibid). Broadly speaking however, modern portfolio investment offers 
improved risk versus return performance in comparison with a domestically diversified 
portfolio (See, for example, Grubel, 1968; Levy and Sarnat, 1970; Lessard, 1976; 
Rugman, 1979). Incentives for internationally diversified portfolio investment arise as 
transactions become progressively risky in the domestic market relative to returns. 
Conceptually, when diversification is extended across national boundaries, a substantial 
proportion of the risk which is systematic within each country can be diversified 
(Lessard, 1977). Lessard demonstrates this, as illustrated in Figure 3.1, by comparing the 
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risk reduction through diversification within one country (U.S.A.) to that obtainable 
through international diversification 
As Figure 3.1 shows, both the total portfolio risk (TN) and the systematic risk (SN) in a 
single-country case drop to TI and SI> respectively, through international diversification. 
Lessard shows the drop to be about one-third less than a single-country (U.S.) figure. 
This drop in portfolio risk is attributed to the fact that returns on diversified single-
country portfolios display considerable independence as opposed to the correlations 
between returns on internationally diversified portfolios (Solnik, 1974; Lessard, 1973, 
1976). 
Most available evidence suggests that a considerable proportion of the investment risk 
which is systematic within a country can be diversified away internationally. Empirical 
evidence further suggests that the potential for such risk reduction through international 
diversification is even greater for Less Developed Country investors. In short, there is 
less uncertainty about the relevance of diversification motive to FDI. What is less certain, 
though, is the extent to which financial diversification motive per se is a sufficient, albeit 
a necessary, incentive for FDI. 
Indirect evidence - the likes of Grubel (1968), Levy and Sarnat (1970), Hughes, et al. 
(1975), Lessard (1973, 1977), and Argmon and Lessard (1977) -at best provides 
international market judgement, suggesting that investors recognize the international 
diversification provided by MNCs through their firms' security price behaviour. It may 
be argued therefore that, beyond mere financial or portfolio motives, firms seek to secure 
international diversification in 'real' assets, the reason being that corporate international 
diversification in real assets provides a more strategic incentive and competitive advantage 
for multinationality. 
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Figure 3.1 Risk Reduction Through National and International 
Diversification 
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Source: Lessard, D. R. (1977) International Diversification and Direct Foreign 
Investment in Eiteman, D. K. and Stonehill, A. I. (ibid) pp. 274-287 
T1 & TN = Total Risk Reductions through diversification: 
national (one-country) versus international cases 
SI & SN = Comparative Systematic Risk Reduction Proflles 
in national versus international diversification 
42 
INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION IN REAL ASSETS. 
The second category of international diversification relates to pursuit of risk reduction 
and, ultimately, multinational expansion via diversification in goods and factor markets. 
Economic theory distinguishes three main types of real asset diversification: horizontal, 
vertical, and conglomerate diversifications. 
A firm is said to be horizontally diversified if it produces the same product/s or provides 
the same service/s in several different plants or locations, regardless of whether these are 
in the same geographic region or not (Buckley and Casson 1976, p.20). Examples of 
firms in this category include soft drinks giants such as Coca Cola, and Pepsi Cola, 
international hotel chains such as Holiday Inn and Sheraton and financial services industry 
(e.g. banks and insurance companies). 
Vertical integration, on the other hand, is the case where the firm produces intermediate 
products which are either complementary or correspond ·to different stages of the same 
production sequence. Typical examples are found in the oil industry where, for instance, 
exploration-drilling -refining -marketing (filling -stations) operational! ownership sequence 
seems to offer multinational oil companies allocative efficiency. The idea is to avoid or 
overcome potential factor distortions that may be induced at the various intermediate 
stages of the firm's global operations (See, for example, Williamson, 1975). 
The last category, conglomerate diversification, seems to be the most complex pattern and 
epitomizes universal multinationality. It is represented by MNCIII in Table 2.1. A firm 
is 'conglomerately diversified' if it produces in more than one production sequence. The 
capacity to engage in this form rests upon the firm's internalization advantages of general 
management skills, or "upon the pursuit of portfolio gains of the kind realised by a 
mutual fund" (Pearce, 1983). Examples of conglomerates include, Royal Dutch/Shell, BP, 
ICI, and most Japanese MNEs. 
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3.1.3 DIVERSIFICATION, RISK REDUCTION AND THE MNE. 
The object of this concluding part is duo-fold. First, it sketches the relationship between 
diversification and multinationality. Second, it reviews diversification in the context of 
risk reduction through foreign investment. It is observed straight away that the 
complementarity of diversification and multinationality, on the one hand, and 
diversification and risk reduction, on the other hand, makes any conceptual separation 
difficult. 
DIVERSIFICATION AND MULTINATIONALITY 
Broadly speaking, each of the economic paradigms of diversification can provide 
opportunities for achieving multinationality. However, while portfolio diversification may 
provide firms with some exploitable ownership specific advantages, "they do not seem 
to be sufficiently important to be other than permissive factors in foreign investment" 
(Hood and Young, 1986, p.52). Multinationality by diversification can be achieved via 
incremental process or through the establishment of wholly owned foreign subsidiaries. 
As an incremental strategy, the firm may move rapidly into some foreign markets and 
gradually increase its commitments. This could be pursued through contractual modes 
(e.g. licensing or turnkey contracts) or via cooperative modes (eg. joint ventures or other 
strategic alliances). In these cases, both multinationality and international diversification 
can be achieved without establishing wholly owned foreign subsidiary. Table 3.1 
illustrates product/market conditions which may determine the kind of diversification 
approach firms may adopt. The concentration strategy approach involves strong 
commitment and competitive position in one or few markets before moving into other 
foreign locations. Both forms are, however, varying degrees of operations in the 
diversification spectrum, the adoption of anyone or combination being determined by, 
inter alia, transactional considerations. 
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Table 3.1 Product/Market Factors Affecting Choice of Diversification. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
PRODUCTndARKETFACTOR 
Sales response function 
Growth rate of each market 
Sales stability in each market 
Competitive lead time 
Spillover effects 
Need for product adaptation 
Need for communication adaptation 
Economies of scale in distribution 
Programme control requirements 
Extent of constraints 
Prefer 'Simple' Prefer 'Concentration 
Diversification if: Diversification if: 
Decreasing/Concave 
Low 
Low 
Short 
High 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Increasing/S-Curve 
High 
High 
Long 
Low 
High 
High 
High 
High 
High 
Source: Ayal, I and J. Zif (1979), "Marketing Expansion Strategies in Multinational Marketing", Journal of 
Marketing, Vol. 43, Spring. 
Incentives for multinationality via diversification increase as transactional considerations 
and firm-specific advantages merge towards a hierarchical governance structure. For 
example, imperfections in markets for technology or other real factors of production 
provide strong incentives for multinationalism. Further, the possession of firm-specific 
advantages has been shown to motivate diversification and foreign investment (Lessard, 
1977; Dunning, 1979, 1980, 1987, 1988; Rugman, 1980, 1981, 1982). Two advantages 
of product differentiability and managerial capacity (Caves, 1971, 1985; Buckley and 
Casson, 1976, 1985, 1989) are specially significant in the equation of diversification and 
multinationality. 
3.1.4 DIVERSIFICATION, RISK REDUCTION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
Empirical investigations into the benefits of risk reduction by international diversification 
began with Grubel (1968). Subsequent efforts include Levy and Sarnat (1970), Solnik 
(1973), Lessard (1973, 1977), Hughes, et al. (1975), and Argmon and Lessard (1977). 
The focus of these studies was on financial assets (bonds and equities). Although they 
provided evidence about the benefits of risk reduction by international diversification, 
they however ignored the effect of real assets diversification and associated benefits. 
Their evidence has been described as "indirect at best" (Lessard, 1977) because they were 
based on financial assets. 
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Exceptions to the above began with Severn (1974) who first applied the diversification 
principle to foreign direct investment. Lloyd (1975) quickly followed, then came Rugman 
(1975, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1980). Rugman extended Lloyd's work by distinguishing 
between international diversification in financial assets and international diversification 
in real assets. Rugman made the analysis within the framework of international trade. 
Under international trade theory financial diversification is referred to as portfolio 
investment, while real diversification is termed direct investment (Rugman 1979, p.21). 
This framework enables Rugman to argue that direct investment is not motivated by 
financial variables but rather undertaken through the specific mechanism of the MNE. 
Modern portfolio theory postulates that the investor is risk-averse, and will choose that 
portfolio which minimizes risk (see, Markowitz, 1970). However, this theory has been 
used with limited success to explain diversification of individual shareholdings by industry 
or by country, and diversification of financial asset holdings (Buckley and Casson, 1976, 
p.82). 
The arguments against the theory of portfolio choice are the same as those which 
challenge the ability of individuals to engage in 'home-made' direct investment. In the 
main the objections centre on market imperfections (discussed in chapter two). These 
make it transactionally inexpedient for small or individual investors to engage in 
international investment. 
The complex twin tasks of reducing risk through international diversification, on the one 
hand, and achieving foreign investment, on the other, can be seen as one of "transaction-
cost economics" or " the economics of organization" (Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1981a). 
Under this proposition the central role of the firm is to economize on transaction costs, 
using its internal organization. In the absence of markets for firm-specific advantages 
(Rugman, 1979, p.35), the internal organization becomes a potentially useful corrective 
for real assets diversification, risk reduction and foreign investment. 
Unfortunately, the modelling apparatus of received microtheory (Le. the capital asset 
pricing model - CAPM) is insufficiently microanalytic to deal with international risk 
dimensions and other transactional considerations (including problems of externality) 
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associated with foreign direct investment, for the reasons already discussed. Besides, the 
absence of international risk-free asset, one of the variables assumed in CAPM, questions 
its applicability. 
3.2 THE APPROPRIABILITY THEORY 
The appropriability theory of the MNE derives from, and consolidates, a dichotomy of 
constructs: the industrial organization framework and the neoclassical concept of 
appropriability of returns from private investment in knowledge. Under the former stream 
of thought, the MNE is portrayed as a more efficient governance structure for 
accomplishing transactions than arm's length market. Such a configuration facilitates 
empirical attempts to assess the purposes served by hierarchical modes of organization. 
This perspective owes its origins to the antecedent contributions of Coase (1937), Simon 
(1957, 1961, 1972), Chandler (1966) and Williamson (1975). The second stream of 
thought is embedded in the public goods nature of knowledge first identified for the MNE 
by Johnson (1970) and Magee (1976, 1977a,b). 
Magee's work consolidated both views under the appropriability concept and brought 
same to the fore as an explanatory power of FDI or multinationality. Essentially, the 
MNE is characterized as a specialist in the creation and dissemination of knowledge 
(technology). Magee distinguishes five stages by which the MNE generates knowledge 
or information: new product discovery, product development, creation of the production 
function, creation of market for the product, and appropriability (1976). The basis of the 
theory is that, because of market failure, or more generally organizational failure 
(Williamson, 1975), MNEs resort to internal organization in servicing foreign markets. 
Through this avenue the MNE can ensure greater appropriability of the private returns 
to its investment in new knowledge. The argument is that research and development costs 
of knowledge are high, moral hazard problems are posed under markets; therefore, 
internalization offers opportunities of recovering costs and avoiding risk of dissipation and 
associated competitive disadvantage. The argument of using patent system to protect the 
appropriability of private returns is thereby suppressed by FDI proponents. 
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SECTION 3 
3.3 THE INTERNALIZATION THEORY 
. .. it is argued in this study that the existing theories are basically subsets of the 
general theory of internalization ... Internalization is a synthesizing explanation 
of the motives for FDI ... The process of internalization explains most (and 
probably all) of the reasons for FDI ... It is now time to recognize that 
internalization is a general theory of FDI and a unifying paradigm for the theory 
of the MNE (Rugman, 1980, with emphasis mine). 
Modern economic analysis of the multinational enterprise relies heavily on the 
theory of internalization. This book is firmly with the tradition of internalization 
theory .... This is effected by taking the modern theory of the MNE - which 
encapsulates most of the insights of internalization theory ... (Casson, 1987, P 
vii). 
3.3.1 SOME BACKGROUND 
The internalization concept derives from Commons-Coasian institutionalistic perception 
of the internal organizational structure of the firm as an alternative efficiency (ie. cost-
economizing) mechanism for completing a related set of transactions. Williamson (1975) 
expanded and brought modern day realism to this economic thought. He synthesized their 
works and those of other antecedent contributors (see Table 3.2) into the Markets and 
Hierarchies dichotomy of economics of organization, which regards the transaction as the 
basic unit of analysis and holds that an understanding of transaction cost economizing is 
central to the study of organizations. However, Williamson restricted his analysis to the 
domestic context, and addressed the economics audience, in stricto senso. It was Buckley 
and Casson (1976) who first applied the transaction-cost approach to the study of 
multinational enterprises and the phenomenon of foreign direct investment. Since then 
several researchers have addressed themselves to one or another of the theoretical issues 
surrounding the internalization concept. These include Hymer (1976), Dunning (1977), 
Teece (1977), Rugman (1980, 1981), Caves (1982), Rugman ed. (1982), Casson (1984, 
1987), Buckley and Casson (1985, 1989) amongst others. 
However, the internalization theory, in its present formulation and popularity as a general 
paradigm of FDI, has been advanced by Rugman (1980, 1981, 1982), and, in a rather 
less extravagant but persuasive way, by Casson (1982, 1984, 1985, 1987). This is 
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exemplified in the above affirmative remarks. Considering therefore that transaction-cost 
economizing is central to the internalization approach, it is not surprising that it features 
prominently in propositions that favour internal organizational structure as a pre-eminent 
mechanism for accomplishing international investment. The transaction cost approach to 
the study of organizations is wide, basic to the arguments of this study, and has been 
discussed in greater detail by Williamson (1975, 1979, 1981a, b). Only issues of a 
specific kind are addressed here. 
Table 3.2 summarizes the major antecedent literatures and future developments expected 
in the transaction cost theory cum internalization theory. The basic premise of the 
relationship between transaction cost theory and the internalization concept can be 
summarized as follows: (1) The proposition that the firm is a production function to 
which a profit-maximization objective has been assigned is less illuminating and self-
limiting (Williamson, 1981a). (2) The economic world is circumscribed by a plethora of 
market imperfections which, for practical purposes, impair the efficient completion of 
transactions through autonomous market mechanisms. (3) Arising from 2, environmental 
factors in combination with a related set of human behavioral factors prospectively 
impede exchanges between firms (i.e. across a market). (4) In consequence (of 2 and 3), 
the external arm's length market is costly and inefficient for completing certain types of 
transactions. (5) The transactional sources of market failure describe both the 
transactional limits of the market and the costs associated therewith. (6) In consequence 
(of 4 and 5), the firm is an institutional response to varying degrees of externality, and 
hence a superior mechanism for accomplishing a related set of transactions than 
alternative governance structures, in transaction-cost economizing terms. 
The above propositions are informed by growing international consensus (in economics 
and international business) that contemporary developments in international activities and 
spread of the MNE have followed the path of an assessment of the operations of the 
internal market of the firm (Buckley and Casson, 1976, 1985; Casson, 1979, 1984; 
Rugman, 1980, 1981, 1982; Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1981a,b). This assessment is 
facilitated by the organizational failures framework (Williamson, 1975). Within this 
framework there is a general perception that the frictions associated with market modes 
can be prospectively attenuated by shifting transactions into the firm. 
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Table 3.2 SOME ANTECEDENTS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
AUTHOR/YEAR 
Commons 1934 
Coase 1937 
Hayek 1945 
Arrow 1964 
Barnard 1938 
Simon 1947 
Chandler 1962 
Caves 1971 
Williamson 1975 
Dahlman 1979 
Buckley 
& Casson 1976 
Rugman 1980 
? 
? 
? 
ORIGIN 
IndustriallInstitutional Economics 
IndustriallInstitutional Economics 
IndustriallInstitutional Economics 
IndustriallInstitutional Economics 
Industrial Organization 
Industrial Organization 
Business History 
MAIN OBJECT OF ANALYSIS 
Significance of transaction costs 
for economic analysis 
Nature of the firm and significance 
of transaction costs 
Economic institutions and role of 
knowledge 
Economics of market failure and 
transaction costs 
Attributes of human factors and 
the rationality of internal 
organization 
Limits of the organization man and 
the rationality of internal 
organization 
Strategy ofMNEs and hierarchical 
forms of business organization 
CONTENWORARYCONTIDBUTIONS 
InstitutionallIndustrial Economics 
InstitutionallIndustrial Economics 
InstitutionallIndustrial Economics 
Economics and International Business 
International Business 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
? 
? 
? 
Economic Analysis of MNEs and 
Market imperfections. 
Source and Nature of transaction 
costs and their role in markets and 
hierarchies 
Role of transaction costs and 
externality in economic exchange 
The MNE and Internalization 
The MNE and Internalization 
Operationalization of transaction 
costs in both firms and markets 
Explanation of alternative 
governance structures and their 
boundaries 
Explanation of how markets and 
hierarchies boundary changes 
This is accomplished by either creating a market for the firm's products/services where 
none already exists and/or substituting arm's length market with a unified governance 
structure (Le. the internal market). This ability is presumed to attenuate (1) 
environmental factors of uncertainty and small-numbers exchange relations, and (2) 
human factors of bounded rationality and opportunism, that lead to prospective market 
failure (Ibid.). 
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3.3.2 A PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ON TRANSACTIONAL CONCEPTS 
Explicating the relation between these transactional concepts - bounded rationality, 
uncertainty /complexity, opportunism, small-numbers bargain, information impactedness 
and atmosphere - is rather long and involved, as Williamson himself acknowledges 
(1975). Suffice it however to observe that: 
1. Opportunism is an extension of the conventional assumption that economic agents 
are suboptimal in their organizational relationship, by reason of miscandour or 
dishonesty, but also self-interest seeking with guile (Williamson, 1975, 1979, 
1981). It is a moral hazard problem that obtains under an "ecology of 
micromotives" (Schelling, 1971). 
2. Bounded rationality is a human behavioral problem of limited competence which 
affects the capacity of the "organization man" to deal with complex economic 
situations, in particular complex exchange relations as in contracts. The term does 
not connote irrationality. Instead, although boundedly rational agents experience 
limits in formulating and solving complex problems, they otherwise remain 
"intendedly rational" (Williamson, 1975). 
3. Small-numbers exchange relations obtain under monopolistic and/or oligopolistic 
market conditions. In these situations opportunistic propensity is almost 
inescapable due to lack of competitive (large-numbers) exchange relations arising 
from market thinness, sensitivity to tradeoffs, uncertainty/complexity, bounded 
rationality, opportunism, or information impactedness. 
4. lriformation impactedness refers to asymmetric informational relationship between 
parties to an exchange relation. It is a market condition, by reason of the above 
factors, in which one or more parties to a transaction possess superior (or inside) 
knowledge about the true underlying circumstances of the transaction, the 
knowledge of which cannot be costlessly discerned by or divulged to others, or, 
if obtained, might be too late for the party to adjust a posteriori 
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5. Under conditions of uncertainty!complexity, parties to an exchange relation 
possess insufficient knowledge of the transaction, profit functions or constraints 
facing each other. 
6. Atmosphere refers to a condition which provides for attitudinal interactions and 
systems consequences that are associated therewith. These factors are illustrated 
in Figure 3.2; they can be seen as causing friction in exchange relations. Friction 
results in transaction costs which, in turn, affect the governance of contractual 
relations. 
The object of transaction cost analysis is to supplant the usual emphasis on technology 
with an assessment of the comparative costs of completing transactions or a related set 
thereof under alternative governance structures (ibid). The central focus of the theory is 
transaction, and, in particular, the differential cost of transacting in markets and 
hierarchies (firms). 
3.3.3 NATURE OF TRANSACTION COSTS 
From Commons and Coase to Williamson, and from Buckley and Casson to Rugman 
(Table 3.2), a deeper understanding of the nature and ramifications of transaction costs 
has progressively emerged with the conclusion that markets do not function costlessly, 
but rather are circumscribed by a range of externalities termed transaction costs. The 
relevance of externalities lies in the fact that it is they that ultimately indicate the presence 
of transaction costs (Dahlman, 1979). 
Transaction costs, in one word, mean the costs of running the organization. Specifically, 
they include all of the following: search and information costs; bargaining and decision 
costs; quality control costs, dimensions of which include monitoring or auditing costs, 
metering costs, policing and enforcement costs; associated transactional risks, e.g. default 
risk; 'transaction-inspired' costs or the so-called government-imposed costs, e.g. taxes, 
tariffs, and non-tariff barriers, political risks, etc. These are contingent upon effecting a 
transaction and would not have otherwise arisen, hence the term, 'transaction-inspired'. 
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All transaction costs can then be seen as resources expended to counteract externalities. 
Specific sources of these costs can be identified with interactions between human factors 
of opportunism and bounded rationality with environmental factors of uncertainty and 
small numbers exchange relations. By themselves alone, these factors do not generate 
transaction costs, rather it is when they join or interact that costs occur (Williamson, 
1975, 1979). Figure 3.2 illustrates possible interactions between these factors. The factors 
can interact in all aspects of economic exchange and generate transaction costs (see, 
Dahlman, 1979, p.148). 
Transaction costs result in two types of internalization: internalization of a market and 
internalization of an externality. The first type refers to the substitution (Le. replacement) 
of an arm's length market with internal organization. Internalization of externality is 
concerned with the creation of a market where none already exists. Thus, under the first 
type the firm is induced by circumstances (eg. mispriced goods or competition) to shift 
transactions out of the market into the firm because thereby it can realize a strategic 
advantage in the use of its resources and over rivals. But, the second type can be 
associated, not with the notion of non-existence of market in the first place, rather with 
strategic attempts by firms to bypass the market and resort to their internal mechanisms. 
In so doing, an externality is internalized by replacing existing institutional arrangements 
(markets), presumed to have high transaction costs, with a new set of institutions (firms), 
deemed to have lower transaction costs. 
It is the existence of these transaction costs in various organizational modes (e.g. markets 
and firms) that creates a major strategic choice problem for managers of MNEs (Holland, 
1986, p.158). The strategic options open to the firm include: (1) internalize market 
transactions when the firm has transaction cost advantage over a market; (2) generate 
internal transaction cost economies where the firm does not have such an advantage; (3) 
use markets when they offer superior transaction cost advantages over the firm. Market 
participants also face the same choices. The result of such choices will determine the 
boundary between firms and markets. It will also identify the factors that permit 
transactions to be classified as one kind or another, as well as identify and match the 
alternative governance structures within which transactions can be organised. 
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Figure 3.2 Nature of Transaction costs and Organisational Failures 
Human Factors Environmental 
Factors 
Source: Williamson, O.E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis 
and Antitrust Implications, New York: The Free Press, pAO. 
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3.3.4 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF INTERNALIZATION THEORY 
It has been postulated (from the preceding discussion) that the critical factors which 
impede exchanges between firms manifest in bounded rationality, opportunism, 
uncertainty, small numbers, information impactedness, and atmosphere. Williamson uses 
these factors to evaluate the strengths or advantages of hierarchy. Since hierarchy, 
internal organization or internalization are synonymous terms, the same rationalization 
can be made here. After all, it is in a bid to avoid or overcome these factors that both 
external and internal markets evolve. The way in which internalization affects each of 
these factors may be summarized as follows:-
1. Bounded Rationality: Internalization serves to attenuate bounded rationality by 
permitting the specialization of decision-making and economizing on 
communication costs (p.257). In effect, internalization permits the bounds on 
rationality to be extended through efficient codes and specialized training or other 
measures that will propel individuals to behave in a more calculating manner. 
2. Opportunism: Internalization weakens opportunistic inclinations through 
administrative fiat. The fact that, in relation to autonomous contractors, the 
parties to an internal exchange are less able to sustain micro motives or 
appropriate subgroup gains at the expense of the organization, the incentives to 
behave opportunistically are accordingly attenuated. 
3. Uncertainty: Internalization promotes convergent expectations, thereby serving 
to absorb uncertainties associated with autonomous decisions by interdependent 
parties in the event of changing market circumstances (Malmgren, 1961). 
4. Small numbers: Internalization permits small-numbers bargaining indeterminacies 
to be resolved by administrative fiat. It can create its own market where none 
exists just as it can bypass existing ones. 
5. Information impactedness: The attenuation of the interaction between 
opportunistic behaviour, market uncertainty, and small numbers bargain, 
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prospectively reduces the asymmetric distribution of relevant information between 
parties under a unified governance structure. 
6. Atmosphere: Internalization permits organizational effectiveness to be viewed, not 
in strict calculative relations of a transaction-specific sort between the parties, but 
more broadly in a less calculative exchange atmosphere. 
Theoretical analysis of these factors predicts that the costs of using the market mechanism 
to coordinate the exchange of an intermediate product are likely to be high under those 
circumstances (see for example, Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1981a,b). Thus, they act as 
incentives for firms to internalize. However, internalization may have its drawbacks 
which make contractual (market-mediated) alternatives desirable in certain circumstances. 
3.3.5 LIMITS OF INTERNALIZATION 
A symmetrical analysis of the limitations of internalization requires an acknowledgement 
of the transaction forces that may impede the process of internalization. Such a 
comparative analysis is necessary whenever the distinctive powers of internal organization 
are impaired and/or transactional diseconomies are warranted by reason of firm size, 
limitations of internal control, and managerial diseconomies of scale (see, for example, 
Williamson, 1975, p.1l7; Blair and Kaserman, 1983, p. 25). Coase (1937, p 340) first 
identified the possibility of a cost disadvantage attending to internalization as the firm's 
size increases. He observed that "as a firm gets larger, there may be decreasing returns 
to the entrepreneur function, that is, the costs of organizing additional transactions within 
the firm may rise". Further, although internalization may reduce the incentive to engage 
in opportunistic behaviour, it may not eliminate it altogether (Blair and Kaserman 1983, 
p. 24). Williamson is also critical of the distortion propensities of internalization. 
Specifically, he notes:-
Internal organization ought to be regarded as a syndrome of characteristics: 
distinctive strengths and distinctive weaknesses, in a comparative institutional 
sense, appear nonseparably - albeit in variable proportions - as a package. 
Although the existence of market failure constitutes a presumptive basis for 
internalizing transactions, the "defects" associated with market exchange may 
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need to exceed a nontrivial threshold before internal organization offers a clear 
cost advantage (1975, p 130). 
The concern here is less with progressive distortions of internalizing by hierarchy than 
with the limitations of internalization theorem as a general paradigm by which foreign 
investment is to be understood Casson (1988) espouses a generalized view of the 
limitations of internalization and, in view of its broad coverage, coupled with the fact he 
is one of the progenitors of internalization as a general theory, his ambivalent position 
is reproduced as Exhibit 3.1 
In conclusion, Casson's views as well as others suggest that the proximity of the 
transactional relationships that exist between markets and hierarchies lies on a continuum, 
with spot market exchange and hierarchy as extremes and a range of contractual 
alternatives falling in between. As transactional relationships shift from 'low-level' spot 
market through 'middle-level' contractual alternatives to 'high-level' hierarchical mode, 
the metric that varies along this continuum is the degree of control that one party to the 
exchange exerts on the other. But there are other variables in the equation of exchange 
relations and transactional control. 
These other variables form a holistic approach to the study of international investment. 
This approach, termed "Eclectic paradigm", recognizes internalization as one of a three-
way determinant of international investment, the other two being ownership and location 
specific advantages. This theoretical framework is the subject of the next section. 
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Exhibit 3.1 Limitations of Internalization Theory 
(1) Although internalization theory is a general theory applicable to all markets, in practice applications 
have tended to focus on just a single market, namely that for technical know-how. Enormous 
emphasis has been placed on the role of FDI in technology transfer. Although this is appropriate in 
the context of US high technology FDI, it is too restrictive when dealing with recent developments 
in off--shore processing and in service industries. Internalization of markets in components and semi-
processed materials, and in information services, needs to be considered as well. 
(2) Internalization issues are usually studied from the standpoint of a single firm. The firm is assumed 
to be surrounded by arm's length markets, and the strategic issue is how far the boundaries of the firm 
should be pushed out by internalising these markets. In practice, however, the boundary to the 
expansion of one multinational is often set by the boundaries already established by other multinational 
firms. A more appropriate perspective from which to study internalization begins with the industrial 
production system as a whole. Given a configuration of production activities, one firm's 
internalization of a market through the acquisition of some facility denies the other firms the 
opportunity of internalising other (related) markets by acquiring that facility themselves. A pre-
emptive struggle may therefore ensue between rival multinationals for the acquisition of key facilities. 
From this alternative perspective, joint ownership of key facilities, which is difficult to explain using 
the conventional approach, emerges as a natural method of resolving conflicts of this kind. A related 
point is that when the ownership of a production system is divided up between a small number of 
multinational firms, there may be several markets where the same multinationals face each other as 
buyers and sellers and yet other markets where they compete on the same side of the market. Thus 
any pair of firms may interact on several fronts, on some of which they cooperate through trading 
intermediate products, while on others they compete in buying from, or selling to a third party (which 
might well be yet another multinational firm). This raises complex strategic issues, such as whether 
competitive behaviour of the latter kind will spill over to undermine cooperative behaviour of the 
former kind, or vice versa. Only a 'systems view' of production allows a satisfactory analysis of 
these issues. 
(3) Internalization theory tends to suggest a polarised view of contractual arrangements, in which pure 
arm's length trade is contrasted with complete hierarchical control. In practice, there are many 
intermediate arrangements - such as joint ventures -and also a variety of implicit understandings built 
up as a result of long-term trading partnerships (so-called quasi-integration). The two often coexist: 
for example, the formal ambiguity over control implied by 50:50 equity joint venture is typically 
resolved by implicit agreements between the two parties. A theory which encompasses the social as 
well as the legal aspects of contractual arrangements is necessary to account fully for such phenomena. 
Source: Casson, M (1988). Recent Trends in International Business: A New Analysis, Unpublished 
Discussion Papers in International Investment and Business Studies, University of Reading, No. 112. 
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SECTION 4 
THE ECLECTIC THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
3.4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The eclectic theory, whose protagonist is Professor John Dunning, is a synthesis of other 
theoretical developments (explored thus far). It is largely drawn from three major strands 
of thought: the organizational failures literature, the industrial organization theory and 
location theory. Together with internalization theory it is the most widely accepted 
theoretical candidate for explaining foreign direct investment. At the same time, both 
concepts offer stiff opposition to each other in terms of being competing paradigms. Both 
schools of thought make definitive statements about the generalizability and predictive 
powers of their theories (See, for example, Casson, 1987 for the former, and Dunning, 
1988 for the latter). 
The crucial questions with which foreign investment theories are concerned are 
compactly stated as:- What, How, and Where to produce (or invest) (Dunning 1977, 
1979, 1980, 1988). An examination of these requires a reformulation of the following 
general analytical kind:-
1. Why do firms engage in international investment? Put differently, why do firms 
domiciled in one country (home country) choose to invest (or produce) in other 
(foreign) countries rather than in their home country? 
2. Given the incremental costs of operating abroad, how are they able to compete 
with their indigenous counterparts? In other words, how do investing firms 
overcome the competition and other transactional frictions associated with 
operating in a foreign country? 
3. Generally, which organizational modes of servicing foreign markets do firms 
adopt? This assumes that firms have alternative modes for operating in foreign 
markets. It also precludes any a priori declaration that one particular mode is 
superior to the other/s, in efficiency terms. This stream of thought seeks to 
identify the differential organizational forms by which international investments 
are completed, and the differential capacities (Le. advantages) that underpin such 
forms. 
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4. Is multinationality an exclusive preserve of few large (dominant) firms? If so, 
why? If not, why is it that certain firms dominate others in the international 
market place? 
The above questions have been asked in different ways and contexts. The specific 
historical perspective adopted in the literature is that which attempts to explain post-war 
US corporate investment in Western European manufacturing industry. In seeking 
answers to the questions, several theoretical developments, as surveyed in preceding 
chapters, have sprung up: some with limited applicability, some contradictory to others, 
and some complementary aspects of the same general phenomenon. 
The common feature of these competing paradigms is that they all provide partial 
explanations to foreign investment and multinationality. Thus, none can claim closure 
or complete satisfaction in explaining the phenomenon. There are missing links of one 
kind or the other in all of them. For instance, explanatory frameworks that derive from 
the industrial organization literature did not address the 'Where' of foreign investment. 
That is, while recognizing the efficiency of internal organization of the firm in 
economizing on international transactions, this group stopped short of explaining 'where' 
such firms' advantages (Le. efficiency properties of internal organization) would be 
exploited. On the other hand, location-related theories, while offering explanations to the 
'Where' of foreign investment, ignored issues of 'How' and 'Why' of it. The concept of 
the eclectic paradigm can therefore be seen as supplying the missing links in an effort to 
identify and evaluate the factors that influence multinationality. 
The main task of this section is to review the theory and application of the eclectic 
paradigm. Discussion is pursued in six sections, after this introductory part as section 
1, and progresses in the order of Ownership advantages (section 2), Location Advantages 
(section 3) and Internalization advantages (section 4). Section 5 provides some empirical 
evidence while Section 6 concludes with its linkage with other received microtheories. 
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3.4.2. OWNERSHIP ADVANTAGES OF MNEs 
BACKGROUND: 
The notion of ownership-specific advantages is explicitly introduced into the discussion 
of multinational enterprises in an attempt to decipher what intrinsic properties firms have 
that inspire them to venture and sustain operations in foreign countries. The goal of a 
firm is an end desired (an objective to be attained); the quest for international market 
share, profit maximization, global positioning, or growth are all aspects of this. Couched 
as objectives, they represent distinctive features of something lacked and wanted by the 
firm. 
Explicating the relation between advantages (or capabilities) and the interplay of motives 
(an incentive force) and objectives (desired ends) may provide an interesting insight into 
the discussion. At the risk of oversimplification, the formulation of this relation can be 
summarized by the schematic in Figure 3.3. The main pairings indicate motive and 
objective on the inverted triangle's base, motive and advantage, on the left side of the 
triangle, and objective and advantage, on the right side. That a firm's advantage has its 
origin somewhere - springing from within the firm or from without or a combination 
thereof - is denoted by the broken line that joins them. 
The logic of figure 3 can be substantiated at any level of human endeavour, individual 
or corporate. Advantage is defined here to mean capacity or something possessed/owned 
that gives the holder superiority in a particular respect over another/others. 
Such a superiority gives rise to a favourable or beneficial condition, under appropriate 
usage. Thus, advantages possessed by a firm provide incentives to pursue certain goals. 
The interaction in each pairing is a necessary reinforcement, it is designed to inspire 
management to consider alternative actions. For example, if the firm's advantage lies in 
superior management skills or product innovation, incentives to protect and maintain the 
advantage become increasingly stronger the more profitable their use prospectively 
becomes. On the other hand, incentives to protect and maintain a dormant asset weaken 
as the transactional rewards become progressively unprofitable. 
61 
Figure 3.3 The Relation Between Advantages, Motives and Objectives 
Motives Objectives 
Advantages 
Sources 
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This philosophical background underscores the crucial role of ownership advantage to the 
growth and success of a firm and to the possibility of multinationality. It also sets the 
stage for considering the dimensions of ownership-specific advantages. 
DIMENSIONS OF OWNERSHIP-SPECIFIC ADVANTAGES (OS As) 
Dunning's (1988) remark aptly summarizes the properties of OSAs . 
. .. Rarely, in seeking to identify the reasons for business achievement, is one able 
to find a single common denominator. Sometimes excellence is primarily based 
on innovatory ingenuity; sometimes on aggressive or novel methods of advertising 
and marketing; sometimes on super-efficient capital budgeting; sometimes on 
dynamic and imaginative entrepreneurships; sometimes on the diversity of 
operational experiences and capabilities; and sometimes on an unusual aptitude to 
manage human relationships ... 
Dunning's observation summarizes the dimensions of OSAs. In simple terms, OSAs are 
monopolistic advantages unique to a firm which enable the firm to compete successfully 
in the market place. The ability of the firm to compete successfully in an "unfamiliar" 
foreign environment rests inter alia on its OSAs. The advantages, which may be tangible 
or intangible proprietary assets, are designed to overcome market imperfections. 
Incentives to develop OS As increase as the opportunities of exploiting, ceteris paribus. 
The range of advantages that prospectively lead to and/or sustain successful 
multinationalization is large, and is compactly summarized by Rugman, et aI., (1986, p. 
119) as follows:-
1. Proprietary technology due to research and development activities. 
2. Managerial, marketing, or other skills specific to the organizational function of 
the firm. 
3. Product differentiation, trademarks, or brand names. 
4. Large size, reflecting scale economies. 
5. Large capital requirements for plants of the minimum efficient size. 
To the above must be included advantages of the following kind: market/ political 
connection, through contacts/dealings with large international clientele, politicians, 
bureaucrats and other informal links; and product market pre-emptive or oligopolistic 
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privileges, as in the case of national companies operating under international cartels (e.g. 
OPEC), or companies in strategic industries (e.g. defense). 
SOURCES OF OS As 
OSAs can arise in any number of ways. However, the literature distinguishes three main 
sources from which a firm can develop or acquire OSAs (Dunning, 1976, 1979). Figure 
3.4 highlights the sources and the types of advantages that can be derived from each 
source. 
3.4.3 LOCATION-SPECIFIC ADVANTAGE THEORY 
The second stipulation for multinationality, under the eclectic theory, is location-specific 
advantage. OSAs are monopolistic advantages which offer the firm the constitutional 
authority and transactional access to use of facilities in a location-specific manner. Those 
advantages provide a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for multinationality. 
Essentially, they do not provide answer to the 'where' of foreign investment. That is the 
gap which location theory seeks to fill. 
The role of location theory in the general rubric of the MNE received little attention until 
lately (Buckley and Casson, 1985, p. 13). Yet, it is in the location theory that any 
complementary explanation of the strategic contexts of foreign investment (Le. growth, 
organizational mode, etc.) are to be found. The entry of location theory into the FDI 
phenomenon finds its antecedent in the Ricardian endowments orthodoxy. In this 
connection, the MNE is seen primarily as a vehicle for the transfer of mobile resources 
(e.g. technology, financial capital, and managerial know-how) to locations of immobile 
complementary resources (raw materials, cheap labour, markets, etc.) (Ibid.). 
Location-specific advantages (LSAs) refer to the set of advantages which accrue to a 
certain location by reason of differences in location-specific endowments between 
countries, or between geographical locations in a country. The specificity of this set of 
advantages resides in the particular location. A firm can only acquire them simply by 
operating in that location. 
64 
Figure 3.4 Sources of Ownership-Specific Advantages 
1. PRIVILEGED SOURCES 
Independent of Multinationality. 
Exclusive possession of, or access to, idiosyncratic assets. 
Transactional advantages resulting from firm size, established market position, product 
differentiation, brand names, or trademarks. 
Transactional advantages due to bank power or financial connections, reflecting plant capacity, 
or scale/scope economies. 
Transactional advantages arising from exclusive or privileged access to factor inputs (e.g. raw 
materials, natural resources, human resources, etc.), information and products markets. 
Transactional advantages due to government protection. 
2. OSAs DUE TO COMMON GOVERNANCE (Commonly enjoyed by subsidiary/associated 
firms, as opposed to de novo firms) 
Advantages of credit rating, in-house facilities, established reputation or brand name. 
Access to functional capacity (managerial, marketing, financial, production, and R&D). 
Economies of joint supply of factor inputs, finished products, etc. 
3. COROLLARY ADVANTAGES OFMULTINATIONALITY (Those induced by geographical 
or product diversification). 
Transactional advantages of wider market opportunities. 
Transactional advantages of size, market power, economies of scale or scope. 
Transactional advantages of informational economies, arising from access to political and 
economic information networks, etc. 
Capacity to diversify production and products in different countries. 
Transactional advantages of risk diversification through the capacity to invest in different 
currency areas. 
Transactional capacity to exploit international differences in factor endowments, production 
techniques, and markets. 
Advantages which may be linked with a country or location include the following: 
1. Natural endowments and national production functions. 
2. Market size and growth. 
3. Government controls and regulations. 
4. Political, legal, economic, and socio-cultural conditions. 
5. Host country's similarity to investor's home country. 
6. Home government's role. 
The types of advantages that may be derived from each source are identified in Figure 
3.6. 
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Figure 3.5 The Advantages to Firms of Undertaking Different Types of Foreign Production. 
Type of Foreign Production Ownership 
advantages 
1. Resource-based Capital; access to 
markets, managerial 
skills; experience 
in similar markets 
2. Import-substituting Capital; specialist 
services knowledge; reputation 
and image; access to 
multi-national 
clients 
3. Trade and distribution General merchanting 
knowledge; access to 
suppliers and market 
outlets 
4. Efficiency seeking Economies of specializa-
tion, scope and geographical 
diversification; access to 
multinational clients 
Location 
advantages 
Resource (for example 
availability and 
cost skilled labour, 
information); 
customization to 
local tastes 
Labour and other costs; 
size of local market; 
local government regula-
tions; need for on-the-
spot contact with 
clients 
Size of market; access 
to customers, suppliers 
and commodity exchanges; 
liberal attitudes towards 
trade 
Few import barriers 
Internalization 
advantages 
To secure supply of 
skilled labour; protection 
and exploitation of 
specialist information; 
quality control 
Exploitation of knowledge 
and business contacts; 
buyer uncertainty; high 
information costs 
To protect market share; 
exploitation of business 
and market contacts to 
avoid underperformance or 
misrepresentation by sales 
agents; to assist price 
discrimination 
To exploit economies of 
common governance 
Source: Dunning (1988), Explaining International Production, London: Unwin Hyman, p.273. 
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Types of Activity 
which favour MNEs 
Engineering design, 
insurance and re-
insurance, management 
consultancy, investment 
banking. 
Reinsurance, executive 
search and accountancy 
management and engineering 
consultancy, branch banking 
Import and export merchanting 
Investment banking 
management 
consultancy 
information technology 
Figure 3.6 Sources/Types of Country (Location)-Specific Advantages. 
1. NATURAL ENDOWMENTS AND NATIONAL PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS:-
Spatial distribution of natural and created resource endowments and markets. 
Cost-effective production factors, e.g. skilled manpower, energy supplies, materials, 
components, semi-finished goods. 
Infrastructural resources, e.g. international communications and transport facilities. 
2. MARKET SIZE AND GROWTH:-
Size and growth structure of national economy. 
Existence of multinational enterprises of varying nationalities. 
Strong and efficient capital markets, high degree of banking development, including a strong 
international bank market. 
3. GOVERNMENT CONTROLS AND REGULATIONS:-
Kind and structure of artificial barriers, e.g. tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and 
service (e.g. import and export controls) 
Tax structure and incentive regimes 
Financial controls, e.g. profit repatriation controls. 
Other investment incentives and disincentives, e.g. expatriate quotas, immigration controls, 
performance controls, etc. 
4. POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF HOST COUNTRY:-
Political system of a country - Is it a stable democracy, socialist/communist, or an unstable 
military government? 
Economic system - a free-market, centrally-planned, mixed, etc. 
Legal system - corollary of political, economic and cultural systems. 
Cultural ethos of the citizens - proximity to foreign investing firm's home country. 
Educational and commercial systems. 
Institutional framework for harnessing resources and for resource allocation. 
5. HOST COUNTRY'S SIMILARITY TO INVESTOR'S HOME 
COUNTRY:-
Psychic proximity, e.g. language, cultural, business, customs, educational, etc., similarities 
or differences. 
Political and economic, etc., interest parities between the investor's home government and the 
host government, e.g. investment, trade, and other economic and political agreements, or 
regional and international co-operative arrangements, e.g. cartels such as OPEC, EEC, 
ECOWAS, etc. 
Territorial/Colonial interest parities, e.g. the Commonwealth, the Anglo-American ties, etc. 
6. HOST GOVERNMENT'S ROLE 
Foreign investment incentive or disincentive schemes 
Nationalization programmes, e.g. indigenization programmes, anti-trust policies, interplay of 
political and economic policies, etc. 
Privatization and other free-market policies. 
Other forms of government intervention in private enterprising, including bureaucratic 
bottlenecks and red-tapes. 
3.4.4. INTERNALIZATION ADVANTAGES OF MULTINATIONALITY 
The first two stipulations of the eclectic paradigm - the OS As and LSAs - attempt to 
explain which firms will service a particular foreign market (using their ownership-
specific advantages), and where such OSAs might be best utilized in transaction-
maximizing terms (by complementary location-specific endowments), respectively. As 
simultaneous explanatory powers, these two conditions are insufficient in explaining 
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international investment, for they do not explain why a firm should choose to exploit its 
OS As abroad or which organizational mode is most efficient in exploiting the advantages 
in a given foreign location. This stream of explanation is the context of the 
internalization advantages. 
The internalization theory, discussed in the preceding chapter, suggests that the incentive 
to internalize the firm's FSAs is the raison d'etre for multinationality. This immediately 
suggests that MNEs perceive the international market as an inferior transaction mode. 
The reasons for the internalization of markets have been explored in section 4. 
Essentially, market failures of two kinds were identified: (1) internalization of a market, 
referring to the supplantation of market mediated exchanges by internal organization; and 
(2) internalization of externality, that is, the replacement of alternative contractural modes 
by the internal structure of the firm. The linkage between internalization and 
multinationality lies in the potentials of internalising markets for control and for 
transaction-cost economy through a unified governance structure. The factors that favour 
internalization are identified in Figure 3.7. 
3.4.5. EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS 
Table 3.3. illustrates some recent empirical applications of the eclectic model. Not 
surprisingly, available literature evidence suggests a preponderance of Dunning's research 
effort in propagating the eclectic model. Initially, empirical application of the model, as 
with the other frameworks, concentrated on the manufacturing industry. Recently 
however, its applicability to other spheres of international economic activity has come 
under scrutiny. This has been pursued through theoretical adaptation or empirical 
extension or both. For example, Boddewyn (1981) adapted the model to examine the 
reasons for corporate divestment. She concludes that: (1) The reasons for FDI, as 
suggested by the eclectic theory, can be reversed to explain international divestment. (2) 
Divestment occurs when a firm loses its FSAs, or when the reasons for internalization 
terminate. (3) By the same configuration of three types of advantages that explain the 
initial decision to invest abroad, disinvestment (or subsequent decrease in FDI) requires 
simultaneous violation of the same. Thus, the absence of one of the three conditions, or 
an adverse change thereof, is sufficient to bring about negative FDI or disinvestment. 
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Figure 3.7 Factors Favouring Internalization Advantages 
1. A VOIDANCE OF mGH TRANSACTION COSTS. 
Need to avoid the high costs associated with searching, negotiating, and enforcing contracts 
across markets. 
Need to control elementary attributes of human decision makers, namely opportunistic 
tendencies and bounded rationality. 
2. OVERCOME MARKET UNCERTAINTY AND PROBLEMS OF SMALL-NUMBERS EXCHANGE 
RELATIONS 
Need to reduce buyer uncertainty and information impactedness problems. 
Need of seller to protect quality of products. 
Need to guarantee market outlets 
Need to guarantee supplies and conditions of sale/purchase 
To provide or compensate for absence of markets or future markets. 
3. CONTROL THE USE OF PRODUCT/TECHNOLOGY 
To eliminate the possibility or resale, product-knowledge dissipation by, or leakage to, 
competitors or potential ones. 
To control supplies and conditions of sale of technology 
To control market outlets, including those which might be used by competitors or potential 
competi tors. 
To capture economies of vertical integration (of interdependent activities). 
4. OVERCOME/EXPLOIT UNNATURAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS 
e.g. Tariffs, foreign exchange control, regulations on foreign investment. 
5. NATURAL RESPONSE TO IMPERATIVES OF CAPITALISM 
Ability to engage in practices consistent with competitive (or anti-competitive) strategies, e.g. 
tax avoidance, transfer-pricing, price discriminations, predatory pricing, leads and lags, cross-
subsidization. 
6. TO ACQUIRE MARKET POWER 
E.g. through mergers and acquisitions, to control either the sources of and/or the markets for 
primary resources, intermediate products or final products. 
To engage in monopoly or oligopoly practices. 
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The eclectic model has also been used to explain multinationalization in the banking 
industry. Gray and Gray (1981) are credited as the first to apply Dunning's eclectic 
theory to multinational banking. Although their work and that of Yannopoulas (1983) 
were largely descriptive, they provided a strong theoretical insight into, and have become 
a useful reference for, the study of international banking. Following them, Cho (1985) 
and Nigh, Cho and Krishnan (1986) have adapted the eclectic model to examine the 
determinants of multinational banking performance as well as the role of location-specific 
advantages in international branch banking. Although these studies relied on US data, 
their findings affirm the predictive utility of the eclectic paradigm. 
Latterly, Dunning has widened the predictive scope of his original formulation as well 
as its empirical applicability. Evidence for this can be found in his most recent writings 
(see, for example, 1988, chapters 2, 6, 13) where he discusses some possible extensions 
of the eclectic paradigm. He also adduces empirical evidence on multinationalization in 
the hotel industry, and business and professional services industry. 
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Table 3.3 Selected Recent Empirical Applications of Eclectic Paradigm. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ year 
of Publication Researcherls Research Context Specific Research Objective Research Methodology 
1. 1980 John H. Dunning 
2. 1981 Jean J. Boddewyn 
3. 1981 H. Peter Gray & 
J. Gray 
4. 1981 John H. Dunning 
& Matthew McQueen 
5. 1983 George N. 
Yannopoulos 
6. 1986 Kang Rae Cho 
7. 1986 Douglas Nigh 
Kang Rae Cho 
8. 1988 John H. Dunning 
9. 1988 John H. Dunning 
Manufacturing Industries in 7 
countries: 5 DCs and 2 LDCs. 
To evaluate the significance of 0- and L-
specific variables - variables in 
explaining industrial pattern and 
geographical distribution of the 
sales of US affiliates in 14 
manufacturing industries in 7 countries 
in 1970 
US Manufacturing industry To examine via the eclectic model 
whether foreign disinvestment theory 
is the reverse of foreign direct 
investment 
US Multinational commercial To apply the Eclectic theory to explain 
banking the multinationalization of non-
financial corporations, with emphasis 
on multinational commercial banking 
International Hotel industry To examine the relevance and applica-
bility of the eclectic paradigm to 
explaining the extent, structure and 
form of involvement by :MNEs in the 
international hotel industry. 
US Transnational banking To examine the transnationalization of 
US banking using the eclectic theory 
US Multinational Banking in To identify major determinants of MNB 
Asia Pacific Region performance in Asia Pacific Region, 
exemplified by Singapore and South Korea 
US Banking involvement abroad To examine the role of location-specific 
advantages in US international branch 
banking. 
International hotel industry Same as in 4 - An update 
Business and Professional To evaluate the locational determinants 
Services of:MNE business 
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Regression analysis 
- Linear and 
- Multiple 
Survey Study 
Exploration survey 
and historical 
analysis 
Historical survey and 
analyses 
Historical data analyses 
Cross-sectional 
analyses, and pooled 
time-services cross-
sectional tests 
Pooled time services, 
and cross-sectional 
regressional analysis. 
Same as in 4 
Survey study 
3.4.6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted a review of key theories: diversification, internalization and 
the eclectic paradigm. The eclectic concept offers a holistic approach to explaining 
foreign direct investment. The logic of eclecticism suggests that a 'full' explanation of 
international investment cannot be accomplished through a microtheoretic approach. 
Aspects of extant mainline theories implicitly fall in this category. The common threads 
that tie these explanatory approaches are: (1) an evolving consensus that received 
microtheory, as useful and powerful as it may be for analytical purposes, operates at too 
high level of parochialism to permit many important international investment phenomena 
to be addressed in an uncontrived way; (2) a growing realization that the extent, form or 
pattern of foreign investment activities cannot be confined to or measured in terms of 
hierarchical mode alone; and (3) a sense that FDI is just one of a number of possible 
organizational mechanisms by which foreign economic involvement can be accomplished. 
The eclectic concept therefore derives from the notion that an explanation of the 
ramifications of foreign investment requires wider considerations and needs to lean upon 
several strands of related theory. Precisely, it states that the extent, form and pattern of 
international investment is determined by the configuration of three sets of firm-specific 
advantages. The paradigm avers that, given the spatial distribution of location-specific 
endowments and the firm's complementary ownership-specific advantages, enterprises 
which have the greatest opportunities for, and derive the most from, internalizing 
transactions will be the most competitive in foreign markets. The later recognition that 
these advantages and their mode of utilization will differ according to industry, country 
and enterprise characteristics seems to be a useful corrective. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A SYNTHESIS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT THEORIES: PART 3 
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CHAYfER 4 
JAPANESE MODEL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Japanese model of foreign investment is sometimes linked with the product cycle 
hypothesis and sometimes thought as a macroeconomic development approach (see, for 
example, Hood and Young, 1986, p. 67; Cantwell, 1988). Some however think that it 
is different from Western patterns of foreign direct investment (see, for example, Kojima, 
1973, 1975, 1982; Ozawa, 1979a, b). The differences are attributed to (a) the late arrival 
of Japanese MNEs, (b) the regional concentration of the MNEs in Asia and Latin 
America, (c) the greater labour intensity of Japanese investments as compared with those 
of the West, (d) the flexibility and willingness of Japanese MNEs to adopt contractual and 
cooperative forms of investment, and (e) the existence of group-controlled investment 
(Buckley, 1983). 
The distinctiveness of Japanese mode of foreign investment has been recognised by 
academics, corporate executives, national governments and multilateral institutions. For 
example, in his preface to Kojima and Ozawa's (1984) "Japan's General Trading 
Companies: Merchants of Economic Development", Just Faaland, then President of 
Development Centre ofOECD, had this to say: "The spectacular growth and development 
of the Japanese economy has brought increasing worldwide attention in recent years to 
Japan's unique economic institutions". This study accordingly identifies with this 
distinction and will proceed with an assessment of the nature of the country's "economic 
giants". 
One of the economic institutions which have played a major role in Japan's postwar 
economic transformation is the sogo shosha or general trading company. International 
economists have been trying to rationalize the success and investment behaviour of the 
sogo shosha within the context of received microtheories of investment. Before 
discussing the theoretical frameworks commonly associated with the Japanese model of 
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foreign investment, it may be insightful to review of the investment behaviour of the so go 
shosha. 
4.2. INVESTMENT PROFILE OF THE SOGO SHOSHA 
Japan's large general trading companies (GTCs) have been described both in Japan and 
abroad by all sorts of terms, ranging form "Japanese-type conglomerates," "Japan's new 
zaibatsus", "Japanese-type multinationals", "modern monsters with worldwide 
communications networks rivaling that of the Pentagon", "mammoth traders handling 
10,000 commodities, from instant noodles to missiles", "speculators in stocks, rice, land, 
lumber and other necessities", to "action think tanks". These characterizations may be 
bewildering, but, they do represent, even if partial or exaggerated, varying descriptions 
of the complexity of the business, organizational structure, resources, and behaviour of 
the sogo shosha (ibid). 
In general, the central element surrounding the business of the GTCs has traditionally 
been trading. However, in order to understand the complexity and diversity of 
investment profile of the GTCs, it is necessary to look beyond their identity as mere 
traders and trade intermediaries. They are active generators of long-term demand and 
supply in a vast range of products. The big nine GTCs (Table 4.1) are reportedly 
handling literally an infinite number of products (Kojima and Ozawa, 1984). 
The scale of operations of GTCs and the magnitude of their investments make them 
leading Japanese multinationals, not only in overseas trading but also in manufacturing, 
resource extraction and other non-trading ventures (ibid.). As Table 4.1 shows, five of 
the six largest Japanese MNEs in 1981 were GTCs; ranking among the first four largest 
MNEs. 
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Table 4.1 Japanese 9 Largest General Trading Companies and How They Rank 
Among Japan's Top 25 MNEs. 
CATEGORY CUMULATIVE VALUE RANKING 
OF INVESTMENT 
US$M 
1. Mitsui & Co GTC 1,176.5 1 
2. Mitsubishi Corporation 790.5 2 
3. Marubeni Corporation 776.0 3 
4. C. Itoh & Co 631.0 4 
5. Japan Asahan Aluminium Other 435.0 5 
6. Sumitomo Corporation GTC 344.0 6 
7. Matsushita Electric Industries Other 337.0 7 
8. Nissan Motor 298.0 8 
9. Nissho-Iwai GTC 284.5 9 
10. Torray Other 284.0 10 
11. Tomen GTC 239.0 11 
12. Honda Motor Other 219.5 12 
13. Kawasaki 211.0 13 
14. Sanyo Electric 193.0 14 
15. Shin Nihon Steel 190.5 15 
16. Sony 188.0 16 
17. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 176.5 17 
18. Ishikawajima - Harima Heavy Industries 175.0 18 
19. Kanematsu Goshu GTC 170.0 19 
20. Japan Usiminus Other 162.5 20 
21. Kawasaki Heavy Industries 157.0 21 
22. Tokyo Kyuku Dentetsu 150.0 22 
23. Teijin 146.5 23 
24. Nichimen Jitsugyo GTC 144.5 24 
25. Tokyo Shibaura Electric Other 141.0 25 
Source: Adapted with modification from Kojima and Ozawa (1984, p.17). The authors' original 
compilation was in Japanese Yen, but given the (authors') average exchange rate of 200 Yen 
to $1 at the time (1981), the equivalent dollar values of the cumulative investments are thus 
computed from the original Yen values. 
Altogether, the top nine GTCs were all among Japan's 25 largest MNEs. The 
commercial success of the trading companies can be traced beyond sheer commercial 
intermediation in wholesale business. A macroscopic assessment of the scale and 
complexity ofthe GTCs's overseas operations reveals a four-way functional classification: 
(1) transactional intermediation, (2.) financial intermediation, (3) information-brokerage, 
and (4) auxiliary functions. This grouping is merely for academic convenience; it, in no 
way, captures the immense diversity of their operations, for, according to some observers 
the sogo shosha "buy and sell everything under the sun except people and coffins" (ibid). 
4.2.1. TRANSACTIONAL INTERMEDIATION 
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One of the fundamental features of the GTCs is their capacity to intermediate in a vast 
range of commercial and noncommercial transactions. This ability stems from, and is 
nourished by, their network of multinational information-collection machinery. Externally 
generated information about prospective and extant operational environment is internalized 
within the company's global network system. The sophistication and cost of the 
information-gathering machinery as well as their scope of coverage constitute potential 
entry and exit barriers to small and/or ill-equipped companies. In consequence, the GTCs 
are able to put this advantage of market-knowledge into extensive commercial use by 
acting as transactional brokers both for other traders and non-traders. 
In order to optimize customer services and, in turn, maximize rent from this advantage, 
GTCs strive to economize on transaction costs. They offer "trader-specific marketing or 
procurement cost advantages and/or provide a particular type of qualitative (non-price) 
marketing service required for a specialized line of product, such as technical and 
promotional services (i.e. offer product-specific non-price marketing advantages)" 
(Kojima and Ozawa, 1984, p.84). Trader-specific marketing/procurement cost advantages 
can be realized both through scale economies in transactions and specialized knowledge 
about a particular market. The ramifications of the intelligence network cum their 
specialized nature enable the GTCs to reduce the search and information costs of 
procuring customized range of inputs and components as well as selling the finished 
products. 
An important corollary of product intermediation is the potential it offers to intermediate 
as well in production techniques. A significant aspect of the transactional brokerage 
function of the GTCs lies in technical development and services. GTCs maintain a large 
crew of technical experts as well as a complement of special sales force to provide 
technical services in plant exports. Kojima and Ozawa observe that "in the absence of 
these advantages, non-trader firms will use either pure market (i.e., direct market 
transactions without the intermediation of traders) or hierarchy (i.e., non-traders 
themselves set up marketing units within their own organizations) .. .implying that the 
"departure-from-trader" phenomenon will occur in either case". (p.85). 
4.2.2. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
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Drucker (1975) provides an approximate description of the financial intermediation role 
of the GTCs. He notes that "in many ways, the trading company is not a 'trading 
company', but a 'finance company'''. He traces the historical development of this role to 
the early stages of industrialization, following the Meiji Restoration in 1868, during 
which the government gave little concern to distribution services and establishment of 
medium-term money markets. The development of the trading company was conceived 
as "one way in which the Japanese company manages its medium-term credit problem, 
for the trading company optimizes the need for medium term credit". Peter Drucker 
elaborates as follows: 
"The trading company creates its own money pool, or what bankers call a 'float' -
a reservoir of money that can be used whenever the need arises and that can be 
turned over a great deal faster than money invested in anyone distribution channel 
or cycle. It creates a medium-term money market, and does so very effectively. It 
represents the most rational optimization of the existing structures, under which 
medium-term finance is critically short and inadequately taken care of by the existing 
banking system ... Just as the zaibatsu bank is the capital market of Japan, so the 
trading company is its money market. " 
Describing the GTCs as quasi-bankers is simply an understatement; in practice, they 
behave like institutionalized bankers. They provide not only in-house full-scale banking 
facilities, but equally extend the services to outside parties. According to Kojima and 
Ozawa, contemporary trading companies are active intermediaries in both money and 
capital markets - supplying short- to medium-term loans to facilitate their trade-
intermediating activities, as well as equity capital to foster their own suppliers. 
Table 4.2 illustrates the magnitude and proportion of debt and equity capital investments 
of the top nine trading companies as of 1981. Despite the huge investments, the return 
on such (equity) investments is typically low, with modal return on equity around 2 per 
cent. The exception is Mitsubishi Corporation with a high ROE of 9.4 per cent - arising 
from its lucrative investment in Brunei natural gas (ibid.). However, it would appear that 
from a strategic point of view, the interest/concern of the GTCs is not so much on the 
return on a particular investment project so long as it fosters transaction intermediation 
which generates commissions. Overseas investment projects provide opportunities for 
intermediating activities which in turn enhance the prospect of economic rents via 
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commissions, management consultancy, technical supplies and services, etc. Kojima and 
Ozawa draw the interesting contrast in the functional attributes of Japanese GTCs as 
financial institutions vis-a-vis institutionalized arrangements found in the western world . 
... as financial institutions, Japan's GTCs are unique. They combine the rules of the 
British merchant bank, which was founded to provide medium-term loans for foreign 
trade, and the German universal bank, which is heavily committed to financing its 
affiliated industrial group. But the important difference is that Japan's trading 
companies are quite willing to accept an extremely low rate of return on financial 
investment in exchange for other business transactions that enable them to earn 
commissions. (p.25) 
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Table 4.2 Magnitude and Per.centage of Equity and Debt Capital Investments by 
Top Nine Japanese Trading Companies. 1981. 
A B C D E F 
Equity Investment Debt Total Overseas Financing ROE EID 
(at home and abroad) (at home and abroad) (A + B) (Equity&Loans as % of C) % Ratio 
Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % 
Mitsubishi Corp 889.775 38.6 1,416.805 61.4 2,306.580 100 701.0 30.4 9.4 4.0 
Mitsui & Co 1,417.680 39.0 2,215.280 61.0 3,632.960 100 1,243.5 34.2 3.1 1.9 
C. Itoh & Co 1,199.790 42.1 1,648.125 57.9 2,847.915 100 576.5 20.2 2.2 4.6 
Marubeni Corp 798.635 53.5 693.475 46.5 1,492.110 100 630.5 42.3 2.2 9.0 
Sumitomo Corp 547.770 63.8 310.265 36.2 858.035 100 296.5 34.6 2.0 6.7 
Nissho Iwai 326.085 40.9 471.625 59.1 797.710 100 305.0 38.2 2.0 1.8 
Tomen 211.880 43.3 277.285 56.7 489.165 100 208.5 42.6 2.0 8.1 
Kanematsu Gosho 172.305 31.8 370.105 68.2 542.410 100 126.0 23.2 1.3 6.1 
Nichimen Jitsugyo 122.690 33.2 246.595 66.8 369.285 100 148.0 40.1 1.2 10.1 
Source: Kojima and Ozawa (1984, p.89). The amounts have been converted into US dollars at the exchange rate of 200 Yen to $1 (the approximate rate at the time). 
Another modification is the incorporation of column F, with the ratios transformed from their original presentation, e.g. 87 to 13 is transformed to 6.7, rather 
than as notations as in the authors' own. 
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In effect, they conclude, the financing services of the GTCs may be likened to a 'loss 
leader' situation in a marketing context, whereby return-to-risk considerations of a 
particular investment project are somewhat underplayed in favour of possible linkage 
effects whose high earning potentials would, in turn, mitigate the original loss. But, the 
ability to make strategic decisions of these kinds depends in part on knowledge of the 
markets. 
4.2.3 INFORMATION-BROKERAGE 
Another important characteristic in the development of transactional prowess in the 
international arena is related to the high propensity of the GTCs to gather information -
economic, political and otherwise. It is reportedly claimed that a GTC's capacity to 
collect economic, social and political information is "far superior to that of the Japanese 
Government, as far as both geographical and topical coverage is concerned" (ibid.). The 
hub of the trading company's intelligence service is its home office in Japan. The home 
office is the "debriefing" point for company employees returning from overseas, as well 
as the centre of a telex network. 
The ability to spin a vast web of information-gathering entails huge expenditure of human 
and material resources. Heavy commitment of resources in communications network is 
the corporate investment counterpart of R&D found in R&D-oriented manufacturing 
companies. The difference, however, is one of kind and mode: whereas trading 
companies' comparative advantage resides not in initiating or generating but in collecting, 
processing and disseminating information, R&D-oriented companies generate and 
internalize knowledge. This distinctive characteristic has an important theoretical 
implication for the behaviour of GTCs as MNEs, as will be discussed shortly. 
Table 4.3. presents the differential patterns of investment in communications among the 
top nine GTCs. The data shown in the table clearly illustrates the importance of 
communications to the trading companies. The capital outlay and its relation to sales is 
comparable in size and proportion to the average R&D expenditure in such technology-
intensive manufacturing industries as electronics (about 3.9%) (ibid.). For instance, with 
an expenditure level of $59,680,000 in telex, telephone, facsimile, postage and computer 
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time, Mitsui is acclaimed to have the most comprehensive, sophisticated system (the 
global on-line network system) with telex-cum-computers strategically installed in five key 
cities around the world. The company handles an enormous volume of information 
through regular intra-firm and other 'covert' communication channels. 
Table 4.3 Communications Expenditures of the Top Nine GTCs, 1978 
GTC (in spending order) 
Mitsui & Co 
Mitsubishi Corporation 
Marubeni Corporation 
C. Hoh & Co 
Sumitomo Corporation 
Nissho Iwai 
Kanematsu Gosho 
Nichimen Jitsugyo 
Tomen 
(converted to US$m; 200Y=$1) 
Communications Expenditure 
59.680* 
21.685 
17.965 
17.640 
17.640 
16.930 
7.470 
7.370 
3.425** 
* Includes computer expenses estimated at about $US30m. 
** Only Head Office expenses 
Source: Ibid, p.90. 
Communications Expenses 
As a % of Sales 
9.60%* 
3.04 
3.78 
3.87 
4.31 
4.68 
4.47 
3.82 
1.87** 
Economizing on intelligence activities is accomplished by assigning transactions to 
geograhic regions in a discriminating way. The approach applies both to the determination 
of efficient boundaries of information-gathering and investment and to the organization 
of communications network. For instance, the organizational cost of information-
gathering, (including transmission) in developed countries is less and more efficient than 
in LDCs because of the relative ease and efficiency of communications and transportation 
and the availability of information media (e.g. publications, broadcasting, lectures, public 
meetings, etc.). Correspondingly, the rate of return on investment in information-
gathering (intelligence activities) will tend to move in tandem with both the organizational 
and locational (geographic) cost of transacting, i.e. it will be much higher in DCs than 
in LDCs. The irony of their operations is that information of a strategic nature about a 
developing country (e.g. political changes, etc.) filters into, and is collected more 
effectively in, developed countries. For instance, subsequent to the fall of the Shah of 
Iran, all the major trading companies established liaison offices in Washington, D.C. 
from where they assessed the implications for Japan's investment interests in the region. 
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Assigning transactions to geographic regions provides a partial explanation to the heavy 
concentration of Japan's manufacturing and extractive investment in developing countries 
(about 70 per cent) contrasts sharply with the relatively small (about 33 per cent) 
commerce-related investment in these countries. The low rate of return on investment in 
intelligence activities in LDCs is attributed to a number of factors, including: acquisition, 
bureaucratic bottlenecks frequently leading to bribery, unwillingness of officials to grant 
interviews or even discuss matters, reluctance to respond to letters and all forms of 
inaccessibility. All of these constructively act as a disincentive to invest except, in a 
"loss-leader" context discussed earlier. 
4.2.4 AUXILIARY FUNCTIONS OF GTCS 
The auxiliary functions can be viewed as a development of specialized management skill 
compatible with the traditional managerial task of organization and co-ordination. The 
basic difference here is that the organization/co-ordination role is a new business function 
established by the GTCs to meet the challenges of a new economic environment. It is not 
the same as corporate business unit or strategic business unit either, rather the 
organization/co-ordination role represents an amalgam of strategic business unit and 
corporate strategic unit in the sense that it integrates in a synergic context the trading 
companies' m<\ior traditional functions (discussed above) into corporate strategy. 
As set out by Kojima and Ozawa (p.26), the critical dimensions for describing GTCs' 
organization/co-ordination function are (1) conversion or 'downstream' operation, and (2) 
development or 'upstream' operation. The first dimension is a reflection of the GTCs' 
propensity to cultivate consumer markets on their own by engaging in material 
procurement, product design and marketing as a vertically-integrated operation that moves 
downstream through different stages of production. The modus operandi of the 
'downstream converter' role is in many respects consistent with 'internalization of a 
market' by which external market (Le. arm's length contractual relationship) is replaced 
with internal market (see, for example, Casson, 1984). 
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As a diversification strategy, it provides an opportunity to expand the traders' operations 
beyond the traditional producers' goods in the upstream stages. Kojima and Ozawa 
describe the strategy as follows: 
The trading company secures necessary raw materials or intermediate inputs and 
organizes a production team by tying up with a manufacturer who will be in 
charge of producing the newly designed products specified by the trading 
company. Usually, the manufacture is a small- or medium-sized company which, 
because it has not yet developed its own market, is willing to become a captive 
supplier or a production division of the trading company. If the manufacturer's 
production skill is inadequate, the trading company brings in the necessary 
technology from the outside under a licensing agreement. 
(p. 26). 
The converter formula is highly relevant and profitable as a market entry mode and 
international market diversification strategy. It can be used to span different segments of 
a market, both vertically and horizontally. Table 2.4. illustrates how the trading 
companies operationalize the converter formula. Basically, they diversify abroad by 
adopting a 'subtle' strategy in capturing perceived or 'informed' (through their network) 
market opportunities. 
The second dimension for describing GTCs' organization/co-ordination function is 
development or 'upstream' operation. Basically, this involves developing, in collaboration 
with another company or companies affiliated with a particular industry, expertise which 
may otherwise be costly for the GTC. This investment strategy enables trading companies 
to diversify into such industrial complexes as petrochemical and electronic manufacture. 
The practice appears to have a historical pattern consistent with 'imitative investment' or 
'follow-the-Ieader' hypothesis. For instance, once Mitsui Co. ventured into construction 
of a petrochemical complex (or kombinato), at Iwakuni, Mitsubishi Corporation and 
Sumitomo Corporation followed suit by setting up similar petrochemical kombinatos at 
Yokkaichi and Niihama, respectively (ibid.). The 'follow-the-Ieader' investment 
behavioural pattern tends to be systematic and pervasive. When one GTC makes a move 
in any direction, it stimulates the interest of others. Like the western-type oligopolistic 
market reaction (see chapter 2), the tendency is to generate and/or capture external 
economies or economize on transaction costs by forging cooperative arrangements. 
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What clearly emerges from the investment 'ubiquity' of Japan's MNEs is that they are, 
in the words of Kojima and Ozawa, "willing bearers of, and capitalizers on, uncertainties 
and risks". If this were true, then, the crucial question is: why do they exhibit such a 
peculiarity towards foreign investment? Put differently, what distinguishes Japanese 
'trade-oriented' model of foreign investment from western 'anti-trade' (the so-called 
American type) FDI? In what theoretical framework can an explanation of their pattern 
be assessed? The next section attempts an answer. 
Table 4.4 Illustrative Industrial Application of the Converter Formula 
INDUSTRY 
1. CLOTHING 
2. CATERING-
RESTAURANTS 
& FAST-FOOD 
CHAINS 
3. TECHNOLOGY 
BASED 
MODE OF OPERATIONALIZATION 
Marketing through affiliated retail outlets 
clothing items manufactured under a 
joint venture or contractual arrangement 
ego licensing with either home or 
foreign manufacturing companies. 
Operating restaurants and fast-food chains 
through franchise arrangements; transforming 
these into successful chain of instant-noodle 
restaurants, known as "Larmen Dosanko" in 
New York. 
Advancing into technology-oriented sectors 
or industry, such as personal computers and 
computer peripherals, by marketing abroad 
products of a manufacturer which it (the 
trading company) supports either as its 
subsidiary, joint venture or contractual 
partner. 
ILLUSTRATIVE GTCs 
Mitsui & Co, with Daitobo Co 
under imported know-how 
from Friedman-Marks Co. of 
USA OR Mitsubishi Corp., with 
a Korean firm, with technology 
licensed by the Takahara Shirt 
Manufacturing Co. of Japan. 
Mitsubishi Corp., under a 
partnership arrangement with 
American Kentucky Fried Chicken. 
C. Itoh & Co. marketing 
overseas, under its own house 
brand, small printers produced 
by a manufacturer which it 
has successfully supported 
as a subsidiary. 
4.3 CONCEPTUAL EXPOSITION OF JAPANESE MODE OF FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT . 
The object here is to elicit theoretical explanation to the empirical analysis sketched 
above. There is less disagreement in the literature that the modus operandi of Japanese 
foreign investments suggests a distinct characterization than there is agreement in how to 
analyze it or justify it within extant FDI theories. Consequently, Japanese 
academics/analysts, notably Professors Kiyashi Kojima and Terutomo Ozawa, have 
proposed alternative explanations. Both have been at the vanguard of theoretical 
developments of Japanese mode of foreign investment since the early 1970s. Their 
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individual and collective works constitute the antecedent literature from which both the 
preceding and prospective discussions derive. 
The common feature in their proposition is the extension of the neoclassical theory of 
trade. By integrating trade theory with FDI theory, they view the MNE as a mechanism 
by which the comparative advantage of nation states may be better advanced. Using the 
standard two-country, two-factor, two-product Hecksher-Ohlin model of trade, Kojima 
(1978) prescribes that investments should flow from a comparatively advantaged 'home' 
country to a relatively disadvantaged 'host' country. He further prescribes that such 
investments should be made in sectors which require internationally mobile intermediate 
products that can be combined with non-transferable inputs in which the host country is 
relatively well endowed. This way, foreign investment may be conceived both as a 
catalyst to trade and as and arbitrager for improving the efficiency of international 
allocation of economic activity (Dunning, 1988, p.50). 
Kojima recognizes that FDI, as a package involving technical knowledge and human skill 
components is to some extent industry-specific. Foreign investment, he argues, is able to 
proceed because of possession of this industry-specific comparative advantage, which can 
be exploited overseas. His model, which rests on the disproportionate effect on 
productivity when sector-specific capital moves from capital-intensive industry of the 
home country into the host country's labour-intensive industry, assumes that the latter 
experiences more productivity through direct investment than in the former "due to the 
smaller technological gap and a greater spill over of technology to local firms" (1978, 
p.126). In this process, while precipitating a change in the host country's industry the 
production frontier remains unaffected because the home industry's comparative 
advantage (in technology and managerial skills) does not fritter away simply because it 
is applied abroad nor are other internationally mobile factors (labour and capital) 
adversely affected. Kojima adopts the line of argument to explain the industrial structure 
of Japanese FDI. But Buckley (1985) observes that "Japanese FDI represents a search for 
location specific inputs (stable environment, low transport costs, but chiefly cheap labour) 
to complement the skills developed by Japanese enterprises". 
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In many respects the literature accepts that: (1) the firm-specific advantages -namely, 
access to a world-wide distribution network, transactional ability and managerial skills, 
and other intrinsic organizational qualities - of Japanese MNEs differ significantly from 
those of their American or European counterparts; (2) the industrial structure and 
distribution of Japanese FDI are markedly different from those of other industrialized 
countries; and, (3) the modelling apparatus of received microtheory (e.g. the product life 
cycle or the eclectic paradigm, although Dunning (1988, p.50) disagrees with the latter 
association) is insufficiently microanalytic to deal with many of the transactional 
phenomena of Japanese foreign investments (see, for example, Buckley, 1980). 
In recognition of these, Ozawa (1979a,b) proposed a four-way classification for 
characterizing as well as distinguishing Japanese-type FDI, namely (1) the later takeoff 
of Japanese foreign investment, (2) regionalization of foreign investments, (3) labour 
intensity of Japanese investments, and (4) the openness of Japanese companies to other 
forms of international investment than FDI. Further joint investigation by Kojima and 
Ozawa (1984) reveals two additional distinctive features, namely (5) the high propensity 
to invest in their own commercial facilities, and (6) the prevalence of group-controlled 
investments. These must be seen not just as explanations rooted in the Ricardian 
orthodoxy of trade theory but, quite importantly, as peculiarities in the behaviour and 
approach of Japanese firms towards foreign investment. In this way, they may well be 
regarded as the raison d' etre for Japanese mode/pattern of foreign investment. 
4.3.1 LATE ARRIVAL IN INTERNATIONAL ARENA 
The first distinguishing characteristic can be associated with the later (than western 
countries) takeoff of Japan in the field of international investment. Japanese investors 
(including individual and institutional, portfolio and direct) are late-comers to the world 
arena of multinationalism in comparison to USA, UK, West Germany and other Western 
European countries. This late arrival vis-a-vis its potentialities (in terms of manpower and 
organizational skills) coupled with 'discrete' desire to 'catch up' with trends in 
international development must have provided a strong impetus to launch into the 
international market with such a rapidity. It must not be isolated, however, that the 'soft 
spot' which USA has had for Japan since after the Second World War - for obvious 
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reasons - would have been somehow contributory, even if in moral supportive terms, to 
the phenomenal growth of Japan. With US influence over its western allies, any 
affirmative actions towards Japan were bound to rub off on both the economic and 
political relations. 
4.3.2 REGIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
Another distinguishing feature of Japan's foreign investment behaviour is the tendency 
to cluster overseas investments by locational proximity. Regional concentration of 
overseas investments in Asia and Latin America provided Japanese firms first experience 
of FDI. Regionalization of foreign investments would seem to be a logical and prudent 
approach to 'attacking' the international arena, especially given the technological and 
other competitive strengths of US and European MNEs. At least, it serves as an FDI 
threshold in terms of geographical and socio-cultural proximity. 
4.3.3 LABOUR-INTENSIVE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 
The third characteristic derives from the relative labour intensity inherent in the structure 
of Japanese industries. This can be attributed to three main factors. First, from a 
historical perspective, pre-war Japan was characterized by industrial backwardness and 
technological bereavement. Even the immediate post-war lacked the necessary 
infrastructure to support manufacturing and capital-intensive activities. Although all that 
is now history, they form the antecedent basis of labour intensity of contemporary 
commercial and industrial activities. Second, and also from historical development, Japan 
is largely a trading nation, and a feature of trading activities is the relative dependence 
on labour. As sketched above, the spectacular growth and development of postwar Japan 
and its present outward-oriented strategy of industrialization have been facilitated largely 
by the sogo shosha. Given the country's "almost complete dependence on overseas 
resources" (Kojima and Ozawa, 1984, p.12) on one hand, and the interest of labour-
abundant developing countries (especially of neighbouring countries of Asia and Latin 
America) in attracting relatively labour-intensive manufacturing activities, on the other 
hand, Japanese firms - anxious to capture markets from western MNEs - tend to establish 
relatively small and medium sized ventures. These are modelled to offer LDCs a 
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combination of labour-intensive, locally congruent technologies and a more friendly 
competitive industrial environment than large-scale, capital-intensive and overtly 
competitive American-type industrial ventures (ibid.). 
Finally, the labour-intensive characterization of Japanese firms might have also stemmed 
from their cultural dependence on people rather than technology. This point is 
underscored by Ouchi (1981) in his analysis of Theory Z that, "success in terms of 
productivity, under Japanese culture, depends upon a company's ability to coordinate 
people, rather than technology". 
4.3.4 OPENNESS TO NEW FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT 
The fourth way of distinguishing Japan's approach to international investment is the 
openness of firms to other modalities of foreign investment than FDI, in particular 
minority-equity interests and/or joint ventures. Japanese MNEs are generally viewed as 
more accommodating to the demands of host countries and more willing to accept 'new' 
forms of outward investment than their western counterparts (Ozawa, 1984). The high 
propensity to depart from foreign direct investment and to engage in minority-owned 
operations and/or non-equity contractural types is attributable to the combination of 
factors described above. 
4.3.5 PROPENSITY TO INVEST IN THEIR OWN COMMERCIAL 
ACTIVITIES 
Another important distinctive feature of Japanese overseas investments is the propensity 
of the sogo shosha to invest in their own commercial facilities. Kojima and Ozawa (1984, 
p.81) observe that unlike technology-based manufacturers, trading companies do not 
invest in research and development themselves; they do not generate knowledge 
internally, rather, they gather both cross-sectional and inter-temporal information about 
supply and demand conditions in commodity markets (from raw materials to intermediate 
and finished products) as well as services. The information set is then transformed and 
internalized as ownership advantage of the trading companies. Thus, as with western 
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MNEs, the more extensive the network oftrading and marketing facilities, the easier and 
more effective it is for the sogo shosha to collect information. Effectively therefore, the 
ownership advantages and internalization capabilities of the sogo shosha derive from the 
multinationality of their operations. This contrasts with western MNEs whose 
multinationality (ability to multinationalize) depends in part on ownership and 
internalization advantages (see chapters 2 and 3 above). 
The theory of Japanese trading companies' involvement in international production begins 
with their multinational trade-intermediating operations (of the co-operative and afiliative 
type and not of the internalization type). These give birth to ownership advantages that 
enable the firms to become effective organizer/co-ordinators of overseas ventures. 
Furthermore, in exploiting such ownership advantages, the trading companies do not 
show preference for, or interest in exercising, intra-firm, hierarchical controls of the sort 
observed in the western-type multinationality. Rather, they resort to variants of co-
operative and affiliative modes: a loose integration of firm and market antecedent of 
Richardson's (1972) theory of co-ordination through cooperation. 
Nevertheless, it is also observed that the conventional western-type FDI by internalization 
does apply to most of the overseas investments made by trading companies in their own 
global networks of branch offices and trading subsidiaries (such as Mitsubishi 
International, U.S.A., Mitsui & Co., Europe S.A., Sumitomo Corporation Italia, among 
others) (Kojima and Ozawa 1984, p.82). But, the internalization is of parametric 
information which the so go shosha consider "crucial for their intelligence operations" 
(ibid.). 
The crucial investment distinction here lies in the mode of generating the internalization 
advantage. As can be discerned from the various analyses of Kojima and Ozawa, the 
Japanese mode of generating internalization advantage appears to be non-idiosyncratic, 
information-specific, exogenously generated, and purely for intelligence purposes. It is 
rather the effect than the cause of multinationality. On the other hand, the western MNE 
type of internalization advantage is idiosyncratic, asset-specific, endogenously generated, 
and purely for monopolistic investment purposes. It is rather the cause than the effect of 
multinationality (for explanation of these terms, see chapter 3, section 3.3). 
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Clearly, the orientation and investment profile of Japanese merchants of foreign 
investment are markedly different from those of their western counterparts. The 
conceptual explanation under a transaction cost analysis framework, discussed in chapter 
3, is consistent with empirical analyses (e.g. Ozawa, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1984; Kojima 
1973, 1978, 1982,; Kojima and Ozawa, 1984; and Kujawa, 1986). One factor which is 
however common to both investment atmospheres (Japanese and Western worlds) is the 
prevalence of competition. Potential competitive disadvantage in a monopolistic 
production/marketing context attenuates the incentive to depend on contractual arm's 
length market mechanisms for future streams of earnings. Essentially related to 
prospective market failure problems of moral hazard (e.g. opportunism, externality and 
dissipation), western MNEs are empirically shown to prefer to internalize their firm-
specific knowledge. As for their Japanese counterparts, while rivalry can be exceedingly 
fierce among the general trading companies for a particular piece of valuable information 
acquired by one of them, because the advantage possessed in the form of information is 
generated externally, internalization of such advantage is rather precarious (Kojima and 
Ozawa, 1984, p.82). Further, because the trading companies are in active competition 
both amongst themselves and with other countries MNEs, they generally adopt an 
approach, exhibiting a high propensity towards group investments. 
4.3.6 GROUP INVESTMENT STRATEGY IN THE CONTEXT OF 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE. 
The last distinctive feature of Japanese overseas investment is the prevalence of group-
controlled investments (ibid. p.83; Buckley, 1985). Kojima and Ozawa ascribe this 
peculiarity to the industrial organization of Japanese industry. The proclivity to establish 
intimate business relationships with a large and diverse number of companies (including 
banks, insurance and shipping companies) - in essence become an active member of a 
particular keiretsu group - is a commonality of Japanese MNEs. Both the transactional 
and financial intermediation features discussed earlier offer trading companies the 
opportunity to intermediate in a vast range of commercial and industrial transactions. 
Together with their information brokerage ability, trading companies are able to assist 
their own manufacturing subsidiaries and affiliates in economizing on production activities 
by relocating in a discriminating way. Their comparative transactional advantage enables 
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them to shift production activities of subsidiaries from home to overseas whenever the 
benefits of home-based production are lost. 
For instance, it was the trading companies that first detected a decline in Japan's 
comparative advantage in low-skilled, labour-intensive goods in the early 1960s and then 
urged Japanese manufacturers to establish overseas ventures in neighbouring Asian 
countries with lower wages (ibid). As organizer/co-ordinator of overseas ventures, the 
orientation of GTCs is clearly based on the doctrine of comparative cost advantage, 
whether it is to do with their subsidiaries wholly or a consortium within the affiliated 
keiretsu group. 
Group integrated/controlled investment is particularly found to be an efficient mechanism 
of accomplishing transactions that are huge in scale, complex and resource-intensive. 
Generally, under western orientation of investment, such transactions will be pursued via 
consortium arrangements - a form of group-integrated/controlled investment. Here, there 
appears to be less systematic emphasis on governance structure (control) than there is on 
establishment of capitalized vehicle either as an entry mode and/or a diversification 
strategy. For Japanese firms, it is a 'pooling' of firm-specific comparative advantages of 
participating companies. It represents in efficiency terms a group integrated package of 
resources which offer a superior transaction cost economy over intrafirm arrangements. 
Kojima and Ozawa clearly perceive the concept of group investment as transactionally 
superior to hierarchically integrated investment from a dichotomy of scale economies: 
"genuine" and "pseudo-" economies of scale. Both are defined in terms of pareto-
optimality - that is, an equilibrium condition in which welfare maximizing decisions of 
firms simultaneously maximize (economy-wide) social welfare. Genuine economies of 
scale "are those that arise from the saving of real resources and the reduction of 
production or selling costs" (Kojima, 1978, p.225). They are pareto optimal since they 
are beneficial to both firms and society at large. Pseudo-economies of scale, on the other 
hand, increase private benefits at the expense of the society (through incremental social 
costs). An example is corporate transfer pricing practice which enables companies to 
potentially avoid or minimize taxes - an increase in social welfare costs or loss of social 
revenue - and thus enlarge private profits (for other illustrations, see ibid., pp. 225-227). 
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A limiting boundary between western-style of group investment and Japanese style is 
therefore one of degree of susceptibility to pseudo-economies of scale, according to these 
authors. Japanese group investment strategy organized under comparative advantage 
governance structure is seen to be less susceptible to pseudo-economies (both in structure 
and direction) than hierarchically integrated investments of Western MNEs. 
4.4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, a transactional interpretation of Japanese mode of foreign investment, in 
which the neoclassical theory of international trade based on comparative cost advantage 
is implicit, reveals interesting features about the structure and modus operandi of 
Japanese multinationals. Essentially constructed around the general trading companies, 
it is shown both empirically and conceptually that their overseas investment activities are 
distinct from those of the traditional "western" form of foreign direct investment. 
A macroscopic analysis of the scale and complexity of the overseas operations of Japanese 
firms also reveals a facilitation based on integrated functional classification of (1) 
transactional intermediation, (2) financial intermediation, (3) information-brokerage, and 
(4) transactional organization/co-ordination. These enable the firms to develop the criteria 
and define the "efficient boundaries" (of an operating unit) for economizing on overseas 
transactions. 
Finally, a conceptual explanation of these is surveyed through six interrelated 
frameworks, namely: (1) late arrival to international investment arena, (2) regionalization 
of foreign investment, (3) labour-intensive structure of foreign investment, (4) propensity 
to adopt new forms of international investment, (5) propensity to invest in their own 
commercial activities, and (6) the prevalence of group-controlled investment. 
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PART TWO 
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
This part explores the dimensions of new forms of international investment. The object 
here is twofold: to examine the identity of the alternative strategies, in terms of their 
dimensions, characteristics and strategic importance as foreign market entry modes, and 
to review related empirical studies. 
As defined in Chapter One, new forms of international investment encompass a whole 
range of international operations that are thought of constituting a grey area between 
exports and direct investment. Precisely, they are not investments in majority or wholly 
owned foreign subsidiaries which conventially define foreign direct investment. Excluded 
also from this definition are bank lending and other financial operations, although these 
may be used to finance new forms of investment. They are therefore to be seen from 
their strategic implications for the firm's growth, profitability and/or global pursuits. Not 
all known forms of alternative investment strategies can be usefully addressed in a study 
of this kind nor are they all necessarily relevant within the definition of new forms. 
The part consists of three chapters: chapters 5 to 7. Chapter 5, which is the first chapter 
of this part, is concerned with the dynamic structure of entry mode determinants and the 
influence of corporate development strategies. Chapter 6 overviews the strategic roles 
of exporting, licensing and franchising, contractual arrangements, and joint ventures on 
international investment. Chapter 7 concludes the part with an examination of the 
applicability of new forms to international banking. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The growth of international business may be said to have followed a three-stage historical 
cycle. The first cycle is the prewar pattern of international business, dating back to the 
Industrial Revolution, which was essentially in trade form. This period witnessed a 
massive worldwide expansion of trade and significant increases in the amount of non-
equity foreign investments. 
The second cycle in the growth of international business is the postwar emergence of 
multinationals. The postwar period, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s, was 
accompanied by a continued rapid growth of multinational, mostly U.S.-based, firms 
through the establishment of wholly-or majority-owned foreign subsidiaries. The third 
period of the historical cycle is the contemporary rapid expansion of international 
investment. This period dates back to the 1970s and has seen significant increases in the 
flow of foreign investment worldwide. In particular, since the mid-seventies the flow of 
financial capital has shown more rapid growth than that of FDI, but also the variety of 
forms of international involvement has witnessed enormous expansion and has 
consequently assumed an increasingly important role in the world economy. What is less 
clear though is the significance of the growing diversity of forms which such investment 
has taken since the early 1970s, and more prominently in the 1980s. 
Until the 1980s a disproportionate amount of attention was given to the growth and 
development of companies by forms other than direct investment. The term "new forms 
of international investment" is an OECD concept applied to the organizational modes of 
international business operations which lie between simple exports and direct investment 
(in the form of wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries) (Oman, 1984). Generically, they are 
defined as international investments in which foreign participation does not involve a 
controlling equity interest or constitute majority ownership. More specifically, new forms 
of international investment (NFIs) encompass: 
(a) joint international business ventures in which foreign-held equity does not exceed 
50 per cent; and 
(b) international contractual arrangements in which the foreign firm may have no 
equity involvement, but the nature of its participation constitutes an investment, 
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such non-equity participation will involve some element of risk on the part of the 
foreign firm, provide it with some control, and yield returns in future periods 
(see, for example, Oman, 1984, pp. 22-23, for a distinction between investment 
and sale). 
All these arrangements are typically referred to as 'alternatives' to FDI or, more 
generally, 'markets'. In terms of historical usage/significance, foreign investment in 
forms other than foreign direct investment is not a new phenomenon, nor are such modes 
of investment particularly a less developed country phenomenon (Cf. Oman 1984). 
Although the tendency to adopt new forms may be more transparent in developing 
economies, their usage in and between developed countries has been documented in a 
number of studies. For example, joint ventures (an aspect of NFIs) have been found to 
be frequently used by Fortune 500 companies in developed countries (Janger 1980; 
Harrigan, 1985). Also, foreign investments in forms other than wholly-owned 
subsidiaries (e.g. licences) have been found to predominate in U.S.-based companies by 
a ratio of 4 to 1 (Contractor and Lorange, 1987). 
The reasons for the increasing adoption of the new forms are varied: they are partly firm-
specific (Le. relating to factors internal to the enterprise); they are partly country-specific 
(host and/or home), or they may be influenced by managerial perception of the 
significance of the factors or their perceptions of the impact of entry made choices on 
shareholders' wealth. In terms of host country influences, the growing tendency to 
favour new forms in LDCs in part reflects strategic macro-economic aim of acquiring 
technological transfer and the development of indigenous skills and technology. Growing 
nationalism, global competition, changing fortunes in financial markets, economic and 
political integration of regional markets (such as the EEC, OPEC, the US-Canada Free 
Trade Agreement, etc), and the increasing democratization of the Eastern and Communist 
bloc are all aspects of environmental stimuli (or distortions) that are prospectively 
associated with changes in corporate foreign investment strategies. 
This chapter, which is the first in part two of the study, explores the alternative modes 
of international market entry and development. Internationalization of business operations 
has become particularly engaging in the process of providing a wider context within 
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which corporate expansion goals are pursued. The dynamics of the international 
environment force changes both in the direction and method by which economic activities 
are organised. As a result, increasing importance is being attached to the modes of 
market entry and development strategies employed by firms in foreign markets. These 
are the subject of exploration in this and next five chapters. 
The object of this chapter is to discuss the dynamic structure of entry mode determinants 
and the influence of corporate development strategies. These are pursued in sections 1 
and 2, respectively. The chapter concludes with a typology of new forms, as a prelude 
to a more detailed discussion of their structures in ensuing chapters. 
5.2. A DYNAMIC STRUCTURE OF ENTRY MODE DETERMINANTS 
The theory of New Form of Investment (NFl) may be described as a re-assessment of the 
explanatory/predictive powers of markets and hierarchies. It is a re-assessment in the 
sense that traditional frameworks (discussed in part 1) have been found inadequate in 
addressing divergent foreign investment practices. The reason is that they focused on one 
mode of organization, namely FOL In particular, it has been recognized since the early 
1980s that a variety of forms of investment and industrial cooperation have assumed an 
increasingly important role in the international investment and diversification strategies 
of firms. The growing importance of these forms, which, have largely been perceived 
in a North-South context, has raised a considerable interest in the future of FOI, the 
changing division of roles of the major participants, and their implications for small and 
medium-sized firms (See, Oman 1984, 1986), among others. 
The phenomenon of interest concerns the choice and impact of entry modes on the 
success of foreign operations. Theoretical recognition and redirection has warranted a 
reformulation and/or relaxation of the underlying assumptions of extant paradigms in 
order to accommodate positive trends in the use of non-FOI entry modes by firms. A 
dichotomy of issues lies at the substratum of the analysis (Figure 5.1): 
1. the locational structures which encourage or support foreign firms to establish 
corporate presence in the host country; and 
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2. the governance structures necessary to exploit opportunities, or to overcome 
obstacles, existing or potential. 
These two structures are discussed the context of the dynamic features of host countries' 
perceptions of the impact of firms' choices of modes of entry on their economic, social 
and political fabrics. 
5.2.1 LOCATIONAL STRUCTURES 
To encompass positive developments in host country attitude towards foreign investors, 
a somewhat different taxonomy from Dunning's may be proposed to distinguish among 
naturallocational endowments and unnatural (contrived) set of institutional arrangements 
that both characterize the politics and set the context within which the integrity of foreign 
investment transactions are decided. This set of structures relates, but not restricted, to 
conventional location-specific advantages enunciated by Dunning. 
The literature states that country-specific features have to be strongly attractive in order 
to lure firms of one or more national origins to locate in another. Traditional FDI 
perspective regards locational factors as consisting mainly in tangible resources (e.g. raw 
materials), human and material infrastructure. However, practical events in many 
countries lead to the conclusion that this view is not only simplistic but, in fact, beclouds 
the structures that decide such advantages. The imperatives of political independence 
makes complex foreign structures in the form of inward direct investment to be 
circumspect, and, in some ways, characterized as imperialistic. 
Failure to recognise this, and constant reference to locational advantages as deriving from 
a firm's oligopolistic propensity (Knickerbocker, 1973; Flowers, 1976; Graham, 1978, 
1985; and Dunning, 1977, 1981, 1988) among others, is to ignore the growing concern 
and hostility of host country political systems toward what they perceive as 'imperialistic 
tendencies'. This feeling is not peculiar to LDCs. Consider America's grudge over 
Japan's inward investment practices. Pat Choate, in his book "Agents of Influence", 
describes how the Japanese have penetrated the US economic, political and education 
systems while keeping their own closed to outsiders. He expresses "the concern shared 
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by American politicians and academics" about Japan's outward investments and how they 
protect and promote these by erecting a complex infrastructure of political and strategic 
influence throughout America. If America can be so disturbed by the scale and 
complexity of inward FDI, how much more would small nation states? 
While a country's natural immobile resources are its provenance structures and have to 
be utilised in situ, however, the politics that surround their utilization, and which, in fact, 
decide whether a foreign investor may be able to internalise or externalise their usage are 
subject to human contrivance and thus negotiable. The distinction between ex ante and 
ex post locational advantages, which had not previously been made, is crucial to the 
argument. It is therefore argued that it is the local politics which unlock economic 
advantages of any location. A complete treatment of locational structures requires that 
the limits as well as the powers of country-specific properties be assessed. The properties 
of a country that commend locational structures as inward-investment enabling factors 
would appear to fall into three categories: incentives, controls, and what may be referred 
to broadly as 'innate structural advantages'. 
INCENTIVE STRUCTURE 
In an incentive sense, locational structures manifest in those government policies which 
foster inward investments. Incentive schemes are significant in that although a country 
may possess natural endowments, if it pursues policies which progressively attenuate the 
bargaining power of inward foreign investors, then there is a risk that the attractive 
properties of its tangible resources may be lost. In circumstances where hard bargaining 
between government agencies and the firm over Iocational utilization of resources is 
crucial, the foreign firm's oligopolistic propensity may be in active conflict with the host 
government, especially if wider issues about control are strategic to both parties. 
CONTROL STRUCTURE 
Closely related to incentive investment scheme is the sensitivity of control instruments 
that are attached to a set of locational structures. A clear example is the sort of inward 
investment policies pursued by India where, regardless of the sophistication or 
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attractiveness of the investment, control is rarely abdicated to the foreign firm (See, 
Desai, 1984). Control has traditionally been associated with the firm, in terms of its 
constitutional authority over intra-firm activities and of possessing an efficient conflict 
resolution machinery. However, control instruments can be assigned to locational 
resources by virtue of their nature, strategic importance to national economy, or a 
combination thereof. An example is the banking sector or defence industry where active 
government controls preclude, or at least monitor very closely, the possibility of foreign 
domination. 
Furthermore, there is a considerable number of measures which, regardless of how open 
or developed a country's economy may be, represent obstacles on the ability of foreign 
investors to engage in certain investment practices. Country control instruments come 
in the shape of laws, regulations and administrative practices which affect the ability of 
non-residents to undertake direct investments, or, even, to participate in certain 
investment activities exclusively reserved for indigens. 
The common feature among host country investment policies is the politics that surround 
foreign equity investment. While the economic advantages of a foreign investment are 
acknowledged, the often unspoken concern of many host governments is the degree to 
which their economic and, perhaps, social fabrics may be eroded by 'unguarded' foreign 
domination of enterprises. Take this away, and inward direct investment will be less of 
an issue in respect both of economising properties and bargaining potentials. 
INNATE STRUCTURAL ADVANTAGES 
Innate structural advantages reside mainly in what is regarded in economics as 
'comparative advantage'. The idea that economic inputs, especially immobile natural 
resources, are most efficiently employed in their place of origin, ceteris paribus, is both 
interesting and engaging. The importance of innate structural advantage is that it suggests 
that, even if there are institutional bottlenecks, it could still be efficient to invest in the 
domain. Examples of innate structural advantage abound in the oil and extractive 
industries, such as offshore oil deposits, gold and other mineral mines, etc. They are 
often a source of firm-government bargains and the degree to which the balance tilts 
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depends on the incentive and control differences described above as well as the 
coordinating properties for organizing economic exchanges. The firm needs to assess two 
primary sets of variables in order to engage in effective decision making about its entry 
mode strategy. 
5.2.2 GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
The notion of governance structures is conducive to a study of, or a sensitivity to, 
transaction-cost issues. It seeks to supplant the conception of the firm as a production 
function by one of the firm as a governance structure (Williamson, 1975, 1986). The 
traditional notion of the firm as a production function to which a profit-maximization 
objective is assigned has had good economics following. By governance structure is 
meant the institutional framework within which the execution of transactions is 
accomplished and their integrity is decided (Williamson, 1986, p. 155). The literature 
recognizes markets and hierarchies as two main alternatives. 
The theory of governance structures seeks to address the transactional properties of 
alternative modes of organizing foreign business operations. The thesis of alternative 
governance structures is concerned mainly with (1) growing corporate propensity to 
depart from traditional powers of internal organization as a means of accomplishing 
foreign investments, (2) recognizing the declining properties of vertical integration as a 
strategic means of achieving international diversification, and (3) providing, in a 
comparative institutional sense, the efficiency properties of alternative modes. The 
emphasis on internal governance is on the distinctive strengths of FDI, but fails to 
acknowledge its distinctive weaknesses. Because of these reasons, issues concerning 
alternative governance structures have become particularly engaging in recent 
international investment practices and international business research. 
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Figure 5.1 A Framework of Entry Mode Determinants 
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NFl propositions seek to explain divergent practices in the market place which offer 
alternatives to FDI, on the one hand, and both technological interdependence and 
technical complementarity, on the other hand. 
There are merits, in political and transaction-cost economizing terms, in assigning internal 
governance structure to certain foreign investment operations. The affirmative argument 
is encapsulated in the theoretical frameworks reviewed in Part One. In summary, the 
general proposition is that the firm is a superior mechanism for allocating resources. The 
efficiency powers of the firm reside in its internal governance structure by which it is 
able to control allocation of resources, resolve conflicts by fiat and economize on 
transaction costs. As for alternative governance modes, general references to market 
failures are frequently employed to justify substitution of internal organization for market-
mediated exchange. 
The object of this study is to present the potential capacity of new forms of investment 
to offer a wider variety and greater sensitivity of the strategic contexts that describe 
foreign investment activities. In the discussions that follow, the term 'alternative' is used 
both in the sense of replacement choice, and in terms of available option from several 
possibilities. Claims of alternative governance structures are therefore claims of 
complementary operational entry modes of accomplishing foreign investment activities. 
In short, but for the control differences between NFl and FDI, (see Table 5.2 below), the 
operational and strategic complementarity of markets and hierarchies will challenge any 
orthodoxy that seeks to discern the supremacy of one mode over the other. It has been 
argued that markets and hierarchies framework, while being a powerful paradigm for 
discussing alternative modes of accomplishing transactions is static in nature (Cal vet, 
1981). The author advocates the need for an understanding of the forces that compel 
transactions to be internalised or externalised as well as the political and social 
implications of the international spread of hierarchical forms. It is in this context that the 
arguments of locational and governance structures are constructed. The taxonomic 
implication of locational structures is the opportunity it offers to introduce political and 
social considerations into the location theory. According to Calvet, these issues have 
been carefully and purposely avoided. But, for how long will they be excluded from the 
105 
equation when the imperatives of growing nationalism are challenging the control 
structure of FDI? An inclusion of this awareness and recognition of transactional 
properties of alternative governance structures may add dynamism to the static 
configuration of the markets and hierarchies framework. 
5.3 DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES OF THE FIRM 
In considering strategic alternatives, three key corporate objectives would appear to be 
significant in relation to adaptive, sequential decision-making. These are: (1) To 
consolidate businesses and operating presence in the home market. (2) To develop 
interests in key strategic foreign markets. For a UK enterprise, principal strategic foreign 
markets may include Western Europe, North America and Far East (in particular, Japan). 
(3) To enter new, high growth product markets or sectors compatible with the enterprise's 
specific advantages. 
These objectives provide a framework for adopting a policy of 'business focus' in the 
market place. Three critical questions are raised in a policy of business focus: (1) 
Where, within its business segment, can a firm achieve the best competitive advantage 
in the market place? (2) Where does the firm see the greatest market growth? (3) Where 
can it leverage its resources and expertise (FSAs) most effectively? 
Translating corporate objectives into business focus, as sketched above, simplifies the 
complexity associated with the development of strategies. The process provides a 
perspective that is pragmatic and complementary to the four-way taxonomy of Young, et 
al (1989). Under the heading of broad development strategies, the authors make a 
distinction between the following constructs: 
- Stability: implying that the firm remains in the same business with no 
difference in the pursuit of existing objectives and in the level 
of commitment. This is consistent with objective (1) and 
question (1) above, namely, consolidation. 
- Expansion: suggesting diversification into new markets or business areas 
(product, geography or both), with the aim of increasing sales, 
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- Rationalization: 
- Combination: 
profits, market share or taking up a competition position. This 
is consistent with objective (3) and questions (1) and (2) above. 
or what the authors term 'retrenchment', by which unprofitable 
markets (product and/or geography) are pruned off, resulting 
in a leaner and more efficient management structure. 
Liquidation, sell-out and divestment are development 
approaches of corporate rationalization or retrenchment 
strategies. This is consistent with objective (2) and question 
(3) above. 
implying a combination of the above, either as a sequential and 
adaptive process or a simultaneous process. This is mainly 
relevant to large, divisionalized companies. 
The preceding discussion can be summarized by the schematic in Figure 5.2. It should 
be noted that these broad strategies are not mutually exclusive. Thus, it is possible to 
find an enterprise stabilizing its operations in the domestic or a particular foreign market; 
expanding into new product/service lines or geographic areas; scaling down its operations 
in some other markets; completely divesting of its activities in some product lines or 
markets; or executing all or some combination of the above, simultaneously. However, 
it is also possible, given the firm's size and scope of operations, to pursue any of the 
broad strategies independently. 
5.3.1 DIRECTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
The next step for corporate management is to decide upon the direction of development 
that is compatible with its chosen strategy. A firm may choose to develop any or a 
combination of the broad strategies by product or service, by geographic market, by line 
functions, by technological application, or by a combination thereof. For instance, a UK 
bank wishing to stabilize and/or diversify its operations in say, Spain, may extend its 
credit card facilities and cash line services to its Spanish customers. It may also diversify 
into non-bank services such as trustee and insurance services, investment banking 
services, portfolio management services, and so on. 
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Consider further the following extracts from the chairman's statement of the undernoted 
companies: 
... From the strong platform (of annual sales of over £3 billion and almost 300 
stores covering the UK market), we are now committed to the next phase of our 
development. We shall reinforce Safeway' s historic strengths in unprocessed 
fresh foods and we shall become significantly better in a number of areas where 
we have identified scope for improvement. These include supply chain 
management, detailed merchandising and store replenishment, own brand 
development and consumer marketing ... (Alistair Grant, Chairman, Argyll Group 
PLC, 1990) . 
... GEC's strategy for the 1990s was set out in the circular sent to shareholders 
on 17th August 1989. A principal objective was to develop a substantial and 
profitable presence in European markets in advance of 1992 through acquisitions 
and international alliances ... (The Rt. Hon. Lord Prior PC, Chairman, GEC 
PLC, 1990) 
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Figure 5.2 Development Strategies of the Firm 
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The preceding statements exemplify generalizations of strategy development paths 
followed by most firms. The series of interviews carried out by this researcher as part 
of this study reflect this general approach to corporate development. Having determined 
the direction upon which it is going to pursue, the next step for the firm is to determine 
how best to accomplish it. Precisely, how will it achieve its development strategies? 
5.3.2 METHODS OF ACHIEVING DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
There are basically two methods of achieving firm strategy. One is internal development; 
and the other is external development. Internal development encompasses rationalization 
and offers a firm a distinct opportunity to review its existing operations, markets (product 
lines and/or geographic bases), production techniques/facilities, marketing and 
management functionalities, financial position and so on. In effect, internal development 
method presents a picturesque account of the balance sheet of the firm: it provides 
corporate management and shareholders a graphic account of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the firm, with respect to its specific competitive advantage as well as to 
competitors. 
Through internal development, a firm may also be enabled to take stock of the 
performance of subsidiaries and business units as well as line functions. Available 
evidence may suggest plant/market closure, product/project abandonment, or some form 
of structural adjustment. Thus, it may be instructive, before resorting to external 
development method, to review present firm activities - markets and products - with a 
view to ensuring that the fabrics of the corporate profile are consistent with the type of 
development it seeks to pursue. 
Achieving corporate strategy through external development methods is exciting, promising 
and demanding. Several options are available in the market. However, factors both 
endogenous and exogenous the firm present limitations on its ability to devise methods 
that are particularly suited to its purpose. In general, the firm's ability to use any 
particular method is a function of its specific characteristics, including industrial 
belonging, market forces and political processes (host and home) and managerial 
perceptions. 
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External development methods are market-mediated mechanisms. They include mergers 
and acquisitions, joint ventures, licensing, and all forms of inter-firm collaborative and 
contractual alliances. External methods can be used in conjunction with internal 
mechanisms. The capacity to utilise both avenues is a powerful test of the firm's strength 
in the market place, but depends, however, on the same set of factors, as already 
mentioned. Each of these groups (that is, directions and methods) leads to either a 
concentric or a conglomerate approach. Where the direction of corporate development 
or the method thereof involves related products, related markets, etc., that approach is 
regarded as concentric. A conglomerate approach, in contrast, is a strategic development 
involving unrelated products or markets. 
Further classification of these approaches distinguishes between vertical (forward), 
horizontal (backward) and diversified integrations or developments. Vertical integration 
is a common investment feature of the petroleum and extractive industry. The tendency 
is to use the internal mechanisms of the firm to establish control and hopefully minimize 
transaction costs. The type of firm-specific advantages (FSAs) that the firm seeks to 
control or protect is always generally determined by external market imperfections 
(Rugman, et al., 1986, p. 112). The pairing of environmental factors of uncertainty and 
small-numbers exchange relations with human factors of opportunism and bounded 
rationality (Williamson 1975, 1980, 1981) are especially important. Transactional 
economies, externality reduction, and the propensity to control via the administrative fiat 
prospectively lead to vertical integration. Thus, an international oil company, such as 
Shell or Mobil, would choose to control and co-ordinate the extraction, transportation, 
refining, and marketing of petroleum instead of employing the services of autonomous 
market agents. 
The argument of lower transaction costs and efficiency, while justifiable and credible, 
may, in stricto senso, not be the driving force, for those can be achieved via market 
mechanisms. I contend within the framework of Stigler (1968) that if transactional 
economies and efficiency are removed from the equation, an argument for plausible 
antisocial consequences can be forcefully engaged. Anticompetitive effects of two types 
are commonly attributed to vertical integration: price discrimination and entry barriers 
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(Williamson, 1975). Where the companies are large and conglomerate, a third anti-trust 
public policy issue arises, namely monopoly. 
Horizontal expansion, on the other hand, is a development strategy in which the firm 
expands its product/service market in different geographic areas. Thus, rather than locate 
different stages of the production or marketing process in various countries (vertical 
expansion), a UK company can expand into US and/or other European markets on the 
same product line. Banks and professional/consultancy firms, (e.g. accountants, 
architects, etc) adopt horizontal diversification. Most large MNEs have expanded both 
vertically and horizontally. Ford Motors is a common example. ICI and Nestle 
exemplify strategic movements from vertical to horizontal, vice versa, as this is common 
with conglomerate firms. 
Conglomerate diversification is the zenith of corporate growth and diversification. The 
major multinational companies - of which there are really few in the UK but many in US 
and Japan - are all conglomerately diversified. A firm qualifies as a conglomerate if it 
produces (Le. manufactures or services) internationally a diversified range of products. 
Take ICI PIc, as an example. Headquartered in the UK where it has over 50 production 
sites, the company is spread all across Continental Western Europe with 97 
manufacturing/research/administrative bases and across Eastern Europe with production 
facilities in 11 countries. In North America, it has 137 operational facilities with USA 
accounting for 106 and Canada the remaining 31. In Latin America, it has 48 operational 
bases, 39 in Asia Pacific, 127 in Australasia (Australia 118 and New Zealand 9), 17 in 
Indian sub-continent, 10 in Middle East, and 54 in sub-saharan Africa. In all, ICI 
employs over 130,000. Its principal activity sectors include: Agrochemicals and Seeds, 
Pharmaceuticals, Petrochemicals and plastics, General chemicals, Paints, Fibres, 
Industrial explosives, and other effect products (such as colours and fine chemicals, 
specialty chemicals, films, electronics, etc.). 
Another example is the ITT, a giant US conglomerate. Its scope of diversification 
includes electronics, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, insurance, food, 
electricals, sanitary fittings, leisure and hotels, etc. Most conglomerates develop from 
purely resource-based enterprises and spread both horizontally and vertically. The need 
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to economize transaction costs and the desire to internalize related set of transactions, 
thereby ensuring that they are governed by administrative processes of the firm, 
prospectively leads these firms to create in-house markets (e.g. credit and finance). Some 
conglomerates extend their interests into banking and finance, insurance and shipping, 
etc. Although Western MNE's have produced some of the world's largest conglomerates, 
however the rapidity with which Japanese firms, the sogo shosha (or general trading 
companies, GTCs) , have metamorphosed into giant conglomerates is outstanding. Indeed, 
they are fast overtaking US giants not only in the scope of their product diversification, 
but also in their geographic spread. Table 5.1 illustrates the extent of product or sectoral 
diversification of top nine Japanese GTCs. 
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Table 5.1 Scope of Economic Activities of Top 9 Japanese Conglomerates 
ACTIVITY SECTOR KITSUI MITSUBISHI MARUBENI C.ITOH SUMITOMO NISSHO IWAITOMEN KANEMATSU NICHIMEN TOTAL VENTURES 
No % 
Agricultural, 12 2 5 1 0 1 3 0 2 26 10.6 
Marine and 
Forestry products 
Minerals and Fuels 2 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 7 2.9 
General Commerce 2 3 1 1 2 3 2 1 1 16 6.5 
Manufactures: 
Food and Beverages 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6 2.4 
Textiles 6 1 5 6 0 0 3 1 3 25 10.2 
Metal Products 6 4 2 2 4 2 2 0 0 22 9.0 
Motor Cars, 5 3 8 9 5 1 0 1 33 13.5 
motorcycles and Parts 
Chemicals 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 5 2.0 
Electrical Machinery 0 17 4 3 0 0 2 1 28 11.4 
Non-electric Machinery 3 0 11 5 4 2 1 1 3 30 12.2 
Sundries 16 10 8 4 1 1 6 0 0 47 19.2 
Total by company 58 41 45 32 16 12 18 12 11 245 100.00 
Source: Kojima and Ozawa (1984) 
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Within the framework sketched in Figure 5.2 and described above, it can be seen that 
a variety of options are open to a firm seeking diversification and growth either in 
product market or geographical market or both. While the expansion strategy can be 
pursued within the firm's home country, the context of multinationalization is 
inharmonious with domestic (market) diversification. For analytical purposes, 
however, it is useful to present both strands as Figure 5.3 demonstrates. 
5.3.3 CLASSIFICATION OF DIVERSIFICATION ALTERNATIVES 
Two questions are fundamental to a firm's decision to engage in diversification? 
Consider these in turn. 
1. Does it seek to diversify in the domestic market or foreign market? The 
consideration of this question is invariant to whether or not the firm already 
operates in foreign markets. Rather, the overriding consideration hinges on 
the firm's global strategy or future development. Consider, for example, the 
excerpts of the diversification strategies of the following three companies, 
drawn from three different industrial sectors. 
(a) ... For some time, both we and Banco Santander Group have recognised the 
importance of increasing our presence beyond our traditional domestic 
frontiers .... In short, we are embarking on the implementation of a strategy for 
European development. We believe that strategy to be viable and flexible and 
that it will allow us entry to Europe at low cost and with low risk ... 
The Royal Bank of Scotland Group pIc "Announcement of Unique 
European Alliance with Banco Santander Group", 6th October 1988. 
(b) ... Our principal objective is to develop a substantial and profitable presence 
in European markets in advance of 1992 through acquisitions and international 
alliances ... 
GEC pIc, Annual Report and Accounts, 1990. 
(c) In common with other retailers, Argyll relies upon effective trading 
relationships with a wide range of suppliers. The creation of the Single 
European Market is encouraging many leading manufacturers to operate on a 
pan-European basis affecting their procurement, production, marketing and 
selling strategies. For this reason, Argyll has formed two important 
associations in order to establish progressively a pan-European retail grouping 
with a network to match the European scale of the manufacturers ... 
Argyll Group pIc, Annual Report and Accounts, 1990. 
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2. Assuming that the company has decided the geographic domain of the 
diversification move, will it then be market segment based, product/service 
based, or a combination of both? 
A geographical diversification per se, whether domestic or international, involves 
expansion into new market segments while holding product/service constant. A 
product/service diversification, on the other hand, involves expansion into new 
product/service market while holding the geographic segment constant. In this case, 
the company launches new products or services into its old and existing markets. A 
third variant involves a combination of the above two, namely launching into new 
market segments with new products. This may be regarded as a novel diversification 
or expansion strategy. 
Johnson Mattheys pIc exemplifies a strategic consideration that incorporates the 
features of Figure 5.3. 
. .. Our objectives are: to consolidate our core businesses and operating 
presence in our home market, to develop interests in key strategic foreign 
markets, e.g. Europe, North America and Far East, and to enter new, high 
growth sectors such as networks and services ... 
Johnson Mattheys pIc, Annual Report and Accounts, 1990. 
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Figure 5.3 Classification of Diversification Strategies 
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5.4. A TYPOLOGY OF NEW FORMS 
International business arrangements can be classified in any number of ways. 
Common literature classification dichotomizes between equity and non-equity 
arrangements or, more technically, between hierarchy and market. The usefulness of 
this polarization lies in its analytical simplicity, namely: the relative ease with which 
risk is linked with control and ownership. Under a hierarchy, risk is assumed to be 
progressively attenuated via administrative fiat of a common governance structure. 
Under a market structure, the ratio of risk to control and to ownership is assumed to 
be high in each case. The reason is often associated with the transactional limits of 
markets and the sources of market failure. In relative terms, markets are assumed to 
lack the efficiency of sequential adaptations to uncertainty and risk and, as such, are 
an inferior administrative process for accomplishing transactions. 
The missing thread in this argument, and one which is central to a possible resolution, 
is the inadequate symmetrical analysis of markets. Williamson recognizes this fact but 
uses the inadequacies of markets as an alibi to invoke hierarchy. Basic to such a 
comparative analysis is the following proposition: Just as hierarchical structure matters 
in assessing the efficacy of internal organization, so does market structure matter in 
assessing inter-firm transactions. In the end, whether a set of transactions ought to 
be executed across markets or within a firm depends on the relative efficiency of each 
mode vis-a-vis the firm's goal. 
Several possible 'markets' are identifiable, depending on whether the environment of 
operations is products/services or finance. It is important to make this clarification 
for the following reasons. First, literature emphasis on multinationality has long 
centred around manufacturing/extractive industry, although application of extant 
theories to financial and service industries, such banks, and hotels, is now growing. 
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Figure S.4 The Structure of Entry Mode Arrangements 
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Second, different nomenclatures distinguish foreign entry modes of financial 
institutions from those of non-financial enterprises, although some commonalities exist. 
For example, joint venture operation is regarded in banking as 'consortium'. Finally, 
since this study is about the identity of 'alternative' forms of international investment, 
its scope is not restricted to any particular industry; it covers banks, as financial 
enterprises, and non-financial enterprises, broadly defined. 
A TAXONOMY OF NEW FORMS 
For analytical purposes, it maybe convenient to distinguish nine main types of 
'markets' or contractual arrangements. Variants of some these are discernible. The 
various permutations are derived from the schematic, Figure 5.4, and their structure 
is indicated in Table 5.2. The structure of entry modes illustrated in Figure 5.4 
represents non-financial enterprises, although interpretations apposite to the financial 
sector can be deduced. These are discussed in greater detail in the following chapters. 
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Table 5.2. Control Structure of New Forms of International Investment as 
Applicable to Non-Financial Enterprises 
CONTROL ALLOCATED TO PARTNERS 
MODE OF INVESTMENT 
A JOINT INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS VENTURES: 
FOREIGN LOCAL COMMENTS 
1. Equity Joint Venture A.P.S.M. A.P.S.M.B. 
2. Non-Equity Joint Venture A.P.S.M. P.S.M.B. 
3. Industrial Co-operation A.P.S.M. P.S.M.B. 
Agreement 
B INTERNATIONAL 
CONTRACTUAL 
AGREEMENTS 
1. Export/Overseas Agency 
2. Licensing 
3. Franchising 
A.P.S.M. 
A.P.S. 
A 
4. Management Contracts A.P.S.M.B. A 
5. Turnkey/Product-in-Hand 
6. International 
subcontracting Contract 
Manufacturing 
7. Assembly Plant/Technical 
Assistance Contracts 
8. Production-Sharing Contracts 
A.P.S. 
A.P.S. 
A.P.S. 
A.P.S.B. 
9. Acquisition & Mergers A.P.S.B.M. 
M.B. 
P.S.M.B. 
P.S.M.B. 
M.B. 
M.B. 
M.B. 
P.M.B. 
Both partners contribute to the assets 
of the venture, share risks and 
profits, and participate in the 
ownership of the enterprise. 
Here the foreign partner has no 
equity stake in the venture, but 
brings resources which contain some 
element of risk sufficient to command 
or warrant control. 
Similar to 1, but with time limit 
on equity and possible restriction on 
terms (e.g. payment) 
The relationship may be more than 
that of a casual seller-buyer. Has 
become an age-long and the easiest 
route to foreign investment. 
Foreign licensor provides local 
licensee right or access to technology 
in return for financial compensation. 
A particular type of licensing, and 
often seen as part of the parent chain 
than a single business enterprise, 
except that the franchisee retains 
control over production in exchange 
of royalties to the franchisor. 
Performance rights and control are 
shifted by contract to foreign 
management in return for a fee. 
The foreign contractor's 
responsibilities generally include the 
design and engineering of plant, 
provision of basic technology and 
know-how, supply of a completed 
production outfit and the training of 
local personnel. 
Otherwise known as Contract 
Manufacturing or offshore 
production/assembly. Similar to 5, 
but the principal provides the 
contractor with design and product 
specifications. 
Similar to 5. The package comes 
completely-knocked-down. 
Similar to non-equity JV, but for a 
specified period of time in return for 
a predetermined share of the output, 
once the foreign partner has 
recovered its costs. 
Similar to outright control. 
Notational inferences in columns 2 and 3 derive from Figure 5.4 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6.1 EXPORTING AS A BASE FORM OF INTERNATIONAL MARKET 
ENTRY 
Descriptions of foreign investment strategies assume a wide spectrum of entry 
mechanisms, ranging from export modes through variants of contractual and cooperative 
modes to wholly-owned subsidiaries. Exporting has a historical following: it has been 
the entrepreneur's primary method of entering into foreign markets; a means of opening 
up new markets; an avenue of circumventing domestic market constraints; and a strategic 
means of increasing turnover and profit. It is often generalised as the least risky means 
of internationalization and represents what Young, et al. (1989, p. 19) see as the 'toe-in-
the-water' in international business. 
Over the years, exporting has grown both in scale and importance. It is vastly seen as 
a strategic necessity of international business and, as such, is supported by national and 
supranational governments via a number of institutional arrangements such as Export 
Promotion Councils, Export-Import banks, Export Credit Guarantee Schemes, etc. For 
example, in 1934, the U.S. government agency - Export-Import bank - was established 
for the purpose of encouraging U. S. trade by supplying credit at subsidized rates of 
interest and financial guarantees to customers of U.S. exporters as well as export 
insurance covers. In the U.K. there is the Export Credits Guarantee Department 
(ECGD), set up in 1930 as an independent department, that has authority, under Treasury 
control, to issue insurance policies to cover risks met by exporters, such as insolvency 
or default of importer, refusal of goods on delivery and political and foreign exchange 
risks. 
Regional and inter-governmental bodies of various sorts are also actively engaged in 
developing markets for products and services through varying degrees of cooperative 
export arrangements. Inter-governmental export and cooperation agencies of the kinds 
found among member states of North America, EEC, ECOWAS, GCC, ASEAN, to 
name a few, are examples of pervasive international recognition of the strategic role of 
export operations in international business. 
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6.1.1. REASONS FOR EXPORTING 
Although sales, costs, and risk factors may be important motivating forces for developing 
export activity, studies about the export behaviour of firms have shown that the actual 
initiating factors in export involvement are either internal or external to the firm. 
6.1.2. INTERNAL DETERMINANTS 
The most important internal determinant of export marketing tends to be corporate 
management. Cavusgil (1984) independently and with Nevin (1981) identified 
organizational and management characteristics as very important in explaining variations 
in export activity and in the export initiation process. In the study of differences among 
exporting firms based on their degree of internationalization, Cavusgil found that 
expansion of export activity is significantly related to the following four behavioural 
factors: 
Management's expectations, concerning the effects of exporting on firm's growth, 
market development and profits; 
Managements' perceptions of and attitudes towards risk and desire to develop new 
markets; 
Technology orientation of the firm; and 
Extent of resource allocation to exporting, such as systematic exploration of 
foreign market opportunities and formulation of corporate export policy. 
In an earlier study, Bilkey (1978) had argued that whether or not management was 
interested in and enthusiastic about exporting depended on the following four factors: 
Management's Impression or Perception ofthe overall attractiveness of exporting. 
This is an abstract idea which is independent of any contributions exporting might 
make to the firm. 
International Orientation of the firm: Several attitudinal factors have been found 
to be significant for the degree of international orientation that a firm may exhibit. 
The firm's background and traditions and foreign attitudes of its top management 
may be special cases. For example, Bilkey notes that the foreign attitudes of top 
managements correlate, in turn, with whether or not: they studied a foreign 
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language in school, lived abroad sufficiently long to have experienced cultural 
shock, and had an attractive foreign experience. 
Confidence in the firm's competitive advantage: Managerial perception of the 
strength and significance of its ownership advantages is a measure of its 
confidence and ability to compete in foreign markets. Composite proxy factors 
include: management's perception of whether or not the firm's products have 
unique qualities; management's perception of whether or not the firm has 
technological, marketing, financial or price advantages; whether or not the firm 
possesses exclusive information about a foreign market or customer; whether or 
not the firm has a patented product; and whether or not the firm has an efficient 
distribution network; and 
Adverse home market conditions: Adverse domestic macroeconomic and/or 
political conditions may cause management to explore export opportunities as a 
means of sustaining the firm's survival and growth. Government regulations 
(such as sectoral ceilings or increased local taxes) and saturated or depressed 
domestic market mayall, in varying degrees, determine whether or not 
management decides to initiate exports. 
6.1.3. EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS 
Internal factors are immanently related to a firm's efforts to exploit market opportunities 
abroad. However, in many cases firms begin export sales in a passive manner, that is 
through unsolicited orders. In their study, Simpson and Kujawa (1974) found that 70 to 
80 per cent of the sample companies' first export order was unsolicited. In cases where 
the initiating force is passive there is usually not an articulated export policy or a formal 
plan of action, rather the firm resorts to its bankers for advice and guidance. 
Unsolicited export orders might come to a firm as a result of information which the 
foreign buyers might have obtained about the firm's product or price advantages. 
Sources of such information include: trade journals, chambers of commerce, banks, 
industrial associations, spillover in advertising or systematic buying procedures of foreign 
buyers. Alternatively, foreign buyers could obtain information about the firm's products 
or price advantages through the firm's embassy in the buyer's country, through trade fairs 
125 
and indirect enquiries through friends abroad, mail order catalogues or by word of mouth. 
In this researcher's experience, all of these have proved to be credible sources of 
information. 
6.2. LICENSING IN THE STRATEGY OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
The term 'licensing' is often used in a generic sense to describe a wide range of 
contractual arrangements involving a transfer of knowledge (technology), rights and 
resources between parties located in different countries. For example, licensing is 
frequently associated with management contracts, franchising, and contract manufacturing 
(see, for example, Rugman et al. 1986, p 94). Monye (1989) employs the term in a much 
broader context to include the above as well as joint ventures, turnkey contracts, etc. The 
submission here is that such a generalised usage tends to distort the true nature and 
practical subtlety of international licensing. Moreover, that kind of umbrella usage can 
be confusing because each of those organisational modes is a distinct strategic form of 
servicing foreign markets. Here, however, the term is employed in a more precise way 
to refer to a contractual arrangement in which a foreign company (the licensor) grants, 
on a quid pro quo basis, a local company (the licensee) the rights to exploit its know-
how. The rights are generally to manufacture and market the licensor's product in the 
licensee's home market. In effect, licensing is simply a legal permission from one firm 
to another that enables the latter to use the know-how or proprietary rights of the former. 
In general, the right to appropriate another firm's assets (tangible or intangible) is 
intricately linked with the fact that such assets are legally protected. In particular, 
intangible properties such as copyrights, patents or trademarks are legally sanctioned 
monopolies or proprietary rights of a company. To use them therefore without the 
permission of the owner tantamounts to an actionable violation. For instance, in a recent 
US case, an artiste successfully pleaded that another had plagiarized his tune. Hence, it 
is this transfer of intangible property rights that is the fulcrum of a licensing agreement 
and distinguishes licensing from the other associated contractual arrangements (Root, 
1987). It is that which also establishes the form which a license may take. 
126 
6.2.1. MOTIVATIONS FOR LICENSING 
There are many reasons why a firm may wish to license abroad. In their surveys of 
international licensing strategy, Telesio (1979) and Contractor (1986) studied the reasons 
for licensing from the perspectives of the licensor (Table 6.1) and licensee (Figure 6.1), 
respectively. 
Table 6.1. Average Occurrence of Reasons for Licensing Abroad 
Reasons for Licensing Percentage of Companies Total Number 
Citing Particular Reason of Companies 
Has Been of Importance Giving a Response 
Rank 
5 Shortage of funds for Investment 55 46 
7 Did not have management for 36 39 
investment 
6 Lacked knowledge of market 48 41 
2 Market too small for profitable 73 45 
investment 
4 Entry in market difficult because 58 45 
of strong competitors 
3 Politically risky situation for 66 35 
investment 
1 Government pressure for licensing 90 42 
Note: Replies were to the question: Considering your recent licensing decisions, which of the factors below 
have been of importance in determining whether you license to an unaffiliated company or a minority-
owned affiliate instead of investing with a controlled manufacturing facility? The possible replies were 
(1) has been of importance, (2) occasionally of importance, and (3) never of importance. In this table, 
the first two possible replies were combined into one. 
Source: Telesio, P. (1979). Technology Licensing and Multinational 
Enterprises, New York: Praeger Publishers, p.38. 
The first three reasons of Table 6.1 are firm-level factors (ranks 5, 7, 6); the fourth, sixth 
and seventh (ranks 2, 3, 1) reasons are host country-level factors, while the fifth reason 
(rank 4) is internalisation or product/ industry - level factor. From the licensor's point 
of view, host government pressure was the utmost reason for licensing, with 90 percent 
of the sample firms citing it. 
Following it was the size of the host country's market. Seventy three percent of the 
respondents felt that the reason they used the licensing mode was because the host market 
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was too small for a profitable investment. Surprisingly, firm size, proxied by managerial 
expertise, knowledge of host market (or lack of it) and financial constraint, are in 
descending rank order of importance the least reasons for licensing abroad. 
From the licensee's point of view, the reasons for entering into licensing arrangements 
range from cost of research and development through selling international brand name to 
the prestige effect of associating with an international company (Figure 6.1). These 
reasons are more likely to influence licensing arrangements between developing country 
licensees and developed country licensors. The former are less likely to have access to, 
or expertise in, technology and are more likely to benefit from association with 
established brand names or internationally recognised companies than their developed 
country counterparts. 
Figure 6.1. Reasons for Licensee's Need for Licensing 
1. Avoid R&D costs. 
2. Upgrade Technology. 
3. Receiving valuable brand name. 
4. Selling internationally through licensor. 
S. To pre-empt licensor competition. 
6. Reproduce proven manufacturing techniques. 
7. Future links/other business with licensor. 
8. To receive future technology from licensor. 
9. Prestige effect of associating with international company. 
Source: Contractor, F.J. (1985), Licensin2 in International Strate2Y, West 
Point Conn Quorum Books, p.178. 
6.3. FRANCHISING IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY 
A franchise is a special type of licensing or technical-assistance agreement in which one 
party, known as franchisor, provides another, called franchisee, the use of a 'package' 
that incorporates both the trademark and technical know-how as well as local exclusivity 
and support service, including supplies and financial assistance. Franchising has had a 
historical following with U.S. enterprises since the nineteenth century. It is generally 
believed that the first franchise ever to be established was by the Singer Sewing Machine 
Company in the USA in 1863 (Young, et aI, 1989, p.227). Since then, it has become 
a popular mode of international establishment among many enterprises including hotels, 
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breweries, soft drink companies, motor dealers, petroleum marketers (filling stations), 
and fast food restaurants. For instance, Holiday Inn grants to the various national 
franchisees its trade name as well as local exclusivity, management assistance, ranging 
from appraisal of a proposed hotel site to the provision of reservations services and 
training programmes. Oil companies attach their trade names to the refined petroleum, 
as in Gulf oil, Mobil oil, Shell oil, etc., and in turn franchise these trade names to filling 
stations. 
In addition to its popular use as a form of international business, franchising is also used 
very frequently between domestic firms. It is also used to achieve market segmentation, 
without necessarily creating intra-firm competition. Franchising benefits the host country 
through the package of training and technology transfers; on the other hand, it affords the 
firm a means of international entry/expansion with minimum risks and commitment of 
resources. 
6.3.1. INTERNATIONAL GROWTH PATTERNS 
Franchising has seen a phenomenal growth in both the domestic and international fronts 
since after World War II. In the last two decades, US MNEs have played a leading role 
in this form of international business expansion (Welch, 1989). It is estimated that one 
third of retail sales in the US are handled by franchising, with three quarters of the sales 
in three areas: car and truck dealers, filling stations, and soft drink bottling (Daniels and 
Radebaugh, 1986 p.517). In terms of international growth pattern, the fastest growth 
areas of the franchising industry have been in the food (mainly fast food and hotels) and 
business services, with US firms forming the lead also. For example, in the early 1980s, 
it was estimated that there were 295 international franchisors in the USA and about 
23,500 outlets abroad, with 30 per cent of this total in Canada, 25 per cent in Europe 
(primarily in the UK) and 20 per cent in Japan (Kacker, 1985). Mcdonald's alone had 
over 1000 foreign franchises in 1980, and expected to derive over half its sales from 
abroad by 1990 (Business Week, 1981 p.162). In fact, the entry of McDonald's into the 
Soviet Union is indicative of the extent of corporate reliance on franchising as an entry 
mode choice. 
129 
There is also a growing number of franchisee countries, including some developing 
countries, whose local firms have developed their own franchise systems and are pushing 
these into the international market. For instance, Pronuptia, a French bridal wear 
franchisor, has 250 foreign outlets. Wimpy's and Bake 'N' Take from the UK and 
Winerwald from Germany are some of the earliest and most successful international food 
franchisors (Daniels and Radebaugh, 1986, p.518). There are, according to one estimate, 
80,000 businesses running on a franchised basis in Britain, many of these as filling-
stations and fast-food outlets. The industry is simultaneously witnessing a steady growth 
and encouragement from home governments. Australia, which by 1986 was ranked only 
behind Canada and Japan as host countries to US franchisors, is now the home of a 
growing number of international franchise systems (Welch, 1990). Malaysia is also part 
of this evolving pattern. With the Malaysian government supporting the development of 
small businesses via franchising, a small number of Malaysian food franchising operators 
have begun to go international (Dusevic, 1989). 
In terms of operational patterns, two types of franchising are distinguishable: 'product and 
trade name' franchise and 'business format' franchising, also known as 'full business 
system'. As the name suggests, the first type of franchise involves the MNE's product 
as well as its trade name, as for example, when Coca-Cola sells its syrup along with the 
right to use its trademark to independent bottling companies (franchisees). The business 
format franchising involves much more than product and trade name. It additionally 
involves marketing strategies, operating procedures and quality control; and continuing 
direct association between the franchisor and franchisee in the operation of the business 
(Young, et al. 1989, p.230). Thus, it is a more comprehensive package than product and 
trade name type, hence it is called full business system. It is also the form which 
dominates the international market and actually separates franchising from licensing. Fast-
foods, hotels and filling-stations are examples of industries using the business format 
system. Although in practice it is difficult to trace the line that divides product and trade 
name franchising and basic licensing, following that Coca-Cola example, nevertheless, 
the literature provides evidence concerning subtle features that separate franchising from 
licensing. 
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6.3.2. DISTINCTION BETWEEN FRANCHISE AND LICENSE 
Franchising has traditionally been regarded as a form of licensing. Conceptually, many 
of the principles of licensing apply equally to franchising: both are contractual agreements 
which, for a fee, involve the transfer of proprietary rights form one firm to another. 
Practically however, franchising involves more than nominal transfer of rights: in the 
main, it entails the provision of a wider package of services on a continuing basis than 
would be the case with licensing in the operation of the business. Although opinions vary 
as to the precise difference between the two types of agreement. The summary presented 
in Figure 6.2 captures many of the differences. 
6.4. CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
STRATEGY 
The discussion so far has focused on a spectrum of contractual arrangements used by 
firms independently as entry modes into foreign markets. Because the manifestations of 
contractual arrangements are so wide-ranging and because some of them are not only in 
mutual or reciprocal relationship but also are commonly found in combination, it is 
appropriate, within the scope of international market development, to consider these for 
aggregate discussion within a single chapter. A management contract may be a by-
product of licensing, franchising or a turnkey agreement. For example, most breweries 
in Nigeria, as in many developing countries, were established as, but not limited to, 
turnkey arrangements. Even those established over ten years ago still operate under some 
form of foreign management contract and depend on their foreign partners for equipment 
repairs and component supplies. 
The formal purpose of this section is to complete the roster of international contractual 
investment strategies by accounting for other establishment modes under which the 
foreign firm may contribute no equity capital, but which provide it with some control or 
returns, even after the project has been completed. Specifically, these include: 
management contracts, turnkey contracts, product-in-hand contracts, market-in-hand 
contracts, international subcontracting, production-sharing and risk-service contracts. 
These are considered seriatim. 
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Figure 6.2. Distinction Between Licensing and Franchising 
Licensing 
1. The term 'royalties' is 1. 
normally used. 
2. Products, or even a single 2. 
product, is the common element. 
3. Licenses are usually taken 3. 
by well-established 
businesses. 
4. Terms of 16 to 20 years are 4. 
common, particularly where 
they relate to technical 
know-how, copyright and trademarks. 
The terms are similar for patents. 
5. Licensees tend to be self- 5. 
selecting. They are often an 
6. 
7. 
8. 
established business and can demonstrate 
that they are in a strong position to 
operate the license in question. 
A licensee can often pass his license 
onto an associated or sometimes 
unconnected company with little or no 
reference to the original licensor. 
Usually concerns specific existing 6. 
products with very little benefit from 
ongoing research being passed on by the 
licensor to his licensee. 
There is no goodwill attached to the 7. 
license as it is totally retained 
by the licensor. 
Licensees enjoy a substantial 8. 
measure of fee negotiation. As 
bargaining tools, they can use 
their trade muscle and their 
established position in the 
marketplace. 
Franchising 
Management fees are regarded as the 
most appropriate term. 
Covers the total business, including the know-how, 
intellectual rights, goodwill, trademark and business 
contacts. (Franchising is all-encompassing, whereas 
licensing concerns just one part of the business). 
Tends to be a start-up situation, certainly as 
regards the franchisee. 
The franchise agreement is normally for five years, 
sometimes extending to 10 years. Franchises are 
frequently renewable. 
The franchisee is very definitely selected by the 
franchisor, and his eventual replacement is 
controlled by the franchisor. 
The franchisor is expected to pass on to his 
franchisees the benefits of his ongoing 
research programme as part of the agreement. 
Although the franchisor does retain the main 
goodwill, the franchisee picks up an element 
of localized goodwill. 
There is a standard fee structure and any 
variation within an individual franchise 
franchise system would could cause confusion 
and mayhem. 
Source: Perkins, J.S. (1987). "How Licensing, Franchising Differ", Les 
Nouvelles, December 157. 
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6.4.1. MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS 
Management contracts are a growing form of foreign market development. Managerial 
talent is one of the most important ownership-specific advantages of a firm. It plays a 
distinct role in the economic and political development of a nation. One of the hallmarks 
of national development is the availability of adequately trained management. Thus, 
although a country may be endowed with natural resources, without skilled indigenous 
manpower it will depend on foreign management to harness such resources. Management 
talent is one important dimensions which is often used to differentiate between developed 
less developed countries, with the latter depending largely on the former for the supply 
of expert skills. 
The term 'management contract' is used imprecisely to refer to transfer of management 
skills. Yet, "rarely are management contracts purely concerned with transferring 
management skills" (Buckley, 1985). For the most part, an infusion of technology is 
involved (Gabriel, 1967; Ellison, 1975, 1976). Some conceive of it as a form of 
licensing or subcontracting arrangement under which the contractee pays for training in 
production and, in return, is "allowed to produce as much as he likes of the product" 
(Casson, 1986). The operational dynamics of contemporary management contracts 
however make this definition infamous, which is why Casson himself feels that "no 
rational profit-maximising firm would be willing to pass on its advantage to a potential 
rival on these terms unless its management believes that the partner will never learn 
sufficient to become a serious rival or that the advantage is about to become obsolete in 
any case". 
Management contract, as the name implies, is a contractual arrangement whereby a firm 
provides management expertise in general or specialised functional areas to another firm 
or organization, for a specified period of time, for a fee. This definition is consistent 
with Ellison's broad conception: 
Management contract is an arrangement under which a certain degree of 
responsibility for the operations of one enterprise is vested in another. The latter 
undertakes the usual management functions, makes available a whole range of 
skills and resources and trains personnel. The contract covers payment to the 
company and the handing over of authority to the locals once trained (Ellison, 
1975, p. 25). 
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Construction management contracts are conventionally excluded from the above 
definition, even though there is not much dissimilarity between the two, at least 
conceptually. In the construction industry, the term 'management contract' refers to a 
contractual arrangement between a construction project client and an external management 
firm under which the latter operates as the project's management contractor with 
responsibility for the management and co-ordination of the design and construction phases 
of the project. The management contractor does not participate in the project's 
construction work, rather provides management services to control and co-ordinate site 
activities, which are normally sub-contracted to other construction firms (CIRIA, 1983, 
p.6). 
A common feature of management contracts is the operational control it confers on the 
foreign contractor as regards the enterprise or a crucial phase of it. Such control would 
otherwise be invested in, or exercised by, the contractee's internal management. The 
operational control may be with respect to general management of a project or an 
enterprise, personnel training and administration, production, financial services and 
administration, provision of inputs and services, and/or distribution and marketing. 
The control element embedded in management contracts gives the foreign firm the 
opportunity to control the amount and type of information that is divulged as well as the 
level of expertise offered. Through this influence, the firm is able to maximize its 
earnings by widening indirectly the scope of its remit. For instance, a foreign contractor 
engaged to manage a state airline does not generally restrict itself to 'mundane' 
management. The operation may involve rationalization, selling off obsolete aircraft, 
acquiring or leasing new aircraft, improving or restructuring reservations services, 
including computerization and control, and any other activity it deems fit for the 
realization of the objectives. 
Management contracts often supplement other forms of international business such as 
licensing, turnkey projects, joint ventures, or subcontracting. In their pure form, the 
foreign firm provides managerial services to a local project, without equity interest or 
ownership claim. Nevertheless, they may be used to facilitate control in the other forms 
and can also serve as a means of avoiding political risks. In particular, in less developed 
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countries, management contracts tend to be interlocked with the political process, but are 
less likely to be volatile to its changing fortunes than dividends from fdi operations. In 
short, the characteristics of management contracts - which make them appealing to host 
countries - are to be found in their residual property. That is, they tend to be employed 
mainly for project redemption purposes and/or for projects in which local resources 
(broadly defined to include know-how, technology, and factor inputs) are either 
unavailable or inadequate. 
The emergence of management contracts in international market development has been 
widely linked to changing international investment strategies in the North-South context 
(Oman, 1986) and reflects judgements of the following general kinds by the developing 
country: (1) a preference for local ownership over foreign ownership, even if that 
ownership is nominal, that is, not accompanied by control over operational activities; (2) 
a lack of local technical and managerial skills to set up and operate the project; and (3) 
a recognition that the project carries with it, at least for the short term, a valuable socio-
economic cost benefit, regardless of the nationality of the foreign contractors (UNCTC, 
1983, p.1). 
These generalizations apply to all types of management contracts, be it hotel management, 
chemical plant operation or procurement of special services. The judgements embody a 
realistic appraisal of corporate deficiency, on the one hand, and corporate capabilities, 
on the other hand, as a unique element of such transactions. The transactional 
implications of this for international investment are: 
(a) an increasing willingness of MNEs to assume 'managerial' role rather than 
'ownership' in overseas operations; 
(b) the opportunity this role provides the MNE to enter and establish operational 
presence in foreign markets that are increasingly inhospitable to direct investment; 
(c) the opportunity this device offers Western MNEs to establish in markets 
traditionally closed to foreign private capital; and 
(d) the flexibility this managerial role provides MNEs to adopt their commercial 
strategies to changes in international markets brought about by global competition, 
fluctuating fortunes in macroeconomic development and environmental pressures 
against foreign direct investment. 
135 
6.4.2. TURNKEY CONTRACTS 
Turnkey projects have become particularly significant in the economic development 
process of less developed countries (LDCs). LDCs are characterised by problems of 
political democracy and leadership, economic development, rapid industrialization, 
inadequate infrastructure, and management of changing fortunes (eg poverty, ethnic 
tensions, prolonged civil wars, depression, high unemployment, hyperinflation, and 
affluence). Their natural resources however provide some sort of 'potent alchemy' to the 
economies. The inter-dependence of LDCs and DCs is not in doubt, and is not at issue 
here. For obvious reasons, the political machinery of most LDCs views FDI of some 
Western MNEs as a potent intervention in their political/economic governance. 
Consequently, they tend to encourage industrialization processes which potentially offer 
technological transfer whilst minimizing the subrogation of economic or political 
independence. Contractual arrangements are deemed to be pro-active in the 
industrialization process, and in this context turnkey projects are particularly significant. 
A turnkey contract is an investment arrangement whereby a foreign contractor has overall 
responsibility for 'setting up' a complete production facility for eventual transfer to the 
host country owner. Projects executed under this sort of arrangement are thus termed 
turnkey projects. Implicit in this definition are the following features: 
1. By 'setting up' is meant construction of the production unit/facility and bringing 
it ready for commissioning. 
2. Ownership of the facility is transferred to the local owner, after a period of test-
runs, signalling the completion of the first phase of the project. 
3. The production facility may be factory, industrial plant, refinery, public 
infrastructure such as airport, seaport or railway facilities. 
4. The local owner/contractee may be a firm or government. The notion that the 
customers are usually governments (mainly developing country governments) who 
have decreed that a given product or service must be produced locally and under 
its auspices (Daniels and Radebaugh, 1986, p.520) is a sweeping generalization. 
This author has been associated with two turnkey arrangements in Nigeria neither 
of which involved the government. There is also abundant evidence about the use 
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of turnkey arrangements in other LDCs' private sector contracts (see, for 
example, country cases in Oman (ed.) 1984). 
Turnkey arrangements are usually accompanied by management contracts, licensing or 
franchising, whereby continuing relationships with the foreign contractors or their 
principals/agents are maintained. In fact, in certain types of industries such as breweries 
licensing is essential. A look at the labels of most beers brewed in developing countries 
depicts an assignment of German or other foreign brands. Implicit in the above definition 
are two types of turnkey contracts: 'light and heavy'. A 'light' turnkey contract is one 
which comes to an end once the physical construction of the project has been completed. 
A 'heavy' one, on the other hand, contains clauses which provide for the extensive 
training of local personnel. 
A common feature of turnkey contracts that distinguishes them from most other 
international business operations is the size of the projects involved. Size is in respect 
of both the scale or complexity of operations and the amount of money involved. Related 
to this feature is the specific nature of turnkey projects. While differing from project to 
project and country to country, the crucial investment distinction of turnkey contracts is 
this: they are idiosyncratic, meaning that they are transaction-specific, specialized, and 
nonmarketable (see Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1981a, for explication of these terms). 
6.4.3. PRODUCT-IN-HAND CONTRACTS 
Product-in-hand contracts are variants of turnkey operations. Under the arrangement, the 
contractor's responsibility goes beyond project completion and commencement of 
operations, as is the case with turnkey projects. The incremental dimension here is that 
the turnkey installation must be completely operational with local personnel. Product-in-
hand contracts are analogous to the 'heavy' type of turnkey contract referred to above in 
that they contain provisions which confer legal responsibility on the foreign contractor to 
train local management and workers to take over the running of the installation. In a 
pure turnkey contract this provision does not form part of the original remit. An example 
of product-in-hand contract is what is termed 'Completely-Knocked Down' (CKD) 
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assembly plant. As the name suggests, it is a subassembly plant. Under the terms of the 
contract, the contractor brings the components of the plant into the host country in a 
semi-assembly form. The contract often stipulates that local input components be utilised 
as much as possible in place of imported components. The feature of product-in-hand 
contracts is that their products are often meant for the host country and/or regional 
market. Major international motor manufacturing companies adopt this mode. In Nigeria, 
for example, Peugeot Motor Company of France, Volkwagenwerk Ag of Germany, and 
Mercedes Benz of Germany, all operate CKD assembly plants. 
6.4.4. MARKET-IN-HAND CONTRACTS 
Another form of turnkey contractual arrangement is the market-in-hand agreement. In 
this form, the foreign contractor is additionally required to take responsibility, wholly or 
partially, for the sale of the project's output. This type of arrangement often 
characterises projects in which the foreign participant has a stronger incentive to establish 
in the host country than his local partner. In this case, the foreign partner/contractor may 
have developed home market for the product but may be concerned about production 
costs. With a host country partner providing transactional economy, for example, 
through cheap labour and provision of infrastructure, the foreign partner may undertake 
to market the project's output outside the host country. 
Market-in-hand contracts are found in fishing projects, petroleum projects, rubber 
products and in projects where there is a greater demand and utility in developed 
countries. In this regard the local partner/contractee provides the administrative support 
and 'software' inputs while the foreign partner/contractor is obliged under the terms of 
the contract to establish market for the products. 
Where the market, if any, for the project's output in the host country offers an inadequate 
incentive to establish the project, or where local promoters lack necessary production, 
managerial and marketing skills, market-in-hand provisions in the contract, enable the 
multinational partner to yield optimization privilege to the host country (See, Ozawa, 
1984). 
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6.4.5. INTERNATIONAL SUBCONTRACTING/CONTRACT 
MANUFACTURING 
International subcontracting, also known as contract manufacturing or offshore 
production/assembly, is an arrangement in which a firm based in one country (termed the 
principal contractor) places an order with a firm based in another country (termed the 
subcontractor) to produce components or assemble finished products. The subcontract 
is typically limited to production to the principal's specifications and brand name. 
Generally, the responsibility for the marketing of the product lies with the principal, with 
sales normally taking place in the principal's home and/or third-country markets. 
One writer describes subcontracting "as a kind of half-way house between arm's length 
transactions on the open-market and complete internalization within the firm ... The 
subcontracting relationship is symbiotic - a technical division of labour between 
independent firms - in which each partner contributes to the support of the other". 
(Dicken, 1986). 
OTHER CONTRACTUAL/COLLABORATIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
A number of other contractual/collaborative arrangements exist that are either 
encompassed within the same package, too industry-specific for common identification 
or involve government agencies in the main. These are generally referred to as industrial 
cooperation agreements (lCA) , although references to licensing, technical assistance 
arrangements, turnkey projects and joint ventures come under this heading. Since these 
other forms have precise signification as discussed above, it may be appropriate to restrict 
ICA to other contractual/collaborative arrangements that are industry-specific or firm-
cum-government. Arrangements under scrutiny here include production-sharing contracts 
and risk-service contracts. 
6.4.6. PRODUCTION-SHARING CONTRACTS 
These are primarily found among oil and extractive industries. Under the contract the 
foreign firm prospects for oil or minerals in specified fields and, if a successful find is 
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recorded, undertakes production in conjunction with the host country's state-owned 
company. Specific features of the agreement include pre-determined production 
percentage share, pre-determined share of the physical output, and length of time required 
to recoup pre-production costs and to hand over contract rights to the state company. 
Pre-determined share of costs and revenues between the foreign firm and the host 
government agency varies from country to country, and ranges from 15 per cent host-
government share, as in Chile, to 85 per cent host-government share, as in Egypt (Oman, 
1984, p.16). Similarly, other considerations, such as technical and financial 
responsibilities of the parties, are carefully specified in the contract. 
6.4.7. RISK SERVICE CONTRACTS 
Risk service contracts are similar to production-sharing contracts in many respects. Both 
are used primarily in the petroleum and extractive industries. The crucial investment 
distinction between the two is that under a risk service contract the foreign company's 
share of output is paid in cash rather than physical output. However, the agreement may 
also contain a provision which permits the contractor to exchange its cash receipts for 
equivalent amount of output (e.g. crude oil) determined at international prices. Another 
important feature of risk service contracts is that the burden of risk rests solely on the 
foreign contractor, who must also provide the investment capital for exploration and 
production. 
What then is the attraction in this type of foreign investment, given that if no oil is found 
the contract terminates? With a production-sharing contract, the foreign contractor is at 
least paid a pre-determined fee for exploration services if no oil is found. Under a risk 
service contract, the foreign contractor's compensation package is made up of capital 
reimbursement, interest on the capital and a pre-determined percentage of risk fee, out 
of production revenues. 
Risk service contracts may be particularly appealing to the large multinational oil 
companies for the following reasons First, their very nature constitutes an entry barrier. 
The requirements of such agreements (including production-sharing contracts) 
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prospectively increase the difficulty of entry by new firms or small-and medium-size 
firms. To be able to compete for these contracts the firm must possess the capital and 
knowledge (technical and managerial) necessary to conduct these types of operation. 
Second, sequel to the entry empendiments, the few participating firms may successfully 
effectuate collusion as a prelude to establishing dominance either in the industrial sector 
and/or market segment. This may account for the global domination of the petroleum 
industry by few large MNEs, such as Royal Dutch-Shell, British Petroleum, Exxon, 
Mobil, Texaco, etc. For the same reason these companies are found in virtually every 
country that produces oil. 
The monopolistic incentives of these factors progressively lead the firms to integrate 
vertically across national boundaries into markets that could otherwise be competitively 
organised. Even if integration (backward or forward) does not capture all aspects of the 
market, the residual (nonintegrated) sector may be so reduced that only a few firms of 
efficient size can service this area. In other words, firms that would otherwise be 
prepared to enter into the initial stage of the market may be discouraged from coming in 
by the prospect of having to engage in small-numbers bargaining, with all the hazards that 
this entails, with the few market-mediated-exchanges (Williamson, 1975, p.116). 
6.5. JOINT VENTURES IN THE STRATEGY OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT 
If direct investment (through wholly-owned subsidiary) is viewed as the ultimate in the 
hierarchical route of resource transfer in which there is a de jure control over foreign 
operations, then joint ventures (JVs) may be categorized as next in the ladder. The term 
'joint venture' implies the sharing of assets, risks and profits, and participation in the 
ownership (Le. equity) of a particular enterprise or investment project by more than one 
firm or economic 'group' (Oman 1984, p.14). It is a contractual arrangement whereby 
two or more parties collaborate in an economic activity under joint control. Reference 
to 'control' is intended to underline the power to govern the financial and operating 
policies of an economic activity with the prospects of yielding benefits. 'Joint Control' 
141 
therefore is the contractually agreed sharing of control over an economic activity. It 
presupposes joint contribution to the venture in accordance with contractually agreed 
proportions. The notion of 'joint control' is to be distinguished from 'significant 
influence' and/or 'joint venture investor'. By 'significant influence' is meant the power 
to participate in the financial and operating policy decisions of an economic activity 
without control or joint control over those policies (lAS No 31, 1991). An investor in 
a joint venture is by definition a party to a joint venture with no joint control over that 
venture. The investor may be a firm, government agency or an economic group with 
significant influence but not joint control over the venture. 
This definition immediately distinguishes between three forms and structures of JVs: 
jointly controlled operations, jointly controlled assets and jointly controlled entities. The 
first type encompasses cases where two or more venturers combine their operations, 
resources and expertise in order to manufacture, market and distribute jointly a particular 
product. Some JVs involve the joint ownership and control of the assets, the use of 
which results in joint profit sharing. A jointly controlled entity is a JV which involves 
the establishment of another entity ('a child') in which each venturer has an interest. The 
child operates in the same way as other enterprises, except that a contractual arrangement 
between the parties establishes joint control over the economic activity of the entity. 
Implicit in the above JV view is a notion of an all party equity participation commonly 
referred to as 'equity joint venture' (EJV). However, all joint ventures cannot, both 
conceptually and practically, be regarded as EJVs. There amy be instances in which a 
collaborating partner has no equity stake in the venture, but, nevertheless, is an important 
lifeline in the organization and success of the project. Where the JV partners are drawn 
together by equity contribution, the distribution of equity shares may be determined by 
each partner's financial contribution, or it may be related to other forms of capital 
contribution, such as technology, management or access to world markets. The latter 
form of participation may be described 'narrowly' as non equity joint venture (NEJV). 
Where the joint venture partnership is between parties resident in different countries, it 
is known as international joint venture (IJV). IJVs under scrutiny here are those in which 
the host country partner holds at least 50 per cent of the equity. Thus, joint ventures 
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which are majority foreign owned are excluded from the category of new forms. In 
practice, however, the type of venture and the relative nature of equity contribution 
coupled with host country inward investment regulations may determine the composition 
of interest. 
In general, the common features of IJVs are: 
1. incorporating a separate enterprise in which investors from two or more countries 
have a mutual interest and share a common economic purpose; 
2. joint commitment of resources to the venture; 
3. joint management responsibility; 
4. sharing of business risks and losses; 
5. joint participation in the profits of the enterprise; and 
6. enduring cooperation in the venture. 
6.5.1. FACTORS FAVOURING THE GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL JOINT 
VENTURES 
The factors underlining the growth of JVs in international business range from cost and 
risk considerations through international competition to host government regulations. 
Traditionally, investors are risk averse, and the specific nature of JVs suggests that firms 
pursuing global strategies might evaluate both the cost constraints and country cum 
investment risks and seek to reduce them when operating in foreign countries. 
Figure 6.3 derived from a study of JV arrangements in developing countries, lists five 
factors, in no particular order of importance, contributing to the diversity in the use of 
JVs. Host government regulations are significant in determining the use of JVs or any 
governance structure. The issue of control is central both to the regulations and to the 
growth of new forms of investment. Host countries would wish to acquire foreign 
technology and know-how with minimum foreign control of its resources. The exercise 
of foreign control and potential costs of wholly owned subsidiaries are a source of friction 
between host governments and foreign MNEs. Accordingly, investment laws are enacted 
to restrict or prohibit entry modes that place the locus of control of certain classes of 
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enterprises on foreign multinationals (See for example, Nigeria's Indigenization Decree 
1972 or India's Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1974). 
For the profit-seeking MNE, the desire to maximize global returns has to be matched 
with loss of control and ownership of foreign subsidiaries. This balance is prospectively 
attained via JV creation whereby the equity in the foreign subsidiary is shared with host 
country interests (Bivens and Lovell, 1976). 
Another factor in the growth of IJVs is the increasing participation of small and medium-
size firms (SMFs) in international business. 
Figure 6.3. Factors Contributing to the Growth of Joint Venture Activity 
Government legislation, especially in developing host countries, requiring local equity participation 
The increasing participation of small to medium-sized companies in international business, with joint 
ventures being used to reduce the capital cost and risks associated with international expansion. 
A greater diversity in the source country distribution of MNEs and the greater willingness of non-US 
MNEs to enter into joint ventures. 
The increasing costs of technological development, with joint ventures being used to reduce risks and 
the costs of R&D. 
The growing intensity of competition, with joint ventures being used for strategic/competitive reasons. 
Source: Derived from UNCTC, Arrangements between Joint Venture 
Partners, UNCTC Advisory Studies, No.2, Series B, UN, New York, 
1-13. 
Culled from Young, et al (1989, p.342) 
The attraction of JVs for SMFs lies in the sharing of investment costs and risks which, 
otherwise might pose entry barriers to this group of enterprises. Associated with cost and 
risk considerations are entry constraints of the kinds posed by size limitations. SMFs are 
conventionally thought of lacking in the package of corporate resources required to 
144 
embark upon foreign investment. In this regard JVs could potentially mitigate this 
obstacle. 
Related to the influx of SMFs is the increasing diversity in the growth of non-U.S. MNEs 
and their willingness to adopt flexible approaches to foreign investment. In particular, 
Japanese MNEs have eroded many of the host countries traditionally served by U.S. 
MNEs, and have done so by adopting non-equity forms that match host countries' control 
desires. 
Costs of technological development and growing competition in the international 
marketplace are other factors contributing to the growth of JV modes of operation. The 
British telecom video telephone project described above is a classic example of how UVs 
might be created in response to high costs of R&D and strategic/competitive forces. 
Harrigan's (1985) three way analysis of the motivations for JV formation (Figure 6.4) 
covers the factors described above by distinguishing whether JVs are used for internal, 
competitive or strategic purposes. Buckley and Casson (1989) illustrates how different 
motives for internalization manifest themselves in various JV contexts (See Figure 6.5). 
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Figure 6.4. Motivations for Joint Venture Formation 
A. Internal uses 
1. Cost and risk sharing (uncertainty reduction) 
2. Obtain resources where there is no market 
3. Obtain financing to supplement firm's debt capacity 
4. Share outputs of large minimum efficient scale plants 
a. A void wasteful duplication of facilities 
b. Utilise by-products, processes 
c. Shared brands, distribution channels, wide product lines and so forth 
5. Intelligence: obtain window on new technologies and customers 
a. Superior information exchange 
b. Technological personnel interactions 
6. Innovative managerial practices 
a. Superior management systems 
b. Improved communications among SBUs 
7. Competitive uses (strengthen current strategic positions) 
B. Competitive uses (strengthen current strategic positions) 
1. Influence industry structure's evolution 
a. Pioneer development of new industries 
b. Reduce competitive volatility 
c. Rationalise mature industries 
2. Pre-empt competitors ("first-mover" advantages) 
a. Gain rapid access to better customers 
b. Capacity expansion or vertical integration 
c. Acquisition of advantageous terms, resources 
d. Coalition with best partners 
3. Defensive response to blurring industry boundaries and globalization 
a. Ease political tensions (overcome trade barriers) 
b. Gain access to global networks 
4. Creation of more effective competitors 
a. Hybrids possessing parents' strengths 
b. Fewer, more efficient firms 
c. Buffer dissimilar partners 
C. Strategic uses (augment strategic position) 
1. Creation and exploitation of synergies 
2. Technology (or other skills) transfer 
3. Diversification 
a. Toehold entry into new markets, products, or skills 
b. Rationalization or (divestiture) of investment 
c. Leverage-related parents' skills for new uses 
Source: Harrigan, K.R. (1985), Strategies for Ventures, Massachusetts: Lexington 
Books, D.C. Heath & Co., 28. 
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Figure 6.S. Internalization Motives for Joint Venture Creation 
A. Lack of Confidence in Long-term Arm's-Length Contracts 
1. Hedge against intermediate product price movements 
2. Avoid recurrent negotiation under bilateral monopoly over the price of a differentiated 
intermediate product 
3. Integrate upstream and downstream operations 
B. Quality Uncertainty 
C. 
1. Insure against defective quality in jointly used components 
2. Adapt a product to an overseas market 
3. Management training and transfer of technology 
4. Buyback arrangements in collaborative R&D 
Collusion 
1. 
2. 
Reduce cost 
Enhance sales and profitability 
3. Economize on monitoring costs 
4. Control output 
4. Hostages: Internalising the Implementation of Counter threats 
1. Counteract imbalance in vulnerability of two parties in a collaborative venture 
2. A void breakdown in confidence and mutual trust 
3. Establish an atmosphere of consummate cooperation 
Source: Derived from Buckley and Casson (1989). "A Theory of Cooperation 
in International Business" in Buckley (1989), The Multinational 
Enterprise: Theory and Applications, London: Macmillan, pp. 46-74 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
STRATEGIC FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 
INTRODUCTION 
7.1 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
One of the most significant developments in world economy within the last two decades 
is the rapid growth of international banking activities following the phenomenal growth 
of international business. In its traditional form of providing foreign exchange and 
financing imports and exports, international banking has become an enterprise unto itself, 
for not only has it become massive in scale, but has also come to exercise a significant 
influence in both national and international economies. To appreciate the importance of 
growth of banking activity across national boundaries and the rise of the multinational 
bank (MNB) is to cast it within the historical context of the macro-economic environment 
in which the development has occurred. 
International banking is a logical extension of a cross-border mercantile operation. It 
existed in the medieval ages, principally to finance joint ventures between merchants 
involved in mUltiple cross-border voyages. International business transactions (in which 
cross-border agency and partnership or joint venture were the predominant forms) can be 
traced back to Genoa between 1156-1158 AD. This trend, albeit rudimentary, signalled 
the evolution of international banking as an obvious corollary of international business. 
However, the growth of modern forms of international banking may be traced to three-
stage periods of development. The first period, referred to as the pre-World War I 
decade, saw banks headquartered in Great Britain as very dominant market leaders in the 
international arena. At the start of the war, UK domiciled banks had 2,000 foreign 
branches while French and German-based banks, altogether, had five hundred foreign 
branches (Aliber, 1984). This trend could be associated with the financial exigency of 
the war and its overseas financing requirements. During this period, US banks had a 
very modest profile in the international arena. While in 1913, there were only six US-
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based foreign branches, by 1920 the number had increased to 100 and remained 
unchanged until the end of the 1950s (Pecchioli, 1983). 
The second period, referred to as the post-World War II, saw the emergence of US-based 
banks as major leaders in the international branch network system. Their foreign banks' 
networks had blossomed from a modest pre-World War I position through 124 foreign 
branches by 1960 to over 500 by the end of the decade. At the same time, other 
European- and Japanese-based banks had embarked on a substantial expansion of their 
foreign networks. The emergence of foreign branch networks of banks from US, Japan, 
and Europe resulted in global competition in the international capital markets on a scale 
unprecedented in the history of international business. The ensuing competition led to 
shrinking of foreign domination of UK, French and German banks. By the end of 1960 
the total number of foreign branches, subsidiaries, etc. had reached 4,500 (UNCTC, 
1981). 
The last period in the evolutionary process of international banking occurred in the 1970s. 
While the 1960s brought an increased awareness of the scale of problems that arise when 
business operations extend beyond national boundaries, the 1970s witnessed enormous 
developments in international banking. Not only did the number of participants and 
volume of business increase tremendously, significant developments also occurred in 
international capital markets and instruments. Table 7.1 shows the growth of global 
network of overseas branches and agencies of different countries and geographic regions 
as of 1978. The arrival of oil - producing countries and the massive injection of 
petrodollars in the international financial system led to dramatic increase in the role of 
banks in the emerging world economy. The OPEC members were deemed good credit 
risks in the 1970s and bank lending surged to stem the tide of petrodollars pouring into 
the international economic system. The intermediation role of international banks (in 
absorbing and re-channelling surplus funds) within this period has been described as "the 
greatest achievement of international banking in recent years" (Houthakker, 1984),ln 
short, since the 1960s, international banking has become very important not only in the 
scale of lending and borrowing, but also in the number and size of outlets owned by 
banks domiciled in other countries. This trend, which was largely in response to macro-
economic developments in the world economy, has been immense and significant in both 
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Developed (DCs) and Less Developed (LDCs). The number of participants and volume 
of business increased tremendously in tandem with the increasing number of domestic 
banks and interpenetration of national economies by foreign banks. In addition, the 
emergence of resource-rich Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 
the early 1970s as major new actors on the world financial markets increased the role of 
MNBs as primary international financial intermediaries. 
Despite these developments, much of the emerging literature has concentrated on the 
growth of MNEs. Published literature indicates that studies on the phenomenon of 
multinational banking have been comparatively scanty. Indeed, there are only a few 
studies that have applied the theories of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and MNEs to 
explain multinational banking. These include the works of Gray & Gray (1981), Cho 
(1983), and Nigh, Cho and Krishnan (1986). The earlier works of Aliber (1976, 1980, 
1984), Brimmer & Dahl (1975), Fieleke (1977), Germidis and Michalet (1984), Goldberg 
& Saunders (1980,) Grubel (1977), OdIe (1981), and UNCTC (1981, 1982) are largely 
descriptive. Conclusions reached from these studies are mainly from U.S. point of view. 
Furthermore, there is no published study on the application of "new forms of investment" 
to the banking phenomenon. Yet studies of this kind may enhance an understanding of 
the operational modes of banks' diversification strategies. Banking is a highly regulated 
enterprise as Table 7.2 and Exhibit 7.1 indicate. Strict restrictions on certain types of 
entry mode in conjunction with deregulation and competition in international financial 
markets mean that banks pursuing global strategies may have to adopt a flexible approach 
to foreign markets. It is the contention here that while the preferred entry route is one 
that provides an optimum mode, returns to risk and control, however, variations among 
nations may indicate different modes of servicing the needs for various markets. Thus, 
banks may have to change their operating strategies abroad in the light of country risk 
levels, competitive regulatory constraints, and intensified political opposition overseas. 
These indicate that the future market and product expansion in the international banking 
industry may become highly selective, with greater dependence for international 
expansion in countries with proximal political and economic relationships. 
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Table 7.1 Global Network of Overseas Branches and Agencies in 1978 
Country Banks US UK Fra. Ger. Switz. Other Other Jap. Far Mid- Africa Carib. Total 
of Origin Europe Latin East East area 
Amer. 
United States 136 56 21 22 8 67 85 32 126 30 16 207 670 
(8) (11) (3) (3) (4) (52) (14) (18) (4) (7) (12) (128) 
United Kingdom 20 19 21 8 8 72 102 8 503 142 148 83 114 
(16) (2) (24) (2) (1) (30) (64) (7) (845) (49) (2182) (81) (3287) 
France 24 11 13 16 10 48 30 7 31 23 30 7 226 
(16) (2) (5) (1) (44) (45) (13) (14) (232) (5) (361) 
Germany 12 13 6 2 1 1 5 12 7 47 
(2) (1) (1) (1) (2) 
Switzerland 12 8 8 4 3 2 7 33 
(3) (2) (1) (3) 
Netherlands 7 8 5 2 8 28 3 10 10 2 10 86 
(2) (1) (9) (3) (11) (8) (4) (3) (39) 
Italy 6 11 4 6 6 1 1 5 1 35 
(5) (2) (1) (7) (2) (3) (11) (26) 
Other Europe 32 18 158 79 7 1 21 22 3 6 1 1 317 
(13) (6) (9) (3) (1) (19) (12) (2) (18) (33) (103) 
Canada 7 28 15 2 6 7 26 11 7 1 140 243 
(5) (14) (10) (1) (1) (2) (11) (31) (84) (154) 
Japan 23 49 22 1 12 6 3 29 122 
(6) (8) (3) (2) (4) (8) (2) (27) 
Australia 9 7 17 528 522 
(4) (4) (12) (16) 
Latin America 15 16 4 2 1 4 39 2 1 1 1 18 89 
(2) (2) (1) (1) (1) (5) 
Other Far East 47 36 130 4 5 3 1 18 257 81 24 6 565 
(17) (2) (4) (6) (10) (108) (4) (12) (146) 
Mid-East 21 17 20 6 8 3 4 106 10 3 177 
(6) (2) (1) (23) (11) (37) 
Africa 15 8 4 13 15 40 
(6) (9) (38) (47) 
Caribbean 1 13 13 
(1) (7) (2) (9) 
Total 387 241 466 142 87 27 250 356 79 1518 425 249 489 4329 
(112) (34) (40) (39) (16) (6) (123) (229) (34) (1018) (134) (2530) (187) (4390) 
Source: OECD (1983). The Internationalization of Banking: The Policy Issues. Paris: OECD, p. 59 
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Table 7.2 Legal Restrictions on Foreign Bank Entry 
Form of foreign bank presence: Situation in mid-1981 
Participation in indigenous banks Main Changes 
1960-1981 
Representative De-novo 
Country Office Branch Subsidiary Subsidiary (1) Affiliate (2) 
Australia * F F F p(10%) None 
Austria None 
Belgium * * Implementation of EEC Directive of 12/12/1977 
-
Canada F R F p(10%) Some liberalization for de-novo foreign subsidiaries 
in the 1980 Bank Act 
Denmark F p(30%) Liberalization of foreign bank entry as from 11111975. 
Implementation of EEC Directive of 12/12/1977 
Finland + F + F p(20%) Liberalization for de-novo foreign subsidiary in 1980 
France Abolition of special register for foreign banks and 
remaining discriminatory provisions in 1975 
Germany 
Greece F p(49%) None 
Iceland F F F p(49%) None 
Ireland R R R R R Liberalization of policy with regard to foreign bank 
branching in 1977. Implementation of EEC Directive 
of 12/12/1977 
Italy Implementation of EEC Directive of 12/12/1977 
Japan R R p(5%) 
Luxembourg * Implementation of EEC Directive of 12/12/1977. Liberalization with 
regard to foreign representative offices in 1980 
Netherlands R Implementation of EEC Directive of 12/12/1977 
New Zealand * F F F F None 
Norway * F F F F None 
Portugal * F F F F Restrictions introduced in 1975 with the nationalization of banks 
Spain * P R R Substantial liberalization of de-novo entry in 1978 
Sweden R F F F F None 
Switzerland Reciprocity principle introduced in 1969 
Turkey * R F F F 
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Table 7.2 Legal Restrictions on Foreign Bank Entry Continued .. 
Country 
United Kingdom 
United States 
(1) Majority interest; 
Key to symbols 
No authorization required 
Form of foreign bank presence: 
Representative 
Office 
De-novo 
Branch Subsidiary 
(2) Minority interest. 
* Licensing under general authorization procedures 
Situation in mid-1981 
Participation in indigenous banks 
1960-1981 
Subsidiary (1) 
R 
Affiliate (2) 
P 
Main Changes 
Banking Act of 1979 
International Banking Act (1978) 
No specific restriction; entry provisions apply equally to both domestic and foreign applicants. In the latter case, a reciprocity test is applied by some countries. 
R Requires case-by-case authorization/approval, with some provisions applying differently to foreign applicants. 
P Permitted within certain specific limits. Figures in brackets refer to maximum percentages permitted. 
F Forbidden by law or not permitted under government policy. 
+ Requires case-by-case authorization. 
For a detailed description of legal restrictions on foreign bank entry, see Exhibit 7.1. 
Source: OECD (1983). The Internationalization of Bankine: The Policy Issues. Paris: OECD, p. 72 
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Exhibit 7.1 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Source: 
Home-Country Control on the Opening of Domestic Banks' 
Establishments Abroad 
The establishment of overseas branches by Australian banks is not subject to specific 
authorization requirements but the central bank is generally notified. Banks are required to 
consult with the Reserve Bank before establishing subsidiaries, whether domestic or foreign. 
The opening of a bank's first branch abroad requires prior authorization by the Austrian 
National Bank acting as foreign-exchange authoritr. Prior to 1979, any opening of a branch 
was subject to approval. Any acquisition of \,arhcipation in foreign banking institutions is 
subject to approval by the supervisory authonty. 
Prior authonzation is legally required for the opening of branches or the acquisition of 
banking subsidiaries though, in practice, banks have to inform the Banking Commission in 
advance. 
Establishments abroad require approval by the Danish National Bank. In the case of 
establishment of subsidiaries abroad, approval by the supervisory authority is also required. 
Prior to 1979, there were no special provisions governing establishments abroad by Finnish 
banks. As from 1979, only commercial banks, mortgage banks, and the post office bank 
are entitled to establish branches or representative offices abroad. In the case of branches, 
approval by the Ministry of Finance is required; for representative offices, notification to 
the Ministry of Finance is sufficient. Subject to permission by the Ministry of Finance, a 
Finnish commercial bank may purchase shares in a foreign financial or credit institution up 
to a total of 20 per cent of the bank's equity capital. 
The establishment of French banks' offshoots abroad and the acquisition of participation in 
foreign banks are free up to an amount of Frs. 1 million per calendar year. For larger 
amounts, prior authorization by the Treasury is required. 
German banks are not subject to specific authorization requirements for the opening of 
establishments abroad, but the supervisory authority must be notified. 
Domestic banks are required to consult with the Central Bank with regard to the opening of 
new branches, acquisitions, or the establishment of subsidiaries abroad. 
The establishment of overseas branches of Italian banks and the acquisition or establishment 
of subsidiaries are subject to prior authorization by the Central Bank. 
Both the establishment of overseas branches of Japanese banks and the acquisition or 
establishment of foreign subsidiaries are subject to prior approval by the Ministry of 
Finance. Capital transactions concerning the opening of foreign establishments stated above 
require prior notice to the Ministry of Finance. 
A formal authorization is legally required for the opening of a forei~n branch. The 
establishment or the acquisition of subsidiaries abroad is not subject to pnor authorization, 
but banks will inform and consult the Banking Commissioner in advance. 
The opening of branches or subsidiaries abroad by Dutch banks is not subject to any formal 
requirement but in respect of subsidiaries a declaration of no-objection is required for 
participation in other enterprises (including banks) in excess of 5 per cent of the own 
resources of the enterprise concerned. 
The opening of subsidiaries, branches, representative offices, or any other form of banking 
presence abroad is subject to prior approval by the Ministry of Finance. 
The authorization of the Ministry of Economy is required for the opening of branches 
abroad, which is, in any case, subject to exchange control provisions. The establishment 
or the acquisition of subsidiaries abroad are not specifically subject to limitations, other than 
exchange control authorization and the general provision that the total amount of fixed assets 
and share holdings must not exceed the bank's own resources. 
Swedish banks are not allowed to have branches abroad. The opening or acquisition of 
foreign subsidiaries require authorization by the government. 
Swiss banks require no specific authorization for the opening of establishments abroad. 
British banks require no specific authorization for the opening of establishment abroad. 
They are, however, asked to notify the Bank of England of intentions to expand abroad. 
The establishment of banking offshoots abroad is governed by Regulation K. A member 
bank may establish a branch abroad subject to prior approval by the Board. Prior 
authorization is not required for the establishment of additional branches in any foreign 
country in which a bank operates one or more branches. The Board must be notified about 
the opening, closing, or relocation of a branch. The same regulations apply to the opening 
of branches abroad by an Edge Corporation. 
Prior specific consent of the Board is required for a bank's investment in its first subsidiary, 
joint-venture, or portfolio investment. The Board grants a general consent for any 
investment abroad if the organisation is not engaged in business in the United States and the 
total amount invested does not exceed 5 per cent of the investor's capital and surplus. Any 
investment in a subsidiary or joint-venture that does not qualify under the general consent 
procedure is subject to prior notification to the Board if the total amount to be invested does 
not exceed 10 per cent of the investor's capital and surplus. Any other investment is subject 
to the specific consent of the Board. 
ibid. p. 54 
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7.1.1 ON THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC FORMS OF BANKING 
From a technical point of view, banks have a wide range of organizational forms from 
which to choose when establishing presence in foreign countries (see, for example, 
Robinson, 1972; Lees, 1974). 
The concept of 'strategic forms of banking' used in this study is a logical extension of 
new forms of investment in the manufacturing sector, but defined somewhat differently 
because of industry structure differences. Thus, the term refers to international banking 
establishments incorporated under host country law in which foreign held equity may 
confer direct or indirect controlling interest. In other works, foreign-held equity in such 
overseas banks does not constitute control under home-country regulations. Branch 
banking is therefore not envisaged by this definition. More specifically, new forms of 
banking refer to: 
(1) Various co-operative banking arrangements established under host-country law in 
which the foreign bank may have a direct or indirect controlling interest; and 
(2) Joint venture and consortium banking arrangements with local banks in which the 
foreign bank partner mayor may not control majority equity interest in the venture. This 
type of foreign banking strategy is to be distinguished from the first category. In the first 
group, the parent bank often retains its corporate identity and/or control as in, say, The 
Royal Bank of Scotland, New York, in USA. In a joint venture or partnership with a 
local bank, the foreign bank usually brings its bank-specific advantages to bear upon the 
venture and uses these as a bargaining power to retain a measure of control in the 
arrangement, especially in situations where the foreign partner has a minority stake in the 
organization. 
(3) The last category may form a separate group by itself because of its specialised 
nature and scope. Included here are merchant banking and a range of near-banking and 
non-banking services. This categorization serves as a convenient means of identifying 
the nature of various organizational forms of banking (or entry) in foreign markets. The 
first category encompasses international co-operative arrangements and include: agencies, 
correspondent relationships, representative offices, affiliates and subsidiaries. The second 
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category comprises international joint venture and consortium banks. Loan syndicate 
arrangements are excluded from this group, because they are more of financial 
investment<; (similar to portfolio investment) than real investment. The last category has 
become distinct in its own right due to the specialised nature of services provided and 
activities covered. It encompasses a whole range of merchant banking and non-banking 
activities including, equipment leasing, factoring and discounting, insurance, tourism and 
holiday services, mortgages and other specialised trade finance operations. 
This introductory section provides a historical perspective on the strategic forms of 
international banking. The rest of the chapter is divided into five sections. Section 2 
explores the taxonomy of strategic forms of international banking, while its dimensions 
are the subject of Section 3. The ramifications of the global strategy of the multinational 
bank are examined in Section 4. Applicable theories of the MNE are extended to 
multinational banking. These are reviewed in Section 5 as are their empirical 
applications. Summary and conclusion bring the chapter and Part 2 of the study to a 
close. 
7.2 A TAXOMONY OF STRATEGIC FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 
Given that this study is about organizational forms of international investment other than 
foreign direct mode, which in the case of banking means establishing foreign branches, 
included in the following taxomony are types of international banking operations which 
may, in any case, fulfil the definition of "new or strategic forms of international banking" 
cited in Section 1. Figure 7.1 illustrates the organizational forms of international banking 
and the associated control structures. Category I is included for completion of analysis 
since by definition overseas branch banks are the banking industry counterpart of foreign 
direct investment. Concern here therefore is on Categories II, III and IV of Figure 7.1. 
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 illustrate the growth of various modes of foreign banking over a 
period of two decades (1960 - 1981) in DECD member countries as homes and hosts of 
foreign banks, respectively. Clearly, other modes than branch banking have grown 
rapidly within the period. 
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Figure 7.1 Organizational Forms of International Banking and Associated 
Control Structure 
CATEGORIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 
CATEGORY I CATEGORY II CATEGORY III CATEGORY IV 
Overseas Branch International Cooperative International Merchant International Joint 
Network Arrangements: Banking services; Venture and Consortium 
International Mergers Representative offices Leasing banking 
and Acquisitions Agencies Factoring Shell branches 
Correspondent arrangements Discounting 
Affiliates Insurance 
Subsidiaries Travels 
Mortgages 
Direct control under Direct or Indirect control Depends: Direct or Depends: Generally 
Home Country Law under Host Country Law Indirect: Home or Host under country of 
operation 
HOMEIHOST COUNTRY STRUCTURE 
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Table 7.3 Organizational Modes of Foreign Banking by Banks Selected OECD 
Member Countries as of Dec. 
OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES AS OF DEC 
1960 1970 
HOME COUNTRY/ORG. MODE RO B S A RO B S 
1. Australia (1980) 16+ 3 6 18 3 
2. Belgium N/A 1 4 15 N/A 1 5 
3. Denmark 
4. Finland (1982) N/A N/A 
5. France (1979) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
6. Germany 3 N/A 5 3 
7. Greece N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8. Ireland 1 111 (*) N/A 1 130 (*) 
9. Italy 22 13 43 21 
10. Japan 31 5 58 6 
11. Netherlands 21 
12. Portugal 1 1 8 1 
13. Spain (1962, 1979) 9 5 N/A - 7 25 N/A 
14. Sweden (1982) 11 
15. Switzerland N/A 9(*) N/A 6(*) 
16. United Kingdom (1982) 8 2676 8(**) 
17. United States N/A 131 39 N/A 534 141 
Total 40 2997 60 15 76 799 179 
% increase (decrease) 90% (73%) 198% 
OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES AS OF DEC 
1981 
HOME COUNTRY/ORG. MODE RO B S 
1. Australia (1980) 17 34 5 
2. Belgium 42 13 16 
3. Denmark 15 23 8 
4. Finland (1982) 12 7 
5. France (1979) 24 22 22 
6. Germany 87 56 
7. Greece N/A 26 N/A 
8. Ireland 7 188 (*) 
9. Italy 140 57 8 
10. Japan 196 151 81 
11. Netherlands 13 68 42 
12. Portugal 8 15 3 
13. Spain (1962, 1979) 166 80 N/A 
14. Sweden (1982) 29 12 
15. Switzerland N/A 38(*) 
16. United Kingdom (1982) 185 1280 68(**) 
17. United States N/A 841 960 
Total 804 2923 1288 
% increase (decrease) 958% 266% 620% 
N/A Figures Not Available RO = Representative Office 
+ Includes Agencies B = Branch 
(*) Branches & Subsidiaries combined S = Subsidiary 
(**) Subsidiaries and affiliates A = Affiliate 
A 
26 
5 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
35 
5 
26 
97 
547% 
A 
5 
49 
19 
16 
36 
N/A 
6 
N/A 
62 
14 
43 
25 
(74%) 
Source: Compiled by the author from several tables from OECD (1983), The 
Internationalization of Bankinlj!, Paris: OECD 
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Table 7.4 Organizational Modes of Foreign Banking in OECD Countries as of 
1960, 1970 & 1981 
1960 1970 
HOME COUNTRY/ORG. MODE RO B S A RO B S A 
1. Australia (1980) 1 6 1 27 8 28 
2. Austria (1971) 2 1 3 11 2 
3. Belgium 1 7 7 N/A 9 11 15 N/A 
4. Denmark 
5. Finland 
6. France (1979) 12 19 14 38 27 31 
7. Germany 31 21 3 73 47 30 
8. Greece 3 5 15 
9. Ireland 164 (*) 229 (*) 
10. Japan N/A 34 N/A 38 
11. Luxembourg 3 8 15 
12. Netherlands 17 6 10 
13. Portugal 1 1 1 2 1 1 
14. Spain 9 4 37 4 1 10 
15. Switzerland 15 8 N/A N/A 56 13 84 123 
16. U.K. (1982) N/A N/A 51 N/A N/A 95 (*) 
17. United States 
Total 70 272 76 243 506 209 173 
1981 
HOME COUNTRY/ORG. MODE RO B S A 
1. Australia (1980) 88 20 89 
2. Austria (1971) 13 3 10 6 
3. Belgium 20 26 29 1 
4. Denmark 10 4 1 
5. Finland 2 3 
6. France (1979) 67 55 61 
7. Germany 285 101 47 
8. Greece 17 65 1 
9. Ireland 2 258 (*) 
10. Japan 103 94 
11. Luxembourg 18 84 
12. Netherlands 11 24 16 9 
13. Portugal 11 2 1 
14. Spain 155 27 6 3 
15. Switzerland 26 16 91 145 
16. U.K. (1982) 163 274 (*) 
17. United States 249 377 46 30 
Total 1222 1364 396 283 
(*) Branches and Subsidiaries combined 
Source: Ibid. 
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CATEGORY I 
This group of organizational forms of international banking can be seen as involving 
varying degrees of co-operation between the foreign bank and a host country entity. 
Co-operative arrangements can be on a reciprocity basis or on commission basis. 
Alternatively, they could simply be a corporate form of banking. 
REPRESENTATIVE OFFICES: These serve as contact points for providing 
business and economic information about the host country or a prospective regional 
market. Such points of contact lead to business connections. In the main 
representative offices act as intermediaries between the parent bank and the host 
country customers, without serving as booking stations, that is, accepting deposits and 
making loans. Where host government regulations disallow branch banking or direct 
foreign participation, foreign banks can use the medium of representative offices to 
scout out business opportunities in the host country. Alternatively, they can be used 
as preparatory grounds while waiting for approval for operations. Usually, 
representative offices do not require authorization and in many cases are licensed 
under general authorization procedures (see Table 7.2). Ireland and Sweden were for 
a time the only two OECD member countries that required authorization, with 
differential provisions for foreign applicants. Sweden abandoned this policy in 1985 
(Business Week, June 4, 1984, pAl). 
AGENCIES: represent a more active organizational presence in foreign countries 
than representative offices. First, agencies are able to accept certain types (specific-
use or short term) deposits, generally from wholesale (Le. corporate) customers. 
Second, they are allowed to make loans to local firms. Third, they can raise funds 
in the host country, usually through local loans or short term deposits although they 
can be supported by their parent banks. However, agencies are not permitted to 
operate current accounts (demand deposits) other than credit balances. 
CORRESPONDENT ARRANGEMENTS: A correspondent bank is a bank with 
which another bank maintains banking relationships. The relationship is created on 
a reciprocity or symbiotic basis. It allows both banks to avail one another the use of 
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its resources to service the other's customers. For example, a correspondent bank 
relationship with a German bank will enable a British Bank to make payments in 
Deutsche Mark on behalf of its domestic clients. Correspondent banking has been at 
the substratum of the growth of international business. As might be expected, the 
growth of international business (and of MNEs) resulted in an expansion of traditional 
domestic banking services. Many banks had to open international departments as 
special units to handle the overseas needs of their domestic clients. As businesses 
increased and as transactional delays through host country foreign exchange 
bureaucracy or international clearing systems, were unrelenting it became more 
exigent to maintain reciprocal deposits with commercial banks located in the countries 
with majority of their corporate clients. 
Additionally correspondent banks provide advisory services, using their local 
knowledge. They provide a first hand survey of overseas market potential for their 
customers. Banks maintain a database on economic and political structure of most, 
if not all, countries where they have correspondent relationships. With that they can 
advise a prospective exporter client on such matters as host government regulations, 
economic and political structure of the potential host market, its monetary and fiscal 
regimes, etc. Correspondent banks are able to assist and advise on the marketing and 
product development of their customers For instance, with their knowledge of local 
conditions, they can recommend reputable agents or distributors in their local area. 
They also provide holiday and travel advisory services. 
AFFILIATES: are local banks incorporated under host country law in which the 
foreign bank holds a minority equity interest. The term 'affiliate' is broadly used to 
cover a wide range of investments in associated companies. Associated companies are 
related companies in respect of which a parent company is in a position to exercise 
significant influence. Technically, the distinction between an affiliate and a subsidiary 
is generally based on the extent to which the parent company (or bank) holds a 
controlling interest in the associated company (OECD, 1983, p.57). The issue of 
controlling interest is explored in the next section. 
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SUBSIDIARIES: refer to local banks incorporated under host country law in which 
the foreign bank has a direct or indirect controlling interest. A subsidiary is a 
corporate form of banking next to foreign bank branch. In some countries, the 
establishment of foreign branches are not permitted for legal and political reasons. 
However, local banking organization can be set up in which the foreign bank enters 
into a partnership with a local bank or holds a majority equity in it. But, it should be 
remembered that, unlike manufacturing subsidiary, here majority equity participation 
does not necessarily imply a controlling interest, vice versa. 
CATEGORY III 
These activities enable banks to register presence in foreign markets through the 
specialised activities. The involvement of banks into these activities is seen as a 
breakdown of the wall that has historically divided banks and nonbanks Foreign 
involvement in both affiliates and subsidiaries may be with respect to purely 
commercial banking activities. Alternatively, it might be related to specialised 
services as in the provision of merchant banking and near-banking services. Such 
subsidiary affiliations may be with leasing organizations, factoring, and discounting, 
consumer credits, brokers and agents, insurance, mutual funds, investment banking, 
travel agencies, etc. 
INVESTMENT IMERCHANT BANKING: An investment (US) or a merchant (UK) 
bank is a financial intermediary which performs a variety of securitisation and 
financial services, including acceptance of bills of exchange, the issue and placing of 
loans and securities, portfolio and unit trust management and some banking services. 
Also called Issuing houses, they provide, risk capital for firms, deal in gold bullion, 
insurance, hire purchase and are active in the EUROCURRENCY market. 
Merchant banking has diversified from its historical role of financing overseas trade 
and accepting bills of exchange. From these traditional functions, they have developed 
a range of other banking services connected with foreign trade, e.g. dealing in gold 
and foreign currency and assisting borrowers to raise money on the stock exchange. 
Nowadays, while such functions are still part of their portfolio of services, they are 
more of institutional (corporate) finance houses, issuing houses, accepting houses or 
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investment trusts. They are most prominent in the mergers and takeovers markets 
where they act as institutional advisers. For example, the Corporate Finance division 
of Kleinwort Benson Group pIc was involved in some of the largest and most complex 
corporate finance transactions which took place during 1989, including advising 
Beecham on the £8 billion merger Smithkline Beckman, regarded as "the largest cross-
border merger ever completed" and a host of other multimillion pound acquisitions and 
mergers (Annual Report, 1989). Following the big bang, there has been a growing 
trend in which commercial banks (and even building societies) offer merchant banking 
services through associated institutional mechanisms. 
SECURITISATION AND DISINTERMEDIATION: Deregulation has brought about 
changes in the boundary between banks and markets in international capital and credit 
markets. The effect is that the basic business of corporate banking is shrinking with 
the securitisation of assets and of the Euromarkets. The creation of a single European 
market prospectively increases the trend towards securitisation and decline in the 
growth of cross-border lending. In this case, the shift from internalization of 
transactions (which entails financial intermediation between international borrowers 
and lenders) to externalization of transactions (which involves direct borrowing from 
international lenders via the security markets) underscores the underlying difficulties 
with intermediation. These can be traced to transaction cost origins in which 
Eurosecurity markets are regarded as more operationally efficient (Le. lower 
transaction costs) than syndicated bank loans. 
High internal transactions by MNBs, problems of third world debt, increasing 
international competition (arising from deregulation and involvement of non-bank 
banks) and the growth ofin-house banks by large MNEs (especially the Japanese) are 
some of the catalysts for the shifting of transactions away from the internal 
organization of MNBs. For example, the rescheduling costs of sovereign debts and 
the associated increase in bad debt provision in the books of MNBs increased the 
policying and enforcement costs of existing debt contracts but have also affected 
expectations about future contracts. Not only that, the transaction costs of searching 
for good credit risks and the subsequent negotiation costs have escalated considerably 
since the debt crisis. 
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In contrast, the emergence of Euronotes and Eurocommercial paper has drastically 
reduced market transaction costs. For example, the less dependence on syndicated 
term lending implies less need for standby facilities, a combination of which leads to 
reduced transaction costs. Furthermore, the relative decline in petrodollars juxtaposing 
major new capital flows from Japanese private and institutional investors has 
contributed immensely to the decline in the relative importance of traditional 
commercial banking. In response, banks have diversified into other non-bank areas 
in the hope of both only enlarging income source base and capturing the clientele. 
LEASING ORGANIZATIONS: have now generally become affiliates or subsidiaries 
of banks. The leasing business is particularly linked to tax efficient schemes but has 
grown in scope and importance as the process of obtaining commercial loans from 
banks becomes increasingly lengthy and costly. Leasing activity covers a wide range 
of markets, from individuals to industries and property and from aircraft to xerox 
machines. In an integrated single market, international leasing will become 
increasingly important to service a European rather than a national clientele. By being 
affiliated with leasing firms, banks of one national origin can establish operational 
presence in a foreign country without the necessity of a direct establishment. 
FACTORING: Liquidity problems and the need to sustain a stable working capital 
have forced small and medium-size firms to transfer the responsibility for credit sales 
collection to debt collecting firms. This service is relatively young in the UK 
compared with the US. The factor has to have a strong support of a bank or other 
financial institutions to be able to discount credit invoices and make immediate 
payments. In many cases, factoring companies are affiliates or subsidiaries of banks. 
Through international factoring companies, factors can offer services to exporters by 
protecting their customers from bad debts overseas and by giving advice on foreign 
exchange transactions. These can be seen as an integrated package of resources which 
a bank can claim as ownership and internalization advantages and through which a 
bank can register presence in foreign markets. 
CONSUMER CREDIT: The consumer credit sector covers mainly asset-based 
financing such as cars, boats, household furniture and property. Also included are 
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various kinds of instalment credit such as hire purchase. In these cases, the loan is 
secured on the goods. This sector offers products similar to those of savings and 
loans organizations. Not only are they becoming integral part of a commercial bank 
structure but are directly in competition with specialised consumer credit organizations 
owned by the manufacturers of the assets financed, e.g. Ford Credit Finance, IBM 
Credit, GMAC, Renault Finance, GE Credit, etc. This in-house financing has put a 
strain on the competitiveness of traditional HP companies as well as rendering the role 
of commercial banks redundant. For example, a person wishing to buy a Ford car 
need not go to an HP company or a commercial bank since the Ford dealer will raise 
the necessary credit at the often advertised "0% financing". Banks are therefore 
having to acquire HP companies as complementary businesses, using their cheap 
funding sources and wider economic base. 
OTHER CO-OPERATIVE MODES: Other service areas which banks actively use 
to penetrate into foreign markets include insurance, travels and mortgages. By 
acquiring controlling interests in these industries, banks are able to increase their 
corporate base and enhance profitability on a global basis. 
CATEGORY IV: 
JOINT VENTURE & CONSORTIUM BANKS: Joint banking venture is an 
association established for the purpose of carrying out specific business of mutual 
interest to the participating banks. Joint venture banks are also called consortium 
banks, for which two main types can be distinguished. The first type comprises those 
set up by member banks who do not feel strong enough to act independently. The 
second type encompasses those which specialise in a particular type of business. The 
first type of consortia is formed by banks who feel too small and/or inexperienced to 
go it alone. The distinguishing feature of this category is the transitory nature of the 
association. As the individual partners gain in strength, the continued existence of this 
category might be at risk. For example, in 1984 the Nordic Bank Consortium was 
bought out by one of the shareholders, Den norske Creditbank - Norway's largest 
bank. The other shareholders - Kansallis Osake Pankki of Finland and Copenhagen 
Handelsbank - have since set up on their own in London (World Banking, 1986). 
Similarly, Ibero Partners now represent only three banks instead of the original six. 
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Also, Scandinavian Bank lost two of its shareholders in 1984, and the setting up of a 
London branch by one of the remaining partners (Union Bank of Finland) suggests that 
it too might be considering leaving the consortium (Ibid.). These and several other 
cases illustrate the transitory nature of this category of joint banking ventures. 
Anecdotal evidence tends to suggest that the long-term future of the consortia lies in 
their provision of specialist services. This implies that the JV entity must not compete 
with its shareholders or transact actively in each other's market. The following 
examples are illustrative. Sir John Hall, chairman of the Association of British 
Consortium Banks as well as of European Brazilian Bank Ltd., describes the 
operational objective of his bank as follows: "We are finders of niche business by and 
large, not lenders or innovators in capital markets. Otherwise we would be facing 
competition from our shareholders - and that of course would be fatal". Nicolo 
Dubini, managing director of ITAB notes that "when a consortium bank starts to do 
what its members already do, then its days are numbered" . Clearly joint venture 
banking is created for specialist services and this view is reflected in the fact that none 
of the London-based consortia have yet participated in the City Revolution - the 'Big 
Bang' (ibid.). It is also perceived as a useful way for the first category of consortia -
those members not large or established enough to go it alone - to diversify. This is 
even more so because the medium-term lending for which consortia were originally 
established can now be easily handled by individual banks. 
Apart from diversifying services into areas not already covered by parent banks, the 
success of consortia also lies in absolute clarity of purpose. Where the partners to a 
consortium have divergent objectives or incongruent goals, the bank is bound to fail. 
An example is the closure of the Paris-based Franco-Algerian consortium bank (Union 
Mediterranee de Banques) in 1985. The major reason for its closure was the 
disagreement between the French and Algerian partners on the role of the bank. 
While the French wanted the bank to be primarily a retail bank for France's many 
Algerian workers, the Algerians saw it as an international bank specialising in trade 
finance and merchant banking (ibid.). The conflict of policies and roles exacerbated 
the bank's problems. 
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Finally, consortium banking can be seen as performing a role similar to JV in the 
manufacturing sector, namely, providing small and medium-size banks opportunities 
to compete in foreign markets, especially in international financial centres like 
London, New York and Tokyo; providing banks of one nationality opportunities to 
develop new products and markets such as underwriting, merger brokering, and 
financial management; providing banks a launching pad into competitive or 
prohibitive markets, which otherwise they would be unable to venture on their own 
individually; and serving as a collective investment mechanism for diversifying risks 
and costs, especially in financing sovereign projects. 
7.3 DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 
In the previous section, international banking was described in terms of jurisdiction 
of legal control. Because of the strategic importance of banks in macro-economic 
development, they are generally constituted as local legal institutions and, depending 
on the host government regulations, may operate as legal extension of the parent bank 
or as local institutions operating under host country law. Unlike foreign affiliates and 
subsidiaries, foreign branches are by contrast a legal extension of the parent bank in 
a foreign country. Accordingly, they are not separately constituted or locally 
chartered companies. Rather, they are an integral part of the parent bank; they have 
no separate legal identity, and are subject to the parent bank's home country control 
and regulation. They are therefore the foreign subsidiary counterpart of the 
manufacturing industry. Thus, foreign direct investment in banking refers to foreign 
branch banking. 
For political, legal and economic reasons, some countries restrict the opening of 
foreign branches. Exhibit 10.1 presents the kinds of national controls applied by 
member countries of OECD on the opening of domestic banks' foreign branches. 
Some countries adopt a liberal approach that is usually linked to reciprocal 
considerations. In developing countries, government restrictive policy is traditionally 
linked to a sensitivity to the problem of foreign bank presence and its impact on the 
indigenous banking system (OECD, 1983). Another point of technical clarification in 
the definition is 'controlling interest'. The practical application of the term varies 
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from country to country and is not necessarily equivalent to the concept of "m<ijority" 
equity interest and participation (ibid.). Although a foreign bank can have a direct or 
indirect controlling interest in a local bank, as in affiliate or subsidiary, that does not 
technically constitute a branch status because the establishment is incorporated under 
local law. 
7.3.1 COMPARATIVE BANKING AND THE MULTINATIONAL BANK 
International banking - also called multinational or transnational banking - has been 
described as one of the least understood aspects of finance and one of the most diffuse 
as well (UNCTC, 1981). There is no consensus definition of the term: different 
researchers adopt different working definitions, perhaps to fit the context of their 
research. Literature perusal suggests two approaches to the discussion of international 
banking. One approach is silent on conceptual issues. Included in this category are 
the descriptive works of Aliber, 1984; Brimmer and Dahl (1975), Khoury (1979), 
Goldberg and Saunders (1981), and Nwankwo (1988). 
The second approach addresses conceptual issues and consists of several working 
definitions. One school of thought in this group perceives it as a currency 
phenomenon. Thus, a multinational bank is one which deals in two or more 
currencies. Specifically, Aliber (1984), posits that " ... from the point of view of 
industrial organization, US banks (or more generally, banks) engage in international 
banking when they sell deposits and buy loans denominated in currencies other than 
the US dollar" (or their home currency). Another school of thought defines it as one 
which operates in, and is subject to the laws of, at least two countries. Other wider 
views exist. One such view defines a transnational bank as one which has global 
operations which involve "not only ... ordinary commercial banking '" but also 
merchant banking, leasing, factoring, and consulting ... ". (UNCTC, 1981). The snag 
with this global perspective is that if a UK bank operates mainly in USA for example, 
it will not qualify as a MNB for the purposes of this and AIiber's definitions. The 
UNCTC provides an alternative definition, namely deposit - taking "banks with 
branches or majority-owned subsidiaries in five or more different countries and/or 
territories" (ibid.) This view is both exclusive and restrictive for the reason stated 
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immediately. It only permits number-counting and numerical locations oftransnational 
banks (Aliber, 1984). Adopting this definition enabled the UNCTC researchers to 
recognize only 84 MNBs by 1975.A conceptual exploration of comparative banking 
(Le. domestic versus international) and the nature of multinational bank (MNB) can 
be pursued in any or all of three ways. The first is a generic description of the 
traditional role of banks. The second is a classification of banks that identifies a 
metamorphosis of involvement in financial markets and client structure. The third 
conceptual process seeks to distinguish between MNBs and MNEs. These are briefly 
surveyed in turn. 
TRADITIONAL ROLE OF BANKS 
In their basic form, banks are financial institutions which act as intermediaries between 
'surplus-saving units' (depositors) and 'deficit-spending units' (borrowers). As 
financial intermediaries they (1) acquire funds from depositors and savers in return for 
safety, liquidity assurance and higher net return; and (2) in turn sell the acquired 
funds to borrowers at a much higher rate of interest, thereby earning a margin of 
spread. In other words, banks borrow at one level of interest rates (Le. rates paid to 
depositors) and lend at another level (Le. rates charged on credit facilities). In 
performing this financial inter:mediation role, banks have a unique ability to bring 
together individual borrowers and lenders to the mutual advantage of both parties. 
They are legally equipped to guarantee safety and liquidity and can diversify risk on 
a global basis.While retaining this basic feature, contemporary banking has however 
widened the intermediation process as Figure 7.2 illustrates. This model presents a 
simple framework for understanding the dimensions of financial intermediation, 
including maturity intermediation, denomination intermediation, portfolio 
diversification, professional management, liquidity assurance and securitisation. These 
functions are structured to suit two types of customers: retail group and wholesale 
group. In this figure, multinational banks can be seen as evolving from the domestic 
market through increasing diversification of traditional functions to a view of active 
participation in international financial markets. 
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DEGREE OF INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT 
Another approach to international banking distinguishes between types of banks and 
their degree of involvement in international markets. This is 'a stages of development' 
approach based on market matrix in which the degree of involvement is matched by 
type of services and clientele group, etc. Figures 7.3 and 7.4 illustrate different 
aspects of this classification. 
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Figure 7.2. A Framework of Financial Intermediation 
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Figure 7.3 Degree of Banking in Domestic and International Markets 
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Both figures portray the various stages of involvement in domestic and international 
retail (and wholesale) money and capital markets. The extent of a bank's commitment 
to international activities is simplified in Figure 7.3 while Figure 7.4 amplifies this 
metamorphosis, specifying in each category the type of services, major customers, 
possible competitors and the kinds of customer service needs. This taxonomic 
explanation is similar to Giddy's (1983) framework, but differs from his not only in 
scale and scope but also recognizes implicitly the barriers to international banking in 
the stages of development. 
A CONCEPTUAL CONTRAST WITH MNE 
A third and last conceptual exploration of international banking contrasts multinational 
banks (MNBs) with multinational enterprises (MNEs). MNBs can be distinguished 
from MNEs in at least three ways. First, they belong to different activity industries: 
the former engage in service activities while the latter produce goods. Accordingly, 
their production functions are fundamentally different from one another. Second, 
MNBs (like the industry in general) are labour-intensive, providing financial and other 
specialised informational services. On the other hand, conventional MNEs are capital 
intensive, albeit combining labour, capital, and technology in their production 
function. This is not to suggest that MNBs are not technological in the production of 
financial services, but relatively speaking, MNEs are more capital intensive (Rugman, 
1979). Third, MNBs have the unique ability to perform financial intermediation. 
Although MNEs can provide in-house financial intermediation and other financial 
services, such as treasury management and consumer credit, they are limited in the 
scope of such services. 
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Figure 7.4 Market Matrix of Degree of Involvement in Domestic and International Markets. 
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MAJOR COMPETITORS 
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Same as Above Plus: 
Foreign Banks 
Merchant and Investment 
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Figure 7.4 Contd. 
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2. INTERNATIONAL 
MARKET 2: MIDDLE 
MARKET AND 
CORPORA TEFINANCIAL 
SERVICES 
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Large Companies 
Large Corporate Bodies 
Foreign Banks 
Other Financial Institutions 
Governments and their 
Agencies 
Same as Domestic Bank 3 
Plus: 
Electronic Banking 
Currency Accounts 
Eurocheques 
Travellers Cheques 
Negotiable Order on 
Withdrawal 
(NOW) Facilities 
Foreign Accounts 
Payment Services 
Foreign Exchange 
General Information and 
Introductions 
Accounts in Foreign 
Countries 
Foreign Exchange Deposits 
Foreign Currency Loans 
Merchant Banking 
Project Finance 
Electronic Funds Transfer 
Correspondent Banking 
Services 
The Above Plus: 
Euro-currency Syndications 
and Deposits 
Financing International 
Trade 
Foreign Investments 
Promotion of Foreign Trade 
and Investments 
Economic and Financial 
Consultative Services 
International Bond Issues 
Sovereign Lending 
World Net Work Systems 
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Foreign International Banks 
Travel Agencies 
Credit Card Companies 
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International Fundings at 
Low Cost 
Giddy (1983) extends the industrial organization theory of FDI to distinguish among 
three types of international banking: arm's length international banking, offshore 
banking, and host country international banking. Arm's length international banking 
is the most basic form; is home based and corresponds to International bank type 1 
and domestic bank 3 of Figures 7.3 and 7.4, respectively. They maintain 
correspondent account balances in foreign banks for the purpose of clearing their 
customers' international payments. But for regulatory barriers and other imperfections 
in the international financial markets, all international banking would take the form of 
arm's length (ibid.). 
An offshore bank is a bank incorporated overseas, usually in a tax-haven country, 
whose function is to provide funds other than those of their own country. The 
financial markets are generally not regulated in the same way as domestic markets. 
The transactional emphasis in offshore banking includes purchase and placement of 
eurocurrency funds, eurocredit activities, and foreign exchange deals. These are 
conducted in offshore or eurocurrency centres. Finally, host country international 
banking refers to banking with local residents in a foreign country where a parent bank 
may establish presence in the form of representative offices, subsidiaries or branches. 
Instances of this type include Glasgow based Bank of China and Bank of Pakistan 
which are primarily designed to cater for the Chinese and Pakistani communities in 
Glasgow and environs, respectively. Apart from providing banking services to a 
'culture-fast' community such as these, the banks have become an important employer 
for British communities of these countries. This point was emphasised during the 
interview sessions of this research. 
Arm's length international banking can be regarded as the banking counterpart of 
exporting and international trade. Offshore banking can be likened to offshore 
assembly plant while host country banking or foreign branch banking is the equivalent 
of foreign direct investment. 
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7.4 GLOBAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY OF THE MNB 
Theories of the economic behaviour of the multinational enterprise are conventionally 
employed to rationalise foreign investment decisions of banks. The framework is 
based on the neo-classical assumptions about imperfections in international 
environment markets. These assumptions create an option for the firm to act in a 
passive direction, by accepting the imperfections, or to react in a manner that will 
potentially avoid or overcome them. 
The basic premise of these theories is that the simple model of the international 
economy, based on perfect market conditions in which free trade would prevail, is 
practically non-existent. Therefore, the symmetry between free trade and the MNE 
(Rugman et aI, 1986, p.98), is the result of the latter's response to the imperfections. 
In turn, the type of response adopted by a firm is dependent upon the firm's strategy. 
The general characteristics of the theories and their applicability are as relevant to the 
manufacturing/extractive industries as they are to the banking industry. This section 
of the chapter examines the role of the global investment strategy of the multinational 
bank as a prelude to discussing the theories. 
7.4.1. MOTIVATIONS OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY 
The various theoretical models that have been developed to explain foreign direct 
investment (FDI) are attempts at rationalising the differential capacities of firms in the 
choice of optimal modes of servicing foreign markets. The starting point for 
examining the models and the structure of the firm's strategy is an enquiry into why 
banks headquartered in a particular country should seek to establish operational 
presence in foreign countries. 
PRESERVATION OF OSAs AND BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP 
A growing body of empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that the international 
expansion of banks is based on the need to preserve their ownership - specific 
advantages (OS As) as they follow their customers abroad. (Grubel, 1977; Fieleke, 
1977; Terrell, 1979; Goldberg & Saunders, 1980, 1981; Gray & Gray, 1981; 
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Tschoegl, 1982; and Yannopoulos, 1983). MNBs are able to do this more 
competitively than local banks due to their pre-established relationship with and better 
access to information on their clients at home (Pringle, 1966; Brimmer & Dahl, 1975; 
and Rugman, 1981). Besides, the banks may need to follow their clients abroad in 
order to ensure a continuing business relationship with the home parent of the foreign 
subsidiaries. Failure to do so may force foreign subsidiaries to turn to foreign banks 
or domestic business relationships. (GEeD, 1983; Nigh, et aI, 1986). 
REGULATORY FORCES 
Banks are also found to react to regulatory forces which seek to restrict their capacity 
to exploit perceived domestic market imperfections. As profit seekers, on the one 
hand, and a vital mechanism in the transmission of government's monetary policy as 
well as financial intermediaries, on the other, banks can find themselves playing 
ambivalent roles in national economy. Where regulatory pressures prevail, they may 
resort to foreign markets to exploit favourable or less restrictive foreign banking 
environments. (Brimmer & Dahl, 1975; Aliber, 1976; Fieleke, 1977; Goldberg & 
Saunders, 1980; and Gray & Gray, 1981). In some developing countries there are 
restrictions on branch banking (see Figure 7.2 and Exhibit 7.1). 
ACCESS TO CHEAPER FUNDS ABROAD 
Broadly speaking, banks are motivated to optimise returns by seeking overseas markets 
where they have access to cheaper funds. A substantial foreign banking presence in 
various offshore banking and some onshore banking markets of developed and 
developing countries seems to suggest the significance of such motivation (Nigh et aI, 
1986). 
INCENTIVE TO ARBITRAGE IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
Where a bank's specific advantages can be employed to capture perceived failures in 
a segmented market, the host government may even be willing to pay the MNB a 
premium for contributing to improve the country's international capital flows. 
Incentives may take the form of tax havens, less restriction in organizational set-up 
(including removal of quotas), or removal of costly barriers to portfolio flows. 
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Although the lessening of entry restraints and the liberal stance of home and host 
country regulations are likely to have played a role in the growth of multinational 
banking, a much more important factor relates to regulatory incentives that offer 
greater freedom from supervision than the home country, or special advantages, or 
both (OEeD, 1983). Exchange controls, taxation, monetary policy, and prudential 
supervision are aspects of this policy. 
SCANNING ADV ANT AGES OF THE MNB 
In a world of imperfectly diffused information, the scanning advantages of an MNB 
may widen its set of investment opportunities. The information - and profit - scanning 
functions of a multinational network are effective parameters for success in foreign 
markets (Vernon, 1979). 
INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION OF RISKS 
Banks may be motivated by imperfections in capital markets to reduce risk through 
foreign diversification of investments. Diversifying a bank's asset holding over several 
countries can potentially lead to risk reduction and ultimately to an improvement in 
risk/return ratio (see, Fieleke, 1977 and Rugman, 1979). 
POLITICAL MOTIVES 
Finally, there may be political motives behind international expansion of banks (ibid.) 
These political motives drive banks to avoid or exploit various externalities in both 
home and foreign markets. Some of these are a consequence of the natural - and 
unnatural - market imperfections explored in part 1 of this study. 
9.4.2 NATURE OF GLOBAL STRATEGY OF THE MNB 
A contextual analysis of the global investment strategy for the MNB may proceed from 
a consideration of the nature of strategic problem in general. 
NATURE OF STRATEGIC PROBLEM 
Schoderbek, et al (1975, p.143) characterised the organizational task of building 
associations between particular environmental changes and accommodative 
organizational actions as the "strategic problem". This construct is shown in Figure 
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7.5. Given the international environment in which the subject strategic problems exist 
and the market imperfections and parity deviations that describe them, the ability to 
adapt to environmental demands and opportunities constitutes a conditio sine qua non 
for firm's survival. This is the context in which a firm's strategy is set. 
The scenario created in Figure 7.5 can be traced to a firm/market relations in which 
the transaction cost differences between existing firms and existing markets are 
emphasized (see, for example, Holland, 1986, p.158 and Rugman et aI, 1986, p.329). 
In general, and for profit-seeking firms in particular, the transactional 
interdependencies of the firm-environment system are a function of the perceived 
nature and importance of the relationship between the firm (as hierarchy) and the 
environment (as market). Such a relationship can be either symbiotic and/or 
synergistic. The former is functionally necessary for the survival of both systems 
(firms and markets). A synergistic relationship, on the other hand, is not functionally 
necessary, but its existence enables the firm and the market to achieve a relatively 
greater performance (see for example, Schoderbek, 1975, p.145). 
Behind the interdependencies are a vast range of environmental constraints which the 
firm has to overcome in order to survive. These include increasing turbulence of the 
international environment, structural balance of the payments disequilibrics, worldwide 
economic recession, volatile exchange rates, volatile interest rates, and technological 
change. In addition, the banking industry is facing increased competition; deregulation 
which has expanded the financial services of non-bank banks; sophistication and 
demand - diversity of bank customers; and the growth pattern of the financial services 
sector. Overall the real issue facing MNBs and, for that matter, all firms, is 
SURVIVAL. Survival, expressed as long-term profitable growth, means securing 
quality earnings from net interest income by intelligent asset/liability management, and 
by generating fee income from value-added services, while controlling costs 
vigorously. This demands a careful and articulated development of business strategy. 
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APPROACHES TO GLOBAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY 
The global investment strategy for the MNB can be explained from two approaches: 
the normative and the pragmatic. The normative approach is theoretical: it is based on 
Dunning's eclectic model of foreign investment. This model rests on three 
simultaneous conditions: ownership-specific, location specific, and internalization-
incentive advantages. In combination, they provide an analysis of what an MNB 
should do in order to "survive", 
ACTUAL PRACTICE OF MNBs 
Descriptive views of actual strategies adopted by MNBs are attempts to explain the 
response of banks to changes in the competitive environment. Kenyon et al(l985) 
provide an analytical evidence of a survey of practice in five countries: USA, UK, 
Germany, France and Japan. From their analyses, banks are seen to evolve strategies 
as a response to intensified competition and growing environmental pressures. The 
various strategies of individual banks in the five-country study can be grouped into: 
(1). those that deal with or require changes in management priorities and (2). those 
that warrant changes in marketing and global strategies. 
CHANGES IN MANAGEMENT PRIORITIES 
MNBs were shown to modify their priorities in response to competitive pressures. 
Such environmental influences included the birth of the eurocurrency market, 
constraints on domestic markets, deregulation, and possibility of arbitrage with 
domestic markets. The 1970s witnessed the upsurge of inflation, OPEC activities, 
volatility in the markets, technological advancement, etc. Coupled with global 
competition, changes in management priorities were seen to occur in the areas 
described below. 
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CHANGE IN PERCEPTION OF UNIQUENESS OF BANKS & THEIR ROLES 
Banking is no longer seen as a unique role, especially in the USA and UK. 
Dergulation has widened the scope of the activities of non-bank banks and caused an 
erosion into the traditional domain of banks. Technological advancement among other 
factors, has contributed largely to the perceived changes in the culture of banking. 
CHANGE OF OBJECTIVE 
Changes are seen to be taking place in the objectives pursued by bankers. In a bid to 
increase profitability, banks are having to set profitability criteria. Consequently, they 
now pay more attention to activity returns than overall returns, as was the case. 
CHANGE IN MARKETING FOCUS 
Bank customers, especially corporate clients, are much more sophisticated than in the 
1960s. Large MNEs have treasury departments and in-house finance establishments 
which compete in varying degrees with banks, with the result that the latter are now 
forced to evolve a new marketing focus. There is also a shift in the fragmentation of 
banks' services to customers. The attempt is to match the growth in the sophistication 
of demand for banks' services and the capacity of competing firms to unbundle the 
delivery of bank products. For a bank to survive in this kind of area, management 
must be prepared to match the skills of competitors not only in the existing fragmented 
packages, but also to create a clientele - product match for its own unbundled 
packages. Corporate treasurers may be willing to accept intramarginal products if they 
are offered other marginal products e.g. loans. 
The second group of responses by MNBs to competitive environmental pressures 
consists of strategies formulated expressly in terms of global product range, focus by 
products, customer segment or geography. Others have to do with expansionist-driven 
responses and responses propelled by financial policies rather than products or 
markets. 
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GLOBAL PRODUCT STRATEGIES 
This group of strategies is designed to cover a wide range of banking products/services 
across a wide range of customers in a well diversified geographical location. It is a 
maximising strategy which seeks to optimise the international returns of individual 
divisions of the bank. To be able to implement this strategy a bank must have certain 
comparative advantages, e.g. in organization, management information systems, etc. 
And to operationalise the strategy, global relationship officers are appointed "to 
coordinate and monitor the worldwide activities of their global customers, the bank's 
exposure to each and the bank's return from each" (ibid.). 
FOCUS STRATEGIES 
Rather than adopt a global product strategy, some banks adopt strategies which seek 
to concentrate their activities either on particular products, customer segments or 
market segments, on a global basis. 
PRODUCT FOCUS 
A bank that has skills to specialise in products may ignore promoting a full range of 
bank services. Instead it will develop differentiated services for competitive offerings 
on a worldwide basis. Again, such banks must possess some advantage in management 
information services that enable them to track down information on product 
profitability across a broad spectrum of customers in a fairly diversified geographical 
coverage. 
CUSTOMER FOCUS 
Where the focus is on customer, banks in such specialism seek to widen their 
international return through selecting and concentrating on customer segments. As 
opposed to product strategy, this category consists in either putting together a suitable 
package of products for special customers or highlighting common products and 
offering them with greater efficiency. 
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GEOGRAPHY FOCUS 
An alternative strategy in this group for maximising international returns of a bank's 
divisions is to focus on certain geographic segments. Where some form of affinity 
exists between geographical parts of the world, as is the case with Britain and its 
former colonies, that can be a natural basis for international diversification of 
divisional activities. This approach is found among British banks on the basis of 
anecdotal evidence. 
EXPANSIONIST STRATEGIES 
This class of strategies characterises the model of globalisation adopted by Japanese 
banks. As relative 'late-comers' in the international banking business, the strategy of 
Japanese banks is not to sell any particular product or target particular customer or 
market segments, but to catch up with leading Western banks. "Late-comers who are 
determined to catch up cannot afford to be choosy at a time of intense international 
competition" (Ibid). These banks have been found aggressive and have loss-leading 
policies, albeit with credit control and long-term profitability. The pattern and 
dynamics of Japanese MNBs are similar to their MNEs, described in Chapter 4. 
STRATEGIES MOTIVATED BY FINANCIAL POLICIES 
This group of strategies is adopted by banks in response to either financial motivations 
or short-run tactical pursuits. The response to financial motivations is associated with 
the activities of some American banks that found the domestic environment to be 
intensely competitive, resulting in an erosion of profit margins. "The new strategy 
consisted of altering the balance sheet nature of he business, seeking overseas 
opportunities and ambitious profit objectives" (Ibid). The strategy employed the tools 
of standard costing for individual expense items. 
On the other hand, the tactical responses are found to be a feature of some major 
German and French banks. This approach is dissimilar to the earlier strategies in the 
sense that it is no strategy per se. Rather, it is a short term retreat by these banks into 
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their traditional markets. As observed by the authors, it may well be that these banks 
are not under any competitive pressures, or that they are yet to evolve a strategic 
response. 
7.5 INTERNATIONAL BANKING THEORIES & EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
To build a theory of international banking, the same parameter of considerations 
surrounding FDI and MNEs may be applicable. In the attempt, a number of theories 
have been extended to explain international banking phenomena. These include: trade 
theory, comparative political advantage hypothesis, colonial vintage hypothesis, market 
imperfections paradigm, product life cycle hypothesis, industrial organization theory, 
transaction cost theory, and the eclectic theory, combining location and internalization 
theories. An overview of these theories follows, seriatim. 
TRADE THEORY 
Aliber (1976) suggests trade theory as one of two possible explanatory approaches to 
the theory of international banking. The other approach is the industrial organization 
theory, which is discussed later on. Trade theory argues that banking will be most 
efficient (and therefore more substantial) in those countries that have comparative 
advantage in producing bank products, in particular the core products (services) of 
money transmission and payment, deposit facilities and bank loans. The theory also 
appraises comparative banking costs and trade barriers in different countries (Lees, 
1974, p.99). Large differences in loan-deposit spreads can induce multinational 
banking (Aliber, 1976). The trade theory does not however provide an insight into the 
sources of these advantages or why a bank would want to internalize them by itself. 
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ADVANTAGE 
Niehans (1983) contends that the international trade theory is not very helpful in 
explaining international banking. The principal determinant of the international location 
of financial services, he argues, seems to be government action, namely legislative, 
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administrative or judiciary. Banks are in the business of financial services and since 
these are strongly dependent on comparative advantages in the pure trade sense, they 
tend to be influenced rather by the regulatory environment. Differences in legislation, 
banking regulation, etc can determine certain activities in a given country. Niehans 
sees these factors as 'comparative political advantage', and these can be likened to the 
notion of 'locational structures' discussed in chapter 5 (section 5.2). 
COLONIAL VINTAGE HYPOTHESIS 
The early establishment of many foreign retail networks depicted colonial vintage 
proclivity, especially British and European banks. Colonial ties provided a head start 
in the drive for global retail and wholesale banking market. These may well explain 
the dominance of Barclays bank and Standard Chartered bank in the Commonwealth 
region or French banks in Franco-phone countries of Africa. 
MARKET IMPERFECTION PARADIGM 
Various sources of imperfections in international financial markets (explored in part 
1) are often cited as giving rise to multinationality in banking. Externalities in the 
markets, which are rooted in market failures, market structure imperfections, market 
disequilibria and government-imposed distortions, create opportunities for a bank to 
go abroad either to avoid or exploit them externalities. Merger and acquisition of 
banks and consortia are examples of market imperfections causing international 
banking. Similarly, use of correspondents, agencies and representative offices can be 
viewed as a response to varying degrees of market imperfections, including host 
country restriction on branch networks. Brimmer and Dahl (1975) and Kelly (1977) 
show that government regulations on capital flows were primarily responsible for US 
banks' expansion into European markets during the 1960s and 1970s. 
PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE HYPOTHESIS 
Goldberg and Saunders (1981) extended the principles of Vernon's product life cycle 
model (explored in part 1) to foreign bank branch decisions of US commercial banks. 
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Thus, American banks went from domestic service and trade financing to the 
'exporting' of loan commitments in tandem with the movement of MNEs from 
exporting to international investment. His emphasis on the importance of non-
competitive advantages of US banks in servicing US multinationals in foreign countries 
is similar to the argument of the industrial organization theory discussed next. 
Niehans (1983) uses the product life hypothesis to propose a three stage development 
of international banking. The first stage is where a bank accepts deposits from foreign 
sources and/or makes loans to foreign borrowers in its domestic currency. This is the 
foreign customer stage. The second stage, called foreign currency stage, is where the 
bank accepts deposits and/or makes loans in the foreign currency. In the third or 
foreign branch stage, the bank maintains its own foreign branches, which epitomizes 
multinational banking. The shortcoming in Niehans' proposition is that it paints a 
simplistic picture of the complex process of foreign establishment. 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION THEORY 
The emphasis of this school of thought is on the ability of a foreign bank to compete 
with its indigenous (and other foreign) counterparts in their domestic market, on 
account its net ownership-specific advantages. These advantages are fully 
acknowledged under Dunning's eclectic paradigm. According to this theory, banks that 
originate from countries with well developed capital markets and with tight controls 
over entry of foreign banks will have a strong tendency to develop ownership-specific 
advantages. 
TRANSACTION COST THEORY 
The transaction cost approach to the study of economic organization regards the 
transaction as the basic unit of analysis and holds that an understanding of transaction 
cost economizing is central to the study of organizations (Williamson, 1981a). Unlike 
most extant theories, this theory has not been extended to the international banking 
phenomena. Economizing is accomplished by (1) making transaction - rather than 
commodities - the central focus of analysis, and (2) assessing governance structures, 
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of which banks and markets are the leading alternatives, in terms of their capacities 
to economize on transaction costs. This in turn highlights the strategic choices facing 
the bank: Will it transact internally through foreign branch or externally through 
correspondents, agencies, affiliates or joint ventures? 
The nature of transaction costs and the associated arguments have already been 
discussed in part 1. Essentially, the theory suggests that the interaction of human 
factors of opportunism and bounded rationality with environmental factors of 
uncertainty, small numbers exchange relation and informational impactedness generates 
costs. The externality generated by this interaction can only be mitigated via the 
administrative machinery of the bank's internal organization because external markets 
are ill-equipped to deal with it. However, as has been argued in chapter 5, under 
appropriate conditions, markets can be a more efficient mechanism for accomplishing 
international transactions than the firm. Securitisation is a typical example in which 
transactions are removed from the bank into the market, involving direct borrowing 
from lenders via the securities markets. Concern over sovereign debt, carrying heavy 
bad debt provisions, high policying and enforcement costs of the existing debt 
contracts, and the high costs of searching for good credit risks are all aspects of the 
inadequacy and limits of internal organization which prospectively lead to use of 
markets. 
ECLECTIC THEORY 
Dunning's eclectic model is an integration of the above theories. It is based upon three 
conditions: (1) ownership-specific, (2) location-specific, and (3) internalisation-
incentive advantages (OLI Theory). These advantages must be simultaneously present 
to consummate a FDI activity. otherwise, "if the enterprise possesses only (1) and (3) 
advantages, it will export ... " (Boddewyn et aI, 1986). Exhibit 7.2 presents various 
sources of these advantages in the banking industry. 
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OWNERSHIP-SPECIFIC ADVANTAGES 
The basic question which this model seeks to answer is: What advantages does a bank 
have which allow it to compete against local and/or other foreign banks? 
Ownership-specific advantages (OSAs) are embedded in industrial organization theory. 
This theory states that a firm (in this case a bank) must possess net ownership 
advantages vis-a-vis other banks in serving particular foreign markets. Net ownership 
advantages of a bank include ownership and control of resources (size of the bank), 
wide banking network, scale economies, ability to tap reliable and quality sources of 
funds, control of and/or strong relationship with large corporate clients whose 
subsidiaries dominate particular foreign markets, and strong informal relationships 
between key executives of the bank and foreign government functionaries. 
The last two examples have been employed in Nigeria and other LDCs. For instance, 
the active presence of Standard Chartered Bank and Barclays Bank in West African 
sub-region followed the industrial domination of large British banks like Shell, B. P., 
leI, Unilever, etc. Strong personal and religious affinity between some Northern 
Nigerian Emirs and their Arab counterparts have been known to stimulate commercial 
ties, resulting in the establishment of certain Arab banks in Nigeria. 
Ownership-specific advantages in the control of resources have also been known to 
play an important role in the internationalization process of banks. For instance, 
Morgan Guarantee Bank of New York was reported to have entered into Nigeria 
through a loan syndication between some Western banks and Nigerian Government in 
which it acted as leader. Some Japanese banks sprang partly due to the active 
involvement of the Japanese refinery construction companies in Nigeria. The same 
goes for West German banks' entry into Nigerian market following the involvement 
of West German breweries. Certain World Bank project loans to LDCs require that 
a major international bank be appointed as the financial representative for loan 
disbursements and repayments. 
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Exhibit 7.2 Multinational Banking in the Context of the Eclectic Paradigm 
Ownership Advantages 
Skilled personnel, access to other managerial resources; access to favourable financial sources; access to, 
or possession of widespread and efficient networks; scope and efficiency of services offered; product 
differentiation ability; size; international reputation and image; Specialist knowledge and experience in 
international operations; specialist knowledge in servicing the banking needs of particular customer groups; 
ability to package tailor-made services; size stature and composition of clientele; scale economies (in 
wholesale and retail banking, foreign exchange and exposure management, and in international clearing 
services), ability to lure customers through cost-effective, efficient, and good marketing services. 
Location Advantages 
3 source areas are distinguishable. 
1. General level of national economic system:- size of national economy; degree/level of economic 
development; stature of national capital markets; level of banking developments; degree of 
concentration of both home and foreign banks; degree of FDI activities. 
2. Political and general socio-cultural systems:- Similarities in language, social, political, educational, 
and business system. 
3. National regulatory systems:- Banking Regulations; fiscal regimes; foreign exchange 
regulations;credit allocation policies; degree of openness to international markets and level of 
concentration of foreign banks; interest rate policies; degree of asymmetry or symmetry of capital 
markets with other national markets. 
Internalization Advantages 
Availability and efficiency of intra-bank funds transfers; efficient customer contacts; efficient international 
networks of market information and commercial intelligence; potential for reduced earnings variability; 
transfer pricing mechanism; flexible asset/liability management's exploitation of knowledge and business 
contacts; exploitation of economies of common governance; protection of global market share; maintaining 
supply of skilled labour and other managerial resources. 
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Finally, a bank may develop ownership advantages in an attempt to either out- perform 
competitors and/or overcome the impact of deregulation. This may perhaps explain the 
motivation for the development of advanced electronic systems to move funds and 
information, the development of home banking system, or the development of 
PRONTO services in 1980 by Chemical Bank of New York to explore technologically 
advanced alternatives to the traditional delivery of retail banking service. 
INTERNALIZATION-INCENTIVE ADVANTAGES 
The internalization theory, explored in chapter 3, can be extended to the banking 
sector to explain why a bank should choose to exploit its advantages itself rather than 
selling them to local and/or correspondent banks. Rugman (1981, p.89) asserts that: 
in the same way that the MNE creates an internal market to overcome imperfect good 
and factor markets, so does the MNB use internalization to overcome imperfections 
in international financial markets. 
The central theme of this theory is that the transactional model of the bank arises to 
evade transaction costs and market imperfections in international financial markets, 
especially failures of arm's-length markets for bank knowledge in overseas markets. 
The theory also highlights the symbiotic relationship between banks and capital 
markets in which both forms of organizations act as possible substitutes for each other. 
Following the organizations failure framework, MNBs find it transactionally cost 
effective to create implicit market for their products/services in overseas markets. 
Because of the unique characteristics of the banking industry (e.g. absence of patent 
products, ease of imitation of banking services/products etc., the MNB creates and 
uses its internal market to produce and market its products/services. Imperfections in 
the national markets and government-imposed distortions (regulations) all create 
incentives to resort to internal organization. 
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LOCATION-SPECIFIC ADVANTAGES (LSAs) 
The opportunities offered by virtue of establishing in a particular country constitute 
the location advantages of the firm. The underlying theory explains that existence of 
country-specific advantages may be combined with bank-specific advantages to 
rationalise a bank's decision to locate abroad. If this were not so then alternative forms 
of servicing foreign markets may be costIess. The absence of control in a 
correspondent bank relation on the one hand, and the need to optimise global 
profitability from a bank's ownership advantages on the other, underpin the complexity 
of the opportunities offered by location characteristics. 
The role of location-specific advantages in the U.S. banking involvement abroad was 
the subject of the empirical study by ho (1983, 1986) and Nigh, Cho, and Krishman 
(1986). As implied in their studies and others, location-related characteristics can be 
firm-specific, polycentric or a natural result of bilateral/multilateral relations. For 
instance, interest rate differentials and market competitiveness are seen as being firm-
specific. Polycentric factors are those that affect all banks by reason of locating in a 
particular country. These include political risk, level of development of capital 
markets, foreign exchange/money transmission controls, trade restriction barriers, etc. 
Additionally, foreign branch network may be encouraged by home cum host country 
relations. Thus, banks may take advantage of relations (economic and/or political) 
between their home country and another country or other countries. The above studies 
confirm this hypothesis. The unique nature of banks and their impact on national 
economy makes them highly susceptible to governmental interference. Because 
government intervention policies can be politically and/or economically motivated, and 
because banks have national (home-country) identities, location-related factors occupy 
a strategic position in the foreign investment decision of MNBs generally. 
Headquarters management are therefore sensitive to the opportunities offered by 
location characteristics in both the domestic and foreign markets. 
Trade theorists however argue that 'banking will be most efficient and more substantial 
in those countries that have a comparative advantage in producing bank products, 
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specifically, the core products (services) of money transmission and payment, deposit 
facilities for savers and bank loans for borrowers'. Against this background, Cho 
individually and collaboratively with Nigh and Krishman hypothesised that such FDI 
activity (Le. foreign branch banking) was positively related to the local banking market 
opportunities, ceteris paribus. Their studies however provide partial evidence on the 
hypothesized relationship. Cho's study contains disaggregated evidence on the role 
of LSAs. On the one hand, the net effects of LSAs are found to be negative for the 
growth ofMNBs, despite various incentives offered in the host countries' markets. On 
the other hand, the study documents the differential effects of location advantages 
across banking activities and markets. Also it is found that LSAs are largely 
responsible for the types of MNB activities, although ownership-specific and 
internalization advantages are more relevant for the level of involvement of such 
activities. While the evidence of these studies is inconclusive, one would imagine that 
the appeal of London or other money centers for FDI banking could be associated with 
factors inherent in the 'local banking market opportunity hypothesis'. It is perhaps the 
intuitive appeal of the LSAs more than inchoate corollary empirical findings that 
underpins its relevance as a determinant of international banking. 
7.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The study is about alternative strategies of international investment. International 
banking is within its scope and is shown historically to be a logical extension of 
international business. International banking is not amenable to any precise definition. 
However, foreign branch banking is shown to be the FDI counterpart of foreign 
subsidiary of MNBs. Banks employ a wide range of organizational forms in servicing 
foreign markets. Within the purview of 'new forms of international banking,' three 
categories of organizational modes are distinguished: cooperative arrangements, joint 
venture or consortium banking, and merchant banking and associated services. 
The dynamics of international banking are explored through a survey of global strategy 
of MNBs in two phases: the pragmatic phase, which examines the global practices of 
banks; and the theoretical reviews of FDI theories applicable to the banking industry. 
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PART 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This study is divided into three parts. The first two parts were concerned with Literature 
review on two levels. The first level, which was the subject of Part One, reviewed the 
literature on foreign investment theories. This provided the basis for assessing the 
applicability of extant theories in explaining wider dimensions of international investment 
than had been contemplated by the theories in their original formulation. A taxonomy of 
the new forms of international investment established the parameters for examining the 
second level, in Part two, the structure and dimensions of alternative strategies to foreign 
investment. The application of markets and hierarchies paradigm was made more 
microanalytic than previous international business studies of these matters. 
This part of the study (Part 3) is the concluding part and is concerned with empirical 
investigation into the phenomena of new forms of international investment. The part is 
divided into three chapters. The first chapter, which is chapter eight of the study, 
establishes the purpose of this research, formulate the hypotheses and discusses the 
research design. The second chapter is chapter nine of the study and is concerned with 
research methodology, the methodology used in the statistical analysis, and the first phase 
of the analysis of research findings. The second phase of the analysis of research findings 
is the focus of chapter ten. It deals with the statistical analyses in relation to the stated 
hypotheses. Chapter eleven concludes the study with a summary and policy implications 
as well as suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 8 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to generate testable hypotheses for the statistical data 
collected in the field work. 
For ease of readership it may be helpful to state the study hypothesis in advance of the 
argument. These are: 
HI: The adoption of new forms by a firm in foreign market development is 
significantly influenced by managerial assessments of firm-specific characteristics. 
H2: The adoption of new forms in the internationalization process is positively related 
to the firm's global strategies/objectives, ceteris paribus. 
H3: The choice of new forms in the internationalization process is not significantly 
influenced by the size of the firm. 
H4: New forms of investment are more likely to prevail in firms with a 'dynamic 
foreign investment posture' than in firms with a 'static posture'. 
Hs: The choice of new forms in foreign market development is significantly 
influenced by managerial perceptions of host country charactawistics. 
H6: Firm choice/use of new forms in the internationalization process is independent 
of competitors' mode of organising foreign transactions. 
H7: Firm choice of new forms in the internationalization process is independent of 
stage of host country development. 
Hg: Firm choice of new forms is dependent upon their perceived net benefits by 
corporate management. 
The premise for all the tests in this enquiry is that common, or at least similar, factors 
are at work in driving the several routes of international entry. While hypothesis-testing 
remains a very crucial undertaking in behavioral science researches, evidently research 
can have a variety of purposes, and the research design which is most appropriate for any 
given project will depend on its purpose. (For a detailed discussion of the purposes of 
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social science projects and their implications for research design, see Selltiz, Wrightsman 
and Cook, 1976, pp 89-112). The divergences of opinions, approaches, and values 
between corporate foreign investment practice and international business research can lead 
to four types of research projects; exploratory, descriptive, normative, and explanatory. 
The common features of exploratory researches are (Manheim and Rich, 1986, p.68): (1) 
their utility when the phenomena of under investigation are new or have not been studied 
before, and (2) the familiarity which they provide about such phenomena, thus enabling 
more precise research questions to be developed and hypotheses formulated. Group 2 type 
researches - descriptive - characterize investigations which are designed to provide an 
unbiased representation of the phenomena of interest so that research questions and 
hypotheses may be better developed. Such studies are labelled descriptive or positive 
because they attempt to justify what already is. In contrast to this type of research, a 
normative research is essentially theoretical: the aim is to present or justify what ought 
to be, rather than what is. Finally, explanatory researches are geared towards casual 
investigations, the objective being to explain why a phenomenon exists or why an event 
occurs. An explanatory research design provides a basis for causal inferences when it 
allows the researcher to rule out any plausible explanations for observed results that 
represent alternatives to the causal hypothesis being tested (ibid). 
The significance of the above typology is that each type requires different sets of research 
design. For example, exploratory research emphasizes flexibility more than precision, 
while descriptive and explanatory researches emphasize accurate measurement of 
phenomena, and require unbiased and reliable observations (ibid). This study, while 
embodying some of the elements of descriptive and explanatory research, conforms more 
with the requirements of an exploratory investigation. 
Regardless of the purpose of a study, a research design should include the following basic 
elements (ibid.): 
(1) a statement of the purpose of the research; (2) a statement of the hypothesis to be 
tested (if any); (3) a specification of the variables to be employed; (4) a statement of how 
the variables are to be operationalized and measured; (5) description of data collection 
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and analysis; and (6) a discussion of analysis of the data collected. This chapter is 
devoted to items 1 to 4, while items 4 and 5 are the subject of chapter 9. 
8.2 A STATEMENT OF THE PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
The study of alternative strategies to international investment may be viewed instricto 
senso, as a study of non-FDI modes of entry into foreign markets. The choice of mode 
of foreign market entry and development strategy is vital to the success of foreign 
operations, hence Wind and Perlmutter (1977) identify it as a "frontier issue" in 
international business. Analytical enquiries in this area can take any number of 
approaches (as shown in parts 1 and 2) for the same reason that entry modes differ in 
their mix of advantages and limitations. Much of the empirical literature has been based 
on the theoretical framework of the eclectic model and internalization theorem. The 
inadequacy of these theories, as originally formulated is evident in their later versions 
which have sought to accommodate divergent modes of foreign investment (see, for 
example, Rugman, 1982 and Buckley and Casson, 1989, and Dunning 1988, for 
internalization and eclectic streams of research, respectively). General explanation of non-
equity forms of foreign investment and specific applications to the international hotel 
industry and the business-service sector, etc., are both theoretical and empirical ways of 
recognizing the diversity of strategic forms of foreign involvement and the need for a 
redefinition of central concepts of received microtheory. 
Recently, the transaction cost theory has emerged as a strong explanatory candidate in the 
foreign investment phenomena. Like the internalization concept, the transaction cost 
approach has its antecedent in the industrial organization literature, but, unlike the 
former, it regards the transaction as the basic unit of analysis and transaction cost 
economizing as central to the study of economic organizations. Both in its original 
formulation in the economics literature (Williamson, 1975) and extension into the 
international business literature (Casson, 1982), structural differences of the firm are 
assumed to arise primarily to: (1) promote economy in transaction cost by assigning 
transactions to governance structures in a discriminating way, (2) determine the efficient 
boundaries between firms and markets, and (3) match internal governance structures with 
attributes of transactions. 
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As applied to foreign market entry and development strategy, transaction cost 
considerations explain why a firm should engage in direct investment rather than using 
contractual or cooperative modes. Clearly, corporate choices are most usefully and 
tractably treated as one of common governance costs (Le. costs of establishing a wholly 
owned foreign subsidiary) versus disintermediation costs (Le. costs of transacting across 
markets). Another view is one of a tradeoff between control and cost of resource 
commitment (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). 
Implicit in the assumptions underlying current theoretical developments and accompanying 
public concern is a view of foreign investment practices in which the traditional FDI via 
wholly owned subsidiary is no longer made the centrepiece of analysis. Spearheaded by 
the OECD in the 1980s, although it has been recognized much earlier (Hyson and 
Weigel, 1970), the literature developed as "new forms of investment" with specific 
orientation to developing countries. Its popularity as a line of research investigation is 
commonly credited to Dr. Charles Oman (the Director of the Development Centre of 
OECD) whose 1984 and subsequent publications have brought realism to the significance 
of changing international investment strategies, albeit in the North-South context. 
8.2.1 THE NEED FOR THE RESEARCH 
This study is concerned with recent developments in international investments and the 
theory of MNE. Extant foreign investment theories have concentrated on FDI and have 
been very successful in projecting wholly owned foreign subsidiary as the most efficient 
governance structure. Despite the elegance and comprehensiveness of FDI reasoning, it 
is still deficient in some respects as a general institutional framework for deciding the 
integrity of foreign investment (see for example, Beamish, 1985; Beamish and Banks, 
1987). 
The need for a detailed and critical study of this kind was highlighted by Professor 
Dunning and others in the late 1970s. Addressing a meeting of European International 
Business Association in Sweden in 1977, Professor Dunning stressed the need for a 
detailed and critical study of alternative modalities of international resource transference. 
Subsequently, the OECD and other multilateral organizations have advocated for a 
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rethinking on the package of FDI (see for example, Germidis, 1981; Oman, 1984 and 
Contractor, 1985). Also, Mr Faaland, President of OECD Development Centre 
underscored the " ... importance and timeliness of undertaking a study of the new forms 
of international investment" (1984). In short, there is virtual unanimity in the international 
business and investment community that, in recent years, the boundaries between equity 
and non-equity/cooperative forms of international investment have become blurred (see 
Dunning, 1981; Oman, 1984a, b, 1986; Hood and Young, 1986.). The proposition by 
a number of economists that traditional FDI was becoming obsolete and was being 
superseded by new forms of investment (Oman, 1984, p.26) is the context upon which 
this research is based. 
Although the trend towards new forms may appear to be prevalent in developing 
countries, it is frequently being adopted in developed economies as well. (see for 
example, Janger, 1980, Harrigan, 1985). Contractor and Lorange (1987) show that 
various modes of NFIs (such as licenses or joint ventures) in U.S.-based companies 
outnumber wholly-owned subsidiaries by a ratio of 4 to 1. 
Setting aside the fact that most existing studies are U.S. based and/or have relied on U.S. 
MNEs as data base, what is somehow surprising is the paucity of synthesis and empirical 
investigation of the "rather disparate literature on a topic which is currently identified as 
an important area in the international trade and development - the growth of 'new forms 
of international industrial co-operation' (Buckley, 1985). In the manufacturing industry, 
and to a partial extent in the banking/services sector, economic rationale for 
multinationality is perceived and pursued through wholly owned subsidiary (or foreign 
branch network in the case of banks). The central questions with which foreign 
investment studies are concerned revolve around two issues: (1) Why firms headquartered 
in one country establish strategic operational presence abroad; and (2) whether the 
establishment pattern is random or systematic with respect to factors that owe their origin 
to the firm, to environmental influences, or to the interaction of both. 
The first set of questions emphasizes governance structures in which the attributes of the 
firm's ownership-specific as well as internalization advantages are significant and 
expressed in ways in which their transaction-cost economizing properties are made 
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dynamic, rather than regarded as a datum. The second set of questions is rooted in 
external stimuli or operating environment structures. These include the institutional 
arrangements that characterize the politics and set conext within which economic activities 
take place in a country. They include not just 'dormant' location-specific advantages-
about which conventional location orthodoxy is emphatic-but more importantly unnatural 
(Le. contrived) set of environmental factors that potentially affect the configuration of 
inter-country relations and ultimately decide whether firms of one country should be 
allowed to establish in another country regardless of their competitive advantages. 
The premise of this study therefore is that the extent of international economic activities 
cannot be confined to or measured in terms of FDI alone, as represented by wholly 
owned foreign subsidiary (or branch banking network). Conceptually and practically, 
there are a number of strategies which firms can use in servicing foreign markets. 
Through these mechanisms, firms can potentially overcome or avoid many of the 
disabilities that have been conventionally associated with the market modes. 
Despite these concerns, published literature indicates that research response has been 
rather scant and disaggregated in the main. NFl researches have been mainly carried out 
as single component studies, although some of these are dichotomous - that is, equity 
verses non-equity. As far as published empirical literature is concerned, there has been 
no empirical investigation of new forms of international investment. Published works are 
generally descriptive or conceptual propositions. This study is an attempt to bridge the 
perceived gap. 
8.2.2 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
The purpose of the study is fivefold: (1) To determine the identity, and assess the 
transactional economizing properties, of alternative (Le. non FDI) modes of 
internationalization; (2) To integrate the economic theory of entrepreneurship with the 
eclectic paradigm under a transaction cost approach. In other words, to determine the role 
of entrepreneurship (corporate management) in the internationalization process, using 
firm-specific and country-specific advantages; (3) To attempt to extend the phenomenon 
of new forms of investment to international banking; (4) To examine the relationship 
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between the stage of country development and the use of new forms of investment; and 
(5) To evaluate the policy implications of the findings for (i) the MNE, (ii) the host 
government; and (iii) multilateral governments. 
Specifically, the study: (1) investigates the extent and significance of, and the 
motivations behind corporate choice of new forms of investment in both financial and 
non-financial enterprises; (2) examines the factors that determine the choice of form and 
their relative importance, from the perspectives of both governance and locational 
structures; (3) assesses the impact of managerial perceptions of the significance of 
ownership-specific advantages, internalization-incentive advantages and host country-
specific characteristics on foreign market entry mode choices; and (4) offers empirical 
evidence of the costs and benefits of new forms. 
One hypothesis of interest concerns the extent to which new forms offer small and 
medium - size firms (SMFs) a creeping opportunity to internationalize their activities. 
Multinationality is conventionally associated with large MNEs deemed to possess 
sufficient firm-specific advantages (FSAs) to countervail externalities in international 
markets. Conversely, the structure of SMFs is portrayed as being insufficiently equipped 
to deal with or overcome international market imperfections. Therefore, an understanding 
of the ability of SMFs to assign foreign transactions in a discriminating way has remained 
somewhat elusive for the above reason. An empirical verification of new forms as a 
vehicle by which SMFs are able to express their specific advantages but also sustain 
foreign transactions is a potential useful corrective. 
Related to this is the question concerning the significance of determinants of governance 
and location structures - namely FSAs, internalisation-incentive advantages and location-
specific advantages - as rationales for adopting NFIs. According to Rugman, et aI., 
(1986, p103), there is little difference in FSAs between firms under oligopolistic 
competition, leading firms to differentiate their products from those of their rivals, but 
also guard against dissipation via hierarchy. This argument presents new forms as a 
residual concept of governance, implying that firms will resort to their usage only when 
the dissipation cost of FSAs is commensurate with royalties from contractual dependence 
(Cf. Coase, 1937). 
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Another important question concerns the attitudes of corporate management towards the 
impact of entry mode choices on firm value. Such attitudes reflect differences or 
agreements in their perceptions of the significance of firm-specific (ie. ownership and 
internalization) and host country-specific factors on the mode of entry into particular 
foreign markets. The relevance of economic theory of entrepreneurship to entry mode 
choices has received little attention in international business literature. In short, analysis 
of entrepreneurship has been very much neglected by economists (Casson, 1985; p.172) 
and by international business researchers, broadly defined. Yet, whether transactions will 
be assigned between firms and markets at all, let alone doing so in discriminating ways, 
is, with little doubt, the central task of corporate management (see for example, Teece, 
1984; Casson, 1985 p172; Buckley, 1989, p154). These theories suggest that firms will 
be sensitive to market and political pressures to the extent that future cash flows, share 
prices, and ultimately, firm value may likely be affected. In particular, what are the 
perceptions of firms about the costs and benefits of alternative entry mode choices and 
what are the policy implications? 
Entry mode choices are yet to be assessed in this problem context. Previous studies have 
concentrated on Dunning's eclectic theory and Buckley and Casson's internalization 
theorem (popularised by Rugman as a general theory of international investment). This 
study aims to introduce into the entry mode literature aspects of the economic theory of 
entrepreneurship in the hope that it will add to the international business research agenda 
as well as respond to Dunning's (1989) call for a more interdisciplinary approach (see 
also Buckley, 1990). 
This study covers both financial enterprises (banks) and non-financial enterprises (as 
generally defined); therefore, references to firms contemplate both types of enterprises. 
8.3 SPECIFICATION AND DEFINITION OF HYPOTHESIS 
The aim of the empirical research is to obtain answers to questions about reality. 
Questions may be practical (as with case studies, participant observation studies or 
evaluation of events and behaviour), or they may be principally of academic interest (as 
with normative research or conceptual development studies). In either case, they will 
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probably be stated in abstract terms, even though the answers sought are usually concrete 
and specific. One of the first problems in research is to devise ways of getting from the 
abstract level of questions to some concrete observations which will hopefully provide 
answers to the questions. That is what a hypothesis is about. Essentially a hypothesis is 
a statement of what may be believed to be factual. 
This section of study is concerned with the specification and explanation of hypotheses. 
It specifies the facts (variables, logical constructs) and the relations among them that offer 
a logical description or explanation of the conditions or events that give rise to the 
problem. Some variables or relations in hypotheses are known and others are 'devised' 
or 'invented' to complete and systemize the explanation. Thus, by logically relating 
known facts to "intelligent guesses" about unknown variables or relations, hypotheses are 
able to extend and enlarge our knowledge. In short, hypotheses have been described as 
"your (our) eyes as you (we) try to approach problems in a scientific manner. Through 
them you (we) look into the disorder that is a problem and see the possibilities of order" 
(Hodnett, 1955, bracket replacements are mine). 
Studies of new forms can be undertaken in either of two ways. One avenue is the single 
component study approach by which the constituents of new forms (e.g. licensing, 
franchising, joint ventures, etc.) are studied individually or separately. Studies of this 
kind include works of Bilkey and Tesar (1977), Wiedersheim-Paul, Olson and Welch 
(1978), Reid (1981), Cavusgil (1984), and Schlegelmilch (1986) for Exporting; Telesio 
(1979), Buckley and Davies (1981), Carstairs and Welch (1982), Contractor (1981, 1984, 
1985), Davidson and McFetridge (1985), Horstman and Markusen (1986), OECD (1987), 
and Monye (1989) for Licensing; Walker and Etzel (1973), Hackett (1976), Caves and 
Murphy (1976), Brickley and Dark (1987), Norton (1988), and Welch (1989) for 
Franchising; Killing (1982, 1983), Beamish (1984, 1985), Beamish and Banks (1987), 
Harrigan (1984, 1985), Connolly (1984), Artisien and Buckley (1985), and Franko (1974, 
1989) for Joint Ventures; UNCTC (1983) and Brooke (1985a, b) for International 
Management Contracts; Wright and Kobel (1981), Lecraw and Gordon (1984) and Dicken 
(1986) for Turnkey Contracts; and the editorial work of Germidis (1980) for International 
Subcontracting. 
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The alternative approach to the study of new forms of investment is the composite 
approach. In this respect, two or more strategy variants are investigated in one study. 
Examples of this approach include the works of Dunning and Cantwell (1982), Oman 
(1980, 1984a, b, 1986) Buckley (1983, 1985 ch.3 in Buckley and Casson, 1985), 
Contractor and Lorange (1987), Dunning (1988, ch.6), and Young et al. (1989). The 
approach adopted in this study identifies with the latter. 
8.3.1. A TRANSACTION COST ANALYSIS OF NEW FORMS OF INVESTMENT 
The study evaluates the relationship between Nfl (mode of entry or form of foreign 
involvement), on the one hand, and the factors that influence their choice, on the other 
hand. By definition new forms of international investment are heterogeneous. For 
analytical purposes, they can be most usefully and tractably viewed as 'new forms' or 
'markets' under a 'markets and firms' dichotomy. It should be made clear at the outset 
that this dichotomy is for analytical purposes since, strictly speaking, included in the 
taxonomy of new forms are international investment strategies in which there is equity 
interest, albeit such foreign-held equity does not constitute majority ownership and 
control. This approach is consistent with a composite analysis of the kind represented by 
the studies cited above. Thus, rather than isolating each mode for analysis - an approach 
for which single component studies are designed - the attempt here is to examine the 
factors which induce or propel firms to establish operations in foreign countries via the 
mechanisms of new forms. This avenue of research offers a complementary strength to 
single component studies such as the ones cited above for, after all, the single modes of 
entry they investigated comply with the definition of new forms of investment. 
To encompass new developments in the field of determinants of foreign investment and 
to express these operationally under a transaction cost approach, a somewhat different 
taxonomy from that of Dunning or Rugman is proposed to distinguish among two classes 
of hypotheses (1) Governance structures, and (2) Country-Specific characteristics. The 
implications of these two classes of hypotheses have been discussed in chapter 5. 
Eclecticism is not lost under this classification, instead it is emphasized. As explained in 
chapter 5, governance structure refers to organisational framework within which the 
integrity of a transaction is decided. Markets and hierarchies are two of the main 
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alternatives. Much of the concern of extant studies has been with issues of the latter kind, 
only empirical issues of the former kind are addressed in this study. 
Governance structure hypotheses encompass both conceptual and transactional attributes 
of traditional ownership-specific and internalization advantages under an expanded eclectic 
framework (see Dunning, 1988). Implicit in governance structure hypotheses are 
propositions that create an awareness of or establish the ci10Cial role of corporate 
management in entry mode choices. The importance of managerial attributes to corporate 
investment has been recognised in a number of studies in accounting and finance. 
However, a significant aspect of corporate investment decisions in which managerial 
attitudes have been grossly ignored concerns foreign market entry mode choices. The 
incorporation of these under governance structures may be a useful corrective. 
Hypotheses about country-specific characteristics both recognize and stress the importance 
of host country's economic-related and noneconomic factors in foreign investment 
decisions . Whereas natural economic features of a country conform to the traditional role 
of location-related factors in explaining inward foreign investment, noneconomic factors 
emphasize the effect of unnatural host country circumstances (such as political 
environment, intra-nation events of the host country, or inter-nation conflict and 
cooperation, etc.) on foreign investment decisions. 
A transaction cost analysis of new forms of international investment under governance 
structures and locational influences is predicated upon the general hypothesis, known as 
"the obsolescence of FDI hypothesis" (Oman, 1984, p.26). Operationalizing this turns 
critically on the question posed by Anderson and Gatignon, (1986) namely: "What is the 
best entry mode for a given setting?" Surely, if FDI has been found inefficient in certain 
operational respects, as implied by the obsolescence hypothesis, it is because of the early 
unremitting emphasis on FDI as the only governance structure. It then raises the question 
about 'sanctity' of a firm's monopolistic advantages in transaction cost terms. It also 
raises the issue of tradeoffs between ownership-specific and internalization factors on 
which FDI propositions are predicated and compelling forces of the environment of 
operations. Such tradeoffs are difficult to evaluate and little understood because entry 
modes differ greatly in their mix of purposes, advantages and drawbacks (ibid). 
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Surveys on how firms make entry mode decisions indicate that few companies make a 
conscious, systematic analysis of the costs and benefits of the options (see Robinson, 
1978). Despite the spate of literature on international business, the literature has been 
silent on how managers should weigh tradeoffs in order to make an optimum choice of 
entry mode that minimizes risks or maximizes returns on foreign investment (for a similar 
argument, see, Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). This apparent silence may be partly due 
to the systematic attempt by institutional economists in presenting the efficiency features 
of the firm as a datum. While recognizing that the criterion for organizing transactions 
is cost minimization, neoclassical reference to the firm has been one of production 
functions. Teece (1984) makes the point very strongly thus: "With little exaggeration, we 
can assert that, until very recently, economics lacked a theory of the firm. To be sure, 
textbooks contain chapter headings labelled 'the theory of the firm', but on closer 
examination one finds a theory of production masquerading as a theory of the firm. Firms 
are typically represented as production functions, or, in some formulations, production 
sets. " 
The second reason why the literature is silent on how managers should weigh tradeoffs 
about optimum entry made choices is rooted in the background and orientation of the 
antecedent literatures of international business, of which micro-economic theory of firms 
and industrial organization literature are pre-eminent. The problem is that both literatures 
were not developed with the education or orientation of business managers in mind (ibid). 
Rather, both disciplines in general, and their formal economic theories in particular, are 
shaped by a concern with normative questions in public policy that are both removed 
from actualities of the world and different from the strategic manager's view of 
international business. In addition, Teece contends that economics as an empirical 
science has long been determinedly oblivious to the problems of predicting behaviour of 
the individual decision unit, instead has focused attention and developed specialized tools 
for the statistical analysis of patterns of behaviour of parameters (whole populations) of 
economic actors. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, because equilibrium analysis plays such a vital 
role within received microtheory, and because strategic change is so often modeled as an 
equilibrium movement (i.e. from one condition to another), the role and analysis of 
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entrepreneurship tends to be neglected by economists (Baumol, 1968; Teece, 1984; 
Casson, 1985). Yet, by definition, it is the entrepreneur who owns and/or controls 
productive activities; it is his task to carry out the direction of resources with efficiency 
(Le. low cost or high returns). He is aided in this process by endogenous as well as 
exogenous factors. Internalization of transactions is governed by internal considerations, 
largely at the discretion of management (Casson, 1985, p.155). The dominant mode of 
theorizing in international business and investment tends to distance the discipline from 
management problems, with the exception of accounting and finance. Without questioning 
the legitimacy or importance of the concerns and objectives that have shaped mainstream 
theories, there may be reservations about whether the discipline of international business 
thus shaped makes a wholly constructive contribution to strategic management. 
Strategic management issues in general, and in the international environment in particular, 
are centrally concerned with dynamics. Economic theory, on the other hand, deals mainly 
with equilibrium analyses, which are very often static. Although, recent theoretical 
formulations have tended to incorporate dynamic features (see for example, Anderson 
Gatignon, 1986; Dunning, 1988), however formal modelling apparatuses of this kind are 
either too complex for the lay manager to assimilate or are insufficiently microanalytic 
to capture all the phenomena of interest. Accordingly, only very simple problems can be 
dealt with economically. Many of the problems confronting general management are 
behavioural and qualitative, and are not amenable to precise quantification. Existing 
foreign investment theories suffer from inattention to these issues, for, according to 
Teece, "managers are as concerned with the journey as they are with the destination when 
industries and markets are being transformed." Therefore, the need for integrating a 
theory of entrepreneurship (incorporating human resouces management) in international 
business is of considerable importance to strategic management. 
Transaction cost theory thus provides a framework for the unification of concepts and 
practices in international investment. It provides a basis which allows different success 
criteria and distinctive comparative strengths and limits of internal governance structures 
to be integrated alongside entrepreneurship, strategic management and environmental 
considerations. It is a dynamic concept which can be used to assess long-term strategic 
decisions, such as entry mode choices. The classical approaches to such assessments 
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emphasize choosing from the feasible set of options that which offers the highest risk-
adjusted return. But, the literature on foreign investment hardly addresses the issue 
directly. Instead, the issue is configured in terms of control each mode affords the firm 
(Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). For example, it is claimed that the issue of control is 
central to the growth of the MNE (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1981; Daniels 
and Radebaugh, 1986; Rugman, Lecraw and Booth, 1986) and of new forms of 
international investment (Buckley, 1985, 1989). 
Dwelling on the issue of control - defined as the ability to influence systems, methods, 
and decisions - Anderson and Gatignon (1986) proposed four constructs that determine 
the optimal degree of control, from a transaction cost analysis, to wit: (1) transaction-
specific assets: that is, investments (physical and human) that are specialized to one or 
few users or uses; (2) external uncertainty: implying the unpredictability of the firm's 
external operating environment; (3) internal uncertainty: indicating the firm's inability to 
determine its agents' performance by observing output measures; (4) free-riding potential: 
that is, agents' ability to receive benefits without bearing the associated costs. 
Clearly, these constructs are couched in terms which permit analysis to be pursued under 
hierarchy. Hence the propositions which the author developed fall within the traditional 
notion of the firm as a superior control mechanism over alternative structures. However, 
instead of an analysis based on a control/cost dichotomy, the attempt here is to formulate 
and test hypotheses based on judgements of corporate management about the transactional 
limits of the firm (governance-related factors) and external environmental considerations 
(host country limiting factors). 
STUDY HYPOTHESES 
Governance-related factors include, but are not restricted to, the firm's expansion ethos 
or entrepreneurial drive, firm size, experience in foreign markets, possession of brand 
name, etc., and economies of scope and geographical diversification. A firm's expansion 
ethos and entrepreneurial drive can be regarded as its internalization advantages, and are 
made manifest in the firm's (i.e. management's) willingness to share ownership and 
control in return for access to local markets. Additionally, the desire to minimize country 
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risks and obtain economies of scope and geographical diversification are pervasive aspects 
of internalization advantages of the firm. All of these are background influences on 
international entry. They may not be seen to directly relate to foreign market entry, but 
increase the basis and likelihood of exposure to international possibilities and pressures 
(Wiedersheim-Paul, Olson and Welch, 1978; Welch, 1990). 
Firm size, experience of foreign markets and possession of brand name, trademarks, etc 
(or possession of large corporate customers, in the case of banks) are ownership-specific 
advantages of the firm. These have been used in several studies to predict the pattern and 
types of influences on the movement into international operations by MNEs. As Dunning 
(1988, p.48) aptly observes, strategically related characteristics of firms most likely to 
be associated with aggressive international behaviour global dimensions of business 
include: firms' long-term goals and perspectives, the nature of their core assets, their 
attitude to innovation and change, the range and segment of critical markets served, their 
attitude to risk and uncertainty, their operational flexibility, their organizational and 
cultural ethos, the entrepreneurial initiative of their management (chief decision-makers) 
and their willingness and capacity to accept contractual/cooperative cross-border alliances. 
A transaction cost analysis of entry mode decisions incorporating these factors suggests 
the development of hypotheses along the lines discussed below. 
8.3.2.1 MANAGERIAL ASSESSMENT OF FIRM-SPECIFIC 
CHARACTERISTICS 
HI: The adoption of new forms by a firm in foreign market development is 
significantly influenced by managerial assessments of firm-specific characteristics. 
This hypothesis implies that the mode of foreign transfer will be determined by corporate 
management dependent upon the nature of the resource transfer and the way they view 
the firm's characteristics. The literature recognizes these factors as ownership-specific 
advantages and internalization-incentive factors. In the context of Dunning's eclectic 
paradigm, both sets of factors must exist in a simultaneous complementarity with location-
specific factors for multinationality to occur. Although, this configuration has served 
economic analysis of foreign direct investment well, the outright omission or suppression 
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of process of entrepreneurship (Teece, 1984; Casson, 1985) makes its utility and 
importance to strategic management somewhat insufficient. Besides, ownership advantages 
are constructed in terms of firm characteristics often perceived as monopolistic. 
The concept of entrepreneurship is a crucial aspect of decision making: it has long played 
a role in the growth and theory of economic development; and has also been at the heart 
of much of business strategy theories (Buckley, 1990). The notion that a firm can choose 
from a finite set of strategies (e.g. lost cost high-volume strategies versus high cost 
innovative-product strategies) implies that a firm's resources and capabilities are not 
ubiquitous. Specific strategies require particular investment decisions, organizational 
structures, and particular organizational cultures. Caves (1980) succinctly asserts that 
certain factors of production are "semi-permanently tied to the firm by recontracting costs 
and market imperfections". By far the most common theoretical approach is that which 
takes the firm and its ownership assets as given, ignoring the fact that the options open 
to a manager include attempts at some degree of innovative improvement in existing ways 
of doing things (Le. accomplishing transactions). 
The decision making process of international market entry can be relatively complex, as 
has been shown by research on exporting (see, Wiedersheim-Paul, Olson and Welch, 
1978; Yaprak, 1985; Rosson and Reid, 1987) and a number of FDI studies. The role of 
management is central in this process. The function of management is to adjust to change; 
the faster the rate of change, the higher the demand on and for management (Buckley, 
1989, p.27). Buckley also notes that the FDI is (or should be) a management intensive 
activity "because of the risks involved in the move and because of the necessity to collect 
and, crucially, to channel information in order to support effective decisions." Such 
decisions are influenced by factors which prospectively lead to a consideration of 
international markets in ways that differ from one country to another. 
A transaction cost analysis of firm-specific characteristics requires an assessment of the 
factors likely to favour international possibilities via new forms. Ownership factors of 
firm size, experience of foreign markets and possession of brand name or trademarks may 
be important. The following internalization factors are also significant in the decision 
process: willingness to share ownership and control in return for access to local markets; 
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minimization of country risks; economies of scope and geographical diversification; and 
cost of establishing foreign wholly-owned outlets. These factors have been mentioned in 
the descriptive literature as likely to induce firms to adopt new forms (see, Oman, 1984). 
They can be perceived as catalysts for international expansion, on the one hand, and 
constraints, on the other. As catalysts, the larger the combination of firm size, experience 
of foreign markets and possession of product identity with internalization advantages, the 
greater the firm's bargaining power (Harrigan, 1985; Monye, 1989). Conversely, these 
factors can constrain entry mode options if their underlying assumptions or forces are 
violated. For example, in studying whether foreign divestment is the reverse of foreign 
direct investment under the eclectic theory, Boddewyn (1983), notes that the former 
requires only that one of the firm's advantages be absent, whereas the latter requires that 
the three conditions of ownership-specific, internalization and location-specific advantages 
be present simultaneously. 
The transactional model of the firm, as originally formulated, suggests factors that 
discourage joint ownership and control. These have been explored in the first two parts 
of this study. However, certain features of the firm may alter this tenacity. The first of 
these is associated with the firm's organizational structure. The growing tolerance of new 
forms, for example, has been related to organizational structure of the parent MNE 
(Caves, 1985, p.87). Also firms having worldwide product divisions and a high degree 
of product diversification may welcome new forms (e.g. joint ventures). New forms of 
investment have been especially evident in the extractive industries where projects are 
visibly risky or involve a large minimum efficient scale of operation or both (Oman, 
1984; Caves, 1985). For these kinds of projects, collaboration with other entities permits 
the foreign firm to acquire or secure interest in the project while simultaneously spreading 
the risk and financial burden that would be otherwise imposed. 
Costly and/or risky ventures or those involving long period to maturity, such as 
petrochemicals, hydrocarbon and steel projects, often stretch the capacity of firms. 
Alternatively, the firm may lack some capacity or competence needed to make a foreign 
investment succeed. Lack of transactional capability to exploit perceived market 
opportunities is a size-related factor that can prospectively lead to strategic alliances with 
local entrepreneurs who could, for instance, provide operational infrastructure, local 
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guarantees, information and general assistance in risk bearing. A firm that is diversifying 
in product as well as geographical markets may be faced with shortage or absence of 
organizational skills necessary to maximize perceived benefits. Domestic market 
saturation is another internalization factor which has been found to be an influence on 
international entry by U.S. franchisors (Hackett, 1976, p.69), U.S. exporters and 
licensors (Bilkey and Tesar, 1977), Australian exporters, licensors and franchisors (Welch 
1983, 1985, 1989, 1990) and several other studies. 
However, while material factors may be crucial, the main influence group in the 
internationalization process may be the decision maker/so In all the studies of the role of 
managerial decision-making on international entry and expansion (Walker and Etzel, 
1973; Reid, 1981; Welch, 1983, 1989; Rosson and Reid, 1987 and others), the average 
find was that the relative impact of the various catalysts appeared to depend heavily on 
how they were perceived by the key decision-maker/s in the companies. In some cases 
the decision-maker was the direct initiating factor in the international move, creating a 
strong internal drive. In others an important influence was the experience of the decision-
makers, developed ex ante (Reid, 1981; Welch, 1983). Managerial influence can manifest 
in the type of follow-through accompanying any evoked (ie. passive) international 
interest, indicating the extent of managerial perception of the strengths and limits of the 
firm as well as the extent of managerial commitment to the international move. 
In the light of the foregoing, it is hypothesized that: The adoption of new forms by a firm 
in foreign market development is signigicantly influenced by managerial assessment of 
firm-speci fic characteristics. 
8.3.2.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRM GLOBAL STRATEGY AND 
CHOICE OF NEW FORMS 
H2 : The adoption of new forms in the internationalization process is positively related 
to the firm's global strategies/objectives, ceteris paribus. 
This hypothesis seeks to asses the significance of firms' global strategies and/or objectives 
on the outcome of entry mode choices. Closely linked to managerial assessment of the 
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strengths and limits of internal organization (hypothesis 1) is a re-examination of the 
reason behind a firms's international move and global pursuits. Global strategies are those 
which recognize that competition is no longer confined to the domestic market, that 
information is limited and interdependence between firms is necessary. Firms become 
global for many reasons and need an approach appropriate to meet new challenges when 
changes occur (Porter, 1980; Porter and Rudden, 1982). Adaptation requires that a 
change is not only a possibility but must be recognized in both decision-making processes 
and operational terms. In both respects, firms must re-examine their assumptions 
concerning how competitive advantage can be gained by integrating the operations of 
diverse geographic location, using flexible, cooperative and international strategic 
alliances such as joint ventures (Harrigan, 1983, 1984; Beamish, 1985; Franko, 1989), 
exporting (Bilkey and Tesar, 1977; Cavusgil, 1984), licensing (Telesio, 1979; Contractor, 
1981, 1982; Contractor and Sagafi-Nejad, 1981; Carstairs and Welch, 1982; Davidson 
and McFetridge, 1985), franchising (Walker and Etzel, 1973; Hackett, 1976; Welch, 
1989, 1990) and subcontracting (Germidis, 1980), amongst others. 
When a profit opportunity has been diagnosed, the firm generally seeks to maximize the 
profit it can appropriate from it. The major constraints on the firm are the actions and the 
reactions of rival and non-rival firms. Since this interaction exists under an ecology of 
continual international competition, risks and uncertainty, and information impactedness, 
an enforceable economic contract which imposes a cooperative solution on the system or 
involves a collective action (Williamson, 1975, p.73) may in these circumstances become 
an attractive option. Although these mechanisms are not without costs; indeed every 
mechanism has, but the costs and strains on managerial capacity under a 
contractual/cooperative framework may not be comparable with the high demand of 
internal coordination of a vertically related MNE. Besides, contractual/cooperative modes 
allow flexibility and adaptation to the flow of events without concern for internal power 
consequences prospective with internal expansion (ibid). 
Structural attributes of new forms of investment and their efficiency consequences have 
been discussed in part 2 of this study. Applications of these global strategies involve 
assessing the principal objectives of firms vis-a-vis rival behaviour in the international 
marketplace. In this setting, strategically similar firms readily recognize their 
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interdependence with one another, pursue similar goals, and react alike to disturbances; 
whereas, strategically dissimilar firms do not have these natural harmonies (Caves, 1982, 
p.109). Nevertheless, active rivalry in the market has diversified, naturally aided by 
imperfections and politically by forces of deregulation. The configuration of economic 
activities manifests in different ways in different markets: some are vertically integrated, 
some are not; they differ in how they compete in the market; some specialise in particular 
products or markets, some are conglomerately diversified; some advertise, others do not; 
some desire monopoly power, others prefer steady growth; some invest in R&D, others 
are free-riders. In all these scenarios, anecdotal evidence suggests that the structural 
forces determining the boundaries of behaviour in international markets may be closely 
linked to firms' motives or objectives. 
Global motives of firms vary according to the above configuration of economic activities. 
In operational terms, they include: to achieve international diversification; to acquire 
reciprocal access to technology or to reduce the cost of acquiring technology; to maximize 
perceived market opportunities at low costs; to circumvent host country barriers or 
competitive barriers; to avoid home market saturation; to reduce risk and uncertainty 
(country and investment); to gain access to a regional market with some preferential 
market arrangements, etc. 
Successful internationalization requires that an assessment of the firm's motives be made 
and correspondingly matched with its specific advantages. A firm's strategic mission 
determines its need to cooperate with others (Harrigan, 1984). Where product lives are 
short, cost implications are high and competition is keen, an analysis of corporate 
objectives and how these fit into firms' characteristics can help forge configurations which 
prospectively reduce transaction costs, enhance profitability, and position business units 
more advantageously. The foregoing suggests that: The adoption of new forms in the 
internationalization process is positively related to the firm's global strategies/objectives, 
ceteris paribus. 
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8.3.2.3 THE IMPACT OF FIRM SIZE ON NEW FIRMS OF INVESTMENT 
H3: The choice of new forms in the internationalization process is not significantly 
influenced by the size of the firm. 
A number of studies (reviewed in Hood and Young, 1986) assert that the most important 
ownership advantage explaining foreign production is firm size (p.72). The interpretation 
is that the size variable incorporates all or most of the other ownership-specific 
advantages which cumulatively catalyze multinationality (Horst, 1972; Lall and Streeten, 
1977; Dunning, 1977, 1979, 1988). The orientation and focus of the size factor in most 
of the studies was on FDI, suggesting that ownership-specific advantages arising from the 
size and complementarity of the firm's activities need to be internally controlled (via 
wholly-owned foreign subsidiary) to be effectively exploited (Dunning, 1988, p.176). The 
size factor has also been extended to international banking in which foreign branch 
banking is hypothesized to depend on the size of the parent bank (Cho, 1986; Nigh, Cho, 
and Krishnan, 1986). 
The evidence from these studies reveals a close relationship between firm size and the 
propensity to invest abroad. The studies also suggest that foreign investment is almost 
completely the preserve of large MNEs. The implications are that small and medium-size 
firms (SMFs) are generally viewed as being unable to internationalize their activities 
through FDI because of their limited resource base - especially their financial, managerial 
and technological resources as well as inexperience of foreign markets. According to this 
school of thought, the growing acceptance, use and familiarity with NFl worldwide may 
gradually create an international institutional framework in which SMFs can convert their 
unique talents and firm-specific advantages (e.g. small-scale production technology) into 
capital which can be invested in a foreign market without having to supply all the other 
components that constitute the traditional FDI package (Oman, 1984, p.97). 
Two implications of this hypothesis can be identified. One which has just been sketched 
contends that an important result of the proliferation of new forms is, or will be, an 
increasing multinationalization of SMFs, implying a lack of statistical significance among 
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small, medium and large firms in the variables that depict non-hierarchical consideration 
and use of new forms. 
A corollary implication, and one which is consistent with FDI studies, holds that the size 
of a firm is positively related to its level of involvement in foreign markets. Empirical 
FDI studies have found firm size, as proxied by its equity capital, to be a good 
representative variable among various ownership advantage factors (see, for example, 
Cho, 1986). The average finding of these studies is that large size firms display a 
preference for FDI and less propensity towards new forms. This implies a statistical 
significance between the three groups of firms in the factors that proxy use of NFls. 
However, as Contractor and Lorange (1987) and others have documented, there is 
abundant evidence on the use on NFl by western MNEs, and these are ordinarily 
regarded as large, even though the evidence about firm size is unclear. 
The clearest evidence about the high propensity to internationalize via new forms by large 
firms comes from Japanese MNEs, normally regarded in the west as de novo MNEs, or 
"unconventional MNEs" (Buckley ,1988). The organizational modes of investment by 
these de novo MNEs seem to suggest a high propensity to use variants of cooperative 
alliances. For example, Kojima and Ozawa (1984, p.42) document Japanese trading 
companies' proclivity to form joint ventures with local partners or third-country interests. 
The trading companies' high propensity to organise joint ventures with local partners is 
coupled with an equally high propensity to accept minority ownership. Taken together, 
Japanese overseas manufacturing ventures involving minority equity participation 
(precisely, 1-29 per cent equity ownership) account for as much as 74.8 per cent, and this 
pattern is reported to apply equally to each of the nine largest trading companies (ibid). 
The willingness of Japanese MNEs (most of whom ranking among the top 20 largest 
MNEs worldwide) to adopt new forms in their internationalization process could be taken 
seriously by western MNEs who may be disturbed by the prospects of losing out if they 
insist on wholly-or majority-owned investment (see also, Oman, 1984, p.83). 
The operationalization of firm size in this study is somewhat different. While assuming 
that firms, as in the above cited studies, possess the corporate capability (Le. firm-
specific advantages) necessary to successfully engage in international expansion, firms are 
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identified and classified by size according to both the perceptions of corporate executives 
of the firms themselves and financial variables as well as the number of employees in 
these firms. Furthermore, since western MNEs (unlike their Japanese counterparts) 
perceive new forms as " a second best" (Le. "a defensive reaction") alternative (Ozawa, 
1984), certain factors which may symbolize this defensive reaction strategy can be 
associated with new forms. Such factors as willingness to share ownership and control 
in return for access to local markets; concern about country risks, cost of establishing a 
foreign subsidiary; size of the parent company; experience in foreign markets, etc., have 
been variously mentioned in the literature as factors which prospectively give rise to the 
use of new forms. Thus, it is hypothesized in the null form that: The choice of new forms 
in the internationalization process is not significantly influenced by the size of the firm. 
8.3.2.4. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICY SHIFTS 
H4 : New forms of investment are more likely to prevail in firms with a 'dynamic 
foreign investment posture' than in firms with a 'static posture'. 
It has been argued that although host government policies can be held largely responsible 
for triggering the move towards increased use of new forms, company strategies and 
behaviour are presumed to allow these policies to succeed in obtaining assent to, and 
conditioned the kinds of MNEs that accepted, minority positions or 
contractual/cooperative arrangements (Franko, 1989). The relationship between firms' 
global strategies and new forms was explored under hypothesis 2 above. The emphasis 
here is on the possibility that changes in functional strategies might induce firms to adopt 
new forms. In her editorial introduction to multinational corporate strategy, Harrigan, 
(1984) wondered how business unit strategies would be adjusted to sustain competitive 
advantage in international markets. In effect what changes must be made in functional 
strategies when firms operate in many nations? 
Strategic management dictates that firms need to match their corporate capabilities to the 
ever-changing environment ifthey are to sustain competitive performance. In the analysis, 
not only are resource allocation issues involved (Tavis, 1981; Teece, 1984), but changes 
in international investment strategy become increasingly inevitable. The former is in the 
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realm of capital budgeting and related matters of financial analysis. The hypothesis of 
interest is concerned with the latter, that is, changes in "strategic postures" (Franko, 
1989) of firms. Recourse to this permits adaptations to environmental uncertainty to be 
accomplished by new forms, rather than by internal administrative processes involving 
greater anticipation of contingencies from the outset (Williamson, 1975, p.9). 
An investment posture can be dynamic or static, in operational terms. Reference to the 
former allows strategic moves which direct a firm's critical resources toward perceived 
market opportunities in a changing environment to be made. 'Static posture', on the other 
hand, is a relatice term, determinable by a periodic time frame. The basic characteristics 
of the contemporary business environment include actual or potential risks and 
uncertainties; increased worldwide competition; increased regulatory constraints, 
governmental intervention or other distortion propensities; increasing cost cum reduced 
availability of resources; and decreased predictability of environmental parameters (e.g. 
inflation, exchange rate fluctuations, etc). 
In this kind of atmosphere, how can a firm compete under a static investment posture? 
In the above kind of dynamic environment, changes in corporate investment outlook can 
be anticipated with greater frequency, say every other year. For analytical purposes, 
corporate investment postures that have not undergone any reviews within the last five 
years, assuming the company has been in existence that long or more, can be classified 
as static. It has been argued that the notion of firm-specific advantage is essentially a 
short-run phenomenon because it is only in the short run when endowments of proprietary 
knowledge are fixed; in the long run, the assets of the firm at a point in time are 
determined by the firm's investment policy (Buckley, 1989, p.ll). 
One statistic for gauging a firm's foreign investment posture is its overseas geographic 
concentration (see Hood and Young, 1986, p.35). Thus, given the firm's industry or 
product concentration as well as its geographic concentration of foreign investment, it 
would be expected to have a strong market position and high penetration within key 
industrial sectors in such markets. Therefore, such firms can afford to be static, implying 
a low frequency or no change at all in their foreign investment posture. The propensity 
to use new forms in this case is expected to be relatively low. However, this contradicts 
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Harrigan's (1985, p .124) hypothesis that concentrated setting will be more attractive for 
JVs because firms operating within oligopolies will focus on mutually desirable goals with 
greater ease. Conversely, firms whose current overseas activity is not geographically 
concentrated are expected to adopt dynamic postures and may frequently use new forms 
to exploit perceived economic and comparative advantages of multi-country operations. 
Exporting, licensing, franchising and joint ventures afford such firms efficiency 
mechanisms as well as contractual opportunity to cut their losses in the face of a highly 
variable and precarious environment. Thus it is suggested that new forms of investment 
will more likely prevail in firms with a dynamic foreign investment posture than in firms 
with a static posture. 
8.3.2.5. THE ROLE OF HOST COUNTRY-SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS 
H5: The choice of new forms in foreign market development is significantly 
influenced by managerial perceptions of host country characteristics. 
Host country-specific characteristics or advantages represent the third strand of the 
eclectic paradigm and is traditionally concerned with the 'where' of investment. In its 
original formation, the eclectic paradigm stated that the extent, form and pattern of 
international investment was determined by the configuration of three sets of advantages 
as perceived by firms (Dunning, 1988, p.42). In other words, the transactional power 
of the firm to determine the 'how', 'why', and 'where' of foreign investment depended 
on how corporate management perceived the firm's net ownership, internalization and 
location advantages. However, research has progressed along the lines of the incentives 
to internalize markets in which FDI is seen to supersede contractual! cooperative modes. 
Forceful arguments with public policy implications are engaged to justify FDI. For 
example, it is claimed that without the incentive to internalize markets, vertical or 
horizontal integration would be a redundant engagement and transactions would be 
accomplished via autonomous means (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1981; 
Dunning, 1979, 1988). Equally, Dunning claims that the distinctiveness of the eclectic 
paradigm is the ability to explain internalization incentives (1988, p.33), implying a 
concern with one made of organization - wholly owned subsidiary. 
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As with other theories, the eclectic paradigm has been criticized on two grounds. First, 
it is couched in static terms, which makes it insufficiently microanalytic for the dynamics 
or the process of change of international investment (Vernon, 1985). Second, it 
insufficiently, if it does at all, allows for firm-specific behavioural differences. The 
attention of this hypothesis is on issues of the latter kind. Vernon's concern about the 
neglect of behavioural interaction is with respect to international oligopolists, rather than 
with foreign investors in general. 
Country-specific factors or location-specific advantages have been couched in terms of 
a focus on the economics of a location. The formal economic theory of location is shaped 
by a concern with normative equilibrium analyses of spatially transferrable comparative 
advantage of one country over another. Applying this notion to multinational phenomenon 
forces the following argument: because transactional market failure is sometimes country-
specific, it has locational implications; consequently, reference to MNE is intended to 
allow for the potentials of "internalizing exogenous spatial imperfections" (Rugman, 
1981). However, from a strategic management point of view failure to recognize the 
strategic response of decision-makers to a set of economic and other variables, and the 
way the idiosyncratic behaviour of firms might influence and respond to international 
market failure, is the major pitfall of these schools of thought strategic nature and 
importance of country-specific factors as very crucial in influencing the level and pattern 
of international investment (see Teece, 1984; Dunning, 1988, p.46). 
It is also recognized that while some attempts have been made to model strategic 
behaviour of firms towards their foreign operations (see, the summary in Robock and 
Simmonds, 1983; and Rugman, Lecraw and Booth, 1986), they have not generally been 
incorporated into the mainstream of international investment theory (Dunning, 1988, 
p.4 7), nor have they been investigated empirically. Clearly, whether or not a firm adopts 
FDI or NFl reflects not only its ability to do so, but on its managerial perceptions of the 
resulting costs and benefits. While there is general agreement about the main country 
characteristics that constitute advantages or disadvantages of particular locations, much 
less attention has been given to identifying the key attributes of firms - in particular those 
which might be operationally or strategically based - which may affect their response to 
particular market opportunities. 
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Strategically related characteristics of host countries most likely to be assessed as 
potentially leading to use of new forms include: host governments' inward investment 
policy (restricting fdi), size of host countries' markets, economic/political climate, 
fiscal/monetary policies, psychic distance (incorporating language, cultural, business, 
customs, etc. differences), level/size of markets, technological/managerial capacity 
(especially for banks), and level of infrastructural development. Whether or not a firm 
will establish in a country by means of new forms will depend on managerial assessment 
and the degree of importance attached to each or a combination of these factors. For 
example, if management views the volatile economic/ political conditions of a country 
high enough to pass over perceived market opportunities, the firm will not invest whether 
or not the host government operates an open door policy. This is the case with Lebanon 
and some African countries. On the other hand, if the firm's products are customized to 
a host/regional market, then the firm may service the market, using contractual or 
cooperative investment modes. Thus, managerial assessment of country-specific 
characteristics is crucial to the use of new forms or fdi, for that matter. 
On the subject of managerial perceptions of host country characteristics, Adams (1980) 
believes that "for the most part, the concept of an impediment to investment is a relative 
one" (p.2). In effect, the perception of the degree of impediments presented, for 
example, by certain government policies, by structural economic problems, or by political 
uncertainty, will often vary significantly from one potential or actual investor to another. 
Underlying these variations are distinct subjective and objective appraisals of the 
investment climate, different perceptions of distinctive characteristics (cost and benefits) 
of the host country, and different perceptions of cash flow implications of investing in a 
particular country (i. e. expected rate of return on capital invested). On the basis of the 
foregoing, it can be hypothesized that: the choice of new forms in foreign market 
investment is significantly influenced by managerial perceptions of host country 
characteristics. 
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8.3.2.6 IMPACT OF COMPETITORS' BEHAVIOUR 
H6: Firm choice/use of new forms in the internationalization process is independent 
of competitors' mode of organising foreign transactions. 
One of the often cited reasons why firms choose new forms of investment is the need to 
match the behaviour of rival firms (Williamson, 1975, p.217; Oman, 1984; Buckley and 
Casson, 1985; Harrigan, 1985). Conceptually, global competition can force a firm to 
develop defensive strategies. A major task in this process is the development of a profile 
of the likely strategic behaviour of rival firms and of their potential reaction to the firm's 
strategic moves. A commonly held judgement (in international business and economics) 
concludes that firms use new forms of investment reluctantly (in response to host 
government demands) and as a 'defensive-reaction' strategy (Oman, 1984, p.71; Ozawa, 
1984). Professor Ozawa quickly dispelled this view with the Japanese experience in which 
competitive considerations make new forms structurally better adapted conduits of 
corporate resource transfers than "the old form" (fdi). 
The primary object of developing a global competitive strategy is to place a firm in a 
position where it can survive and prosper in the international marketplace relative to its 
rivals. In this process, the firm first develops a profile of competitors' behaviour; and 
then attempts to match its internal strength (firm-specific advantages) to competitors' 
strategic moves, industry specific conditions and its external environment (country 
specific factors). Porter (1980) identifies five factors which influence inter-firm 
competition; the rivalry among existing firms, the threat of potential or new entrants, 
power of supplier's, and the bargaining power of purchases. In an international 
environment, the bargaining power of the host government as well as that of the host 
country firms may constitute incremental types of competitive force. To a large extent, 
these factors may be seen as constituting both entry and exit barriers. Entry barriers to 
competition are economic impediments which, in relation to international entry process, 
may limit or hinder a firm's choice of entry mode. Transactional sources of economic 
impediments of six different kinds are suggested (ibid). 
227 
First, the existence of scale economies forces new entrants to establish large scale 
operations if they must be competitive, in transaction-cost terms. For example, the notion 
of scale barriers can exist in exchange relations which require potential entrants to 
demonstrate competitiveness by acquiring a degree of monopsonistic power similar to that 
enjoyed by incumbent rivals. Potential rivals are also prone to strong resistance from 
existing firms, to the extent that they may not realise scale economies because they are 
unable to capture a sufficiently large share of the market. The second transactional entry 
barrier stems from product differentiation. This requires potential entrants to eschew 
product loyalties and brand names to carve a niche in the international marketplace. 
Clearly this entails high R&D expenditure in product development and advertisement. 
Capital requirements which may be necessary to break into new grounds (geographical 
and product markets) are the third source of entry barrier. 
The fourth, called switching costs, are the contractual costs of shifting from one supplier 
to another or upsetting the long term relationship between existing firms and their 
suppliers. Where the market in question is one for which economies of scale are large in 
relation to the size of the new entrant or one for which small-numbers exchange relations 
exist, the impediment to entry is apt to be severe for the firm. This may apply mainly to 
small and medium size firms. Fifth, access to distribution channels poses an entry 
problem. New entry into a mature industry or a market with well established marketing 
channels is impeded by the lack of knowhow, by the difficulty of upsetting established 
customer relationship, and by the absence of related performance history (including 
capital market credit references) which can be assessed by factor suppliers. 
The sixth source of entry barrier springs from government regulations. In relation to 
foreign investment, host government imposed distortions (eg. tariff and nontariffbarriers, 
sectoral restrictions on FDI, etc.) may progressively impede the allocative efficiency of 
existing firms, but more actively weaken entry mode options of would-be-entrants. These 
factors interact with other competitive forces to pose limitations on firms' behaviour 
generally in the marketplace, and mode of entry, in particular. 
Active international rivalry in conjunction with 'foreign positioning' (Rugman, Lecraw 
and Booth, 1986, p.345) may force firms to maintain operational presence in a particular 
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product or geographic market, despite declining market opportunities. These are termed 
exit barriers and can arise from six sources. 
The first exit barrier to international investment lies in the nature of the firm's assets, 
notably idiosyncratic assets (Williamson, 1979). The attributes of idiosyncratic 
investments for which exit impediments are posed are transaction-specificity, 
nonmarketability, specialized usage and users, and nonrecurrent usage. Transaction-asset 
specificity of three kinds are critical: site (or geographic) specificity, as when successive 
operations are located cheek by jowl by reason of transaction-cost economy; physical 
asset specificity, as where specialized capital assets are required for production, as 
commonly found in large, capital-intensive firms in the petroleum (exploration, drilling 
and refinery), steel, or heavy-engineering industries; and human asset specificity that 
arises from specialized knowledge or that acquired by learning, induction or by reason 
of employment. The reason idiosyncratic assets are critical and constitute exit barriers is 
that, once an investment has been made, parties to the exchange (buyer and seller) are 
effectively 'locked into' bilateral exchange relation for a considerable length of time 
thereafter. Pulling out therefore might create transactional diseconomies, at least to the 
unwilling party who may then seek compensatory remedies. 
The second source of exit barriers relates to the fixed costs of abandonment or 
termination. These costs are related to specificity, discussed above. Investments or 
exchange relations that are unspecialized among users or parties to the exchange pose few 
hazards, since the afflicted parties in these circumstances can readily turn to alternative 
sources without difficulty. However, for specialized transactions and for certain overseas 
operations, not only are nonmarketability problems posed, but labour settlements 
(including pension payments) complicated by low productivity and low abandonment 
value have important cost-bearing consequences. 
Third, strategic costs of abandoning a market may inhibit divestment because otherwise 
the firm may lose foreign market positioning. In order to match rival firms in the fight 
for global or regional market share, it may be necessary for the firm to retain the 
operation with slow market growth simply for strategic reason (i.e. to defend its interests 
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and preempt rival entry). Such transactions impose strategic costs which inevitably act as 
exit barriers. 
Information barriers, the fourth source of exit impediments, can prevent or, at least, make 
it difficult for management to obtain accurate data to assess performance and exercise 
balanced judgement to exit. Exit decisions are made complex when impactedness 
combining with opportunism is in active interaction with uncertainty and small numbers 
exchange relations. The fifth source of exit barrier is both psychodynamic and intangible. 
Reference to managers' emotions is intended to capture or emphasize management's 
influence, pride and personal interest in a given project, and reluctance to quit from it. 
Finally, public policy considerations may work to impose exit barriers for certain types 
of projects. Just as entry barriers arouse government and public concern, if they are 
deemed anticompetitive or are seen to have efficiency-debilitating properties, so can 
certain types of project abandonment cause public concern, if social and political issues 
are thereby raised (e.g. unemployment and regional imbalance). 
At least, each source of entry and exit barriers bears some relationship to organizational 
patterns of operation. Existing firms have some advantage over would-be entrants. If 
entry barriers work to severely limit the capacity of firms to enter into the marketplace, 
exit barriers impose competition of a different kind, requiring firms already operating in 
the market to make special efforts to design exchange relations that have good continuity 
properties (Williamson, 1975). If the height of entry/exit barriers and the extent of 
foreign investment activity are highly correlated (see, Caves 1982, p.96), then the extent 
of foreign investment activity can be gauged by the entry mode behaviour of MNEs. If 
significant barriers to entry or exit surround a market, the modes best qualified to 
overcome them may be hypothesized to be variants of new forms. In order to verify this, 
it is hypothesized that: Firm choice/use of new forms in the internationalization process 
is independent of competitors' mode of organizing foreign transactions. 
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8.3.2.7 RELATIONSHIP OF STAGE OF COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT 
H7: Firm choice of new forms in the internationalization process is independent of 
stage of host country development. 
It has been claimed that the move to acceptance or use of new forms of investment is 
specifically a less developed country phenomenon (Franko, 1989). Much earlier Franko 
and other writers had documented instances of MNE acceptance of reduced equity 
position as a trade-off for preferential access to protected markets (1974, pp.325-26 and 
other sources cited therein). Oman (1984) has argued that new forms may be suited for 
projects located in LDCs. In short, the tenet of these claims is one of the contextual 
backgrounds of this study. The issue of the relationship of stage of development of 
countries to use of new forms of investment is central to renewed interests in foreign 
investment theories. It has public policy implications and has been addressed mainly in 
descriptive form, albeit supported by historical, macroeconomic data and anecdotal 
evidence. Notable exceptions are the single component studies, cited below. While 
providing evidence on the relationship of stage of development to joint venture creation 
rationales (Tomlinson, 1970; Gullander, 1976; Janger, 1980; Beamish, 1984, 1985) and 
on the relationship of development level of a country and joint venture instability and 
performance (Franko, 1971; Reynolds, 1979; Janger, 1980; Stuckey, 1983; Beamish, 
1984, 1985), the authors were silent on the central issue. 
The hypothesis has implications for the transactional ubiquity of traditional FDI. The 
general proposition, referred to as "the obsolescence-of-FDI hypothesis" (Oman, 1984, 
p.26), is concerned with the claim that, in the North-South context, traditional FDI was 
becoming obsolete and was being replaced or superseded by new forms of investment. 
This claim is traceable to a paper published over twenty years ago by Charles D. Hyson 
and Dale R. Weigel (1970), which spotlighted the controversy surrounding the role of 
FDI in the development process. By that time, both policy-making emphasis and research 
focus were on the positive contribution of FDI to national development. At the time FDI 
accounted for around 25 per cent of the total foreign capital obtained by developing 
countries (ibid). At the same time also, conflict between MNE and governments (host, 
home, and multilateral) was brewing. The inevitability of conflicts was more apparent as 
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MNEs were perceived as not only vehicles for the transfer of their national cultures and 
political and economic values, but more importantly as having sufficient power to 
overcome government restrictions on their modus operandi. 
By mid 1970s interest in the affirmative contribution of FDI in the development process 
has come full circle and was increasingly questioned by national and international 
governments (see, for example, UN, 1973). Progressively many host countries, notably 
LDCs, became interested in "unbundling" the package of resources (capital, technology 
and management) normally supplied under FDI, perhaps as a macroeconomic means of 
minimizing foreign exchange costs of acquiring foreign technology, and as a potent 
political means of checking the infusion of foreign cultural and political values. Whether 
these have been achieved or not remains a moot issue. 
It is in this historical context that the hypothesis of interest was contrived as a North 
(developed country) to South (developing country) phenomenon. Since then analytical 
enquiries have progressed along single components of new forms (such as licensing, 
franchising, joint ventures, etc.), taking as a datum the claim that these forms of 
investment are restricted to, or best suited for, developing countries. At the same time, 
there is literature evidence that the new forms are used frequently by large MNEs in the 
developed countries (see, for example, Janger, 1980; Harrigan, 1985; Contractor and 
Lorange, 1987). Current evidence among EEC firms shows that the Single European 
Market has spun a web of cross-border strategic alliances characteristic of new forms 
(see, for example, Hiltrop (1991) and Thompson and Knox (1991)). 
The object of this hypothesis is to test empirically the proposition that new forms of 
investment are devised for LDC projects. Certain proxy factors of development level of 
countries which are thought to encourage the use of new forms include: 
economic/political climate of a country, level of industrial development, openness of host 
country towards foreign investment, presence of many foreign businesses etc. These 
factors represent one of two perspectives of national stage of development; that is, they 
represent features of a developed country or a developing country. How the factors differ 
between DCs and LDCs as rationales for using new forms is based on the assessment of 
corporate management. This approach is consistent with Beamish (1984, 1985), but here 
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more proxy variables are utilised to capture many features of level of country 
development than Beamish's study Thus it is hypothesised that: Firm choice of new forms 
in the internationalization process is independent of stage of host country development. 
8.3.2.8 MANAGERIAL PERCEPTIONS OF BENEFITS OF NEW FORMS 
Hs: Firm choice of new forms is dependent upon their perceived net benefits by 
corporate management. 
The proposition that a firm is a system of relationships whose existence is dependent on 
the entrepreneur's direction of resources (Buckley, 1989, p.154) has largely been 
suppressed in both the theory and empirical analyses of corporate investment (Teece, 
1984). Yet, the transactions cost approach recognizes that markets (of which new forms 
are important constituents) and hierarchies are alternative organizational mechanisms for 
supporting transactions, and that the choice of the one or other ought to be made 
according to which is the more efficient way to support the transaction in question 
(Williamson, 1975; Teece, 1984). In order to investigate why it may be desirable to use 
new forms in foreign transactions, one must explore the nature of new forms (their 
processes) and examine the attributes of transactions they appertain to. 
The transactional features of new forms underlying their net benefits can be summarized 
as follows: (1) New forms of international investment (NFIs) enable firms to diversify 
risks (country and investment). (2) NFIs can be used to avoid market disabling factors 
of opportunism, uncertainty, barriers to market entry and exit, etc. (3) NFIs are superior 
means of exploiting a firm's assets abroad or foreign market opportunities, with minimum 
resources and risks. (4) NFIs provide advantage of flexibility to adjust to changes in the 
international marketplace. (5) NFIs may be used as pre-emptive manoeuvres to gain 
access to promising markets and technologies. (6) NFIs are particularly suited for projects 
destined for developing countries. 
In themselves, these features cannot provide the commitment or stimulus to 
internationalize. They are important catalysts for choice of new forms, but the stimulus 
must come from the decision-maker's perception that the company can utilise these 
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benefits (see, for example, Welch, 1990). The transactional features of NFIs create a 
clear perception of the international possibilities in them. The neoclassical assumption is 
that transactions will be organized by markets unless market exchange results in 
contractual incompleteness or difficulties, and hence transaction costs. Essentially, the 
presumption is that economic activity is best organized via markets because the 
bureaucratic distortions associated with internal exchange are thereby prospectively 
attenuated (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Teece, 1984). Additional advantages of 
markets over firms may include the following. 
First, markets are informationally economical and efficient with respect to price 
adjustments. This is the economic principle governing the efficient markets hypothesis. 
Second, production cost advantages may be realized through markets. For instance, where 
the firm's internal needs are insufficient to exhaust scale economics, these can be more 
fully realized by buying instead. Furthermore, markets can aggregate uncorrelated 
demands, thereby achieving intertemporal efficiencies (ibid). This is readily found in 
exporting. The transactional properties of export houses, confirming houses and buying 
houses stem from their capacity to intermediate between manufactures and importers. 
They attempt to correlate and coordinate the demands of a large number of small buyers, 
who otherwise lack the monopsonistic power required to negotiate directly with 
manufacturers. Fourth, subcontracting or joint ventures can mitigate the diseconomies of 
scope and transactional difficulties (e.g. small-numbers relations) which attend ownership 
and exchange arrangements of indivisibilities of both physical capital and informational 
types. Finally, market modes can be used as pre-emptive manoeuvres to gain access to 
promising markets and technologies, without committing huge resources. 
These features fit well into the "defensive reaction hypothesis" (Oman, 1984). Other 
issues related to this hypothesis are: the role of host government policy; and the 
importance of international managers' perceptions of a given country's 'investment 
climate', regardless of how subjective those perceptions may be (p.72). As with Oman's 
defensive reaction hypothesis, the proposition under investigation seeks to highlight the 
fact that the success of host government policies in attracting foreign firms via new forms 
may depend on the latter's willingness and ability to accommodate rather than simply pull 
out, or refuse to exploit perceived profit opportunities. 
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The notion of managerial perceptions of net benefits and their impact on choice of entry 
mode is a relative one. The perception of net benefits presented for example by 
diversification motive, by smoothing of cash flow and risk reduction, or by efficiency 
argument, will often vary significantly from one firm to another. One firm's benefit may 
be another's disincentive or, at least may be perceived so. Underlying the variations are 
distinct subjective and objective appraisals of the host environment, behaviour of rival 
firms, internal strengths and limitations, and strategic reasons for considering alternative 
modes of entry. How variations in perceptions will affect choice of new forms in the 
internationalization process is the subject of empirical investigation. In the light of the 
foregoing it may be hypothesized that: Firm choice of new forms is dependent upon their 
perceived net benefits by corporate management. 
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CHAPTER 9 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
DATA COLLECTION AND QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTRATION 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The primary goal of survey research is data collection in which information is obtained 
directly from individual persons who are selected so as to provide a basis for making 
inferences about some larger population. In obtaining this information, two principal 
instrumentation methods, involving direct or indirect approach in each case, are generally 
employed. These are Questionnaire and Interview. Questionnaires can be administered 
by mail or self. Alternatively, information can be obtained through face-to-face or 
telephone interviews. Each of these four approaches has its merits and drawbacks. 
MAIL QUESTIONNAIRE 
Also called postal surveys, this particular method is the cheapest form of investigation. 
Provided an up-to-date mailing list of the sample respondents is available, mail 
questionnaires enhance the prospects of reaching certain groups of people who might not 
otherwise be reached by telephone or be disposed to grant personal interviews. 
Interviewer bias can potentially be reduced through mail questionnaires, provided the 
questions are clearly worded and framed in simple terms. The main drawbacks are: (1) 
They tend to be slow in revealing results; and (2) the response rate is usually very low 
and this may invalidate or skew the significance of the subsequent analysis. 
SELF -ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRE 
From a research point of view, this method has two implications. First, if administered 
by the researcher it can facilitate information collection, if the appropriate respondent is 
reached, because thereby the researcher can stimulate the latter's interest to the aim of 
the research. Second, by meeting the respondents personally, the researcher can use "one 
stone to kill two birds" (Le. use of the occasion to solicit for subsequent interviews). 
This is bound to yield greater interview schedule than would be obtained through mail 
request. The major drawback of this method is the high travelling expenses of self-
administration. It is most useful if the researcher is within the locale of the respondents 
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or if the respondents are within one locale. For example, since London is the 
headquarters of most UK-based banks, self-administration of questionnaires may prove 
cost effective in these circumstances. 
PERSONAL INTERVIEWS 
These offer the researcher the flexibility to modify the questions according to the 
interviewee response, enabling a more in-depth collection of information. In many cases, 
the researcher's data bank can be augmented with brochures and other material 
information about the firm which otherwise might not be obtained. However, if the 
interviewer strays from a structured set of questions, then elements of bias may creep in 
from either the respondent or the interviewer. Personal interviews are both expensive and 
a comparatively slow process of collecting data. 
TELEPHONE SURVEYS 
This method is easy to administer, fast in eliciting information and relatively inexpensive. 
As a sole source of information, it may yield insufficient information, except if the 
number of questions is very small. Imagine asking twenty questions or more (as most 
academic researches involve) over the telephone! As a support to any of the above 
methods, telephone survey permits the researcher to clarify questions that are not clearly 
understood; they also provide follow-up opportunities which can add to the improvement 
of both the quantity and quality of information obtained. However, it may tend to 
alienate potential respondents because of inconvenience at particular times. In any event, 
it is a very popular approach in industrial market research. 
In general, the greater the combination of survey instruments used in a research, the 
greater the prospects of increasing and/or improving the quantity and quality of data. A 
survey should provide five types of information about respondents: facts, perceptions, 
opinions, attitudes, and behavioural reports (Manheim and Rich, 1986, p.1OS). In the 
design and administration of questionnaires for this study, these factors were uppermost. 
For this study, all of the above methods were adopted. The questionnaires were 
administered and interviews conducted with a view to evoking responses that a) were 
indicative of firm behaviour over a range of variables affecting or likely to affect the use 
of new forms of investment (NFIs) as entry modes, b) reflected firm-specific and country-
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specific factors, c) covered a broad spectrum of industrial sectors and activities as well 
as national orientations, and above all, d) reflected respondents' opinions and beliefs. 
Additionally, a careful consideration was made on the scope and context of the 
behavioural variables of significance to ensure that questions adequately sampled their full 
range and depth. 
The development of the questionnaire ensured that each variable of interest was 
unambiguously defined, and that a variety of questions were developed as potential 
stimulants of response, especially in variable areas of strategic concern. 
9.2 CRITERIA FOR QUESTIONNAIRE DEVELOPMENT 
The sample consists of firms (Banks and Companies) with overseas operations, drawn 
from a large number of countries. These countries include developed as well as less 
developed countries and cover various geographical regions of the world. A study of this 
kind which involves firms drawn from different parts of the world can create both 
semantic and interpretational problems. The problems become complicated if the 
questions seek to elicit information of a strategic nature, such as questions concerning 
foreign investment and their deterministic features, or if the questionnaire is lengthy. 
Experience, coupled with discussions with many executives, reveals a reluctance to spend 
company time to fill a lengthy questionnaire nor are executives prepared to divulge 
information other than those publicly available, e.g. annual reports. In at least 11 
instances, the chief executives showed me a pile of questionnaires they had received in 
the last two months. Most of these were about 8 - 10 pages long, and one senior bank 
manager said emphatically: "there was no way I could make time to answer an eight-page 
questionnaire" . One feedback from my pilot study was the curtailment of the 
questionnaire to very essential informational aspects. In order to achieve this, a number 
of criteria were set as a guide to questionnaire development. The decisions were 
informed by the researcher's experience (both in previous researches and as a company 
executive) and are consistent with the criteria of question formulation of Kerlinger (1970, 
pp.467-478) and Churchill Jr., (1987). 
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One criterion was to reduce technical terms to the bare minimum, Thus, where the 
question related to organisational mode of foreign investment or "new forms" by 
specification, respondents were rather asked to identify (by ticking) from a pool of 
common business patterns which one/s best described their companies' route of entry into 
a foreign market. While not claiming to be a standout procedure, the objective was to 
reduce any ambiguities in the research questionnaires. 
Another criterion in the questionnaire development was to adopt the market survey 
approach, by keeping the questionnaire short, precise and manageable. The snag with 
this approach is that where the information desired is of a technical nature, precision may 
disallow or at least reduce a more in-depth gathering of information. However, by 
isolating and structuring questionnaires in short sections, and adopting criterion (1) above, 
the problem may be overcome. In developing the research questionnaire, each variable 
area of interest was defined, and a variety of questions, designed to produce multi-item 
measures to avoid bias commonly associated with single-item measures, were conceived 
as potential stimulants of response indicating behaviour in that area (see Mannheim and 
Rich, 1986, p.112; Questionnaire Design Technical Manual, No.5, 1972). 
The next criterion was organizational. Based on the pretest of the questionnaires, 
structured adjustments had to be made both in the content and scope of the questions 
asked. Also, questions varied slightly between banks and companies. For instance, 
questions on organizational modes of entry differ between the two groups of 
organizations; and within each group, questions had to be structured according to whether 
the bank or company was U.K. owned or foreign owned. Furthermore, brevity was 
achieved by asking less demanding questions in the early section of the questionnaire, 
such as those concerning firm characteristics which can be gleaned from their annual 
reports. 
The fourth criterion was to ask questions germane to the research problem and objective. 
In this process, it is recognized that no set of questions can fully capture the phenomena 
of interest just as no sample can claim to capture all the characteristics of a population. 
Here, a number of measures were adopted. First, validity (internal and external) was 
pursued by avoiding leading questions that suggest directional answers, thus introducing 
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bias (see Mannheim and Rich, 1986, p.83). Second, question wording was crucial in that 
if questions are asked in ways that encourage respondents to give one rather than another 
answer, the data will reflect the real world less than they will reflect the choices made 
in question construction. The literature provides some general guidelines, namely, using 
items that have been successfully used in prior research; using contingency questions to 
find out; using questioning formats that ask respondents to state the degree to which they 
agree or disagree with series of statements selected to reflect different attitudes about the 
subject matter (ibid, p.111; Robinson and Shaver, 1973). 
The last and most important decision criterion, designed to reduce semantic and 
interpretational problems, was to include foreign companies with operational presence in 
the U.K., rather those operating outside the U.K. It is reasonable to assume that a 
foreign firm from a non-English speaking country operating in the U.K., will possess 
English language capability. The same goes for a U.K. firm operating in a non-English 
speaking country. In general, it may be assumed that a firm operating in a foreign 
country will possess some managerial competence in that country's national/official 
language. These five criteria improved data collection for the research. 
9.3 QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTRATION 
With these decision criteria, a two-phase exploratory study was conducted during the 
middle half of 1990. The first phase involved a questionnaire study covering 66 
companies and 31 banks. The second phase involved interviews with 26 corporate 
executives; 12 bank executives and 14 company executives, most of whom were senior 
managers. Tables 9.1 and 9.2 present the summary and analysis of the response of the 
sample firms, respectively. 
The study sample comprised: 
1. U.K. Companies 
2. Foreign Companies, drawn from 6 countries (Table 9.4) 
3. U.K. Banks, and 
4. Foreign Banks, drawn from 15 countries (Table 9.6). 
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The study covers 26 industrial sectors, ranging from banks through engineering and 
manufacturing to music and entertainment industry (Table 9.8). 
Table 9.1 Summary of Questionnaire Administration 
Nature of Firm Number of Number Useable Percentage 
Questionnaires Returned Lot Return 
U.K. Companies 100 55 47 55.0 
Foreign Companies 50 24 19 48.0 
U.K. Banks 21 11 10 52.4 
Foreign Banks 50 23 21 46.0 
TOTAL 221 113 97 51.1 
A total population of 221 firms was identified for the purposes of the study (Table 9.1). 
The Times 100: 1988-1989 Statistics of leading companies in Britain and Overseas and 
World Banking 1986 (which was the latest edition) formed the sampling frames. The 
study is limited to UK-based firms (banks and companies) and foreign-based firms. For 
the purposes of this study, the term 'firm' is used generically to refer to banks and 
companies collectively. Where a reference is intended for banks or companies, they will 
be used specifically. Also in this study, 'UK based firms' are defined as banks and 
companies with overseas investment operations (generally conceptualised as MNEs) 
having their registered head offices in the U. K. Similarly, foreign firms refer to banks 
and companies operating in the U.K. with registered head offices outwith the U.K. 
Three criteria for inclusion in the sample were set for all firms, regardless of nationality. 
(1) The firms will have been involved in international operations for at least five years, 
where by international operation is meant one of the two criteria following. (2) At least 
5 percent of the firm's (parent's) global investment is accounted for by foreign investment 
operations, or (3) at least 5 percent of the group turnover (or operating income for banks) 
is controlled by foreign investment earnings. These criteria have been used in other 
studies involving MNEs (See, for example, Demirag, 1988, 1990). Before administering 
the questionnaires, pretests were conducted by administering the survey to a small sample 
of respondents similar to those in the larger sample. Pretesting a survey instrument is 
viewed "as important to successful survey research as a test drive is to buying a good 
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used car" (Mannheim and Rich, 1986, p.119). The pretests served to: develop different 
versions of the instrument, verify their utility, and refine the final output. The 
questionnaires were sent to the chief executives of 221 firms as detailed in Table 9.2. 
In order to increase the geographic representativeness/response, extra follow-up mail 
effort and telephone calls were undertaken. 
Table 9.2 Analysis of the Response of the Sample Firms 
No. of Questions sent Ineligible Firms 
UK Companies 100 
Foreign Companies50 
UK Banks 21 
Foreign Banks 50 
Total 
ELIGIBLE FIRMS 
UK Companies 47 
Foreign Companies19 
UK Banks 10 
Foreign Banks 21 
Overall 97 
8 
5 
1 
.1 
Positive ResponseNegative/Non Useable 
Response 
(51.1 %) 6 ( 6.5%) 
(42.2%) 4 ( 8.9%) 
(50.0%) 2 (10.0%) 
(43.8%) 4 ( 8.3%) 
(47.3%) 16 ( 7.8%) 
TOTAL RESPONSES TO TOTAL POSSIBLE RESPONSES 
UK Companies 
Foreign Companies 
UK Banks 
Foreign Banks 
Overall 
55.0% 
48.0% 
52.4% 
46.0% 
51.1 % 
NO RESPONSES TO TOTAL POSSIBLE RESPONSES 
UK Companies 
Foreign Companies 
UK Banks 
Foreign Banks 
Overall 
45.0% 
52.0% 
47.6% 
54.0% 
48.9% 
Total Eligible Firms 
92 
45 
20 
§ 
No Response 
39 (42.4%) 
22 (48.9%) 
8 (40.0%) 
23 (52.7%) 
108 (52.7%) 
Ineligible Firms include return-to-sender mails, firms which have been acquired, out of business, unable to 
respond due to lack of time or were mistakenly identified as having overseas operations. 
NegativelNon-Usable Responses represent firms which replied to the questionnaire but did not answer some 
of the core questions for reasons of confidentiality or inadequate knowledge. 
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Such follow-up attempts proved very useful because it turned out that about 10 % of the 
initial questionnaires had been wrongly post-coded, or the firms had changed addresses, 
had been acquired, or had misplaced the questionnaire. The telephone calls were also 
used as a basis for establishing contacts for prospective interviews. Some of the 
interviews were informally established through this process. 
9.4 QUESTIONNAIRE DATA RELIABILITY 
Returned questionnaires were examined for completion, errors and omissions. Follow-up 
phone calls and letters saved such questionnaire that otherwise would have been 
discarded. The rates of positive response were 55.0%,48.0%,52.4%, and 46% for UK 
companies, Foreign companies, UK Banks, and Foreign banks, respectively. The overall 
rate of response (usable and unusable lots) was 51.1 % (See, Table 9.2). 
9.5 NON-RESPONSE BIAS 
The overall response rate of 51.1 % compares favourably with most studies. However, 
the presence of non-response may suggest that the viewpoint of non-responding firms was 
significantly different from that of respondents and this may affect the validity of the 
research. Non-respondents indicated why they did not participate in the survey. The 
average main reasons were 'company policy' and 'lack of time'. These reasons are 
consistent with the interview discussions, personal experience and other researchers' 
findings (See, for example, Pike, 1988). While non-response bias may pose a problem 
in a mail survey, the extent to which the bias may affect the validity of inference drawn 
from the sample was investigated. In order to detect any bias due to non-response, 
Oppenheim (1966, p.34) suggested that if late returns of questionnaires were assumed to 
represent non-respondents, then it would be possible to detect if non-response bias was 
present in a sample. The test for non-response bias is done by comparing one or more 
variables of interest between respondents and non-respondents (proxied by earlier and 
later returns). Here, two relevant variables of the sample firms were inspected using the 
Chi-square tests: the scope of international operations (proxied by Foreign Investment and 
Foreign Earnings ratios) and industry groups. These variables and test were also used 
by Demirag (1990), though in a different research context involving MNEs. 
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An alternative statistical test is the Mann-Whitney U test. In each case the Chi-Square 
tests showed that there was no indication of significant differences between respondents 
and non-respondents (Tables 9.3.1 and 9.3.2). Regardless of the statistical test applied, 
the Oppenheim methodology can only capture non-response bias that can be portrayed by 
the average responses. It does not capture non-response bias created by a non-
symmetrical distribution of the respondents (Wallace, 1987). To capture such potential 
non-response bias, especially given the wide demography of the respondents, the 
demographic data of the late respondents and those of the respondents whose responses 
were not subjected to further analysis because of inadequate completion were compared 
with demographic data of 'valid' respondents. No statistically significant difference was 
found between the two groups, suggesting a lack of non-response bias. 
Table 9.3.1 A Test of Indifference between Respondents and Non-Respondents in 
Scope of International Activities. 
Respondents 
Freq % 
UK Companies (n = 100) 
Foreign Companies (n = 50) 
UK Banks (n = 21) 
Foreign Banks (n = 50) 
47 
19 
10 
21 
97 
Chi-Square 
0.667544 
D.F 
3 
Significance 
.87957 
88.7 
82.6 
83.3 
84.0 
85.8 
Min.E.F. 
1.7 
Non-Respondents 
Freq % No 
Valid Total 
% 
6 
4 
2 
4 
16 
11.3 
17.4 
16.7 
16.0 
14.2 
53 
23 
12 
25 
113 
46.9 
20.4 
10.6 
22.1 
100.0 
Cells with B.F. < 5 
3 
Table 9.3.2 A Test of Non-Response bias in the demographic data of Respondents 
and Non-Respondents. 
UK Companies 
Foreign Companies 
UK Banks 
Foreign Banks 
Chi-Square D.F 
1.3718734 3 
Respondents 
Freq % 
55 55.0 
24 48.0 
11 52.4 
23 46.0 
113 51.1 
Significance Min.E.F. 
.71241 10.3 
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Non-Respondents Valid Total 
Freq % No % 
45 45.0 100 45.3 
26 52.0 50 22.6 
10 47.6 21 9.5 
27 54.0 50 22.6 
108 48.9 221 100.0 
Cells with B.F. < 5 
None 
The basic criterion for the choice of respondents was their capability to provide the 
needed information on the basis of their participation in decision-making as chief 
executives or heads of international divisions. Consequently, the target respondent in 
each case was the Chief Executive or his nominee. The purpose of the personal 
interviews was to clarify and explore in more depth the implications of the results 
obtained from the postal survey. The selection of MNEs interviewed was based on: (a) 
the industry groups; (b) the size of parent firm; (c) the scope of international activities; 
(d) the nationality of the firms; and (e) the answers to key questions in the questionnaire. 
An overall attempt was made to interview firms of different nationalities, covering a wide 
spectrum of industries. Altogether interviews with 26 bank and company executives were 
conducted, as follows:-
4 UK Banks' executives the most junior of whom was Senior Manager-
International Operations. 
12 UK Companies' executives, the most junior of whom was Manager Corporate 
Affairs. 
5 Foreign Banks' executives - the most junior of whom were in charge of their UK 
branches/offices. 
5 Foreign Companies' executives - the most junior of whom was Public Relations 
Manager. 
With respect to possible cultural differences and their impact on responses of the 97 
executive respondents, drawn from 16 countries, while these cannot be ruled out, 
Hofstede (1980) has observed that managerial values are a lot similar in these 
circumstances. In particular, at the macro level, it is claimed that managerial culture 
exhibits similarities to some degree (Cooper, 1979, p .10). Finally, the foreign firms' 
answers to certain questions were aggregated because most countries in the sample were 
represented by 1 company or bank, and as such could not be taken as representative of 
national trends (See, Tables 9.4 and 9.6). 
9.6 ANALYSIS OF DATA AND STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES 
The questionnaire for each sample group was divided into 5 sections, in a sequential 
order in order to enhance data entry since most of the questions were the same across the 
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4 groups. Data coding and analysis were carried out on the SPSS/PC + - the DOS 
version of the Statistical Package for Social Sciences, which can be operated on any PC 
with hard drive. Appendix 4 shows the SPSS/PC + data entry. The analysis was 
performed in a progressive order as follows:-
1. Analysis of Part 1 of the questionnaire in order to obtain a picture of the 
characteristics of the respondents and their degree of representativeness of the 
populations surveyed; 
2. Analysis of Part 2 of the questionnaire to give a picture of respondents' scope of 
international operations and to determine the impact of changes. 
3. Analysis based on Part 3 of the questionnaire to: (a) establish the pattern and 
frequency of respondents' use of new forms as initial entry mode choices, and (b) 
determine the importance of items in a contractual package and the significance 
of control features, if any, for companies in the survey. 
4. Analysis based on Part 4 of the questionnaire to establish the extent to which 
firm-specific factors combine with entrepreneurs' perceptions and country-specific 
characteristics to provide fuller explanation of the divergent forms of foreign 
investment, and 
5. Analysis based on Part 5 of the questionnaire to: (a) determine respondents' 
perceptions of the net benefits of new forms; (b) confirm or refute the hypothesis 
that the new forms are best suited for use in LDCs; and (c) to gauge respondents' 
opinions as to whether the new forms will gain or lose popularity and their 
reasons. 
Respondents were asked to use a frame of reference for judging each item of information. 
They were further asked to indicate the degree of significance or importance they attached 
to series of statements selected to reflect different attitudes about relevant items of 
information. As Mannheim and Rich (1986, p.ll1) observe, this approach has several 
advantages over the use of simple statements. First, in an exploratory study of this kind, 
this approach provides a simple means of securing measures of the intensity of 
respondents' opinions. Second, it helps ensure that all respondents will be using the same 
frame of reference in answering, and it thereby increases the validity and reliability of 
measures. Furthermore, statements about various topics can be interspersed in a set so 
that respondents are not cued about the purpose of a line of questioning. Finally, series 
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of statements are easily used in constructing complex measures of attitudes and 
perceptions called scales or indices (ibid, pp .140-149). In the questionnaire, Likert-type 
scales were used to assess respondents' perceptions and attitudes, with scores ranging 
from 1 to 5, except in certain cases involving an assessment of motivational factors and 
influence of locational and firm-specific factors where the range was higher. The ordinal 
scales were transformed into metric for computational purposes, by scoring as 1 items 
which respondents perceived as very important/significant to 5 (or higher number as the 
case may be) for items perceived as least important or very insignificant. In the 
SPSS/PC+ coding, Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 designate Foreign bank, UK bank, UK company 
and Foreign company, respectively (Appendix 4). For each, labels and variables are 
defined sequentially according to the numbering of the questionnaire. 
9.6.1 DESCRIPTION OF STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES 
A variety of statistical methods were used to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 11. 
Means and standard deviations were calculated for all corporate responses and these were 
ranked according to the mean scores, with mean scores tending towards 1 being superior 
in rank to those tending towards 5 (or higher). Thus, a mean score of 1.677 ranks higher 
than mean score of 1.833, and so on. The data collected lent themselves to 
nonparametric statistics. Nonparametric statistical test appropriate to assessing the 
significance of differences between the firms' responses in respect of each of the variables 
were carried out. A detailed description of the statistical tools employed in the study is 
presented as Appendix 5. 
ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS: PART 1 
9.7 CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRMS IN THE SURVEY 
The study sample consists of 66 companies drawn from seven countries including the UK 
(Table 9.4), and 31 banks drawn from sixteen countries including the UK (Table 9.6). 
In both cases, UK represents a home country, on the one hand, and a host country, on 
the other hand. Tables 9.5 and 9.7 below respectively provide a summary of the 
individual characteristics of the sample companies and banks. The companies cover a 
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wide range of industrial activities (25 in all), ranging from battery and cable manufacture 
through heavy engineering and hotel & catering services to recorded music & 
entertainment and textile manufacture. The details of industrial distribution of the 
companies (together with the banks) in the survey are summarized in Table 9.8. 
Altogether the survey covers 97 firms. Every effort was made to represent as many 
industrial sectors and national origins as possible. 
9.7.1 NATIONALITY OF THE FIRMS 
From Table 9.4, US based companies represent 42 per cent of foreign companies in the 
survey. Japanese and German companies follow in that order with 32 per cent and 11 
per cent, respectively. Companies based in Belgium, France and the Netherlands make 
up the rest of the sample with 5 per cent representation each. Returned questionnaires 
from these companies were unusable but two of these were included in the interview 
schedule. Employment and financial statistics from some of the foreign companies, 
especially Japanese companies, relate to their UK operations only. However, the 
sampling frame from which these companies were drawn depict that their parents rank 
amongst the 1000 largest industrial companies in the world. 
A similar analysis from Table 9.6 puts Japanese banks (19%) ahead of other foreign 
banks in the sample, followed by Danish, French and Italian banks with 11 % each. 
Banks from other eleven countries make up the balance of 48 per cent. In all, UK firms 
dominate the sample groups, as might be expected, constituting 71 per cent of sample 
companies and 32 per cent of sample banks. 
Table 9.4 Summary of Nationality of Companies in the Survey 
Country of Origin Frequency Cumulative Percent Cumulative 
Frequency Percent 
Belgium 1 1 1.5 1.5 
France 1 2 1.5 3.0 
Germany 2 4 3.1 6.1 
Japan 6 10 9.1 15.2 
The Netherlands 1 11 1.5 16.7 
U.K. 47 58 71.2 87.9 
U.S.A. 8 66 12.1 100.0 
n = 66 
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9.7.2 ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE 
A breakdown of the respondents (Table 9.9) shows that the majority (45.4 per cent) of 
the respondents were divisional managers. Included in this group are functional heads, 
namely, Accountancy (Finance), Marketing, Production, Company Secretary/Legal, 
Corporate Affairs, Development/ Planning, etc. As was evident from the personal 
interviews and telephone conversations, the divisional heads were delegated by the Chief 
executives who felt that they were most suited to respond to the research issues involved. 
Majority of the respondents in this category were Finance Directors or Chief 
Accountants, Marketing Directors or Head of Corporate Strategy. Next to divisional 
managers were Managing Directors or General Managers (34 per cent). Senior Managers 
or other managers with equivalent responsibilities constituted 16.5 per cent of the 
respondents. For the reason stated above, it was not surprising that Chief 
executives/chairmen were responsible for answering 4.1 per cent of the questionnaires. 
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Table 9.5 Summary of Characteristics of Companies in the Survey 
Company Main Activity Country Size of Company" Scope of International Activities" 
of 
Origin Employees Group No. of Overseas Fl/GTI FlE/GE Respondent 
Turnover £m Outlets % Range % Range 
1 Marketing of Sensitized Materials Germany 1,022 194 25 10-20% 10-20% CA 
2 Paper Packaging UK 925 70 4 10-20 10-20 CE 
3 Rubber/Plastics Manufacture UK 5,000 250 12 > 30 > 30 CE 
4 Brewing/Pub Retailing UK 90,138 4,036 N/A N/A N/A MM 
5 Contract Services UK 132,025 2,224 55 20-30 20-30 MKD 
6 Manufacturing - Steel Drums UK 2,603 194 11 > 30 > 30 FD 
7 Building Materials UK 20,818 1,283 19 > 30 > 30 GS 
8 Industrial Gases, Health Care Products UK 38,350 2,309 79 > 30 > 30 CPM 
9 Building Materials Manufacture UK 11,930 961 24 > 30 > 30 FD 
10 Specialist Chemicals UK 1,037 89 N/A > 30 > 30 MM 
11 Gas Production & Distribution UK 79,000 7,983 52 5-10 5-10 MD 
12 Manufacture of Polymeric Products UK 8,500 589 30 10-20 > 30 C/CE 
13 Electric Typewriters Japan 168+ 25+ 53 20-30 20-30 MM 
14 Copiers & Photo Equipment Japan 1,938+ 356+ 90 20-30 10-20 MD 
15 Textile Manufacturing UK 63,598 1,904 53 > 30 > 30 GS 
16 Battery Manufacturing UK 12,176 345 34 20-30 10-20 MD 
17 Distribution USA 21,000 5,130 131 > 30 > 30 MD 
18 Security Printers UK 11,826 484 49 > 30% > 30% R&DM 
19 Manufacturing USA 56,000 9,080 211 > 30 > 30 MD 
20 Packaging/Stationery Manufacture UK 12,783 424 40 20-30 20-30 MD 
21 Luxury Consumer & Writing Products UK 1,799 194 12 > 30 > 30 MKD 
22 Chemical Manufacture USA 145,787 18,320 215 > 30 > 30 MD 
23 Information Publisher UK 13,000 800 4 10-20 20-30 MD 
24 Motor Vehicle Manufacture USA 47,900 7,895 53 > 30 > 30 MKD 
25 Defence Systems Manufacture UK 42,372 6,664 75 > 30 > 30 GS 
26 Engineering UK 36,737 2,686 65 > 30 > 30 CAM 
27 Retailers of Electrical Goods, etc. UK 18,474 1,755 3 > 30 > 30 FD 
28 Fresh FruitlV egetable Supplies UK 5,304 499 12 10-20 10-20 FD 
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Table 9.5 Summary of Characteristics of Companies in the Survey continued .• 
Company Main Activity Country Size of Company" Scope of International Activities" 
of 
Origin Employees Group No. of Overseas FI/GTI FIE/GE Respondent 
Turnover £m Outlets % Range % Range 
29 Steel & Engineering Products UK 10,000 550 35 < 10 5-10 C/CE 
30 Packing & Printing Materials UK 3,204 130 9 10-20 10-20 CS 
31 Motor Vehicle Manufacture Japan 371+ 436+ 84 20-30 > 30 MD 
32 Chemicals & Paints Manufacture Germany 2,547 434 33 20-30 20-30 MD 
33 Chemicals UK 133,800 13,171 450 > 30 > 30 CPM 
34 Architectural Consultancy UK 30 1 4 5-10 5-10 MD 
35 Gold/Silver/Platinum Refmers UK 7,179 1,431 28 > 30% > 30% CPM 
36 Oil Exploration & Production UK 454 263 59 > 30 20-30 FD 
37 Retailing UK 75,000 5,600 400 N/A N/A CPM 
38 Building Materials UK 11,041 638 17 > 30 > 30 R&DM 
39 Publishing UK 20,652 1,242 35 5-10 5-10 GS 
40 Cameras Japan 20,000 1,550 111 > 30 > 30 FD 
41 Finance UK 1,000 597 9 < 10 N/A R&DM 
42 Water Treatment Manufng & Engineering UK 78,000 6,000 N/A N/A N/A FD 
43 Building Materials UK 27,915 1,460 12 > 30 > 30 CS 
44 Communications Systems, computers Japan 45,200 15,760 462 20-30 > 30 MD 
45 Information & Entertainment UK 27,915 1,460 12 20-30 > 30 CAM 
46 Oil Belgium 23,600 7,450 63 20-30 20-30 CA 
47 Wire & Cable Manufacture UK 7,486 525 13 > 30 > 30 R&DM 
48 Telecommunications & Electronics UK 26,216 1,655 13 > 30 > 30 MD 
49 Recorded Music & Entertainment Netherlands 7,265 1,263 41 5-10 > 30 CS 
50 Manufacturing UK 2,771 172 9 10-20 > 30 R&DM 
51 Property & Sea Ferry UK 64,000 4,578 44 > 30 > 30 CAM 
52 Manufacturing USA 30,000 1,500 24 20-30 20-30 CS 
53 Services UK 140 600 14 > 30 5-10 MD 
54 Food Manufacture USA 31,700 3,670 12 10-20 20-30 CPM 
55 Oil & Gas UKlNetherlands 134,000 47,779 500 > 30 > 30 CAM 
56 Food & Catering UK 3,308 281 34 > 30 > 30 FD 
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Table 9.5 Summary of Characteristics of Companies in the Survey continued .. 
Company Main Activity Country Size of Company" Scope of International Activities" 
of 
Origin Employees Group No. of Overseas FI/GTI FIE/GE Respondent 
Turnover £m % Range % Range 
57 Retail & Home Furnishing UK 29,290 1,221 285 10-20 10-20 MM 
58 Sugar Refiners UK 18,000 3,360 50 > 30 > 30 CPM 
59 Electrical & Electronic Equipment Japan 48,000 19,318 481 > 30 20-30 MM 
60 Oil Production & Marketing France 41,200 10,290 243 > 30 > 30 MKD 
61 Oil USA 2,700 251 120 20-30 20-30 CAM 
62 Paper & Coating Manufacture UK 1,557 103 3 10-20 10-20 OD 
63 Hotel & Catering UK 92,900 2,470 8 20-30 20-30 GM 
64 Packaging USA 30,000 1,563 21 10-20 10-20 FD 
65 Pharmaceuticals UK 17,857 1,408 56 > 30 > 30 OD 
66 Food & Hygienic Products UKlNetherlands 296,000 14,102 480 > 30 > 30 MD 
253 
--------------------------~-.~----------------------------------------------------------------------I 
!Wi 
Table 9.5 Summary of Characteristics of Companies in the Survey continued .. 
n Figures relate to 1989 
+ Figures are for UK operations only 
Notation of Respondent's Position 
C/CE 
CA 
MM 
MKD 
FD 
GS 
CPM 
R&DM 
MD 
GM 
OD 
CAM 
CS 
Chairman/Chief Executive 
Chief Accountant 
Marketing Manager 
Marketing Director 
Financial Director 
Group Strategist (AnalystlManageriDirector) 
Corporate Planning Manager 
Research & Development Manager 
Managing Director 
General Manager 
Operations Director 
Corporate Affairs Manager 
Company Secretary 
Table 9.6 Summary of Nationality of Banl{s in the Survey 
Country of Origin Frequency Cumulative Percent Cumulative 
Frequency Percent 
Australia 3.2 3.2 
Austria 2 3.2 6.4 
Belgium 1 3 3.2 9.6 
Brazil 1 4 3.2 12.8 
Cyprus/Greece 1 5 3.3 16.1 
Denmark 2 7 6.5 22.6 
France 2 9 6.5 29.1 
Italy 2 11 6.5 35.6 
Japan 4 15 12.9 48.5 
Nigeria 16 3.2 51.7 
Pakistan 17 3.2 54.9 
Sweden 18 3.2 58.1 
The Netherlands 19 3.2 61.3 
Turkey 1 20 3.2 64.5 
U.K. 10 30 32.3 96.8 
U.S.A. 1 31 3.2 100.0 
n = 31 
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Table 9.7 Summary of Characteristics of Banks in the Survey 
Scope of 
International 
Bank Size Activities 
Bank Country of Origin Employees Group Assets FI/GTI FIE/GE Respondent 
£m % Range % Range 
1 UK 116,400 127,616 > 30% > 30% SM 
2 UK 114,000 125,000 > 30% 10-20% SM 
3 UK 110,000 116,000 10-20 10-20 SM,GS 
4 UK 40,000 25,000 < 10 < 10 SM 
5 UK 38,000 4,316 10-20 N/A M 
6 Netherlands 35,000 48,425 < 10 <10 GM 
7 USA 32,000 30,800 <10 < 10 GM 
8 UK 28,700 28,700 > 30 > 30 SM 
9 Brazil 28,690 2,060 < 10 > 30 GM 
10 Italy 26,000 1,046 20-30 20-30 GM 
11 Pakistan 25,622 4,479 <10 20-30 GM 
12 UK 24,000 30,096 10-20 10-20 SM 
13 Turkey 20,212 5,080 < 10 20-30 AM 
14 Denmark 16,500 31,088 <10 10-20 GM 
15 Italy 16,362 39,961 10-20 10-20 GM 
16 France 16,300 30,535 N/A N/A M 
17 UK 15,200 N/A < 10 < 10 SM 
18 Austria 10,932 27,689 <10 < 10 GM 
19 Japan 10,256 26,079 N/A N/A AGM 
20 Nigeria 8,500 26,600 > 30 > 30 AM 
21 Australia 7,084 8,511 < 10 < 10 GM 
22 France 7,000 26,395 < 10 20-30 AGM 
23 Japan 7,000 N/A < 10 < 10 M 
24 Japan 6,173 5,825 < 10 < 10 GM 
25 Sweden 3,800 9,000 < 10 < 10 GM 
26 UK 3,200 9,427 > 30 > 30 SM 
27 UK 2,500 N/A > 30 10-20 GM 
28 Greece/Cyprus 2,026 1,261 > 30 <10 M 
29 Japan 125+ N/A > 30 20-30 GM 
30 Belgium 43+ N/A < 10 > 30 MD 
31 Denmark N/A N/A > 30 20-30 MD 
+ Figure only for UK operations 
Respondents 
M Manager 
SM Senior Manager 
AGM Assistant/Deputy General Manager 
GM General Manager 
MD DirectorlManaging Director 
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Table 9.8 Industrial Distribution of Firms in Sample 
Firm Type Frequency Cumulative Percent Cumulative 
Frequency Percent 
Banking and Finance 32 32 33.0 33.0 
Battery & Cable Manufacture 2 34 2.1 35.1 
Brewery & Pub Retailing 1 35 1.0 36.1 
Bldng Materials & Allied Products 4 39 4.1 40.2 
Chemicals & Paint Manufacture 5 44 5.2 45.4 
Computers & Comms Systems 2 46 2.1 47.5 
Contracts, Consultancy & Services 3 49 3.1 50.6 
Copies & Photographic Equipment 2 51 2.1 52.7 
Defence Systems Manufacture 1 52 1.0 53.7 
Distribution & Haulage 1 53 1.0 54.7 
Electrical & Electronic Products 4 57 4.1 58.8 
Food & Agro Products Manufacture 5 62 5.2 64.0 
Heavy Engineering & Manufacture 6 68 6.2 70.2 
Hotel & Catering 2 70 2.1 72.3 
Information and Publishing 2 72 2.1 74.4 
Luxury Consumer Products 1 73 1.0 75.4 
Metal Refiners 1 74 1.0 76.4 
Motor Vehicle Manufacture 2 76 2.1 78.5 
Oil & Gas Production & Marketing 6 82 6.2 84.7 
Rubber & Plastics Manufacture 5 87 5.1 89.8 
Pharmaceuticals 2 89 2.0 91.8 
Polymeric Products Manufacture 90 1.0 92.8 
Property & Transportation 1 91 1.0 93.8 
Recorded Music & Entertainment 2 93 2.1 95.9 
Retail & Home Furnishing 3 96 3.1 99.0 
Textile Manufacture 97 1.0 100.0 
n = 97 
Table 9.9 Position of Respondents 
Position Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Chairman/Chief Executive 4 4.1 4.1 
Managing Director/Gen. Manager 33 34.0 38.1 
Divisional Head 44 45.4 83.5 
Senior Manager/Manager 16 16.5 100.0 
n = 97 
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9.7.3 SIZE OF FIRMS 
The size of firms in the survey was gauged in two ways: financial and by employee. 
A. FINANCIAL - COMPANY PERSPECTIVE 
Table 9.10 presents the size of companies in the survey as measured by Turnover. The 
information is as of June 1989. The greater part of the companies (33.4%) have a 
turnover of between £1 million (No. 34 in Table 9.5) and £500 million. These are small 
companies that nevertheless have a number of foreign outlets and derive between 5 to 10 
per cent of their annual turnover from foreign investment and also commit the same level 
to foreign operations. For example, that company with £1 million turnover is a UK 
architectural consultancy company that employs 30 people; has 4 overseas outlets; invests 
about 8 per cent of its total resources abroad; and derives 10 per cent of its total 
resources from abroad. Within this group however are mainly the subsidiaries of foreign 
based multinational companies (e.g. Japanese and German MNCs) that reported only their 
UK figures. 
Just under 32 per cent of the companies have a turnover of between £500 million and £2 
billion. About 12 per cent have a turnover of between £2 billion and £5 billion. These 
three groups put together only account for 22 per cent of the combined turnover of the 
companies in the survey. However, the list is dominated by 15 large companies (22.7 
per cent) with a turnover in excess of £5 billion, in particular by 7 of the companies 
(10.6 per cent) whose latest revenue was in excess of £10 billion. These 10.6 per cent 
account for no less than 55.6 per cent of the combined revenue of the companies while 
the next 12.1 per cent account for 22.3 per cent (Table 9.10). Companies within the 
10.6% category include conglomerates such as the major oil companies (Royal 
Dutch/Shell, BP), ICI, IBM, Japanese MNCs, etc (See Table 9.5 for details). 
BANK PERSPECTIVE 
Whereas companies speak of size in terms of turnover (among other indices), banks speak 
in terms of total assets. Table 9.11 presents the size of banks in the survey as measured 
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by Total Assets. The majority of the banks (44 %) have assets of between £10 billion and 
£40 billion. This group accounts for nearly 41 % of the combined banks in the survey. 
However, the list is dominated by the large multinational banks (MNBs) (16%) whose 
latest total assets range between £40 billion and £130 billion. This group accounts for 
more than 52 % of the combined assets of the banks, with average bank asset of over 
£104 billion. With a low asset size of £48.5 billion and a high of £127.6 billion, this 
group consists of the three largest UK clearing banks and one Dutch bank (with £48.3 
billion assets). Small banks with assets of between £1 billion and £10 billion make up 
the balance of 40 %, but their combined assets total only 6.5 %. 
Table 9.10 Summary Size of Sample Companies by Turnover 
(as of June 1989) 
Turnover Frequency Percent % of Combined Turnover Average Company 
Turnover (£m) 
Under £lOOm 4 6.1 0.1 46.3 
101-500 18 27.3 2.1 289.4 
501-1,000 8 12.1 2.1 657.5 
1,001-2,000 13 19.7 7.7 1,479.6 
2,001-5,000 8 12.1 10.1 3,166.6 
5,001-10,000 8 12.1 22.3 6,975.3 
over 1O,ooom 7 10.6 55.6 19,820.0 
n = 66 100.0 100.0 
Combined Turnover £249,765 million 
Table 9.11 Summary Size of Sample Banks by Total Assets 
(as of June 1989) 
Total Assets Frequency Percent Valid Percent % of Combined Average Bank 
Assets Asset (£m) 
£1,ooom - £4,999m 5 16.1 20.0 1.7 2,632.4 
5,000 - 9,999 5 16.1 20.0 4.8 7,568.6 
10,000 -39,999 11 35.5 44.0 40.8 29,358.5 
40,000-130,000 4 12.9 16.0 52.7 104,260.3 
Don't know/Not Available 6 19.4 Missing 
n = 31 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Valid Cases 25 Missing Cases 6 
Combined Total Assets £790,989 million 
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B. SIZE OF FIRMS BY EMPLOYEES 
The size of the firms in the sample vary widely also in terms of the number of staff 
employed. Table 9.12 presents a comparative view of the range and percentage of 
employees across the four groups in the sample. Surprisingly, UK companies by far 
employ the highest number (48.5 %) of staff worldwide relative to other employer groups 
in the survey. They are followed, as would be expected, by foreign banks and foreign 
companies, in that order. These account respectively for 21.6% and 19.6% of the total 
number of people employed worldwide by the firms in the survey. 91 per cent of the 
firms are largely labour-intensive. Even highly technological manufacturing companies 
in the survey (Le. ICI, IBM, Shell, etc) employ over 130,000 people worldwide. The 
least employer among the companies in the survey is that UK architectural consultant with 
30 people. On interview, the managing director of the company revealed that the 
company subcontracts its overseas operations to local firms and does not regard these as 
its employees despite the long standing contractual relations with them. In effect, the 
company secures overseas architectural contracts and subcontracts to local firms under 
the UK company's control. The highest employer-company in the survey was a 
UK/Netherlands manufacturer of food & hygienic products with 296,000 employees 
worldwide as of June 1989 (No. 66 in Table 9.5). For banks, the least and highest 
reported employers were respectively a Cypriot bank with 2,026 employees worldwide 
(No. 28 in Table 9.7) and a UK bank with 116,400 employees (No.1 in Table 9.7). 
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Table 9.12 Summary Size of Sample Firms by Employee 
(as of June 1989) 
UK Companies Foreign Companies UK Banks Foreign Banks Valid Total 
Range of Employees Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
1- 999 4 4.1 3 3.1 2 2.1 9 9.3 
1,000- 4,999 8 8.3 4 4.1 2 2.1 2 2.0 16 16.5 
5,000- 9,999 5 5.2 1.0 5 5.1 11 11.3 
10,000- 49,999 19 19.6 8 8.3 5 5.1 12 12.4 44 45.4 
50,000-100,000 7 7.2 1 1.0 8 8.2 
Over 100,000 4 4.1 2 2.1 3 3.1 9 8.3 
Total/Percent 47 48.5 19 19.6 10 10.3 21 21.6 97 100.0 
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9.7.4 SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT 
The degree of firms' internationalization was measured in three ways: (1) Foreign 
investment as a percentage of Total Consolidated Annual Investment (Table 9.13); (2) 
Foreign investment earnings as a percentage of Total Consolidated Annual Turnover 
(Table 9.14); and (3) Geographical concentration of overseas activities (Table 9.15). 
A fourth measure applied to companies only is the number of foreign outlets (Table 
9.16). This could not be calculated for banks because of inadequate information. 
Tables 9.13 and 9.14 are classified according to whether the firms are small (5%-
20%), medium (20%-30%) or large (over 30%). Large banks (54.2%) and medium 
size companies (44.0%) display a higher propensity towards foreign investment than 
the other sizes of firms. Small and medium sized banks and large companies depict 
the most cautious exposure to foreign investment. The apparent caution of small and 
medium size banks may be attributable to size factor, deregulation and competition. 
The pattern is somewhat in terms of foreign investment earnings (Table 9.14). Small 
size banks and large companies appear to display a greater degree of 
internationalization (with 51.5 % and 54.5 %) than the other categories, followed by 
medium size banks (29 % )and small companies (27.3 %). That trend may be consistent 
with a cautious investment approach in which firms tend to invest or operate in 
markets with maximum return/risk. 
Table 9.13 Categorization of Firms' Degree of Internationalization (Foreign 
Investment as Percentage of Total Group Annual Investment) 
DANKS COMPANIES 
Degree of Internationalization MNDs Percent MNCs Percent 
Small (5% to < 20%) 7 22.6 22 33.3 
Medium (20% - 30%) 7 22.6 29 44.0 
Large (Over 30%) 17 54.8 15 22.7 
n = 31 100.0 66 100.0 
N = 97 
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Table 9.14 Categorization of Firms' Degree of Internationalization (Foreign 
Investment Earnings as Percentage of Total Consolidated Annual 
Turnover) 
BANKS COMPANIES 
Degree of Internationalization MNBs Percent MNCs Percent 
Small (5% to < 20%) 16 51.6 18 27.3 
Medium (20% - 30%) 7 29.0 12 18.2 
Large (Over 30%) 6 19.4 36 54.5 
n = 31 100.0 100.0 
Table 9.15 Overseas Geographic Concentration of Sample Firms 
U.K. Banks Foreign Banks U.K. Companies Foreign Companies 
n = 10 n = 21 n = 47 n = 19 
Geographic Area Percent Percent Percent Percent 
Western Europe 33 67 58 42 
North America 67 5 34 27 
Latin America * 5 * * 
Far East (incl Japan) * 14 2 26 
Middle East * * 2 * 
Africa * 4 2 * 
Asia * 5 2 5 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* 
Respondents did not provide data for these areas. On telephone follow-up, they indicated that they 
did not consider their operations in these areas as bulky, as the question demanded, or of great 
significance in their global activities. Some said they were divesting in these areas because of 
hostile government policies, political and economic uncertainty, or simply as part of their global 
rationalization exercises. 
Table 9.16 Scope of Internationalization (Number of Overseas Outlets by 
Sample Companies) 
No. of Overseas Outlets Frequency Percent 
Under 50 37 56.1 
50-100 13 19.7 
100-200 6 9.1 
200-300 4 6.0 
Over 300 66 100.0 
Clearly the level of internationalization, as depicted by the number of foreign outlets, is high. 37 
Companies have between 4 to just under 50 overseas establishments. In fact, but for the architectural 
consultancy company with 4 outlets, the rest have at least 8 overseas operations. 6 Companies have over 
300 (See Table 9.5). 
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The geographic concentration of overseas operations (Table 9.15) indicates that UK 
banks tend to concentrate their overseas activities in North America (67%). In 
contrast, their foreign counterparts seem to operate predominantly in Western Europe 
(67%). The position is fairly different with companies, where both UK and Foreign 
companies maintain greater concentration in Western Europe, with 58 % and 42 % 
respectively. Outside Western Europe and North America, the Far East (defined to 
include Japan) has the next largest concentration of foreign operations, although UK 
banks appeared not to have any significant presence in the region. Middle East and 
Latin America seem to be least favourable host regions to the sample foreign firms. 
9.8 DETAILS OF INTERNATIONAL ENTRY MODES 
In terms of initial entry mode patterns, Tables 9.17, 9.18 and 9.19 respectively 
provide evidence on the preference of UK companies, foreign companies and banks 
(UK and foreign). Table 9.17 highlights initial entry mode choices of UK companies 
by geographic location. Equity Joint Venture (EJY) mode emerges as the dominant 
pattern both in geographic regions and in total usage. The slight exceptions are in 
North America and Australia where mergers and acquisitions and wholly/majority-
owned subsidiaries are respectively the preferred modes. Licensing appears 
surprisingly a very low entry mode among UK companies, considering that licensing 
has historically been associated with technology transfer. The reasons may have to 
do with the observations of Hood and Young (1986, p. 8) that: licensing can potentially 
inhibit the longer term development of a market, as commonly licensees do not 
perform up to expectations; and licensing is often associated with contracts for 
technical and managerial assistance. Of the total 254 modes of entry into the 8 
geographical regions, Wholly Owned Subsidiary comes second to EJV with 19.7 % , 
followed closely by mergers and acquisitions with 15.7 %. EJV was also the most 
preferred choice of initial entry into the UK by foreign companies in the sample, 
followed by mergers and acquisition (Table 9.18). 
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Table 9.17 Overseas Ownership Patterns of 254 Affiliates of 47 UK MNCs 
as of June 1990. 
Location WOS M&A EJV NEJV Licencing Franchising Sales Management Office! Production 
Agency Contracts 
w. Europe 11 9 21 5 1 
23.4% 19.2% 44.7% 10.6% 2.1% 
North America 10 18 17 1 1 
21.3% 38.3% 36.2% 2.1% 2.1% 
Far East 4 3 16 2 1 1 3 1 
(inc. Japan) 12.9% 9.7% 51.6% 6.5% 3.2% 3.2% 9.7% 3.2% 
Australia 15 9 10 1 2 2 
37.5% 22.5% 25.0% 2.5% 5.0% 5.0% 
Asia (inc. 2 14 1 2 3 
Japan) 8.7% 60.9% 4.4% 4.3% 8.7% 13.0% 
Middle East 3 6 3 2 4 6 
12.5% 25.0% 12.5% 8.3% 16.7% 25.0% 
Eastern Europe 3 2 2 2 
10.0% 30.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 
Africa 5 14 3 6 4 
15.6% 43.8% 9.4% 18.7% 12.5% 
TOTAL 50 40 101 16 3 6 19 18 
19.7% 15.7% 39.8% 6.3% 1.2% 2.3% 7.5% 7.1 % 
= Data not available. 
WOS = WhollylMajority-Owned Subsidiary 
EJV = Equity Joint Venture 
M&A = Mergers & Acquisition 
NEJV = Non-Equity Joint Venture 
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Greenfield Valid 
Total 
47 
100.0% 
47 
100.0% 
31 
100.0% 
1 40 
2.5% 100.0% 
23 
100.0% 
24 
100.0% 
10 
100.0% 
32 
100.0% 
1 254 
0.4% 100.0% 
Table 9.18 Initial U.K. Entry Mode Choices by Sample Foreign Companies. 
N.F.I. Entry Mode Frequency 
Equity LV. 12 
Acquisition & Merger 6 
Assembly/Sub-contracting 1 
Percent 
63.2 
31.6 
5.2 
n = 19 
Cumulative Percent 
63.2 
94.8 
100.0 
9.8.1 INITIAL UK ENTRY MODE BY FOREIGN COMPANIES 
Equity joint venture appeared to be the most popular mode of entry into the UK by 
the foreign companies in the sample (Table 9.18). About 63 % of them indicated that 
they first entered into UK markets through EJVs. Acquisition and Merger was the 
next most popular method, with 31.6% of the firms venturing into the UK first time 
by it. 
9.8.2 ESTABLISHMENT MODES OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 
For banks, branch network remains the most popular mode of establishing abroad 
(32.3 %). Table 9.19 below shows branch banking, representative office, subsidiary 
banking and joint venture banking, in that order, as the preferred organizational modes 
of international banking. However, strict national regulations on branch banking 
means that, although banks would naturally show a preference for it, the frequency of 
its use on a global scale might be low. On the other hand, organizational modes 
promising less foreign control might have favour with many host governments. As 
Table 9.20 below illustrates, correspondent and representative offices are the most 
frequent organizational modes used by banks (both UK and Foreign alike), although 
the trend is in reverse order of frequency with foreign banks. Foreign 
affiliates/associates, joint venture banking and merchant banking services are widely 
used, in that order. It is still early days for overseas cash lines, despite their domestic 
popularity. 
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Table 9.19 Establishment Modes of International Banking: 
Initial Entry Mode Choices of Sample Banks 
Entry Mode Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Subsidiary banking 5 16.1 16.1 
Branch banking 10 32.3 48.4 
Representative Office 7 22.6 71.0 
Correspondent Office 2 6.4 77.4 
Joint Venture Banking 4 12.9 90.3 
Mergers & Acquisition 2 6.5 96.8 
Merchant Banking 1 3.2 100.0 
n = 31 
Table 9.20 Utilization Frequency of Establishment Modes 
(U.K. Banks and Foreign Banks). 
UK BANKS FOREIGN 
BANKS 
(n=10) (n=21) 
ORGANIZATIONAL MODE PERCENT PERCENT 
Foreign Affiliates/Associates 80.0 54.5 
Representative Offices/Agencies 80.0 90.9 
Correspondent Offices 90.0 77.3 
Joint Venture Banking Arrangements 70.0 50.0 
International Merchant Banking Services 70.0 40.9 
Overseas Cash Line Services 40.0 9.1 
9.9 SIGNIFICANCE OF SPECIFIC CLAUSES IN CONTRACTUAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Specific and general terms are important features of contractual arrangements 
(discussed in Chapter 6). These clauses are crucial both in determining the bargaining 
power of the parties and in setting the operational boundaries and performance 
requirements of the parties in contractual terms. They also provide the basis for 
deciding royalty payments. Table 9.21 lists nine factors identified from the literature 
as likely to determine the outcome of international contractual arrangements. Because 
contractual arrangements are particularly used by companies, the question was 
restricted to companies. 
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Table 9.21 Importance of Specific Tie-in Clauses in Contractual Agreements. 
Tie-Clause 
Machinery and equipment supply 
Technical assistance in production 
Technical assistance in plan design and construction 
Technical assistance in procuring/supplying inputs & components 
Technical assistance in marketing and management 
Personnel training 
Right for utilization of patents, trademarks, etc. 
Right for utilization of design 
Right to the use of advertising materials 
% of Companies Total Number of 
Citing Particular Companies Giving 
Clause as being a Response 
Significant 
80 
86 
81 
75 
63 
62 
60 
32 
9 
45 
49 
48 
48 
46 
47 
48 
47 
45 
Note: Replies were to the question: How significant is each of the following factors in contractual 
agreements (eg. licensing, turnkey arrangements, etc?) The possible replies range from Very 
Significant (1) to Very Insignificant (5). In this table 'Very Significant' and 'Significant' replies 
were combined, and so were 'Very Insignificant' and 'Insignificant' replies 
Table 9.21a Specified Length of Time in Technical Agreements. 
SPECIFIED LENGTH OF TIME IN TECHNICAL AGREEMENTS 
Years Frequency Cumulative Percent Cumulative 
Frequency Percent 
Not less than 5 years 8 8 50.0 50.0 
5-10 years 5 13 31.2 81.2 
10-15 years 2 15 12.5 93.7 
Not less than 20 years 1 16 6.3 100.0 
The managers of the multinational companies were asked to identify the most 
significant items they would consider in contractual agreements. Of the firms replying 
to each question, 86 per cent stated that technical assistance in production was the 
most important item in a contractual agreement; 81 per cent regarded technical 
assistance in plant design and construction as significant; 80 per cent stated that 
machinery and equipment supply was significant for them; and 75 % considered 
technical assistance in procuring/supplying inputs/components as significant in 
contractual agreements. These items are all concerned with firm-specific advantages 
in technology. 
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Essentially, these items are inextricably linked with patents, trademarks and know-
how. In general, these items are linked to one another and in many cases form part 
of the MNC's package of resources in international licensing, franchising, turnkey 
contracts or subcontracting. These findings are consistent with those of earlier studies 
(see, for example, Telesio, 1979; Monye, 1989). 
Given the importance of specific features of contractual agreements, respondents were 
asked if there was a specified length of time in their technical agreements. 75.8% 
(i.e. 50) of the sample companies answered NO, meaning that there is no specified 
length of time in such agreements. Of the 16 companies (Le. 24.2%) that answered 
in the affirmative, 50% of these indicated that the duration of such agreements was at 
least 15 years; 31.2% for 5 to 10 years; and 12.5% for 10 to 15 years. For one 
company, the minimum acceptable length of time is 20 years (Table 9.21a). The 
findings underscore the strategic importance of new forms of international investment. 
9.10 MOTIVATIONS FOR NEW FORMS OF INVESTMENT 
Respondents were asked to identify and rank, in order of relative importance, a list 
of 9 motivations for adopting new forms, broadly defined in the questionnaire as non-
equity forms of foreign investment (Table 9.22). These motivational statements were 
informed by literature review and have been postulated in the literature as reasons 
favouring the use of new forms. An assessment of respondents' views indicates that 
the foremost reason why companies adopt new forms is to achieve international 
diversification. 74% of sample UK companies (Table 9.22) regard international co-
operative arrangements as a way by which international diversification can most easily 
be achieved. 
'Host government FDI regulations' and 'high political risk in host country' follow 
closely in that order, with 67 % and 63 % of UK companies citing them as particularly 
important. Firm size, denoting managerial and financial capacity, was least important, 
suggesting that capital constraint and organizational skills are not decisive factors for 
UK companies contemplating going abroad. 
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Table 9.22 Average Occurrence of Reasons for Adopting New Forms of 
International Investment by UK Companies Abroad 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
8 
9 
5 
7 
% of companies 
citing particular 
reason to be of 
Reason for adopting new forms significance 
Achieve international diversification 74 
via cooperative arrangements with 
local partners 
Host government regulations/pressure 67 
restricting inward foreign direct 
investment 
High political risk in host country 63 
(eg. risks of expropriation) 
Risk diversification (ie. reduction) 52 
through costlrisk sharing with local 
partnerls 
Reciprocal exchanges of technology/ 49 
high costs of technology 
Because competitors adopt non-equity 27 
contractual forms 
Size of firm too small to finance, 21 
manage and/or market overseas 
operations 
Products customized to hostlregional 51 
market 
Protect/support existing foreign 36 
business 
Total Number 
of responding 
companies 
36 
35 
34 
35 
30 
29 
31 
37 
31 
Note: Chief Executives of sample firms were asked to tick and rank in order of strategic importance the 
following motivations for adopting new forms of international investment (defined broadly as non-
equity/ cooperative/contractual modes of foreign market entry). (Answers were 1 =Most 
Important, 9 = Least Important). 
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Table 9.23 Average Occurrence of Reasons for entering into UK via New 
Forms of International Investment by Foreign Companies. 
RANK Reason for adopting new forms 
2 Achieve international diversification via 
cooperative arrangements with host country 
partners 
9 Reciprocal access to technology/high cost of 
technology 
10 Because competitors adopt non-equity /flexible 
forms of entry 
4 Size of firm too small to finance, manage and/or 
market overseas operations 
8 High cost of establishing a foreign subsidiary 
3 Strong market competition 
% of Companies 
citing particular 
reason to be of 
importance 
84 
41 
37 
68 
44 
76 
6 Entry into UK as a gateway to wider EEC markets 53 
5 Products customized to UK/EEC markets 64 
7 UK Governments investment policy 47 
1 Global profitability and increased market share 89 
A similar survey was carried out among foreign companies operating in the UK. The 
chief executives of foreign companies in the UK were asked to tick and rank in order 
of strategic importance the motivations for adopting new forms of investment, with 
special reference to their entry into the UK. 89 % of the companies responding cited 
global profitability and increased market share as the foremost reason for adopting new 
forms. The second and third reasons are closely linked with the goal of global 
profitability, namely, 'achieve international diversification ... ' and 'strong market 
competition', respectively. Unlike their UK counterparts, foreign companies regard 
firm size as an important factor for using new forms (rank 9 versus rank 4). Because 
the UK market is more advanced and open than that of most developed and developing 
countries, the questions reflected that position. However, an overall assessment of the 
reasons for adapting new forms shows a great deal of similarity between UK 
companies (Table 9.22) and foreign companies (Table 9.23). 
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Table 9.24 Organizational Influences on Entry Mode Choices 
No of Times Cited 
RANK As Being Influential Percent 
1 Managing Director/Chief Executive 33 34.0 
2 Corporate Strategy/Development 16 16.5 
3 Operations 15 15.5 
4 Finance Director/Chief Accountant 11 11.3 
5 Marketing 9 9.3 
6 Board of Directors 8 8.2 
7 Corporate AffairslInvestor Relations 5 5.2 
n=97 100.0 
9.11 ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES ON ENTRY MODE CHOICES 
Decision-making has been undoubtedly one of the topical issues in the field of 
management. There is equally little doubt that decision-making is one of the most 
crucial attributes of successful management, leading experts such as Drucker (1954), 
Simon (1957), etc., to consider it synonymous with management. Drucker has argued 
that the major obstacle to organizational growth is managers' inability to change their 
attitudes and behaviour according to the requirements of their organizations. Thus, 
the role of management in corporate investment decisions is non-controversial. 
Corporate management encapsulates what is regarded in strategic management as the 
'entrepreneur' (Casson, 1982, 1985; Teece, 1984; Ansoff, 1986; Buckley, 1989). 
However, there has been controversy, or a difference of emphasis, over the precise 
role of corporate management in international investment decisions (Casson, 1985, 
p.172). Further, because of the emphasis on equilibrium analysis within received 
theory, the role of corporate management tends to be downplayed, if not outright 
suppressed (Teece, 1984). 
In order to investigate the strategic role of corporate management in the 
internationalization process, respondents were asked to identify and rank the influence 
of various organizational incumbents on their firm's entry mode choices. Table 9.24 
gives the average rating for each member of corporate management. Clearly, the 
firm's chief executive or managing director, as the case may be, represents the most 
influential organizational agent in the international move. 34% of the sample firms 
271 
ranked the chief executive highest. It is not however a surprising result in that the 
chief executive, who in all probability is also a member of his firm's board of 
directors, is the principal decision maker in the organization. His effectiveness lies 
in matching the potential capacity of the organization to meet environmental demands. 
Potential capacity, in turn, refers to the optimal match of the chief executive's decision 
styles, task demands and organizational climate (Driver and Rowe, 1979). 
The chief executive, as the name implies, is primus interpares, that is 'first among 
equals'. To this end, 16.5% of the respondents cited corporate strategy/development 
unit of their firms as the next organizational influence in their internationalization 
process. Following this department closely are the operations department and the 
finance department, in that order, with 15.5 % and 11. 3 % of the respondents citing 
them as potentially influential in entry mode choices. This order will appear to be 
both logical and pragmatic from a strategic point of view. There is little doubt that 
before any final decision is made on pattern of accomplishing foreign investments, 
these divisional managers will have put together a dossier for the chief executive, 
perhaps for onward presentation to the board of directors, specifying the strategic 
contribution and impact of suggested patterns on their units. The head of finance, for 
example, will have to develop the cash flow implications of licensing abroad, 
subcontracting, joint venture arrangements or direct investment for that matter. 
The relative insignificance of the board of directors or corporate affairs department 
may not, for practical purposes, be surprising. In particular, non-executive board 
members tend to rely on the rationality of their executive counterparts who may be the 
authors of a proposed mode of entry. In the words of Lenz and Lyles (1989), "many 
board members, despite good intentions, have an inadequate understanding of both 
current strategy and broad issues affecting strategic success." To the besieged board 
of directors, therefore, the appearance of certainty conveyed by its chief executive 
supported by divisional heads is alluring. Executives can then present to board 
members an entry mode choice that has the trappings of profitability and shareholder 
wealth maximization. The findings here are consistent with those of Reid (1981) and 
Welch (1983, 1990). The authors found the influence of decision-makers to be very 
significant in the internationalization of Australian franchisors. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
10.1 MANAGERIAL ASSESSMENT OF FIRM-SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS 
AND USE OF NEW FORMS 
The purpose of this chapter is to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter Nine, using 
the statistical techniques described in Appendix 5. The analyses of findings are pursued 
in the order of the hypotheses. 
HI: The adoption of new forms by a firm in foreign market development is 
significantly influenced by managerial assessments of firm-specific 
characteristics. 
This hypothesis seeks to explore the extent to which the perceived importance of firm-
specific characteristics determines the outcome of entry mode decisions. Certain factors 
have been identified in the literature as firm-specific advantages or characteristics. These 
are essentially in the form of ownership and internalization advantages (Dunning, 1977, 
1979, 1981, 1988; Rugman, 1979, 1980, 1982). A firm's ownership advantages in 
relation to international move include: (1) its size (denoting corporate capability); 
(2)experience of foreign markets; and (3) possession of brand name, trademarks, etc. 
Similarly, its internalization advantages may manifest in: (1) its willingness to share 
ownership and control in return for access to local markets; (2) minimization of country 
risks; and (3) economies of scope and geographical diversification. Much of the empirical 
analyses focus on these factors as dependent variables. The emphasis of this hypothesis 
is on how they are perceived by decision-makers and how differences in perception may 
affect the outcome of organizational choice of foreign market entry mode. 
Cooper (1979) has argued that many of the serious problems confronting industrial and 
public service organizations centre on 'people aspect of company life.' O'Toole (1979) 
characterizes the problem as that of 'differences in firm cultures.' Precisely, he argues 
that: as no two managers are alike no two corporations are identical: they differ by 
industry, product line, technology, size, age, nature of ownership, geographic location, 
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and so forth (ibid, p.17). Firms also differ in more subtle structural aspects, an 
understanding of which can lead to a better understanding of organizational behaviour and 
the overall performance of the firm. 
A transactional cost analysis integrating entrepreneurship first requires a recognition that: 
in neoclassical economics the manager is responsible for deciding upon and implementing 
the production plan; in institutional economics he is also responsible for choosing 
institutional arrangements and thereby determining the boundaries of the firm (Casson, 
1985). It also requires that differences in firm cultures exist and that situations and 
environments can change in a way that a once-appropriate culture might become 
dysfunctional to the long-term survival of an organization (O'Toole, 1979, p.19). 
Received foreign investment theories have ignored these firm cultural differences, and in 
the process have suppressed the role of the entrepreneurship in foreign investment 
decisions - a point duly recognized by Professors Buckley, Casson and Dunning (the 
Reading School). One way to operationalize the foregoing is to restate the static 
economic models of systems in ways which permit dynamic features of the firm to be 
recognized and investigated. The hypothesis of interest offers a means of determining 
the extent to which perceived differences in 'firm cultures' affect entry mode decisions. 
Five levels of perception were applied in assessing the significance of certain firm-specific 
advantages (as identified above). The assessments were made on inter-firm sample level, 
that is, UK companies versus Foreign companies, and UK banks versus Foreign banks. 
Corporate managers were asked to assess the significance of the identified firm 
characteristics in their firms' choice of mode of entry into a foreign market. Tables 
10 .1.1 and 10.1. 3 show the results for companies and banks, respectively. For company 
executives, size was perceived to be the most important ownership advantage, with 
foreign companies attaching more importance to it than their UK counterparts (mean 
score 1. 368 versus mean score 1. 769). 'Experience of foreign markets' and 'willingness 
to share ownership and control in return for access to local markets' were perceived to 
be significant, in that order, by UK companies (mean score 1.854 each). UK companies 
also perceived 'minimization of country risks' as the fourth significant (internalization) 
factor affecting the choice of entry mode. On the other hand, their foreign counterparts 
perceived the significance of these factors somewhat differently, ranking them 3, 4, 2, 
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respectively. Not only that, they were more sensitive to their importance as entry mode 
determinants, as shown in their respective mean scores and standard deviations, than their 
UK counterparts. Ownership advantages that derive from property rights (e.g. brand 
names and trade marks) are least important to U.K. companies as are advantages of 
common governance (e.g. economies of scope) least important to foreign companies. 
These observations do not tell much about the effect of the observed differences in mean 
scores on entry mode choices. Suppose we assume in the research question that the 
observed differences in the mean scores of firm-specific advantages (FSAs) for the two 
sample groups (UK companies and Foreign companies) are merely a function of sampling 
error and that these two groups of samples are really drawn from populations that have 
the same mean. If this were true, the implication would be that differences in managerial 
assessments of FSAs do not affect discrimination entry mode choices. Thus,we have: 
Ho: JlK=JlF 
where K = UK company variable 
F = Foreign company variable. 
Table 10.1.1 Questionnaire Responses by Mana~ers, Concerning the Significance 
of Firm-Specific Advantages (FSAs in the Choice of Mode of Entry 
into a Foreign Market (Scale: 1 = Very Significant to 5 = Very 
Insignificant) . 
U.K. FOREIGN 
n = 47 n = 19 
Firm Specific Advantages Rank Mean Standard Rank Mean Standard 
Deviation Deviation 
0 Size of company 1 1.769 0.872 1.368 0.496 
0 Experience of foreign markets 2 1.854 0.478 3 1.579 0.507 
I Willingness to share ownership 3 1.854 0.882 4 1.684 0.582 
and control in return for access 
to local markets 
I Minimization of country risks 4 1.952 0.795 2 1.474 0.513 
I Economies of scope and 5 2.093 0.684 6 2.000 0.471 
geographical diversification 
0 Possession of brand name, 6 2.390 0.945 5 1.842 0.688 
trade marks etc. 
o = Ownership-specific advantage 
I = Internalization-Incentive advantage 
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Table 10.1.2 Significant Differences in Mean Scores of FSAs as Entry Mode 
Determinants: UK Vs Foreign Companies. 
FSAs 
Minimization of 
country risks. 
Possession of brand 
name, trade marks etc. 
Experience in foreign 
markets. 
Size of company. 
Willingness to share 
ownership and control 
in return for access 
to local markets. 
Economies of scope 
and geographical 
diversification. 
* p < 0.05 **p < 0.10 
Pooled Variance Separate Variance 
Estimate Estimate 
F-Value Signif t-statistic Signif. t-statistic Signif. 
2.40 0.048 2.40 0.019 2.82 0.007* 
1.89 0.148 2.26 0.028 2.54 0.015* 
1.13 0.725 2.03 0.047 1.99 0.055** 
3.10 0.012 1.86 0.069 2.23 0.030* 
2.29 0.061 0.76 0.449 0.88 0.381 
2.10 0.090 0.54 0.592 0.62 0.539 
The alternative hypothesis is that the two groups are really samples from populations with 
different mean scores and the disparity between the observed sample means reflects the 
difference in their population values. This suggests that the different perceptions or 
assessments (as evidenced by their mean scores and rankings) indeed do produce a 
difference in entry mode choices. Symbolically, that is 
HI: ILK is not equal to ILF 
To test the hypothesis, a series of t-tests was carried out. Two observations are 
noteworthy here. First, the statistical hypotheses are stated in terms of population 
parameters not statistics. This is because the decision to be made really involves what 
is true about the population/s, companies in general, not just about the two samples 
observed in this experiment. Second, the alternative hypothesis above does not specify 
whether ILK is greater or less than ILF' It just states that the population means for each 
variable (FSAs) are different. This implies that the statistical test should be sensitive to 
differences in either direction, ILK> ILF and ILK < ILF' requiring a non-directional or two-
tailed test. A summary of the test of the hypothesis is presented in Table 13.1.2. These 
procedures have been discussed in Appendix 5 and as explained, the SPSS prints two 
variance estimates: pooled or separate. The use of one or the other depends on whether 
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equality of variance can be assumed. Norusis (1986, p.208) advises the use of the 
SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE whenever the researcher suspects that the 
variances are heterogenous, as might be expected in a behavioural science research. 
The fundamental assumptions of using the t-test are fully met. First, the two sample 
variances (UK companies and Foreign companies, or banks as the case may be) are 
independent and sampling is random. Second, the population distributions of the two 
groups are normal or the samples are large (McCall, 1970). 
As shown in Table 10.1.2, apart from experience in foreign market whose F-value is 
large (1.13) with the probability of .725, the probability levels of the other factors justify 
using the separate variance estimate. 3 of the 6 firm-specific factors were found 
statistically significant at less than 5 % level, with another significant at less than the 10 % 
level. These are: minimization of country risks (.007), possession of brand name, etc 
(.015), size of company (.030), and experience in foreign markets (.055). 
The observed significance level in each case is the probability that the sample companies 
could show a difference at least as large as the ones observed in the managers' 
perceptions, if the population means are really equal. This result leads to a rejection of 
the null hypothesis of no difference between means. It implies that the observed 
difference between the mean scores is too remote to have probably occurred by sampling 
error alone and that the magnitude of difference in managerial perceptions does determine 
entry mode choice. However, the evidence from two FSAs, namely willingness to share 
ownership and control, and economies of scope and geographical diversification leads to 
an acceptance of the null hypothesis of no difference between mean values. No 
statistically significant differences between the mean values of comparative measures were 
found. Thus, the relationship between managerial perceptional entry mode choice is only 
in respect of the above four factors. 
EVIDENCE FROM BANKS 
The sample banks agree almost on the same level in their perceptions of the importance 
of certain Bank-specific advantages (BSAs) (Table 10.1.3). Possession of large 
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international corporate customers is perceived as the most important BSA. While UK 
banks are more sensitive to minimization of country risks (rank 2 versus rank 4), foreign 
banks seem to attach greater importance to experience in foreign banking/market. With 
this exception all the other factors are evenly perceived by both groups. 
Table 13.1.3 Questionnaire Responses by Managers, Concerning the Significance 
of Bank-Specific Advantages (BSAs) in the Choice of Mode of Entry 
into a Foreign Market (Scale: 1 = Very Significant to 5 = Very 
Insignificant) . 
U.K. FOREIGN 
n = 10 n = 21 
Bank Specific Advantages Rank Mean Standard Rank Mean Standard 
(BSAs) Deviation Deviation 
0 Possession of large 1 2.000 0.500 1 1.842 0.834 
international 
corporate customers. 
I Minimization of 2 2.000 1.225 4 2.105 0.875 
country risks. 
0 Size of bank. 3 2.111 1.167 3 2.000 0.816 
0 Experience in foreign 4 2.200 0.789 2 2.000 0.745 
banking. 
I Cost of establishing 5 2.333 0.500 5 2.158 0.898 
a foreign subsidiary/ 
branch. 
I Economies of scope 6 2.556 0.726 6 2.278 0.752 
and geographical 
diversification. 
I Willingness to share 7 2.556 1.509 7 2.632 0.955 
ownership and control 
in return for access 
to local markets. 
o = Ownership-specific advantage 
I = Internalization advantage 
Similar t-tests were carried out to determine the effect of the observed indifference on 
mean scores on entry mode choices. The null hypothesis is the same as that tested for 
companies above. In other words, how likely is it to see a difference of the magnitude 
indicated by each dyad of mean scores if, in fact, there is no difference in managerial 
perceptions between the sample groups in the population? The result of this test (Table 
10.1.4) indicates that the difference between the mean values of comparative measures 
is not statistically significant at the 5 % level. 
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Table 10.1.4 Significant Differences in Mean Scores of BSAs as Entry Mode 
Determinants: UK Vs Foreign Banks 
Pooled Variance Separate Variance 
Estimate Estimate 
F-Value Signif t-statistic Signif. t-statistic Signif. 
Economics of scope 1.07 0.970 -0.91 0.369 -0.93 0.368 
and geographical 
diversification 
Experience in foreign 1.12 0.796 -0.67 0.506 -0.66 0.517 
banking 
Cost of establishing 3.23 0.095 -0.54 0.591 -0.66 0.514 
a foreign subsidiary 
Possession of large 2.78 0.143 -0.52 0.606 -0.62 0.540 
international corporate 
customers 
Size of bank 2.04 0.199 -0.29 0.772 -0.26 0.801 
Minimization of 1.96 0.225 0.26 0.796 0.23 0.821 
country risks 
Willingness to share 2.50 0.102 0.16 0.872 0.14 0.892 
ownership and control 
in return for access 
to local markets 
Looking at the separate (or even pooled) variance t-test (Table 10.1.4 above), the smallest 
observed significance level associated with a t-value of -0.93 is .37. This implies that 
37 % of the time a difference of at least this magnitude would occur when the two 
population means are equal. There appears not to be much reason to believe that the 
means differ in the population. Casual observation of Table 10.1.3 tends to support this, 
as the mean scores and the rankings of the bank-specific advantages are somewhat evenly 
matched among the two groups. This finding however partly contradicts, and partly 
corroborates, the company evidence (Table 10.1.2). In contradicting it, the result 
suggests that in respect of banks there is no relationship between managerial perceptions 
ofBSAs and entry mode choices. The company evidence corroborates the bank own only 
in respect of: willingness to share ownership and control in return for access to local 
markets, and economies of scope and geographical diversification. 
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To the extent that managerial perceptions differ between the groups, that is, the scores 
in one group are higher than those in the others, the several averages will be unequal. 
The mean values are not likely to be precisely equal but, under a null hypothesis of 
identical population distributions, will differ because of sampling error. The general 
rationale is that if the sample groups are distributed in the same way and with the same 
central tendency, then the averages of the ranks for the four sample groups should be 
approximately equal, implying no differences in perceptions and even if they occur, do 
not affect discrimination entry mode choices because such differences would have been 
due to sampling error. It is hypothesised that there is no difference between the 
perception score of UK banks, Foreign banks, UK companies and Foreign companies. 
In order to verify whether the population distribution from which the samples were drawn 
are identical and whether the differences in perception of firm-specific advantages are due 
to sampling error, in which case may not affect entry mode choices, the Kruskal-WaIIis 
test for K samples was carried out. The result of this test, presented in Table 10.1.5, 
indicates that the difference between the mean values of the following comparative 
measures is statistically significant at the specified percentage levels: 
1. Willingness to share ownership and control, at .1 % level. 
2. Minimization of country risks, at 10% level. 
3. Cost of establishing a foreign subsidiary, at .1 % level. 
4. Size of firm, at 10% level. 
5. Experience in foreign markets, at 10% level. 
6. Competitors' pattern of entry, at 5 % level. 
While providing evidence to reject the null hypothesis at the various significance levels, 
the analysis suggests that the probability that such a difference between means relative to 
the variability of such differences could occur merely as a function of sampling errors is 
so small in the above six variables that it is likely that the dyad means are from samples 
drawn from two different populations. The implication is that differential managerial 
assessments (at least with respect to these six factors) produce differences in entry mode 
decisions likely to lead to choice of new forms. 
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Interview sessions with respondents seem to corroborate this evidence. When 
interviewees were asked how managerial perceptions had influenced the choice of one 
mode or another, or, in fact, how such perceptions had influenced movement into 
international markets, the impression gained from both UK and Foreign managers (banks 
and companies) is that the various catalysts (listed in the above tables and others that have 
been used to explain FDI) appeared to depend heavily on how they were perceived by the 
chief executives of the various firms. One chief executive of a UK company put it 
bluntly: "I don't care what attractions a particular market has, if I think that the overall 
interests of my company might not be best served operating in that country, I'll not. " 
Another executive said that the type of follow-through which any international interests 
and enquiries might generate from his company varied considerably according to his 
perceptions and commitment to international move. The average impression gained from 
the interviews was the same, that is: while economic circumstances of the firm may 
induce it to invest abroad and/or adopt one particular mode or another, the decision-
maker's influence is crucial to the choice and such influence is informed largely by the 
decision-maker's assessment or perception of the strategic nature of firm-specific 
advantages. 
These findings support earlier studies (Walker and Etzel, 1973; Reid, 1981; Rosson and 
Reid, 1987; Welch, 1983, 1990) on the influence of the decision-maker on international 
entry. These findings also corroborate both the neoclassical and institutional economics 
roles of the manager (Casson, 1985) in which he is responsible for deciding upon and 
choosing the technique for implementing the foreign production plan, on the one hand, 
and responsible also for choosing institutional arrangements for accomplishing 
international transactions, on the other hand. 
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Table 10.1.5 KruskaI-WaIIis One-way Analysis of Variance Test of Significance of Differences in the Importance of FSAs to Entry 
Mode Choices. 
UK Banks Foreign UK Foreign Kruskal- Chi-Square 
Banks Companies Companies Wallis Probability 
Independent n = 10 n = 21 n = 47 n = 19 @ @ 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Willingness to share 2.56 1.51 2.63 .96 1.85 .88 1.68 .58 11.6477 .0087* 
ownership and control. 
Minimization of country 2.00 1.22 2.11 .88 1.95 .79 1.47 .51 6.5635 .872*** 
risks. 
Cost of establishing a 2.33 .50 2.16 .90 1.85 .48 1.58 .51 12.0327 .0073* 
foreign subsidiary. 
Size of firm 2.11 1.17 2.00 .82 1.77 .87 1.37 .50 7.4868 .0579*** 
Experience in foreign 2.20 .79 2.00 .75 2.39 .95 1.84 .69 6.4493 .0917*** 
markets 
Possession of corporate 2.00 .50 1.84 .83 2.09 .68 2.00 .47 2.7987 .4237 
customers/brand name, 
etc. 
Economics of scope 2.56 .73 2.28 .75 1.67 .58 N/A N/A 5.8903 .1171 
and geographic 
diversification 
Competitors' pattern 3.40 .84 1.50 .71 2.13 1.46 1.73 .59 4.3463 .0371** 
@ Corrected for Ties 
* Significant at. 1 percent 
** Significant at 5 percent 
*** Significant at 10 percent 
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10.2 THE FIRM GLOBAL STRATEGY DIMENSION 
H2: The adoption of new forms in the internationalization process is positively 
related to the firm's global strategies/objectives, ceteris paribus. 
The object of this hypothesis is to assess the significance of firms' global objectives or 
strategies on the outcome of international entry mode choices. Put differently, to what 
extent does firm strategy and competitive position relative to industry rivals influence 
corporate acceptance/use of new forms. Franko (1989) addressed a similar question under 
the "Wells effect" or the propensity of smaller, lower-market share firms within an 
industry to utilize proportionately more non-FDI modes than industry leaders. Firms 
become global for a variety of reasons, including those identified in Table 10.2.1. The 
extent to which these reasons become important and induce international entry varies from 
one enterprise to another. As Kotter and Schlesinger (1989) have observed, the strategic 
options available to managers can be usefully thought of as existing on a continuum, the 
significance/adoption of one or a combination thereof depends on situational factors (the 
firm's internal and external forces). 
A related question with which this hypothesis is concerned is: To what extent are new 
forms of investment characteristic of particular industries, but not of others? The former 
are characterized as "dominant", industry leaders with oligopolistic global strategies. 
Their risk-profile matching behaviour in a sector would push follower firms to adopt 
"flexible" ownership policies and strategic profiles in attempts to match leader firms' 
geographical scope (Vernon, 1974; Vernon and Wells, 1976; Knickerbocker, 1973). 
Follower companies are deemed to lack the technological, financial or managerial 
capabilities necessary to fully take on foreign and host country rivals, and particularly 
host country and investment risks and challenges via wholly-owned subsidiaries (Franko, 
1989). The schematic image is that Shell will endeavour to follow Exxon, Jaguar will 
try to follow and Ford Motors, Pepsi Cola will follow Coca Cola, Compaq computers 
will follow IBM, and Wimpy will follow McDonald's, but whereas McDonald's refused 
contractual/co-operative arrangements and Coca Cola avoided them, Wimpy and Pepsi 
Cola would accept them in a bid to 'catch-up.' 
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Table 10.2.1 Questionnaire Responses by Managers, Concerning Motivations for 
New Forms: Evidence from UK and Foreign Companies. 
U.K. FOREIGN 
n = 47 n = 21 
Rank Mean Standard Rank Mean Standard 
Motivation Deviation Deviation 
Achieve international diversi- 1 1.833 1.699 1 1.677 0.970 
fication via international 
co-operative arrangements. 
Host government regulations 2 2.588 1.811 2 2.000 1.374 
(restricting fdi to selected 
sectors only, and requiring 
local equity participation 
in the rest). 
High political risk in host 3 3.030 1.425 3 4.684 1.565 
country. 
Risk diversification through 4 4.206 1.122 6 5.000 2.108 
cost/risk sharing with local 
partner/so 
Reciprocal exchanges of 5 4.552 1.292 8 7.059 2.015 
technology/high costs of 
technology. 
Protect/support existing 6 5.967 1.921 7 6.111 2.272 
foreign business. 
Products customised to host! 7 5.971 2.203 5 4.786 2.007 
regional market. 
Because competitions adopt 8 7.000 1.336 9 7.474 1.307 
flexible forms of foreign 
investment. 
Size of firm too small to 9 7.677 2.286 4 4.714 0.756 
finance, manage or market 
overseas operations. 
Range 1-9 1 = Most Important 9 = Least Important 
The use or acceptance of new forms in general, and of any mode in particular, has inter 
alia industry-sector dimensions. More importantly, it has serious and often overlooked 
company strategy dimension (ibid). It has been said that the essence of strategy 
formulation is coping with competition (Porter, 1979). Franko uses this company 
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strategy dimension to argue that in oligopolistic competitive industries in particular, it is 
firm strategic differences and not 'cultural differences' which may explain the more 
frequent use of new forms by Japanese, French, Italian and German firms than their 
U.S., U.K., Swiss and Dutch counterparts (1976). Following Franko's (1989) specific 
(Le. minority joint venture) proposition, it can more generally be proposed that firm 
acceptance or use of new forms varies inversely with identifiable corporate competitive 
postures and strategies with respect to industry rivals. 
Franko and other writers have used the Wells effect to hypothesize a relationship between 
MNE strategy and the propensity to accept or use new forms of investment. Presumably, 
significant differences in the incidence of new forms should be related to differences in 
global strategies or diversification strategies. Differential frequency analyses (Tables 9.22 
and 9.23) have provided evidence which appear to support the notion that firms go 
international for a variety of reasons. Using measures of central tendency and dispersion, 
the characteristics of the frequency distributions are made more precise for analysis. For 
example, both the degree or level of importance and comparative sensitivity of each factor 
are portrayed using the mean and standard deviation. 
Table 10.2.1 indicates that the most important motivational factor was the desire for 
international diversification with minimum resource/risk commitment. While 
multinationals may be keen to diversify, they show a cautious approach by collaborating 
with local partners. Foreign companies in aggregate exhibit this propensity more (mean 
score 1.677) than the UK companies (mean score 1.833). Also, Foreign companies are 
significantly more sensitive to the capacity to finance/manage overseas operations (rank 
4 mean score 4.714) than their UK counterparts (rank 9 mean score 7.677). UK 
managers, in contrast, perceive risk diversification through local participation as a 
stronger incentive than do their foreign counterparts (rank 4 mean score 4.206 versus 
rank 6 mean score 5.000). Differences in ranking and sensitivity in the other strategic 
factors are shown in the table. 
To test whether differences in global strategies have any effect on entry mode choices, 
the Mann-Whitney U test was carried out. The logic of this test centres on the idea that 
if the rankings of one sample group differ greatly from the rankings of the second sample 
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group, then it can be concluded that there is a difference in central locations of the 
populations (Groebner and Shannon, 1985, p. 632). In this case, the test statistic is not 
only sensitive to differences between the mean scores but also sensitive to both the central 
tendency of the scores and their distribution. Because the strategic policy of the firm 
incorporates an assessment of a totality of factors which potentially shape the 'mission' 
of the firm (Rugman, et aI, 1986, p.325), the null hypothesis is thus stated in more 
general terms: differences in firms global strategies have no effect on entry mode choices. 
Table 10.2.2 Mann-Whitney U Test of the Significance of Differences in 
Motivations For Use of New Forms Between UK and Foreign 
Companies. 
Mann-Whitney 
Number of U Test 
Global strategy/objective favouring new forms Cases Z-Statistics Significance 
Achieve international diversification 66 1.7860 .0142*** 
Host government regulations restricting fdi 66 24.2596 .0000* 
High political risk in host country 66 28.6151 .0000* 
Risk diversification through cost/risk sharing 66 10.5220 .0022** 
Size of firm too small to embark on overseas 
operations alone (as measured by Turnover) 66 4.3764 .0064** 
(as measured by Employees) 66 3.1811 .0203*** 
* Significant at .01 per cent 
** Significant at .10 per cent 
*** Significant at 1 per cent 
Table 10.2.1 shows that the average responses of UK companies are generally lower for 
most of the nine global strategies. This is exhibited in the ranking, though the ranking 
is unchanged for the first three strategic factors. This difference is significant for the 
following strategic factors (Table 10.2.2): 
(1) Achieve international diversifications; 
(2) Host government regulations restricting fdi; 
(3) Avoid high political risk in host country; 
(4) Risk diversification through cooperative arrangements with local partners; and 
(5) Firm size (as measured by both turnover and employees). 
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The implication for the hypothesized relationship is that these factors may be seen to 
increase the basis and likelihood of international possibilities via new forms. The five 
factors are linked to one another and may be expressed differently by different firms, but 
their importance lies in their contribution to the analysis of foreign investment decisions, 
especially when information is restricted and interdependence between firms is recognized 
(Buckley, 1990, p.19). Differences in motivational values between individual firms 
reflect different preferences, abilities, endowments of wealth, entry mode choices, etc. 
Differences in the average values of parameters between microeconomic units reflect 
differences in both individual and corporate attitudes, economic structures, diversification 
strategies and international entry patterns. As Teece (1984), Buckley and Casson (1985) 
and others have observed, differences in market requirements, firm capabilities, and 
transactional relationships allow for differentiation amongst global strategies. Firms 
wishing to enter into potentially unstable but profitable foreign markets are likely to be 
more aware of the risks and uncertainty of heavy commitment of corporate resources than 
firms whose major concern may be to match competitors' action or to overcome mobility 
barriers. The evidence of three large companies in the survey supports the view that 
successful internationalization requires an assessment of the firm's motives and that these 
be correspondingly matched with its corporate ability. This is consistent with Harrigan's 
(1984) findings that firms' strategic missions determine their international entry pattern, 
and more specifically their need to utilize cooperative and contractual modes. 
13.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRM SIZE AND USE OF NEW FORMS 
H3: The choice of new forms in the internationalization process is not 
significantly influenced by the size of the firm. 
A widely held notion is that large firms will, ceteris paribus, prefer foreign direct 
investment to new forms due to their monopolistic power in ownership advantages. Firm 
size in itself is an ownership advantage which has been used extensively as a proxy for 
financial, managerial and technical capabilities. A corollary of this is that new forms will 
be a phenomenon of small and medium-size firms (SMFs). New forms, such as 
franchising, have often been perceived as a source of capital for small business 
expansion. For example, Oxenfeldt and Thompson (1969) argue that franchising systems 
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are created because franchisors 'have too little capital to create a wholly owned chain.' 
Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969) and Hunt (1973) have specifically argued that small 
companies with 'limited access' to capital markets use modes characteristic of new forms 
to expand. Other authors who subscribe to the view that new forms are a phenomenon 
of SMFs include Ozanne and Hunt (1971), Caves and Murphy (1976). 
Large industry "majors" or "insiders" (Franko, 1989) with significant shares of world 
markets have resources and experience that lead them to see few, if any tangible, benefits 
from taking on local joint venture partners in foreign operations. Industry giants like ICI, 
IBM, Shell, ITT, Coca Cola, McDonald's, etc. therefore have little or no motivation to 
use new forms or, more specifically, to enter JV s with host country partners. In contrast, 
small and medium size firms, regarded as "second-tier", "outsider" firms (ibid.) might 
both attempt to gain world market share by displaying (1) a willingness to share 
ownership and control in return for access to local markets, (2) a high propensity to 
minimize country risks and cost of establishing a foreign subsidiary, (3) a desire for 
economies of scope and geographical diversification; and (4) a tendency towards 
managerial, financial and technological gains from local participation and cooperation. 
This presumption of dominant firm behaviour was characterized as the "Wells effect" (see 
Stopford and Wells, 1971, especially pp. 138-141). Under this concept it has been 
asserted that some, if not all, "non-dominant" firms in particular industries show a high 
propensity to place special emphasis on the use of joint ventures (and other non-direct 
investment modes) in their international competitive strategies (Mascarenhas, 1986). 
Under both the "Wells effect" and the "oligopolistic market behaviour" (Knickerbocker, 
1973) hypotheses, "non-dominant" firms are seen as small and medium size firms that 
lack the corporate prowess (in terms of financial, managerial, marketing, and 
technological capability) to engage in international competition. 
However, casual observation indicates that in contrast to the traditional notion, new forms 
of investment are not limited to SMFs. There are many large MNEs that use variants of 
new forms. Such large MNEs as McDonald's, ITT Sears, Coca Cola, etc., 
internationalize by both direct investment and new forms (See Brickley, Dark and 
Weisbach (1991). In addition, it was reported that other large MNEs such as IBM, 3M, 
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Deere and Co., Eastman Kodak, and Monsanto were considering possibilities of using 
variants of new forms of investment (The Wall Street Journal, December 30, 1988). 
An agency-theory explanation of why firms use new forms suggests that they are not 
limited to SMFs with restricted access to capital markets (Brickley, Dark and Weisbach, 
1991). Besides, finance theory indicates that in the absence of offsetting considerations 
(e.g. incentive effects), risk sharing will be preferable to equity ownership(Rubin, 1987). 
In order to determine whether there is a relationship between the size of the firm and use 
of NFIs, two procedures were adopted. First, respondents were asked to indicate 
whether the size of their firm had any significant influence on the use of new forms. 
38.6 per cent of UK companies responding and 68.4 per cent of Foreign companies 
admitted that the size of their companies has an influence on their choice of entry modes 
(Table 13.3.1) On the other hand, 61.4 per cent and 31.6 per cent of UK and Foreign 
companies respectively indicated that size was not influential. Altogether 47.6 per cent 
of the responding companies (Le. 30 companies) aver that size is influential to their 
choice of new forms, while 52.4 per cent (or 33 companies) indicate otherwise. 
Siegel (1954, p.104) states that when the data of research consist of frequencies in 
discrete categories, the X2 test may be used to determine the significance of differences 
between two independent groups, which in this case are UK and Foreign companies. 
Table 10.3.1 Questionnaire Responses by Managers, Concerning the Impact of 
Firm Size on the Choice of New Forms: Company Evidence. (Possible 
Replies: Influential, Uninfluential). 
Influential Uninfluential Valid Total 
Valid Valid 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
UK Companies 17 38.6 27 6l.4 44 69.8 
Foreign Companies 13 68.4 6 3l.6 19 30.2 
30 47.6 33 52.4 63 100.0 
Chi-Sguare £ D.F. Significance MinE.F. Cells with E.F. < 5 
3.60095 .23252 1 .0577 9.048 None 
4.71952 .26399 .0298 (Before Yates Correction) 
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The hypothesis under test is that there is no relationship between firm size and the choice 
of new forms in their internationalization process. Based on respondents' answers, a 
frequency table of influence was constructed in the form of a '2 x 2' contingency table. 
The underlying assumptions are: (1) The two groups of companies are independent; (2) 
the individual companies in each group were randomly and independently selected; (3) 
each observation qualified for one and only one category; and (4) the samples are large 
such that no expected frequency is less than 5 (ibid.). The results of the chi-square test 
are shown in Table 10.3.1. The SPSS prints two versions of the chi-square statistic. The 
standard version, labelled BEFORE YATES CORRECTION, equals 4.720. The observed 
significance level is .030, leading to a rejection of the hypothesized difference. 
The Yates' correction is an adjustment to a 2 X 2 contingency table, designed to improve 
the estimate of the observed significance level. It incorporates a correction for continuity 
which markedly improves the approximation of the )(2 distribution. Based on the Yates' 
correction, the computed value leads to an acceptance of the hypothesis at the .05 level. 
In order to determine the strength of the relationship between firm size and use of new 
forms, a correlation coefficient is calculated. The nonparametric counterpart of the 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient r is the CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENT 
C (Siegel, 1954, p.196; Norusis, 1986, p.275). The C is a measure of the extent of 
association or relation between two sets of attributes. This measure is always between 
o and 1, where 0 denotes no relationship and 1, a perfect relationship. From Table 
10.3.1, the value of C before or after Yates' correction is a function of the number of 
categories, thus for a 2 x 2 table (as Table 10.3.1), the upper limit of C is .707 (Siegel, 
1954, p.201). Therefore, on a scale of 0 to .707, the strength of the association between 
firm size and choice of new forms of investment is .373. Thus we could conclude that 
firm size and choice of new forms are somehow related in the population of which UK 
and Foreign companies are samples (by a margin of 37.3%). 
The second procedure involves categorizing firms into small, medium and large sizes, 
using the criteria of both turnover (or assets in the case of banks), and number of 
employees. These were examined separately as to their reliance on selected Nfl-adoption 
rationales. Termed 'new forms of investment - adoption rationales', these are "defensive 
reaction" rather than "strategic initiative" reasons for employing the mechanism of new 
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forms. They are also perceived as "second best" alternative reasons for adopting new 
forms (Oman, 1984, 1986; Ozawa, 1984). Differences between the mean ranks of the 
selected rationales were tested using the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance 
(Tables 10.3.2, 10.3.3, 10.3.4 and 10.3.5) for Foreign companies, U.K. companies, 
Foreign banks and U.K. banks, respectively. The aim is to determine whether there are 
differences in the choice of new forms (Le. differences in mean perceptions of NFI-
adoption rationales) when the size of the firm is small, medium, and large. In general, 
it is hypothesized that the average perceptions of the NFl-adoption rationales will be the 
same among small, medium, and large firms. The results of the tests follow seriatim. 
Table 10.3.2 Kruskal-WalIis One-Way Analysis of Variance Tests of the 
Relationship of NFl-Adoption Rationales to Firm Size: Foreign 
Companies' Evidence 
Mean Rank by Firm Size 
Small Medium Large 
NFl-Adoption Rationale n=5 n=5 n=5 
Willingness to share ownership 3 15 5 
and control. 
Minimization of country risks. 4 8 13 
Cost of establishing a foreign 12 9 
subsidiary . 
Size of parent company. 7 6 10 
Experience in foreign markets. 2 14 11 
l;R; = 28 52 40 
--
H = 2.88 X22, 0.10 = 4.61 
EVIDENCE FROM FOREIGN COMPANIES 
Small size foreign companies were found to be more sensitive to willingness to share 
ownership and control, minimization of country risks, and experience in foreign markets 
than their medium and large counterparts (see Table 10.3.2). Medium and Large firms 
appeared less sensitive on both these two factors and experience in foreign markets. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that small firms are keen to expand their markets abroad. 
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With a lot of competition from medium and large firms in the domestic market, it would 
be surprising if they displayed an unwillingness to collaborate with local partners. Their 
willingness to share ownership and control would reflect in minimization of host country 
risks as well as compensate for lack of experience in foreign markets. 
Large foreign companies, while not minding sharing ownership and control and less 
concerned with experience in foreign markets, were found to be more sensitive to cost 
of establishing foreign subsidiaries as well as to experience in foreign markets. These 
are internalization-incentive advantages in their internationalization process. Considering 
the nationalities of the foreign companies in the sample (Table 9.4), it is hardly surprising 
that the above characterizations are evident. Since the observed value of 2. 88 is less than 
the critical value of 4.61 at the .10 level, the hypothesis of equal perceptions among the 
three sizes of companies is accepted. The data indicate lack or absence of significant 
differences in the mean perceptions of NFl-adoption rationales among small, medium, and 
large foreign companies. 
Table 13.3.3 Kruskal-Wallis One-Way Analysis of Variance Tests of the 
Relationship of NFl-Adoption Rationales to Firm Size: UK 
Companies' Evidence 
NFl-Adoption Rationale 
Willingness to share ownership 
and control 
Minimization of country risks 
Cost of establishing a foreign 
subsidiary 
Size of company 
Mean Rank by Firm Size 
Small Medium Large 
n=5 n=5 n=5 
2 7 15 
14 4 12 
10 5 8 
6 13 
Experience in foreign banking and 11 9 3 
markets 
1; R; = 43 26 51 
H = 720.9 X22 '0.005 = 10.60 
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EVIDENCE FROM UK COMPANIES 
Similar tests were carried out among small, medium and large UK companies (see Table 
10.3.3). The evidence is somewhat disaggregated. Similar to small foreign companies, 
UK small companies were found to be more willing to share ownership and control, but 
surprisingly, less concerned about the cost of establishing a foreign subsidiary, country 
risks and lack of experience in foreign markets. Again, anecdotal evidence supported by 
the interviews with small company executives seems to confirm this conservative and 
cautious approach. 
UK medium-size companies, while willing to share ownership and control and to 
diversify were more concerned about their size, risks and cost of establishing a foreign 
subsidiary. This propensity is evident in the geographic concentration of U.K. companies 
(see Table 9.15) - that is, mainly in relatively stable geographic zones - Western Europe 
and North America. Large UK companies were found to be more sensitive about their 
experience in foreign markets and less concerned about the other factors. Differences in 
the perception of the three groups with respect to the factors were tested using the 
Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance. The observed value of 720.9 exceeds the 
critical value at .005 level, suggesting therefore a rejection of the hypothesis of a 
relationship between firm size and use of new forms. The data indicate significant 
differences in the rank perceptions of NFl-adoption rationales among small, medium, and 
large UK companies. 
EVIDENCE FROM FOREIGN BANKS 
The evidence of similar tests with respect to foreign banks is presented in Table 10.3.4. 
Medium size foreign banks were found to show a greater sensitivity towards the first four 
factors in the table than their small and large counterparts. On the other hand, they were 
less worried about their foreign experience, possesion of large corporate customers, and 
economies of scope. This would tend to be the case naturally since foreign banks, 
especially Japanese ones, are supported by large holding companies (the so go shosha). 
Since many of the foreign small banks operating in the U.K. are not wholly branch 
networks, or at least did not initially establish through this process, it is not surprising 
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that the sample group did not display much sensitivity towards cost of foreign branch, 
their size or experience in foreign branching. However, the evidence of a willingness to 
enter into collaborative ventures was surprisingly not too strong, mean score 8.70, even 
though they showed a high propensity towards economies of scope and geographical 
diversification. Large foreign banks were found to be most unwilling to share ownership 
and control. That also reflects on their low sensitivity to country risks. Partly due to the 
sad experience in sovereign loan losses, especially European and American banks, and 
partly due to the size and nationalities of the sample banks, high cost of establishing 
foreign branches coupled with the possession of large international corporate customers, 
accurately mirrors the perspectives expressed at the interviews. 
The observed value of 9.801 exceeds the critical value of 9.21 at the .01 level, leading 
to a rejection of the hypothesis. The data indicate significant differences in the mean 
perceptions of Nfl-adoption rationales among small, medium, and large foreign banks. 
Table 10.3.4 Kruskal-Wallis One-Way Analysis of Variance Tests of the 
Relationship of NFl-Adoption Rationales to Firm Size: Foreign Banks' 
Evidence. 
Mean Rank by Firm Size 
Small Medium Large 
Nfl-Adoption Rationale n = 7 n = 7 n=7 
Willingness to share ownership 5 19 
and control 
Minimization of country risks 6 3 16 
Cost of establishing a foreign 17 6 10 
branch 
Size of bank 20 4 9 
Experience in foreign banking and 13 14 10 
markets 
Possession of large international 12 18 8 
corporate customers 
Economies of scope and geographical 2 21 14 
diversification 
~~ = 75 67 86 
--
H = 9.801 
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EVIDENCE FROM UK BANKS 
The evidence from UK banks is somewhat different from their foreign counterparts. UK 
medium-size banks show a high propensity to share ownership and control because they 
want to benefit from economies of scope and geographical diversification. They are 
equally concerned about their size and cost of establishing a foreign branch, for the same 
reasons given above, but less worried by country risks and foreign experience apparantly 
because, they are predominantly located in relatively stable European and North 
American continents. Large-size UK banks are not as much sensitive to their size, 
possession of large international corporate customers, and economies of scope as they are 
about country risks and cost of establishing a foreign branch network. Consequently, on 
the one hand, and surprisingly, on the other, they showed the greatest willingness to 
share ownership and control. Equally surprising was the fact that sample U.K. small 
banks were less willing to share ownership and control, and less sensitive to their size, 
but more worried about their experience in foreign banking/markets and country risks. 
Table 10.3.5 Kruskal-Wallis One-Way Analysis of Variance Tests of the 
Relationship of NFl-Adoption Rationales to Firm Size: UK Banks' 
Evidence 
Mean Rank by Firm Size Kruskal-
Small Medium Large 
NFl-Adoption Rationale n=7 n=7 n=7 
Willingness to share ownership 21 9.5 3 
and control 
Minimization of country risks 7.5 17 7.5 
Cost of establishing a foreign 13.5 13.5 4.5 
subsidiary 
Size of bank 18 6 9.5 
Experience in foreign banking and 4.5 19.5 13.5 
markets 
Possession of large international 13.5 1.5 13.5 
corporate customers 
Economies of scope and geographical 13.5 1.5 19.5 
diversification 
~R; = 91.5 68.5 71.0 
@ Corrected for Ties H = 1.2297 X22 010 = 4.605 
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Differences in the rank scores of the three groups with respect to each of the factors were 
also tested using the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance. The correction factor 
for the ties in the scores has been incorporated in the Kruskal-Wallis H equation. The 
null hypothesis test is a )(2 test with 2 degrees of freedom. Since H = 1.23 is less than 
the critical value of 4.61, the null hypothesis is therefore accepted. This leads to a 
conclusion that the average perceptions of NFl-adoption rationales among small, medium, 
and large UK banks are the same. The correction for ties has little effect on the result. 
The average result of no significant effect of firm size on foreign investment for the latter 
sample group tends to support earlier studies. In their study of the determinants of 
foreign investment by UK advertising agencies, Terpstra and Yu (1988) tested the 
hypothesis that "the size of an advertising agency should have a positive impact on its 
foreign investment." Their analysis contradicted this hypothesis, thus blurring the impact 
of firm size on advertising agencies' foreign investment. Similarly, Brickley, Dark and 
Weisbach (1991) found that new forms of investment (exemplified by franchising) are not 
simply tools for small and medium size firms, rather large MNEs use them as well. In 
a much earlier study, Stopford (1972) noted that the use of joint ventures and minority 
equity in foreign manufacturing operations by US MNEs appeared to be an inverse 
function of a firm's relative size in its industry. 
Using the "Wells effect" by which large, "dominant" and "industry leaders" are regarded 
as having a lower propensity to use new forms of investment than their smaller, "non-
dominant" rivals, Franko (1989) tested the correlation between company size and 
"minority joint venture propensities". Within a two industry population (tyres and autos 
and trucks) and study samples of US firms versus non-US firms, Franko found first, an 
inverse relationship between company size and minority joint ventures (MJV) use and 
second, the inverse relationship was much stronger among US firms taken alone. Thus, 
he concluded that the "Wells effect" "appears somewhat weak and nonlinear (not that 
there is any a priori reason to expect a linear relationship)." Franko also found a high 
incidence of MJV avoidance by smaller (relative to large, dominant industry leaders) 
segment-dominating firms, many of whom were European or Japanese MNEs. His 
findings are supported by the results of this study. The impression gained from 
interviewing three Japanese-corporate executive (two companies and one bank) was that 
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:; there appeared to be a sustained attempt by Japanese MNEs to adopt foreign investment 
approaches that are structurally and operationally different from those of their Western 
counterparts, especially the US MNEs, including a high propensity to use new forms. 
10.4 THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICY SHIFTS 
H4 : New forms of investment are more likely to prevail in firms with a 
'dynamic' foreign investment posture than in firms with a 'static' posture. 
As a corollary to hypothesis 2 above and the "Wells effect," it could be argued on the 
basis of the "experience-effect logic" associated with the Boston Consulting Group (1972) 
that firms concerned about risks and uncertainties, increasing global competition, rising 
costs/reduced availability of corporate resources and environmental distortion propensities 
(in particular host governments') are more likely to adopt a flexible strategic investment 
approach than firms that adopt a relatively stable approach. The latter may be associated 
with industries experiencing a relatively stable growth, high share of world markets with 
high financial returns and little, if any, managerial and financial constraints. These 
features may frequently be associated with large, dominant and industry-leader firms, ego 
IBM for the computer industry, Coca Cola for the soft drink industry, ICI for the health 
care industry, Exxon and Shell for the oil industry, and Nissan Motors and Ford Motors 
for the motor industry. In a word, these companies are conglomerates or industry giants 
and may be said to have a lower propensity to frequent changes in investment policy and, 
therefore, less likely to accept new forms than their rival followers. 
On the other hand, firms that show greater concern for the above investment hazards may 
be more disposed to utilize new forms than the conglomerates or industry leaders. 
Through experience (or inexperience) these firms may be prone to lower market share, 
lower financial returns and, perhaps due to cash flow, managerial and financial 
constraints than the leader firms. Under these circumstances, these firms may be inclined 
to frequently change their investment policies as a strategic reaction posture, in attempts 
to both follow industry leaders' oligopolistic, risk-profile matching behaviour and achieve 
growth and financial performance. Accordingly, this group of firms may likely show 
higher propensity towards adopting 'flexible' ownership policies and entry mode patterns. 
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Presumably differences between these two firm groups can be examined to determine 
whether 'dynamic strategy profile' firms do more frequently use, or are more likely to 
use, new forms than 'static strategy profile' firms. 
In order to examine whether a classification of the above kind might be helpful in 
interpreting firm strategic profile, two statistical procedures were applied: frequency 
analysis and XZ test. Table 10.4.1 presents a cross-classification of UK and foreign firms 
in terms of the catalysts for change in foreign investment profile. Respondents were asked 
to identify the factors they considered likely to induce changes in, or stagnate, their 
international investment behaviour. 
Table 10.4.1 Catalysts for Change in Foreign Investment Posture 
UKFlRMS FOREIGN FlRMS 
Banks Companies Banks Companies 
Factors mentioned by Respondents+ n = 10 n = 47 n = 21 n = 19 
% % % % 
Shift in corporate policy/strategy 60 66 45 32 
Global Competition 40 29 31 23 
Host Country's inward investment policy 5 24 
Host Government's outward investment policy 21 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* In some cases respondents stressed more than one factor 
As would be expected, more than one factor might be responsible for a corporate change 
in foreign investment profile. For example, operational activities of rival firms in a 
particular geographic or product market can force a shift in the company's investment 
policy /strategy with respect to that geographic region or product market or even its global 
approach. The predominant factor responsible for a change in firms' foreign investment 
profile is shift in corporate policy/strategy. Of course, if there is a shift in a firm's 
investment policy this may in all probability filter through the firm's foreign investment 
strategy to the effect that a particular product or market area may be abandoned or 
expanded. This factor appears to induce a change in investment profile more for UK 
companies and banks than their foreign counterparts, with UK banks exhibiting the 
greatest sensitivity to it. Foreign banks tended to be more affected by the factor than their 
company counterparts. 
299 
" ' " . 
Another important catalyst cited by respondents is global competition. Again UK firms 
on the average appear more likely to be affected than their foreign counterparts. Also, 
foreign banks exhibit greater sensitivity to the factor than companies (both UK and 
foreign). It is rather surprising that host country's political/economic climate is not 
considered an important agent of change in foreign investment policy. Perhaps, this may 
be attributed to the nationality of the sample firms. Many of them have bulk of their 
overseas activities in Western Europe and North America (see Table 9.15), and, as such, 
are not exposed to the vangaries of their host countries as much as might be the case 
were they mainly located in LDCs. 
Some respondents had other reasons than the above for changing foreign investment 
posture. For example, a major UK gas company was forced to alter its domestic and 
international investment policy and strategy following the government's privatization and 
relaxation of the government's control. Another, a major confectionery company, was 
forced to change its global diversification approach by the economic recession in general 
and, depression in the UK confectionery in particular, couped with global competition. 
In addition to identifying the factors that induce changes in foreign investment posture, 
respondents were asked first, to indicate the overseas geographic concentration of their 
economic activities (Table 9.15) and second, whether this position had changed in the last 
five years. Hood and Young (1986, p. 35) had argued that a firm's foreign investment 
posture could be gauged by its overseas geographic or product concentration. Thus, given 
its geographic concentration, a firm would be expected to exhibit some of the 
characteristics of the market leader sketched above, i.e. strong market position and high 
penetration within host country's industrial sectors. Such firms would be expected to 
make little or no change in their strategic posture in such markets. Conversely, firms 
whose overseas activity is not concentrated and have had to make changes in the last five 
years may be characterized as displaying a dynamic investment posture. 
Table 10.4.2 presents a crosstabulation of dynamic and static postures among sample 
banks and companies. 77.4 percent of sample banks have not altered their foreign 
investment posture in the last five years as against 30.3 percent of companies that adopt 
a similar posture. In all, it would appear that banks and companies tend to move in 
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inverse direction with respect to foreign investment postures (see Table 10.4.2). A test 
of the relationship between foreign investment posture and the likelihood of adopting new 
forms is analogous to testing whether or not there is a difference between the two groups 
(firms with 'dynamic postures' versus firms with 'static postures') in the choice of new 
forms of investment. The hypothesis of study is that firms which adopted 'dynamic 
postures' would more frequently accept new forms of investment. The null hypothesis 
therefore is that there is no difference between firms with 'dynamic postures' and firms 
with ' static postures'. 
Table 10.4.2 
Banks 
Companies 
Chi-Square 
17.0394 
14.2940 
Questionnaire Responses by Managers, Concerning 
Whether their Firms Maintain a 'Dynamic' or 'Static' 
Foreign Investment Posture: a X2 Test of the 
Relationship between Foreign Investment Posture and 
the Choice of New Forms 
DYNAMIC STATIC TOTAL 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
7 22.6 24 77.4 31 32.0 
46 69.7 20 30.3 66 68.0 
53 54.6 44 45.4 97 100.0 
D.F Significance MIN E.F. Cells with E.F. < 5 
1 .0000 14 None 
1 .0000 (Before Yates Correction) 
Since the observed significance level is too small, the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference between firms with 'dynamic postures' and firms with 'static postures' is 
rejected. As the study hypothesis (the alternative hypothesis) predicts the direction of the 
difference between the two groups, the region of rejection is one-tailed. The conclusion 
therefore is that firms which adopt dynamic foreign investment postures are more likely 
to accept new forms than do firms with static foreign postures. Franko (1989) found a 
similar result in his analysis of use of minority and 50-50 JVs. Using the 'Wells effect' 
he found that the 'strategic posture' of 'segment specialists' tended to disfavour the use 
of new forms (i.e. joint ventures) as part of an oligopolistic 'catch-up' or 'geographical-
matching' strategy. The most plausible explanation for this result is that the 'dynamic 
strategic posture' allows firms to avoid head-on competition with industry leaders by 
using several options to diversify their markets. Also, as globalization of markets 
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intensifies so will international expansion and competition in the international arena 
accelerate and so will the use of new forms intensify (see also Terpstra and Yu, 1988). 
Thus, although certain economic and non-economic factors can be largely held 
responsible for triggering the move towards the use of new forms, the kind of strategic 
posture adopted and behaviour both allowed these factors to succeed in inducing firm 
reaction to use of new forms, and conditioned the kinds of MNEs that accepted them in 
the internationalization process. Franko(1989) reached a similar conclusion in his study. 
10.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF HOST COUNTRY-SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS 
Hs: The choice of new forms in foreign market development is significantly 
influenced by managerial perceptions of host country characteristics. 
The importance of location-specific advantages has been examined extensively in the 
literature. Locational advantages combine in simultaneous proportion with ownership and 
internalization advantages to constitute the eclectic theory. Several host country 
characteristics were isolated and respondents were asked to indicate in order of strategic 
importance the influence of these factors on their firms' decision to enter into foreign 
markets through the mechanism of new forms. 
Table 10.5.1 presents the individual sample and cross-sectional results ofthe respondents' 
perceptions. The cross-sectional mean indicates that the size of host country's markets is 
the most important locational factor (overall mean score 1.567). Following this is the host 
country's inward investment policy/regulation (mean score 1.659). Psychic distance -
representing language, cultural, business, customs, etc. - does not appear to be an 
important locational factor across the 4 sample groups (mean score 2.595). Within -
group analysis shows that size of host country's markets is the most important locational 
factor favouring the use of new forms for both U.K. and Foreign companies, with the 
latter attaching greater importance to it than the former. With respect to host government 
inward investment policy, UK banks appear to be much more sensitive to it than other 
sample groups. 
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Banks were isolated and studied separately for significant differences in the importance 
of each of the locational factors (Table 10.5.2). The same procedure was applied to 
companies (Table 10.5.3). The t-tests showed, in the case of banks, two locational factors 
to be statistically significant at the 5 % level. These are: the host government's inward 
investment policy, and the level of inter-bank market. No significant relationship was 
found between U.K. and foreign banks in respect of the importance of the other factors. 
This suggests that apart from host government's regulations and level of inter-bank 
market, there may be no significant difference in the importance of the other locational 
variables in determining the use of non-branch network in foreign market development. 
@ 
Rank 
2 
3 
7 
8 
5 
4 
6 
.. 
@ 
Table 10.5.1 Questionnaire Responses by Managers, Concerning the 
Significance of Host Country-Specific Advantages (CSAs) in 
the Choice of New Forms of Investment (Scale: 1 = Very 
significant to 5= Very Insignificant) 
UK Banks Foreign Banks UK Companies Foreign Companies Cross-
SalOD. 
n = 10 n = 21 n = 47 n = 19 n = 'J7 
Locational Factor Mean SO Mean SO Mean SO Mean SO Mean SO 
Host Governments 1.333 0.500 1.947 0.780 1.674 0.837 1.684 0.478 1.659 0.218 
inward investment 
policy 
Size of host 2.111 0.928 1.700 0.571 1.405 0.798 1.053 0.229 1.567 0.389 
country's markets 
Economic/political 1.889 0.333 2.000 0.775 1.829 0.442 1.737 0.806 1.864 0.095 
climate 
Fiscal/monetary 2.667 0.866 2.191 0.402 2.073 0.685 2.316 0.671 2.312 0.222 
policies 
Psychic distance 2.778 0.441 2.450 0.759 2.429 0.801 2.722 0.669 2.595 0.157 
Level of inter- 2.333 -.500 1.750 0.786 .. .. .. .. 2.042 0.292 
bank market 
Technological & 1.889 0.601 2.000 0.649 .. .. .. .. 1.945 0.056 
Managerial Capacity 
Infrastructural .. .. .. .. 2.214 0.470 2.000 0.594 2.107 0.107 
development in 
host country 
Questions were either not relevant to the group or were not properly answered . 
Cross-Sectional Rank 
The evidence from companies is similar (see Table 10.5.3). Apart from size of host 
country's market (significant at the 1 % level), no statistically significant differences were 
found in the importance of other locational factors in determining the use of new forms. 
303 
Table 10.5.2 Significant Differences in Mean Scores of CSAs as Entry Mode 
Determinants: U.K. Vs Foreign Banks 
No. of 
cases 
Host government's 28 
inward investment 
policy 
Size of host 29 
country's market 
Economic/political 30 
climate 
Fiscal! monetary 30 
policies 
Psychic distance 29 
Level of inter- 29 
bank market 
Technological & 29 
Managerial capacity 
* Significant at 5 % level 
F-Value 2-Tail 
Pooled Variance 
Estimate 
t-value 
Probability 
4.65 0.032 1.62 
2.64 0.079 -1.47 
5.40 0.020 0.41 
4.63 0.005 -2.08 
2.96 0.119 -1.20 
2.47 0.191 -2.04 
1.17 0.867 0.44 
Table 10.5.3 Significant Differences in Mean Scores 
Separate Variance 
Estimate 
2-Tail t-value 2-Tail 
probability prob. 
0.118 2.06 0.050* 
0.153 -1.23 0.245 
0.684 0.55 0.587 
0.047* -1.58 0.147 
0.241 -1.46 0.157 
0.052 -2.41 0.024* 
0.666 0.45 0.659 
of CSAs as Entry Mode 
Determinants: U.K. Vs Foreign Companies 
Pooled Variance Separate Variance 
Estimate Estimate 
No. of F-Value 2-Tail t-value 2-Tail t-value 2-Tail 
cases Probability probability prob. 
Host government's 62 3.07 0.012 -0.05 0.962 -0.06 0.954 
inward investment 
policies 
Size of host 61 12.10 0.000 1.88 0.065 2.63 0.011* 
country's market 
Economic/political 60 3.33 0.002 0.57 0.568 0.47 0.644 
climate in host 
country 
Fiscal! monetary 60 1.04 0.959 -1.28 0.204 -1.29 0.204 
policies 
Psychic distance 60 1.43 0.428 -1.36 0.178 -1.47 0.151 
Infrastructural 60 1.60 0.221 1.49 0.141 1.36 0.186 
development in 
host country 
* Significant at 1 % level 
In order to verify the significance of differences in managerial perceptions of the 
importance of certain host country factors in influencing the use of new forms, the 
Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance test was carried out. Table 13.5.4 presents 
the summary of the results of this test. In this summary presentation it is considered 
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redundant repeating the mean values of each host country variable since these are shown 
in Table 10.5.1. Three host country-specific variables imported into the analysis from 
related set of questions to the respondents are: (1) products customized to host/regional 
market, (2) level of economic development, and (3) general phenomenon of LDCs. These 
three factors were brought in to permit the use of the Kruskal-Wallis test, in place of the 
factors ranked 4, 5 and 6 in Table 10.5.1. 
Table 10.5.4 Kruskal-Wallis One-Way Analysis of Variance Test of Significance of 
Differences in the Importance of CSAs to use of New Forms Among 
the Four Sample Groups 
Host Country Characteristics 
Host government's inward 
investment policy 
Size of host country's markets 
Economic/political climate in 
host country 
Psychic distance 
Products customized to host/ 
regional market 
Level of economic 
development 
General phenomenon in 
LDCs 
* Significant at .01 per cent 
** Significant at .10 per cent 
*** Significant at 1 per cent 
Z-Value 
24.2596 
2.1660 
.9091 
2.3484 
2.6460 
1.3644 
1.6568 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Probability X2-Value Significance 
.0000 35.1000 .0000* 
.1411 4.3400 .2265 
.3404 6.7400 .0806*** 
.1254 4.6700 .3226 
.1038 7.8516 .0016** 
.2428 2.3000 .5122 
.6466 31.5900 .3459 
The result of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicates the difference to be statistically significant 
for the following three comparative country-specific factors: 
1. Host government's inward investment policy, at .01 % 
2. Economic/political climate in host country, at 1 % 
3. Products customized to host/regional market, at .10% 
However, this difference was not statistically significant for the following four country-
specific variables: 
1. Size of host country's markets 
2. Psychic distance 
3. Level of economic development 
4. LDC phenomenon. 
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These findings seem to suggest an increasing importance of the former factors and a 
decreasing importance of the latter factors in foreign investment decisions over time. In 
the 1960s and up to mid 1970s, MNEs were less concerned with host government policy, 
economic/political climate or host/regional market customization. The reason could 
presumably have colonial attributes as well as historical trends. On the former dimension, 
imagine a British firm wishing to establish in any of the colonial territories in the 1950s 
up to the late 1960s. The firm did not have to worry about any of these factors because 
they were not at issue and consequently were not important considerations for foreign 
investment. However, inward investment policy shifts during the 1970s were the product 
of the economic and political tenor of the times and the growing nationalism of many 
countries. This period witnessed unprecedented rise of wealthy oil nation states. 
Economic power was to be matched by political power, resulting in restrictive inward 
foreign investment policies. Consequently, contemporary corporate investment decisions 
had to address issues that were of little or no consequence in the past. This view was 
shared by the chief executive of one UK company. He said his company had to choose 
between closing its operations in Saudi Arabia and entering into minority joint ventures 
with local partners in 1974. Obviously, his company had to choose the latter, but he also 
said that while at the time it was like "swallowing a bitter pill", over the years, however, 
the cash flow implications and wider business opportunities this avenue has generated has 
encouraged his company to adopt cooperative forms as a "first best alternative". 
The literature on country characteristics and the empirical findings in manufacturing FDI 
suggests a positive relationship between manufacturing FDI and some of the above 
factors, e.g. psychic distance (see, for example, Dunning, 1981, 1988). However, the 
impact of the second set of factors (found to be statistically insignificant) on firms' 
foreign investment is not so clear. Empirical findings in international banking tend to 
suggest that geographic proximity (which is captured within psychic distance) has a minor 
impact on banks' foreign investment (Ball and Tschoegl, 1982; Choi, Tschoegl and Yu, 
1986). Other researchers' findings on the significance of locational factors on foreign 
investment seem to corroborate the findings of this study (see, for example, Davidson and 
McFetridge, 1985; Terpstra and Yu, 1988; Franko, 1989). 
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10.6 THE IMPACT OF COMPETITORS' MODES OF ENTRY 
H6: Firm choice/use of new forms in the internationalization process is 
independent of competitors' mode of organising foreign transactions. 
This hypothesis seeks to offer evidence on the irrelevance (or relevance) of competitors' 
international behaviour (Le. international entry mode) on a firm's choice of new forms. 
One of the often cited reasons why firms choose new forms of investment is the need to 
match rivals' behaviour (Williamson, 1975, p. 217; Oman, 1984; Buckley and Casson, 
1985; Harrigan, 1985). Global competition forces firms to develop defensive strategies. 
A major task in this process is the development of a profile of the likely strategies rival 
firms and their potential reaction to the firm's strategic moves. In effect, the essence of 
competitor analysis (Rugman, et aI., 1986, p. 333) is to examine the impact of 
competitors' current and emergent strategies, capabilities and general industry conditions. 
In the analysis competitive structures of two kinds are discernible: entry and exit. 
The propensity to use new forms is in part due to a desire of the host government to 
reduce foreign ownership and control but is also facilitated by the willingness of MNEs 
to compromise on total ownership (Buckley and Casson, 1985, p. 56). This, according 
to the authors, is often the result of competitive pressure. Thus, new forms of investment 
offer entry into markets which would otherwise be foreclosed to foreign MNEs in general 
or particular MNEs (e.g. of particular countries or trading circumstances). Of interest 
here is foreclosure of competitive kind, that is, entry barrier erected by existing 
oligopolistic competitive structure. In these circumstances, new forms of investment may 
offer entry prospects and may be preferable (Buckley and Davies, 1980; Oman, 1984). 
While competitive structure of entry barriers works to severely limit the capacity of firms 
to enter into certain markets, competitive structure of exit barriers makes it difficult for 
existing firms to pull out. They are required to maintain exchange relations of good 
continuity properties. In this setting, some form of contractual/cooperative arrangements 
or minority equity participation may be seen as providing firms a leeway to both maintain 
operational presence in the market and limit its level of resource commitment. In both 
competitive structures, the pattern of competitors' behaviour can be influential to a firm's 
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actions or reactions. In particular, competitors' entry modes may be significant, whether 
in terms of the follow-the-Ieader behaviour hypothesis (Knickerbocker, 1973) or as a 
defensive reaction strategy hypothesis (Oman, 1984). 
To test both hypotheses, it is stated in the null form that firm choice/use of new forms 
is independent of competitors' mode of organizing foreign transaction. In operationalizing 
the hypothesis, respondents were asked to indicate whether their rivals' mode of entry had 
an influence on their firms' international entry modes choices. Tables 10.6.1 and 10.6.2 
present the results and chi-square tests for companies and banks, respectively. 38.3% of 
UK companies and 21.1 % of Foreign companies said that their competitors' modes of 
entry had a significant influence on their entry mode choices (Table 10.6.1). On the other 
hand, 61.7% and 78.9% of UK and Foreign companies respectively indicated that their 
competitors' entry mode patterns had no influence on their use of new forms. 
On the basis of the crosstabulation, Chi-Square test was carried out between the 
Influential group and Uninfluential group in order to determine the significance of 
differences between the two groups. The test reveals that it is likely that the observed 
value might have arisen under Ho, that is, the observed probability is greater than XZ 
critical value. The data do not therefore permit us to reject the null hypothesis that choice 
of entry mode is independent of competitors' entry patterns. Thus, on the basis of this 
evidence, it will appear that competitors' mode of international entry has no significant 
impact on the use of new forms of investment. 
Table 10.6.1 Questionnaire Responses by Managers, Concerning the Influence of 
Competitors' Entry Mode Patterns on the Choice of New Forms: 
Company Evidence (Possible Replies: Influential; Uninfluential) 
UK Companies 
Foreign Companies 
Chi-Square 
1.11786 
4.71952 
.129 
.163 
Influential Uninfluential Valid Total 
Valid Valid 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
18 
...4 
22 
38.3 
21.1 
33.3 
D.F. Significance 
.2904 
.1784 
29 
15 
44 
61.7 
78.9 
66.7 
47 
19 
66 
71.2 
28.8 
100.0 
MinE.F. Cells with E.F. < 5 
6.333 None 
(Before Yates Correction) 
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Table 10.6.2 Questionnaire Responses by Managers, Concerning the Influence of 
Competitors' Organizational Entry Modes on the Organizational 
Pattern of International Banking: Evidence From Sample Banks 
(Possible Replies: Influential; Uninfluential) 
Influential Uninfluential Valid Total 
Valid Valid 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
UK Banks 4 40 6 60 10 34.5 
Foreign Banks 12 63.2 
.1. 36.8 19 65.5 
16 55.2 13 44.8 29 100.0 
Chi-Square £ D.F. Significance MinE.F. Cells with E.F. < 5 
1.77778 .240 1 .1674 4.5 1 
1.38808 .214 1 .2568 (Before Yates Correction) 
The result of a similar test on the sample banks is presented in Table 10.6.2. The findings 
are similar in one respect and different in the other. As with UK companies, 40% of the 
sample UK banks indicated that competitors' international entry modes had a significant 
influence on their entry mode choices. 60% of these said they did not have any influence. 
On the other hand, a significantly high percentage (63.2%) of Foreign banks (in 
comparison with 21.1 % of Foreign companies) indicated that they were influenced by 
their competitors' entry patterns. Only 36.8% (as opposed to 78.9% of the sample foreign 
companies) appeared not to be influenced by competitors' behaviour. 
The )(2 test was used to determine the significance of this difference between the 
influenced and uninfluenced bank groups. As with the sample companies, this difference 
was not statistically significant at the 5 % level, suggesting therefore that banks' use of 
non-branch international banking modes is invariant to competitors' organizational 
pattern. Before the Yates correction for continuity, the observed significance level tells 
us that 25.7% (or 16.7% after correction) of the time a difference of at least the one 
observed between the two groups would occur in the population. 
Although on the basis of the above tests, the null hypothesis is not rejected, it does not 
mean an absence of a relationship between competitors' entry mode behaviour and a 
firm's use of new forms. In order to know whether the two variables are related or to 
know the degree of their relation, a correlation coefficient is calculated. (For a discussion 
of this, see 10.3 above). The contingency coefficient C measures the extent of association 
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or relation between two sets of attributes for 2 x 2 tables, the maximum value of C is 
.707. From Tables 10.6.1 and 10.6.2, the values of Care .163 and .214, respectively. 
Transforming these on a scale of 0 to .707 becomes .231 and .303, respectively. Thus, 
we could fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 5 % level of significance, and conclude 
that competitors' entry mode behaviour and firm choice of new forms are not related in 
the population consisting of the four sample groups. In other words, C = .231 or C = 
.303 is not significantly different from zero. 
While not providing a conclusive evidence, the findings here offer a weak (if not 
contradicting) evidence for the oligopolistic reaction hypothesis. The findings also 
contradict such US-based studies, as those of Perlmutter and Heenan (1986) and Terpstra 
and Yu (1988). Earlier Levitt (1983) had observed a trend towards globalization of 
markets caused by inter-firm competition, among other factors. Perlmutter and Heenan 
saw the development of joint ventures as a dynamic competitive reaction to this 
globalization of markets. Together Terpstra and Yu hypothesized that these two factors 
have a profound impact on internationalization activities of US advertising agencies. 
There is hardly any doubt about this! However, they argue in the process that 
globalization of markets and the need to follow clients bring about internationalization in 
which joint ventures (and other non-FDI modes, by implication) will be the outcome of 
intense competition and oligopolistic reaction. Although methodological differences are 
significant for interpretation of results, the empirical results of hypothesis 6 do not 
provide support for both their hypothesized relationship and the defensive reaction 
strategy hypothesis. In other words, while competitor analysis is important and while new 
forms may be responsive strategies to rivals' organizational patterns, the evidence is yet 
inconclusive. The strength of the methodology adopted here is in the fact that it is 
predicated on the practitioners' views, even though it is 45% of sample banks as against 
67 % of sample companies that are unaffected by competitors' mode of entry. 
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10.7 RELATIONSHIP OF STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT 
H7: Firm choice of new forms in the internationalization process is 
independent of stage of host country development. 
An important objective of this study is to determine whether or not the use/acceptance of 
new forms of investment is a characteristic phenomenon of less-developed countries. Both 
the antecedent literature (Weigel and Hyson, 1970; Casson, 1979; Germidis, 1981; 
Oman, 1980, 1984) and subsequent literature references and related studies (Beamish, 
1984, 1985; Buckley, 1985; Franko, 1987, 1989; and others) have unequivocally 
regarded the growth of, and trend towards, new forms of international investment' as a 
normative desirability of LDCs. The unremitting reference to their usage in the North-
South context has gone unchallenged, even though they are found to be frequently used 
by Fortune 500 companies in the developed countries (J anger, 1980; Harrigan, 1985). 
Some writers such as Contractor and Lorange (1987) have shown that the use of new 
forms by US MNEs outnumbers that of wholly owned subsidiaries by a ratio of 4 to 1. 
Despite the evidence, public policy emphasis (e.g. OECD and UNO) and literature 
discussions (e.g. Buckley and Davies, 1979; Casson, 1979) have had overtones of 
assertions of historical trend towards, as well as national preference for, new forms in 
LDCs. The argument is that in these countries the new forms are seen as a possible 
means of replacing hostile relationships between them and foreign (especially Western) 
MNEs with contractual, cooperative or reduced equity arrangements based on mutual 
trust and commitment (Franko, 1989). This hypothesis attempts to provide an empirical 
evidence on whether the move towards new forms of international investment is confined 
only to LDCs. To the extent that they were associated with LDCs, or to the extent that 
there was a move towards new forms of investment in LDCs, could their usage be said 
to have been prompted by LDC factors or were MNEs demonstrating anew, voluntary 
acceptance of these forms? Alternatively, was MNE acceptance of new forms related to 
host country policy quid pro quos (e.g. trade and other barriers to competition) that 
would assure the financial "success" of such ventures while isolating them from 
competition with, or integration into other parts of, MNE systems? (Franko, 1989). 
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The search for evidence to support or refute the above hypothesis and hence attempt to 
answer the above question is pursued through three statistical procedures. First, the 
relationship of stage of development to choice of new forms is examined through 
measures of central tendency and dispersion (Tables 10.7.1 and 10.7.2). Second, the 
extent of agreement or disagreement to the proposition that new forms are confined only 
to LDCs (Le. LDC phenomenon) is presented and tested in Table 10.7.3. Finally, the 
significance of the relationship of stage of development to use of new forms is examined. 
(Tables 10.7.4 and 10.7.5). 
Tables 10.7.1 and 10.7.2 illustrate how new forms are employed for different reasons in 
developed and developing countries by sample companies and banks, respectively. A 
number of proxy factors were isolated to estimate cumulatively a country's stage of 
development. These are factors which have been used in similar studies (see for example, 
Tomlinson, 1970; Balasubramanyan, 1973; Furnish, 1976; Gullander, 1976; Beamish, 
1984, 1985; Davidson and McFetridge, 1985; Franko, 1989; and for banking, see 
Yannopoulos, 1983; Cho, 1983, 1985; Nigh, Cho and Krishnan, 1986). 
COMPANY EVIDENCE (Table 10.7.1) 
The size of host country's markets and economic/political situation in host country were 
the most important reasons for using new forms in developed and developing countries, 
respectively. For the sample companies, new forms were used in developed countries not 
as the result of government suasion or legislation, rather on account of host market's size. 
Two reasons may account for this market size effect. First, in the absence of restrictions 
on direct investment, the choice between internal and external transacting mechanisms can 
be hypothesized to depend primarily on the expected present value of cash flows from 
current and future international investments. The higher the expected value, ceteris 
paribus, the more likely that the firm will choose the direct investment option (Davidson 
and McFetridge, 1985). However, since many of the fixed costs of internalization tend 
to be independent of market size, the chances are that smaller markets will exhibit higher 
rates of new forms of investment (e.g. licensing). Second, since most developed countries 
operate more open market economies than LDCs, competition is more likely to prevail 
in the former than in the latter market. Competition is sustained under large numbers 
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exchange relations (Williamson, 1975). When combined with market size and 
sophistication, it may induce firms, particularly small and medium size ones, to adopt 
inter-firm and market transfer mechanisms (see, Davidson and McFetridge, 1985). 
Economic/political situation in LDCs is a major factor leading foreign firms to use new 
forms. These countries are generally associated with policies that restrict the use of 
wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries (see, Franko, 1989). Thus, the use of new forms will 
be seen as a way of 'appeasing' host governments but also of appropriating maximum 
rents by offering companies a mix of earnings (see, Contractor, 1985). Janger (1980) and 
Beamish (1985) observed a similar result, noting that MNEs formed joint ventures in 
LDCs for a variety of government-related reasons. Apart from the differentials in market 
size (rank 1 versus rank 3) and economic/political situation in host country (rank 3 versus 
rank 1), the evaluation of the factors that propel several of the companies surveyed 
appears to be symmetrically ranked in both developed and developing countries (Table 
10.7.1), although the sensitivity of the factors is on the average greater in the latter than 
in the former. This suggests that the reasons for using new forms in LDCs may not 
necessarily have economic origin. On the contrary, the transactional reasons for 
employing new forms in DCs may be rooted in economics. 
BANK EVIDENCE (Table 10.7.2) 
The relationship of stage of country development to international banking networks is 
presented in Table 10.7.2. Location advantages accrue by reason of differences in 
location-specific endowments between countries. These advantages are not bank-specific 
by themselves, but their joint effects with ownership-specific advantages and 
internalization advantages are bank-specific, under the eclectic paradigm, and differ 
among multinational banks (MNBs). Major sources of location-specific advantages can 
generally be found in these areas (Cf. Cho, 1986): different banking/financial 
environments, different economic/political situations, presence of banks of different 
nationalities, differential levels of foreign investment, and effective interest rate 
differentials. 
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Table 10.7.1 Relationship of Stage of Development to Choice of New Forms: 
Company Evidence (n=66). 
DC LDC 
Proxy Factors of Stage of Development Rank Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. 
Size of host country's markets 1 1.405 0.798 3 1.737 0.816 
Openness towards foreign investment 2 1.674 0.837 2 1.684 0.478 
Economic/political situation in host country 3 1.829 0.442 1 1.053 0.229 
Level of industrial development 4 2.214 0.470 4 2.000 0.594 
Tax Rate Differential 5 2.312 0.222 5 2.316 0.671 
(between home & host countries) 
Psychic distance (socio-cultural 6 2.595 0.157 6 2.722 0.669 
dissimilarities, etc.) 
Table 10.7.2 Relationship of Stage of Development to Choice of Entry Modes: Bank 
Evidence (n=31). 
DC LDC 
Proxy Factors of Stage of Development Rank Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. 
Existence of major corporate clients in 1 1.889 0.333 1 1.700 0.571 
host country 
Host country as a major/important 2 2.000 0.500 2 1.750 0.786 
financial centre 
Economic/political situation in host country 3 2.111 0.928 5 3.667 0.816 
Presence of other banks in host country 4 2.333 0.500 3 1.947 0.780 
Level of foreign investment 5 2.600 1.265 4 2.000 0.775 
(including home country's) 
Interest Rate Differential 6 3.333 3.536 6 4.667 1.966 
(between home and host countries) 
The reasons that compel sample banks to internationalize (via non-branch banking 
networks) are shown to be somewhat similar in both DCs and LDCs. For the banks in 
the survey, the foremost reason for establishing overseas operations, whether in DCs or 
LDCs, is the existence of major corporate clients in the host country. Next in equal 
ranking in both country scenarios is the host country general banking environment. While 
the first factor has ownership-specific origin, the latter is a location-specific advantage. 
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It is surprising to find economic/political situation in a developed country being of 
moderate concern, but not surprising that it is of little concern in LDC banking. The 
impression gained from interviewing bank executives was that the opening of new 
markets in Eastern Europe offered opportunities for wider geographic expansion, but 
banks still remained sceptical about the economic/political situations in these countries. 
Even within the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), the lack of harmonization of social 
and economic policies, as would be required by the EEC, and the political neutrality of 
some member countries such as Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland are sources of political 
and economic concern for international branch banking. Hence, rather than attempting 
to set up new operations, several European banks have tried to enter new markets by 
means of acquisition. For specific examples, see Hiltrop (1991). In addition to acquisition 
mechanism, Hiltrop observes that a number of banks have responded to 1992 Single 
European market by forming international strategic alliances as well as acquiring minority 
interests in rival banks. 
The fact that economic/political situation in LDCs received little concern for foreign 
MNBs was probed further through interviews with bank executives. In the words of the 
head of the international division of a major UK bank, "my bank, and I know it's the 
same for other major international banks, has yet to grapple with the financial problem 
of third world debt. " When asked to reconcile this with the possession of large corporate 
clientele, the executive said that his bank "operates through a number of strategic 
mechanisms that are considered less risky than wholly owned foreign branches." A senior 
manager in the international division of a major Scottish bank described what he called 
"back-to-back strategy" as an international economic symbiosis by which a bank 
establishes strategic relations with banks of different nationalities, the main purpose being 
to provide services to their overseas customers on inter-bank reciprocal basis. In other 
words, if a UK bank's major customer was setting up operations in Nigeria, for example, 
a 'back-to-back' strategy allows the UK bank to 'domesticate' the customer's services and 
offer them as a package through a reciprocal arrangement with a major Nigerian bank or 
other foreign bank based in Nigeria, with offices in the U.K. 
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10.7.1 DEPENDENCY BETWEEN NEW FORMS AND LDCs 
Overall, there is evidence that firms operate in developed and less-developed countries 
for various reasons, but the findings here (Tables 10.7.1 and 10.7.2) indicate that these 
reasons may not be radically different and specific for the acclaimed dependency between 
the use of new forms of investment and LDCs. The similarity between the findings here 
and those of earlier studies (cited at the beginning of the section) ends in the following 
way. Whereas they accept as a datum that the new forms are phenomena of LDCs, 
apparently because the central focus of their studies was on LDCs (e.g. Beamish, 1984, 
1985; Cho, 1986; Franko, 1989), the argument here is broadened to include a proposition 
that its use is not confined to LDCs. 
In order to determine whether the use of new forms of investment is confined or 
restricted to LDCs, sample respondents were asked if they agreed with or disagreed with 
this proposition. Table 10.7.3 presents the findings. Altogether, about 71 % of the 97 
respondents disagreed with the proposition, 13 % agreed with it, and just over 15 % were 
either neutral or did not know. An individual firm breakdown of those disagreeing reveals 
this order: 84.2% Foreign companies, 70.2% UK companies, 70% UK banks, and 61.9% 
Foreign banks. In fact, of the 19 foreign companies in the sample, none agreed with the 
proposition, instead 3 indicated that they were not sure. 
Table 10.7.3 Questionnaire Responses by Managers, Concerning the Notion that 
the use of New Forms is a Phenomenon of LDCs. (Possible Answers: 
Agree, Disagree, Neutral/Don't Know). 
Agree Disagree 
Freq. % Freq. % 
UK Banks (n = 10) 2 20.0 7 70.0 
Foreign Banks (n = 21) 2 9.5 13 61.9 
UK Companies (n = 47) 9 19.1 33 70.2 
Foreign Companies (n = 19) 0 0.0 16 84.2 
Total 13 13.4 69 71.1 
Chi-Square 
1.4339 
2.6828 
~ D.F. Significance MinE.F. 
(a) 
(b) 
0.124 2 .50 
0.168 3 .30 
4.4 
3.0 
NeutrallDK Valid Total 
No % Freq. % 
6 
5 
3 
15 
10.0 10 10.9 
28.6 21 21.6 
10.6 47 48.5 
15.8 19 19.6 
15.5 97 100.0 
Cells with E.F. < 5 
1 
(a) x2-Value, when banks combined versus companies combined, in a 3 x 2 contingency table 
(b) x2-Value, when Neutral responses are merged with Agree Vs. Disagree, resulting in a 4 x 2 
contingency table 
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Siegel (1956, p.178) suggests that when k is larger than 2 (and df> 1), then )(2 test may 
be used if fewer than 20 per cent of the cells have an expected frequency (E.F.) of less 
than 5 and if a cell has an E.F. of less than 1. If these requirements are not met by the 
data in the form in which they were originally collected, the researcher can combine 
adjacent rows and/or columns without distorting the data in order to increase the E.F. in 
the various cells (see also, Hinkle et al. 1979, p.348). This combination was achieved on 
two levels: (1) merging banks against a merger of companies, and (2) merging neutral 
responses with agreement versus disagreement (Table 10.7.3 above). Each of these 
combinations resulted in a failure to reject the hypothesis. Thus, there is a good evidence 
to reject the contention that the use of new forms is a phenomenon of LDCs. The 
maximum contingency coefficient is . 205 (on a scale of 0 to .816), implying a weak (low) 
association between new forms and less developed countries. 
Finally, the Wilcoxon's Matched-Pairs test was also applied to determine whether the 
stage of host coutry development has any effect on the use of new forms. The Wilcoxon 
test is regarded as the most useful test where behavioural data are involved, in particular 
if both the relative magnitude and the direction of differences are considered (See, Siegel, 
1956, p.75). Tables 10.7.4 and 10.7.5 present the results of this test for companies and 
banks, respectively. Based on this test, 5 out of 8 proxy factors of stage of development 
were found to be statistically significant at the indicated levels. These are: 
1. Economic/political situation in host country, at 10% level. (Table 10.7.4) 
2. Level of industrial development, at 5 % level. (Table 10.7.4) 
3. Openness of host country towards foreign investment, at 5 % level. (Table 10.7.4) 
4. Major corporate customers in host country, at 5% level (Table 10.7.5) 
5. Size of foreign investment in host country, at 5% level (10.7.5). 
These lead to a rejection of the hypothesis at the 5 % level, although the significance level 
for economic/political situation was weak at 10%. This result seems to imply that these 
country characteristics have a significant impact on the choice of new forms in servicing 
a country. In particular, while the host country's economic/political situation, openness 
towards foreign investment, and level of industrial development are significant company 
net locational advantages for the use of new forms, for multinational banks, such 
advantages are derived from possession of major corporate customers and level of foreign 
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investment. Clearly these net locational effects are found to be favourable for firms' 
profitability. The results of this test also indicate that the size of host country's market 
is not enough to induce companies to use new forms, ceteris paribus, just as the presence 
of other banks in the host country and the locational advantages of being a major financial 
centre are not sufficient reasons for non-branch banking networks. These results are 
consistent with the findings of Contractor (1984). 
Table 10.7.4 Relationship of Stage of Development to Choice of New Forms: 
Summary of the Results of Wilcoxon's Paired Tests: DCs Vs LDCs: 
Company Evidence. 
Proxy Factors of Stage 
of Development 
Economic/political situation 
in host country 
Size of host country's market 
Level of industrial development 
Openness of host country 
towards foreign investment 
Mean Rank of 
DC Measure 
1.829 
1.405 
2.214 
1.674 
Wilcoxon's 
Mean Rank of Paired Test 
LDC Measure Z-Statistics 
1.053 -1.8043 
1.737 -1.2136 
2.000 -2.1974 
1.684 -2.8166 
* Significant at less than .5% ** Significant at less than 5 % 
No of 
Cases Prob. 
12 .0712** 
7 .2249 
26 .0280** 
19 .0049* 
Table 10.7.5 Relationship of Stage of Development to Choice of Entry Modes: 
Summary of the Results of Wilcoxon's Paired Tests: DCs Vs LDCs: 
Bank Evidence. 
Wilcoxon's 
Proxy Factors of Stage Mean Rank of Mean Rank of Paired Test No of 
of Development DC Measure LDC Measure Z-Statistics Cases Prob. 
Presence of other banks 2.333 4.667 - .629 6 .5294 
in host country 
Major corporate customers 1.889 1.700 -3.2194 22 .0013* 
in host country 
Level of foreign investment 2.600 2.000 -3.0859 14 .0020* 
(including home country's) 
Host country as a major/ 2.000 1.750 - .7803 26 .4352 
important financial centre 
* Significant at less than .5% 
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10.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF PERCEIVED BENEFITS OF NEW FORMS 
H8: Firm choice of new forms of international investment is dependent upon 
their percieved net benefits by corporate management. 
The proposition that markets and hierarchies are properly regarded as alternative 
governance structures to which transactions are assigned in discriminating (mainly 
transaction cost economizing) ways (Williamson, 1975, 1981b) has long been recognized 
in institutional economics, but has received relatively little attention in international 
business. Furthermore, that a firm is a system of relationships whose existence is 
dependent on the entrepreneur's direction of resources (Buckley, 1989, p.154) has been 
largely suppressed in both the theory and empirical analyses of corporate investment (see 
also, Teece, 1984). The fact is that it is the corporate manager or entrepreneur who 
ensures that the assignment of transactions to alternative governance structures is made 
in a discriminating way. He is guided in this process by his assessment of the costs and 
benefits of alternative governance structures, given the combined effects of net ownership-
specific, internalization and location-specific advantages. 
Thus, it can be hypothesized that whether a given set of transactions will be executed 
within the firm or across firms (Le. markets) is dependent on managerial 
perception/assessment of the net benefits (or costs) of using one mode rather than the 
other. This means that given the circumstances limiting inter-country transactions 
(explored in hypotheses 1 to 7) in general, corporate choice to internationalize via the 
mechanism of new forms will be greatly determined by managerial assessment of the net 
benefits of using the new forms. This assessment may be behavioural and/or may be 
informed by an analysis of the risk-adjusted net present values of the income stream 
extracted from a country under each alternative governance structure. The approach 
adopted here is that of Telesio's (1979) qualitative assessment of the costs and benefits 
of technology licensing. 
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Table 10.8.1 Questionnaire Responses by Managers, Concerning Net Benefits of New Forms of Investment (Scale: 1 = Strongly Agree; 
2=Agree; 3=Neutral; 4=Disagree; 5=Strongly Disagree). 
UK BANKS FOREIGN BANKS UK COMPANIES FOREIGN COMPANIES CROSS-SECTIONAL 
n = 10 n = 21 n = 47 n = 19 
RANK' PERCEIVED BENEFITS MEAN SD MEAN SD MEAN SD MEAN SD MEAN SD 
2 Diversify risks (country and 2.400 1.265 2.810 .814 2.256 .581 2.000 .000 2.367 .293 
investment) risks 
4 A void market disabling factors 3.300 .823 2.905 .768 2.500 .707 2.211 .419 2.729 .412 
of opportunism, uncertainty, 
entry barriers, etc. 
5 Superior means of exploiting 2.800 1.135 3.429 .746 2.628 .900 2.368 .895 2.806 .391 
a firm's assets abroad and 
foreign market opportunities, 
with minimum resources and 
risks 
3 Flexibility to adjust to 2.700 1.059 3.048 1.071 2.628 .757 2.316 .478 2.673 .260 
changes in both the host 
economy and the international 
market 
Pre-emptive manoeuvres to gain 2.500 1.080 2.143 .573 2.000 .724 1.842 .501 2.121 .243 
access to promising markets 
and technologies 
6 A less-developed country 3.600 1.350 3.571 .746 3.476 .862 3.842 .375 3.622 .135 
phenomenon 
VALID CASES 10 21 43 19 93 
* Refers to Cross Sectional ranking 
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A variety of factors, which constitute both costs and benefits, serve to catalyse the use 
of new forms. A cross-sectional assessment of the factors (Table 10.8.1) indicates that 
the use of new forms as pre-emptive manoeuvres to gain access to promising markets and 
technologies is perceived as significantly more important than any other factor (with an 
overall mean score 2.121). While Foreign banks, U.K. companies, and Foreign 
companies perceive the use of new forms to diversify risks as next important benefit, 
U.K. banks view it as slightly more important than as pre-emptive manoeuvres (mean 
score 2.400 versus 2.5). Again, there is an overall agreement that the use of new forms 
is not restricted to LDCs. 
An intrafirm analysis of the scores of the benefits gives the impression of differential 
managerial sensitivity towards each factor. Before testing the significance of the 
individual factors, it is helpful to examine whether there is a difference in the scores of 
the populations from which the samples were drawn. If for assessment purposes, it is 
hypothesized that there is no difference is managerial perceptions of the benefits of new 
forms, then it is possible to test this claim between independent sample groups, Le. UK 
companies versus Foreign companies, and UK banks versus Foreign banks. If each pair 
of population distributions have the same form, the observed difference implies that the 
scores are higher or lower in one sample group than in another. The Mann-Whitney U 
test is chosen for this assessment because of its sensitivity to both the central tendency 
of the scores and the distribution of scores (Hinkle, Wiersma and Jurs, 1979, p. 355). 
Tables 10.8.2 and 10.8.3 present the results of the Mann-Whitney U test for companies 
and banks, respectively. The result of the tests in both the sample companies and banks 
lead to an acceptance of the null hypothesis of no difference in perception between UK 
and Foreign companies. The only exception is the diversification use of new forms among 
UK and Foreign companies (Table 10.8.2). This was significant at 5% level, implying 
that managers do differ their perception of the risk diversification benefit of new forms. 
This difference is even apparent from Table 10.8.1. Whereas there appeared to be virtual 
unanimity among sample foreign companies in the diversification use of new forms (zero 
standard deviation), opinion differs somewhat among UK companies in the survey 
(standard deviation 0.581). 
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Obviously, the mean perception scores are not likely to be precisely equal, but may differ 
because of sampling error. The results of the Mann-Whitney U tests tend to buttress an 
organizational behaviour study which found that executives in large US corporations 
significantly share common cultural similarities with their counterparts in Western Europe 
(O'Toole, 1979). The fact that the four sample groups share a common perception of the 
benefits of new forms does not imply that the latter are normally chosen on these bases. 
Table 10.8.2 Mann-Whitney U-Test of the Significance of Differences in Managerial 
Perceptions of Net Benefits of New Forms: UK Vs Foreign 
Companies. 
Diversify both country and investment risks 
Avoid market disabling factors of opportunism, 
uncertainty, entry barriers, etc. 
Means of exploiting a firm's assets abroad 
and foreign market opportunities with 
minimum resources and risks. 
Flexibility to adjust to changes in both 
the host economy and the international 
market 
Pre-emptive manoeuvres to gain access to 
promising markets and technologies 
Best suited for less-developed countries 
* Significant at 5 % level 
Mean Value By 
Type of Firm Mann-
UK Foreign Number Whitney 
n = 47 n = 19 of firms Z-Statistic 
2.256 2.000 62 -1.9651 
2.500 2.210 61 -1.5922 
2.630 2.370 62 - .8947 
2.630 2.320 62 -1.5588 
2.000 1.820 62 - .6748 
3.480 3.840 61 -1.4647 
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Signif. 
.0494* 
.1113 
.3709 
.1192 
.4998 
.1430 
Table 10.8.3 Mann Whitney U-Test of the Significance of Differences in Managerial 
Perceptions of Net Benefits of Non-Branch Banking: UK Vs Foreign 
Banks 
Mean Rank By 
Type of Firm Mann-
UK Foreign Number Whitney 
n = 10 n = 21 of firms Z-Statistic Signif. 
Diversify both country and investment risks 2.40 2.81 31 -1.3708 .1704 
Avoid market disabling factors of opportunism, 3.30 2.91 31 -1.3028 .1927 
uncertainty, entry barriers, etc. 
Means of exploiting a firm's assets abroad 2.80 3.43 31 -1.4588 .1446 
and foreign market opportunities with 
minimum resources and risks. 
Flexibility to adjust to changes in both 2.70 3.05 31 - .8222 .4110 
the host economy and the international 
market 
Pre-emptive manoeuvres to gain access to 2.50 3.57 31 -1.1157 .2645 
promising markets and technologies 
LDC phenomenon ( i.e. best suited for LDC projects) 3.60 3.57 31 - .4311 .6664 
In order to test that the choice of new forms is related to managerial perception of net 
benefits, the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of the variance test was applied. In this 
test, the theoretical frame of reference (Le. the null hypothesis) is that the choice of new 
forms is not related to perceived benefits. Put differently, the theoretical null hypothesis 
is that firm choice of new forms of investment is not dependent upon managerial 
perception of their net benefits. 
Table 10.8.4 presents the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test. The analysis is significant (at 
the specified percentage levels) on all the benefit factors but one, namely their use as pre-
emptive manoeuvres to gain access to promising markets and technologies. Thus, on the 
basis of these data, the perceived entry mode benefits will, ceteris paribus, induce firms 
to choose new forms in their internationalization process. In essence, firms will use the 
new forms: 
1. To diversify country and/or investment risks; 
2. To avoid market disabling factors of human and environmental kinds e.g. 
opportunism, uncertainty, entry/exit barriers, etc., 
3. As superior means of exploiting a firm's assets abroad and foreign market 
opportunities, with minimum resources and risks; 
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4. As a flexible means of adjusting to changes in the host country; and 
5. To enter less-developed country markets that pose a combination of high 
political/economic risks and profitable market opportunities, or for marketing and 
service operations (e.g. professional service firms such as Accountants, Investment 
brokers, architects, etc). 
Overall, if firms assessed the benefits of entry mode alternatives before starting foreign 
operations, the likelihood of costly failure and disappointments could be reduced. 
10.9 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS 
Over a decade ago, Professors Yoram Wind and Howard Perlmutter (1977) noted that 
choosing the most appropriate entry and development strategy was a frontier issue for the 
international firm. A year later, Professor Richard Robinson observed that few firms 
actually made a conscious, deliberate cost/benefit analysis of the entry mode options. Up 
till today, entry mode choice remains one of the critical, but also one of the most difficult 
decisions in the internationalization process. Apparently, firms (mostly American MNEs) 
were and still are inflexible about the preeminent role of 'wholesale' ownership and 
control of foreign operations. Furthermore, assigning transactions between firms and 
markets in discriminating ways has only been recently acknowledged as the central task 
of corporate management. 
The purpose of this study was to examine these issues by integrating entrepreneurship and 
the dynamics of foreign investment (the eclectic paradigm) under a transaction cost 
analytical framework. This required that the role of corporate management be made 
central to the analysis of foreign investment decisions. This in turn requires that 
management be aware of, and incorporate into entry mode equations, the circumstances 
limiting or favouring intrafirm (as well as interfirm) transactions (i.e. ownership-specific 
and internalization advantages), host country characteristics, and the net benefits of using 
alternative governance structures in any given foreign investment operation. 
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Table 10.8.4 Kruskal-Wallis One-Way Analysis of Variance Test of Significance of Differences in the Relationship of Perceived Net 
Benefits and Choice of New Forms. 
UK Banks Foreign UK Foreign Kruskal Chi-Square 
Banks Companies Companies Wallis Probability 
Factor n = 10 n = 21 n = 47 n = 19 @ @ 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Diversify risks 2.400 1.265 2.810 0.814 2.256 0.581 2.000 0.000 0.0016 0.0001* 
A void market disabling 3.300 0.823 2.905 0.768 2.500 0.707 2.211 0.419 0.0008 0.0102*** 
factors of opportunism, 
etc. 
Superior means of 2.800 1.135 3.429 0.746 2.628 0.900 2.368 0.895 0.0027 0.0306*** 
exploiting a firm's 
assets abroad and 
foreign market 
opportunities, with 
minimum resources 
and risks. 
Flexibility to adjust 2.700 1.059 3.048 1.071 2.628 0.757 2.316 0.478 0.0972 0.0750**** 
changes in markets 
Pre-emptive manoeuvres 2.500 1.080 2.143 0.573 2.000 0.724 1.842 0.501 0.1734 0.1220 
to gain access to 
promising markets and 
technologies 
An LDC phenomenon 3.600 1.350 3.571 0.746 3.476 0.862 3.842 0.375 0.5254 0.0016** 
@ Corrected for Ties 
* Significant at 0.01 per cent level 
** Significant at 0.1 per cent level 
*** Significant at < 5 per cent level 
**** Significant at < 10 per cent level 
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Hypotheses concerning the transaction cost nature of these issues, the impact of 
managerial perceptions of their strategic importance to entry mode choices, and the 
relationship between the stage of country development and corporate choice of entry 
modes were tested using data gathered from a questionnaire survey of corporate 
executives from 47 UK MNCs, 19 Foreign MNCs (drawn from 6 developed countries), 
10 UK multinational banks (MNBs) and 21 Foreign MNBs (drawn from 15 countries, 
including 3 LDCs). This was supported by interviews with executives of 12 UK MNCs, 
5 Foreign MNCs, 4 UK MNBs and 5 Foreign MNBs. 
A review of FDI studies and single component studies of new forms of foreign investment 
(e.g. licensing, franchising, joint ventures, etc) reveals unremitting references to a 
number of factors as explanatory variables of foreign investment. Table 10.9.1 presents 
these variables. These have never before been all brought to bear in a single empirical 
study. The variables accord with Dunning's eclectic framework, as indicated in the Table. 
The specified significance levels indicate the explanatory power of the variables, in 
statistical terms. From the discussion of the significance levels in several statistics books, 
it can be inferred that there is no rigid or hard-and-fast approach to the setting of 
significance levels. It is for heuristic reasons instead that significance levels are 
emphasized; such an exposition seems the best method of clarifying the role which the 
information contained in the sampling distribution plays in the decision-making procedure 
(Siegel, 1954, p. 8; see also, Norusis, 1986, p. 226). 
Table 10.9.2 presents the relationship of these variables in explaining new forms of 
investment. Altogether 10 of the 17 variables are found to be significant explanatory 
variables of foreign investment. The findings suggest that these factors play important 
roles, albeit in varying degrees, in foreign investment decisions. They derive from firms' 
ownership-specific advantages, internalization-incentive advantages, and location-specific 
advantages (see Table 10.9.1). Ownership-specific advantages of the following kinds were 
found to be significant in explaining foreign investment. These are firm size (as measured 
by turnover, assets or employees), ability to customize products to host/regional market, 
and experience of foreign markets. The last two factors and firm size as measured by 
turnover were found statistically significant at 0.10 %, while size as measured by 
employees or assets (for banks) was significant at 1 %. Firm size denotes corporate 
326 
capability, that is, financial, managerial and technical capability. In this study, the impact 
of firm size is tested in two ways (using the three criteria). First, it was established by 
Chi-square tests that firm size and choice of new forms were related for the sample UK 
and Foreign companies. Second, each sample group was categorized into small, medium 
and large sizes, and were examined separately as to the reliance on selected NFl-adoption 
rationales. These have been described as "defensive reaction" or "second best" alternative 
reasons for adopting new forms of investment (Oman, 1984, 1986; Ozawa, 1984). The 
statistical evidence from the four sample groups is not clear-cut; different sample groups 
manifest different relationships with selected NFl-adoption rationales (Tables 10.3.2 -
10.3.5). None of the NFl-adoption rationales was consistently significant across the four 
sample groups. But a cross-sectional analysis of the impact of firm size on the choice of 
new forms (Table 10.9.2) shows that it is significantly related to choice of from, 
regardless of the size criterion employed in the analysis. 
However, the evidence from sample small and medium-size firms is not in accord with 
Franko's (1989) finding that "smaller companies hungry for market share often competed 
for governments' favours by offering minority ventures as a way of accomplishing their 
own objectives of entry into an international oligopolistic industry". There is certainly 
evidence of the willingness to share ownership and control by SMFs, particularly by 
foreign firms more than UK firms, but not of the kind seen under the "Wells effect." 
Perhaps, the apparent 'inertia' may have something to do with the traditional conservative 
attitude of the British. More importantly, however, is that on the average, large firms 
appeared to have a higher propensity to use new forms, which by implication means a 
greater willingness to share ownership and control, than SMFs. This may be due to the 
confidence they (the large firms) have in their ownership-specific advantages which allow 
for greater bargaining power and manoeuvrability - as one Japanese company executive 
called it, "switch-over power" - over the SMFs. The Japanese and European companies' 
executives interviewed underscored the importance of the flexible entry mode approaches 
to their corporate global existence. The marketing director of a large US MNE indicated 
that his group would be quite willing to collaborate with local partners once the market 
was there. For many large firms, the adoption of flexible entry mode enabled them to 
gain greater control subsequently because the inadequacy of the local partner would be 
so apparent that control would almost certainly default to the large foreign MNE partner. 
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Table 10.9.1 Some Determining Factors of Foreign Investment 
Nature of Explanatory Variable Significant Insignificant 
Advantage up to beyond 
5% level 10% level 
@ @ 
0 Size of Firm: 
Measured by Turnover (for companies) X 
Measured by Assets (for banks) X 
Measured by Employees (all) X 
I To achieve international diversification X 
L Host government's policylregulation on FDI X 
L High political risk in host country X 
I Willingness to share ownership and control X 
I Minimization of country and investment risks X 
L Political/economic climate in host country X 
L Psychic distance X 
I Pre-emptive manoeuvres X 
L Less-developed country phenomenon X 
Oil Products customized to host/regional market X 
I Economies of scope and scale X 
0 Experience of foreign markets X 
L Levels of economic development X 
L Size of host market X 
@ = Depends on sample size. Here, n = 97 
0 = Ownership-specific advantage 
I = Internalization-Incentive advantage 
L = Location-specific advantage 
It must be stressed that while firm size may be important in entry mode choices, it must 
be balanced against other firm-specific characteristics. For example, the desire to achieve 
international diversification, willingness to share ownership and control, desire to 
minimize risks, and extent to which pre-emptive measures are required are internalization-
incentive advantages. All these were found to be particular strategies of firms in overseas 
operations and were significant in choosing new forms among the sample firms. 
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Table 10.9.2 New Forms of Foreign Investment: Analysis of Explanatory Variables. 
Kruskal-Wallis Chi-Square 
Z-Value Probability X2-Value Probability 
Size of Firm (as measured 4.3764 .2236 22.1695 .0064** 
by Turnover) 
Size of Firm (as measured 3.1811 .3645 19.6316 .0203*** 
by no. of employees) 
Size of Bank (as measured 6.2888 .0984 20.2100 .0632*** 
by Assets) 
Achieve international 1.7860 .1814 17.5517 .0142*** 
diversification 
Host government's policy/ 24.2596 .0000 35.1000 .0000* 
regulation on FDI 
High political risk in host 28.6151 .0000 45.0393 .0000* 
country 
Willingness to share control 10.5220 .0146 30.7300 .0022** 
Minimization of country risks 5.5835 .1337 15.6600 .0741 *** 
Political/Economic climate in .9091 .3404 6.7400 .0806*** 
host country 
Psychic distance 2.3484 .1254 4.6700 .3226 
Pre-emptive manoeuvres 5.4360 .1425 19.6000 .0750*** 
An LDC phenomenon 1.6568 .6466 31.5900 .3459 
Products customized to host/ 2.6460 .1038 7.8516 .0016** 
regional market 
Economies of scope 1.8659 .6007 12.6490 .3950 
Experience in foreign markets 8.4383 .0378 23.2200 .0057** 
Level of economic development 1.3644 .2428 2.3000 .5122 
Size of host market 2.1660 .1411 4.3400 .2265 
* Significant at .01 percent 
** Significant at .10 percent 
*** Significant at 1 percent 
While firm-specific characteristics provide firms opportunities to evaluate their strengths 
and weaknesses in relation to a given overseas operation, host country-specific 
characteristics offer a complementary platform for assessing the optimum mode of entry 
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into a particular country. Because most location advantages accrue by reason of 
differences in location-specific endowments between countries, they are not firm-specific 
by themselves. Rather, it is the combined effects of these with ownership-specific 
advantages and internalization-incentive advantages that generate firm-specificity and 
differences among multinationals. Of the seven location-specific characteristics commonly 
found in foreign investment studies and tested in this study, only three were found to have 
significant explanatory impact on new forms of investment across the four sample groups 
(Table 10.9.2). These are: the host government policy/regulation on FDI, high political 
risk in host country, and political/economic climate in host country. The last two are 
closely related. Together with national policies towards inward foreign direct investment, 
they act as strong determinants for choosing new forms of investment. 
Host country-specific policies and environmental constraints on foreign investment vary 
considerably in form, intent and impact on firms. In general, host government's inward 
FDI policy and high political risk were found to be highly significant at .01 % while 
political/economic climate was significant at 1 %. These results are consistent with 
Davidson and McFetridge's (1985) hypothesis of greater reliance on external mechanisms 
in host countries with policies that restrict the use of internal transfer mechanisms. Of 
course, the greater foreign firms perceive the distortion propensities of host or potential 
host governments, the more likely resources, insofar as they will be transferred at all, 
will be transferred via contractual or cooperative rather than the internalized mode (see 
also, Dunning, 1988, p. 182). As Davidson and McFetridge observe, governments can 
oblige an inward investment transaction to be conducted in a manner that is inconsistent 
with preplanned entry mode. Such dramatic changes will doubtlessly involve costs on the 
part of the foreign firm. It will be interesting to know cost implications of such sudden 
policy changes. Do they lead to project abandonment? What structural costs and 
organizational changes are posed? These questions are a matter for further research. 
Although host government policies may be held largely responsible for triggering the shift 
towards increased use of new forms, it has been observed that firm strategies and 
behaviour are instrumental in allowing these policies to succeed in obtaining MNE assent 
to minority (as well as contractual and cooperative) positions, and conditioned the kinds 
of MNEs that accepted them (Franko, 1989). 
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Such other host country-specific factors as psychic distance, LDC phenomenon, level of 
economic development, and size of host market were not statistically significant across 
the sample groups. However, when the stage of development is emphasized as the 
independent variable, in which case the choice of form depends on the stage of national 
development (i.e. DC versus LDC), then the level of economic development is found to 
be significant. Either way, the size of host market was not found significant. This result 
is in accord with that of Davidson and McFetridge (1985). Although their emphasis was 
on internal transfer, the authors found no relationship between market size and 
sophistication of the host country and technology transfer via the internalized route. A 
plausible reason for the lack of relationship between level of economic development and 
entry mode choice, apart from methodological problem, may be the stage of development 
of countries in the sample. Contrary to Contractor (1981) and Dunning (1988, p. 185), 
as countries develop, the propensity of their governments to increasingly interfere with 
the market system will reduce. In other words, such countries will not frequently be seen 
to intervene in private transfer of resources; they will leave market forces to 'sort' these 
out and will only be concerned if the transactions have strategic or public policy 
implications (e.g. defence contracts, etc.). 
These findings suggest that the use of new forms is not a phenomenon of LDCs and that 
while country-specific characteristics and microeconomic factors are important in entry 
mode decisions, the actual choice of mode rests with corporate management. The 
literature has largely ignored this fact either because the critical role of strategic 
management is taken for granted in this regard or it is deemed inconsequential to the 
analysis of foreign investment. Yet, both in neoclassical economics and institutional 
economics, the central role of management is emphasized. These two dimensions have 
been instrumental antecedents of foreign investment research, but researchers, with the 
exception of Professors Buckley and Casson, have tended to downplay the role of 
entrepreneurship, if not outright suppressed (Teece, 1984). The correspondence between 
corporate management and foreign investment is emphasized all through the study. 
The impression gained from interviewing corporate executives suggests that it really does 
not matter what the microeconomic factors may be or what locational advantages exist, 
the decision-maker's influence is the ultimate decider of whether or not an overseas 
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operation will be carried out and, if so, what modality it should take. Lack of strength 
to prove or show very clear domination of one or two factors as determinants of new 
forms of investment suggests the following: (1) the interplay of a variety of factors in 
determining the choice of new forms or any transactional mode; (2) the factors are 
situationally specific, that is, the set of factors that determine the choice of mode in one 
investment period/country may change in the next period or country; and (3) the dynamic 
nature of the factors as well as changes in corporate behaviour over a period of time. 
Finally, it has been mooted that new forms of foreign investment may lose their 
popularity (see, for example, Franko, 1989). Franko's position is captured in the 
following exposition. "A move toward increased acceptance of minority ownership 
position by MNEs has thus occurred in a few of the LDCs that have insisted on it. Quite 
apart from whether the minority JV form is "new" form ... is it good, bad or indifferent 
from a host country's point of view?" The overemphasis on the notion that new forms are 
designed for LDCs has blurred research judgement that although host government policies 
may oblige firms to use non-FDI modes, firm strategies/objectives and behaviour are 
actually instrumental to the success of such policies. Firms need to approach foreign 
markets from diverse routes and need to maintain a flexible operational mode while 
seeking to secure optimum economic rents. 
In consideration of the foregoing, respondents were asked what they thought the future 
of the new forms of investment would be. Possible replies were: Will be Popular, Will 
be UnpopUlar, and Neutral/Don't know. Of the possible 97 respondents, 93 (almost 96 %) 
replied to the question. Of the respondents, 70% of UK banks, 31.6% of Foreign banks, 
57.8% of UK companies and 89.5 % of Foreign companies felt that the use of new forms 
will become popular in future. The composition of respondents who thought that its use 
in the future will diminish is as follows: 10% of UK banks, 26.3% of Foreign banks, 
24.4% UK companies and 10.5% of Foreign companies. The remainder in each case 
represents those who were unsure or preferred to be neutral (Table 13.9.3). 
A test of the difference between "popular" and "unpopular" respondents among the 
sample groups was performed using the Chi-square test. The null hypothesis is that there 
is no difference between "popular" and "unpopular" respondents regarding the future of 
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new forms. In other words, in the population, the choice of new forms is independent of 
differences in managerial perception of their future popularity or unpopularity. Applying 
the notations of Table 10.9.3 as advised by Siegel (1956, p. 178) and Hinkle, Wiersma 
and Jurs (1979, p. 348), the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected at the 5% level. 
Table 10.9.3 Questionnaire Responses by Managers, Concerning the Future Use of 
New Forms of Investment (Possible Replies: Will be Popular; Will be 
Unpopular; Neutral/Don't Know). 
Popular Unpopular NeutrallDK Valid Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % No % 
UK Banks (n = 10) 7 70.0 1 10.0 2 20.0 10 10.8 
Foreign Banks (n = 21) 6 31.6 5 26.3 8 42.1 19 20.4 
UK Companies (n = 47) 26 57.8 11 24.4 8 17.8 45 48.4 
Foreign Companies (n = 19) 17 89.5 
..1 10.5 ...Q ...Q 19 20.4 
Total 56 60.2 19 20.4 18 19.4 93 100.0 
% respondents 95.9% 
Chi-Sguare D.F. Significance MinE.F. Cells with S.F. < 5 
(a) 6.704 2 .05 5.6 None 
(b) 13.801 3 .01 4.0 1 
(a) x2-Value: when banks combined versus companies combined, in a 3 x 2 table 
(b) x2-Value: when Neutral frequencies are combined with Popular versus unpopular, in a 2 x 2 contingency 
table 
In effect, the data support the contention that the propensity to use new forms in the 
future may depend on the "brightness" or "bleakness" of their future. If they are 
perceived to have a bright future (Le. to be of popular use), the more likely that firms 
will tend to use them more frequently. On the other hand, if firms perceive their future 
to be bleak (Le. unpopular), the tendency to use them will diminish. 
As has been observed above, such managerial perceptions will generally be informed by 
a combined assessment of firm-specific characteristics and receiving country-specific 
characteristics. There is little doubt that the new forms of investment have corne to be 
accepted as complementary to and, in some cases as, substitutes for foreign direct 
investment. The objective of the study was not to investigate the FDI obsolescence claim 
because the focus of the research was not on developing countries. However, while the 
study has provided some evidence that the use of new forms is not an LDC phenomenon, 
anecdotal evidence points to a renewed interest in the use of FDI in LDCs. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
11.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This study tests a model of foreign private investment that identifies a mix of minority 
equity positions, contractual and cooperative arrangements, known as "new forms of 
international investments." It brings together several strands of past research on various 
aspects of new forms and tests empirically several claims that have been made in the 
literature about their operational utility. One of such claims is that the use of new forms 
is a particular phenomenon of LDCs. The other is that they are largely suited for small 
and medium-size firms deemed to lack monopolistic advantages required to countervail 
international (including indigenous) competition and 'size power' to establish the 'first 
best' alternative (i.e. wholly owned subsidiary). This study also integrates the economic 
theory of entrepreneurship with the eclectic paradigm under a transaction cost framework. 
The centrality of corporate management in the internationalization process is expressed 
through an examination of the significance of managerial perceptions of ownership-
specific, internalization-incentive and country-specific factors in entry mode choices. 
This approach is novel in the entry mode literature, and so also is the application of the 
notion of new forms to the banking enterprise. 
The examination of these issues follows a progressive order of the theoretical and 
empirical evidence on the phenomena of interest. In the literature review section of the 
study (Part 1), received microtheories of foreign investment were reviewed with a view 
to assessing their applicability to explaining new forms. Theories of new forms of 
investment can be viewed as extensions of FDI theories: they may be derived from 
relaxing some of the restrictive assumptions of orthodox theories. The three-part 
overview surveys the theoretical literature relevant to the modern understanding of the 
determinants of international investment. 
In doing so, it emphasizes theories of the MNE based on (1) the market imperfections 
paradigm, the product life cycle hypothesis, the oligopolistic reaction hypothesis 
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incorporating the behavioural motives notion, and the currency area phenomenon; (2) the 
international diversification hypothesis, the appropriability theory, the internalization 
theorem, and the eclectic paradigm; and (3) an analysis of the Japanese model of foreign 
investment, found to be both conceptually and operationally different from western style. 
The review of the literature gives rise to generalizations of the following kinds. First, 
the theories are based on one mode of multinationalization, FDI, involving the 
establishment of wholly or majority-owned foreign subsidiary (or foreign bank branch, 
in the case of banking enterprise). Apparently, modes of foreign investment other than 
the hierarchical mode sat awkwardly within the neo-classical framework of transaction 
cost economy based on internal organisation. Second, among the received candidates -
and there are many of them - for general theory of foreign investment and of the 
multinational enterprise, Dunning's eclectic theory is found to possess more explanatory 
powers than the other contending theories. However, this approach is still deficient in 
some respects. First, in its original formulation, it did not envisage changing 
international investment strategies and, as such, lacked the power to explain non-FDI 
modes of investment. Second, how the three elements are configured over time is unclear 
and leaves a classification system that lacks dynamic content. Third, the relationship 
between ownership-specific advantages and internalization appears logically redundant. 
Finally, the relationship between the three factors and foreign investment decisions is 
completely ignored. 
Rugman's claim that internalization represents a general theory of foreign investment and 
of the MNE suffers from inattention to generalities. That the raison d'etre for firm 
existence is to internationalize transactions is questionable. If every economic transaction 
is exectued via hierarchy, then, not only will the size preserving tendency of the firm be 
violated but also its efficiency properties will, on the margin, decline. Additionally, the 
role of country-specific characteristics is suppressed under the internalization theory. 
The Japanese model, on the other hand, is found to reflect the attributes of new forms 
of investment. A review of the trading companies' overseas investment activities reveals 
several features which are distinct from those shown by traditional "old" form of foreign 
direct investment. These include: (1) a high incident of minority ownership; (2) a high 
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propensity to form joint ventures with indigenous firms; (3) a significant involvement in 
turnkey projects, equipment leasing, and active promotion of technology transfer of 
labour-intensive, standardised products; (4) an active use of direct overseas loans; (5) the 
propensity to invest in their own commercial activities; and (6) the prevalance of group-
controlled investment. 
The study of alernative strategies to foreign investment appropriately starts with a 
taxonomic identification of their forms. Chapters 5, 6, and 7, constitute part two of the 
study. The object of the part is simply to provide a synthesis of the identity of the 
alternative strategies, in terms of their dimensions, characteristics and strategic 
importance as foreign market entry modes. 
Chapter 5 discusses the dynamic structure of entry mode determinants and the influence 
of corporate development strategies. It is noted here that the dynamics of the 
international environment force changes both in the direction and method by which 
economic activities are organized. Descriptions of foreign investment strategies assume 
a wide spectrum of entry patterns, ranging from export modes through variants of 
contractual and cooperative modes to wholly-owned subsidiaries. Exporting, the first part 
of the review, has been a historical means of opening up new markets. It offers 
opportunities for circumventing domestic market constraints and is a strategic means of 
increasing global turnover and profit. Exporting is often generalised as the least risky 
means of internationalization or the 'toe-in-the-water' in international business. Contrary 
to popular belief, exporting is not a simplistic form of foreign involvement; it is a 
specialised field which demands firm commitment, in terms of both resources and efforts. 
Licensing and franchising are also reviewed as international market development and 
investment strategies. Although licensing and franchising are closely linked, they present 
relatively different organizational features. International licensing offers licensors the 
opportunity to exploit their know-how in foreign markets by granting rights to local 
licensees. The rights are generally associated with the manufacture and marketing of the 
licensor's product in the licensee's home or regional market. A licensing exchange can 
be outward, inward or reciprocal. International licensing decisions are complex: 
theoretical explanations of its motivations integrate contributions from economics, stages 
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of development hypothesis and business strategy approach. These frameworks suggest 
circumstances under which licensing will be a transactionally superior mode of 
international market development to FDI. The strategic context of international license 
is seen as one in which markets and hierarchies combine with eclectic insights to explain 
the corporate motives for adopting this mode. 
Franchising is a distinct type of license agreement. A franchise agreement provides a 
wider package of services than licensing. In general, the package incorporates the use 
of trademark and know-how, input and component supplies, support service, and a 
continuing direct relationship between franchisor and franchisee. Two types of franchise 
are distinguishable: the product and trade name franchise, and business format or full 
business sytem franchising. The latter type is more comprehensive and is the model that 
is populary used in an international context. The internationalization process of 
franchising follows many paths: some direct and some indirect. The adoption of any 
route is shown to depend on the interaction of three kinds of influence: change agents, 
pre-establishment stimuli and firm-specific characteristics. Also, managerial expansion 
ethos are shown to be important along with other decision-maker driven factors in 
determining international entry. 
Five types of contractual arrangements commonly used in combination are found to 
manifest different characteristics. These are management contracts, turnkey contracts, 
international subcontracting, production-sharing contracts and risk-service contracts. 
Management contracts bring about the expertise of the foreign firm in general or 
specialised functional areas. This expertise confers operational control on the foreign 
contractor in the performance of the contract or crucial phases of it. The use of 
management contracts in servicing foreign markets connotes a willingness of MNEs to 
assume managerial role rather than equity interest. This transactional posture allows the 
MNE to establish in markets that are increasingly inhospitable to FDI or those 
traditionally closed to foreign investors. The motives for management contracts vary, 
including offensive or initiative strategy, capital constraint, risk reduction, market 
penetration and investment protection. As well as for profitability reasons, management 
contracts could be the only mode of involvement acceptable to some host governments. 
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Turnkey contracts involve a significant deployment of the firm's resources. Under the 
arrangement, the MNE has responsibility for setting up a complete production facility for 
eventual transfer to the host country owner. Turnkey projects represent idiosyncratic 
investments, involving expenditure of transaction-specific kinds in human and physical 
capital. Variants of turnkey contracts include product-in-hand contracts or sub-assembly 
contracts and market-in-hand contracts. Under these modified arrangements, the MNE's 
responsibility extends beyond ordinary turnkey to include training of local personnel who 
will take over the operation of the plant after the 'key has been turned.' In the latter 
version, the MNE additionally takes responsibility under the contract for the sale of the 
project's output. A feature common to all forms of turnkey arrangements is their size, 
in terms of both scale or complexity of operations and the amount of resources. 
International subcontracting, also known as contract manufacturing, relates to the 
production of components or the assembly of finished products. Such contracts are 
primarily used for projects domiciled in developing and eastern bloc countries. The 
growth of international sub-contracting is closely related to the tariff regulations in 
developed countries and proliferation of free trade or export processing zones in 
developing countries. This mode of international entry can be viewed as arising from 
economic-dominant process in which the MNE's motivation is predicated upon the need 
to economise on production and transaction costs as well as on the desire to sustain a 
flexible production system. International subcontracting may also be induced by host 
government's distortion propensities and/or firm concern over risk considerations. 
Production-sharing contracts are primarily found in oil and extractive industries. Such 
projects entail huge resource commitment and involve the host government or a state-
owned company as a joint partner. Specific features of the agreement include pre-
determined production percentage share, pre-determined share of the physical output, and 
length of time required to recoup pre-production costs and to hand over contract rights 
to the state company. Production-sharing contracts provide a host country opportunities 
for attracting foreign investment without losing ownership and control of its resources. 
The size and complexity of such projects coupled with their longevity contributes 
significantly to multiplicity of benefits flow which, in conjunction with the host 
government's partnership, potentially reduces both investment and country risks. 
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Risk-service contracts are similar to production-sharing contracts. Both are used 
primarily in the petroleum and extractive industries. The crucial investment distinction 
between the two is that under risk-service contracts, the MNE' s share of output is paid 
in cash rather than in physical output, although the agreement may permit an exchange 
for equivalent amount of output determined at international market prices. Another 
important feature of risk-service contracts is that the burden of risk rests solely on the 
MNE, who also provides the investment capital for exploration and production. The 
compensation package comprises capital reimbursement, interest on the capital and a pre-
determined percentage of risk fee out of production revenues. 
The chapter concludes by summarising the role of joint ventures (JVs) in the strategy of 
international investment. JVs can be perceived as being next to wholly owned 
subsidiaries in the ladder of foreign investment, in terms of ownership and control. JVs 
have distinct characteristics and present a distinct set of advantages as an alternative mode 
of international investment from those considered in previous chapters. Yet, however, 
their operational dynamics frequently involve contractual modes such as management 
contracts or licensing. JVs may be equity based or non-equity based. The factors 
underlining the growth of IJVs range from cost and risk considerations through 
international competition to host government impositions. JVs offer opportunities for 
macroeconomic development, including new technologies, personnel training and transfer 
of tradesecrets and know-how, and access to international markets. Above all, they 
provide firms and host countries with resources for which there may be no equally 
efficient and available substitutes, especially for high risk and capital intensive projects. 
Finally the configuration of a JV model requires an assessment of the external 
environment as well as an examination of firm-specific characteristics. The model should 
incorporate features which anticipate circumstances under which the JV reconfiguration 
may be necessary. It should also provide for adaptations to monitor performance and 
stability as well as contingency mechanisms for equitable disposition of the JV in the 
event of a dissolution. 
Chapter 7 concludes this part of the study with a review of the strategic forms of 
international banking. This study is about alternative strategies of international 
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investment. International banking is within its scope and is shown historically to be a 
logical extension of international business. International banking is not amenable to any 
precise definition. However, foreign branch banking is shown to be the FDI counterpart 
of foreign subsidiary of MNBs. From a technical viewpoint, banks have a wide range 
of organizational forms of servicing foreign markets. Within the purview of 'new forms 
of international banking', three categories of organizational modes are distinguished: 
cooperative arrangements, joint venture or consortium banking, and merchant banking 
and associated services. 
Part three is the empirical and concluding part of the study. It is made up of four 
chapters (chapters 8 to 11). Chapter 8 discusses the research design and research 
hypotheses. It also presents a statement of the purpose of the research, discusses the need 
for the research and develops the study hypotheses. 
The hypotheses of study are developed around eight propositions: 
(1) managerial assessment of firm-specific characteristics and use of new 
forms of international investment (NFl). 
(2) Firm global strategy dimension. 
(3) Relationship between firm size and use of NFL 
(4) The impact of foreign investment policy shifts. 
(5) Significance of host country-specific characteristics. 
(6) The impact of competitors' entry mode behaviour. 
(7) Relationship of stage of country development to use of NFl, and, in 
particular, the dependency between LDCs and NFL 
(8) The significance of perceived net benefits of NFl to entry mode choice. 
Chapter 9 is concerned with the research methodology and statistical procedures. The 
chapter discusses the approaches adopted for field research and presents the preliminary 
analyses of the research findings. This is the descriptive phase and is divided into eleven 
sections, covering the questionnaire administration and data reliability, description of 
statistical techniques, characteristics of firms (companies and banks) in the survey and 
preliminary findings based on the fieldwork. The initial results of the study relate, inter 
alia, to details of international entry modes, including initial U.K. entry modes by foreign 
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companies and establishment modes of international banking, significance of specific 
clauses in contractual arrangements (for MNEs); motivations for new forms of 
investment, and organizational influences on entry mode choices. 
Chapter 10 presents the second, and main, part of the research findings. Essentially, the 
chapter is analytical and is concerned with an in-depth statistical analyses of the research 
findings. The analyses are based seriatim on the eight study hypotheses, postulated in 
chapter 8. For each hypothesis test, a comparison of the results is made against relevant 
previous or tangential research findings. 
Hypotheses concerning the transaction cost nature of the eight issues, the impact of 
managerial perceptions oftheir stratetic importance to alternative entry mode choices, and 
the relationship between the stage of country development and corporate use of new forms 
are tested using data gathered from a questionnaire survey of corporate executives from 
47 U.K. MNCs, 19 Foreign MNCs (drawn from six developed countries), 10 U.K. 
MNBs and 21 Foreign MNBs (drawn from 12 developed and 3 developing countries). 
Altogether the sample consists of 97 firms. The questionnaire survey is supported by 
interviews with 26 corporate executives drawn from 12 U.K. MNCs, 5 Foreign MNCs, 
5 U.K. MNBs and 5 Foreign MNBs. Due to insufficient country coverage, firms drawn 
from outside the UK are aggregated as 'Foreign Companies' and 'Foreign Banks' for 
statistical analyses. In the analyses the role of corporate management is made central to 
foreign investment decisions. A review of FDI studies and single component studies of 
new forms of international investment (e.g. licensing, franchising, joint ventures, etc.) 
reveals a frequent reference to a number of explanatory variables. These variables are 
derived from Dunning's eclectic paradigm. 
Different statistical techniques are applied in testing the hypotheses. The principal 
findings are summarized hereunder. 
1. As a general rule, the central role of management in entry mode decisions, and, 
in particular, in firm assent to minority positions or contractual/cooperative forms 
is observable among MNEs and MNBs (see 10.1). 
2. The study provides evidence on the relationship between corporate strategy and 
acceptance of new forms of investment (see 10.2). Firms become global for 
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many reaons, and need an approach appropriate to meet new or potential 
challenges in the international marketplace. Diversification motive hypothesis 
implies that firms go international in pursuit of global expansion. The 
oligopolistic reaction hypothesis suggests that firms become global as part of an 
oligopolistic "catch-up" or "geographical-matching" strategy. In short, strategy 
in international business is influenced by many considerations. Both the 
environment of operation and government-induced changes influence the strategic 
options open to the MNEs. Since not all MNEs can respond efficiently to these 
environmental parameters, this study provides strong evidence that those that seek 
to maintain competitive edge over rival or host country firms tend to use variants 
of new forms as part of market-matching or oligopolistic reaction strategy. 
3. There appears to be no systematic relationship between firm size and the use of 
non-FDI modes among the sample firms. While there is some evidence, based on 
respondents' views, about the influence of firm size on the choice of new forms, 
there appears to be little evidence for the proposition that firms accepting minority 
or non-FDI positions are predominantly small and medium-size (see 10.3). The 
widely-held view is that smaller companies hungry for market share often 
competed for governments' favours by displaying a high propensity for new forms 
as a way of accomplishing their own objectives of entry into an international 
oligopolistic industry (Franko, 1989; see also, Oman 1984a, 1986). However, 
the cross-sectional evidence from the four sample groups contradicts the above 
proposition and is in accord with the findings of Franko who observed that 
"know-how diffusion and the breakdown of other barriers to entry ... obliged 
even industry "majors" to accept minority forms in the face of host country 
demands. " 
The lack of general, systematic relationship between firm size and use of new 
forms may be attributed to two reasons. One is the way of constructing the size 
variable and the other is the post-classification smallness of the sample size, 
particularly the sample banks. The first reason is not peculiar to this study; most 
researchers have attributed the inconsistent evidence of firm size to the way in 
which the size variable is constructed (see for example, Dunning, 1988, ch.6; 
Terpstra and Yu, 1988). For this study, methodological problems of the kinds 
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experienced by these authors only arise from the " NFl-adoption rationales" rather 
than one of a statisical kind. On the other hand, the impact of firm size as 
perceived by the respondents themselves may likely be less subjective and hence 
less likely to bias downward the impact of firm size for the large firms in the 
sample than the above studies. This is the stance adopted in this study. 
The second reason for the unsystematic result of the impact of firm size relates 
to the size of the firms after reclassifying them according to respondent managers' 
perceptions. Especially in the case of U.K. banks, this approach yielded 2 small-
sized banks, 3 medium-sized banks and 5 large banks. With such small samples, 
the quality of "unbiasedness" cannot be protected by the statistics so produced. 
4. Changes in firm foreign investment strategy are geared towards responding to 
changes in the environment of operations. Such firm policy shifts are necessary 
to take advantage of emerging opportunities in the market place, such as the need 
to accept a reduced equity position or accept cooperative/contractual arrangements 
in return for a preferential access to a protected market. Firms contemplating 
entry into Japan or other protected markets tend to alter their foreign investment 
policies to suit host government inward investment requirements. 
"Strategic postures" as used in this study classify firms not by size or by 
"specialty niche/segment domination" as employed by Franko (1989), but 
according to the recurrence of shifts in corporate investment behaviour (see 10.4). 
Firms classified as pursuing a "dynamic strategic posture" were those that 
frequently altered their foreign investment posture in the last five years in relation 
to their geographic concentration. The converse represents "static strategic 
posture." Unlike Franko's classifications which were made subjectively by him, 
the classifications in this study are made by corporate managers of the responding 
firms on the basis of industry characterizations. Firms with highly diversified 
product lines and/or those with diversified geographic operations tend to adopt 
"flexible" or "dynamic strategic postures". These firms may favour using new 
forms either as a means of obtaining incremental returns from products which are 
gradually phased out of the corporate product portfolio (ibid.) or as a means of 
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adjusting to "geographical-matching requirement of high-performing but protected 
markets. A number of researchers have described the process by which 
oligopolistic, risk-profile matching behaviour in a sector, would propel 'follower 
companies' to adopt flexible ownership policies in attempts to match 'leader 
companies' geographical scope (Knickerbocker, 1973; Vernon, 1974; Vernon and 
Wells, 1976). The reason is that the follower companies, generally seen as small 
or medium size firms (SMFs) are presumed to lack the technological, financial 
and managerial capabilities required to fully compete with rival industry leaders 
as well as with LDC risks and challenges, via wholly or majority-owned 
subsidiaries. 
5. While firm-specific characteristics provide firms opportunities to evaluate their 
strengths and weaknesses in relation to a given overseas operation, host country-
specific characteristics offer a complementary platform for assessing the optimum 
mode of entry into a particular country. Host country-specific policies and 
environmental constraints on foreign investment vary considerably in form, intent 
and impact on firms. In general, host governments' inward FDI policies, high 
political risk and political/economic climate bear significant relationship with the 
use of non-FDI modes (see 10.5) . The findings here are consistent with Davidson 
and McFetridge's(1985) hypothesis of firm reliance on new forms (defined 
generally in their study as market mechanisms) in host countries with policies that 
restrict the use of internal transfer mechanisms. 
Managerial perceptions of the nature and importance of host country 
characteristics and their impact on the diversification strategy of the firm are 
significant in entry mode choices. Thus, the greater foreign firms perceive the 
distortion propensities of potential host countries, the more likely resources, 
insofar as they would be transfered at all, will be transfered via new forms rather 
than via hierarchy. The evidence of this study appears to show little or no 
support for the impact of the following host country-specific factors on the use 
of new forms (see 10.5): psychic distance, LDC phenomenon, level of economic 
development, and size of host market. But, when the stage of country 
development is emphasized as a dichotomous independent variable (Le. DC versus 
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LDC), then the level of economic development is found to be significant in the 
use of new forms (see 10.7). Either way however, the size of host country's 
market does not appear to be significant. Thus, in support of the findings of 
earlier studies of Davidson and McFetridge (1985), Terpstra and Yu (1988), and 
contradictory to the findings of Contractor (1981) and Dunning (1988, ch.6), 
there appears to be little or no relationship between market size and sophistication 
of the host country, on the one hand, and mode of entry into the market, on the 
other. Psychic distance is used to capture such features as cultural, social or 
geographic proximity. On the evidence of this study, it can be hypothesised that 
psychic distance has no significant impact on entry mode choice. Terpstra and Yu 
(supra) reached a similar conclusion in their study, although an earlier study by 
Davidson and McFetridge (supra) found support for the impact of psychic 
distance (i.e. geographic proximity) and the probability of internal transfer. 
6. One interpretation of the defensive reaction hypothesis or oligopolistic reaction 
hypothesis is that the move by multinational firms towards greater use of new 
forms of investment is an essentially defensive reaction, as these firms seek to 
match competitor behaviour, or as part of an oligopolistic "catch-up" or market-
matching strategy. In particular, the "Wells effect" presumes a higher propensity 
of smaller, lower market-share firms within an industry to utilize the non-FDI 
modes than do industry leaders (i.e. large multinationals). These hypotheses are 
not supported by the findings here (see 10.6). A simple way of determining 
whether rival firms' entry mode behaviour influences corporate assent to minority 
or non-FDI position is to pose the question directly to business executives in the 
"corridors of power." A large proportion of the executives indicated that 
competitors' entry mode behaviour had no influence on their use of new forms 
as opposed to those who answered in the affirmitive (see Tables 10.6.1 and 
10.6.2). Thus, contrary to the initial concern, there appears to be little evidence 
for the defensive reaction hypothesis, oligopolistic reaction hypothesis or the 
Wells effect, implying that the trend towards the use of new forms is independent 
of rival firms' mode of international entry or choice of form. Perhaps, one 
reason why firms' entry mode choices are unaffected by rivals' entry mode 
behaviour may be firms' greater concern with host government policies and their 
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own strategic posture than with competitors' behaviour per se. Another may be 
what can be termed the 'fashion of the investment climate or period' as well as 
the dynamic nature of the factors that determine choice of form. Entry mode 
patterns are as dynamic as the environmental parameters that determine them. 
Therefore, what may be fashionable in one period or country may not obtain in 
another. 
7. One primary concern of this study is to provide empirical evidence to support or 
refute the widely held notion that the use of new forms is a particular 
phenomenon of LDCs. In other words, is the move towards the use of new 
forms of international investment related to the stage of country development? 
To determine the relationship of stage of development to NFl-usage rationales, 
a number of macro- economic variables identified as proxy factors of host country 
characteristics are used to gauge situations in which the use of non-FDI modes 
will differ between developed and developing countries (Tables 10.7.1 and 
10.7.2). In the tests, certain host country factors are found to be significant in the 
choice of entry modes between DCs and LDCs among the sample firms. These 
include, economic/political situation in host country, level of foreign investment 
in host country, level of industrial development and openness (or restriction) of 
host country towards foreign investment (Tab Ie 10.7.4 and 10.7.5). These factors 
provide rationales for adopting new forms. As countries develop the propensity 
for their governments to interefere with the market system will reduce, ceteris 
paribus. Thus, high distortion propensities juxtaposing "profitable investment 
opportunities are likely to lead to the use of new forms. This finding is however 
contradictory to an original hypothesis which states that, as countries develop, the 
propensity for them to rely proportionately less on internalized mode and 
proportionately more on externalized mode will increase (see Contractor, 1981; 
Dunning, 1988, p.185). 
There seems to be a lack of general systematic relationship between the stage of 
development and the use of new forms in the sample firms. The findings suggest 
that the use of new forms may not be a particular or a general phenomenon of 
LDCs and that while country-specific characterists and micro-economic factors 
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are important in entry mode decisions the actual choice of mode rests with 
corporate management. In this connection managers of the sample firms were 
asked if, in their opinion and experience, the use of new forms is a general 
phenomenon of LDCs. Majority of the respondents disagreed with the 
proposition. Sample foreign companies, in particular, showed a complete 
disagreement with the hypothesis (Table 10.7.3). Notwithstanding this finding, 
there is little doubt that MNE acceptance of new forms is related to host country 
policies as the earlier evidence suggests. As the literature also suggests, such 
policies could have been prompted by government insistence on increased local 
ownership and participation. This in itself is not a bad policy: it is a way of 
protecting indigenous skills which every national government is obliged to do, 
developed or developing. 
Beyond this however, the observed shifts in LDC policies during the 1970s were 
the product of the economic and political tenor of the times. First, the period 
(1973-1975) witnessed series of United Nations hearings on the role of 
transnational corporations in third world development(see Franko, 1989). 
Second, this period saw unprecedented increases in the wealth of many oil 
producing LDCs. By the mid 1970s the combination of these two factors could 
be seen as highly contributory to the increased bargaining powers of many LDCs. 
For countries like Iran, Libya, etc. their "hatred" for American government 
literally spilled over to American allies such that western MNEs were perceived 
as instruments of 'American imperialism' or 'anti-Moslem.' These are 
subterraneous factors which were largely responsible for the apparent hostility 
towards foreign MNEs. In short, the unremitting reference to the notion that new 
forms are designed for LDCs has blurred research judgment that while host 
government policies may oblige firms to use non-FDI modes, firm strategies/ 
objectives and behaviour are actually instrumental to the success of such policies. 
8. This study attempts to emphasize the correspondence between entrepreneurship 
and foreign investment decisions. The literature has largely ignored this fact. The 
impression gained from interviewing the corporate executives suggests that the 
decision-makers' influences and perceptions are very crucial to whether or not an 
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overseas operation will be embarked upon and, if so, what modality it should take 
(see also, Welch, 1990). Usually, the decision-maker is guided by his assessment 
of the firm's corporate capability (Le. its ownership-specific advantages), its 
internalization-incentive considerations, host country-specific characteristics and 
cost/benefit analysis of using alternative governance structures. All these 
considerations are incorporated in the analysis of new forms of investment. 
Accordingly, it is hypothesized that firm use of the new forms is significantly 
related to their perceived net benefits. In the cross-sectional questionnaire, the 
managers of multinational banks and companies were asked questions relating to 
their perceptions of the benefits obtained or likely to be obtained from using non-
equity modes of foreign investment. They were asked, for each of six factors 
(including the five below), to state the extent of their agreement or disagreement 
with 'a certain factor' (Table 10.8.1). A statistical analysis of the managers' 
responses offers evidence that perceived net benefits of new forms (and for that 
matter, direct investment) can function as a seed bed for relevant impulses and 
prepare the foundation for an international move (Tables 10.8.2 and 10.8.3). 
Through variants of new forms of international investment, a multinational firm 
can (1) diversify both country and investment risks; (2) avoid market disabling 
factors of opportunism, uncertainty, barriers to entry or exit, etc., (3) exploit both 
its advantages abroad and foreign market opportunties, with minimum resources 
and risk; (4) secure flexibility to adjust to changes in the host economy as well 
as in the international market; and (5) invest in promising LDC markets, without 
committing large resources or with minimum risks and uncertainties. Its use as 
a pre-emptive manoeuvre is not supported by the statistical tests. As with 
licensing studies (Telesio, 1979), exporting studies (Reid, 1981; Welch, 1983) 
and franchising studies (Welch, 1990; Brickley, Dark and Weisbach, 1991), the 
relative impact of the catalysts of non-FDI modes appear to depend heavily on 
how they are perceived by corporate management acoss the sample firms. 
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11.2 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE STUDY 
Analyses of the research findings suggest several conclusions which primarily reflect the 
objective of the study. The objectives in turn capture most of the literature concerns about 
the transactional efficiency of new forms of investment. These concerns relate to issues 
of four general kinds. First, are the new forms ofinvestment substitutes for, or 
complements, of foreign direct investment? Second, is FDI becoming obsolescent in the 
changing global investment environment? Third, what is the role of the economic theory 
of entrepreneurship in foreign investment decisions and, in particular, in entry mode 
choices? Finally, are the new forms of investment confined to LDCs? 
11.2.1 NEW FORMS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR FDI 
The option of minority-equity and non-FDI modes as a means of entering into and 
establishing in a foreign market instead of making a full investment has been recognized 
in the literatures of international business, international economics and international 
financial management. But the transactional properties of new forms have received little 
systematic attention in these literatures. Alternative investment strategies provide firms 
(as investors) and host nations (as recipients) opportunities to build satisfactory 
institutional forms for reconciling their competing interests. On the inter-firm level, they 
provide institutional mechanisms for reducing the cost and risk of foreign investment. 
A foreign investment must be both profitable for the multinational firm and effective for 
the host country's objectives. In these circumstances, new forms present opportunities to 
reconcile the firm's global objectives with environmental considerations in ways which 
may not be practicable or acceptable under FDI mode. 
The evidence of the study also suggests that the new forms present opportunties for 
multinational firms to penetrate markets and countries foreclosed to foreign MNEs via 
direct involvement. The findings of the study lead to a suggestion that in certain 
circumstances, the new forms are transactionally more expedient than the direct 
investment mode. In particular, the empirical analyses here suggest five main reasons 
why sample multinational firms prefer new forms to foreign direct investment. These are, 
in order of importance: 
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1. When the objective is to achieve international diversification with minimum 
commitment of corporate resources. 
2. When host government's regulation/pressure restricts inward direct investment. 
3. When a promising host market is potentially strewn with high political risk, in 
particular risk of expropriation. 
4. Risk and costs diversification, improving their sensitivity to host country 
conditions and thereby penetrating awkward market segments. 
5. Customizing products to a host country without commiting huge resources, 
especially if such investments are non-recurrent or if host country policies do not 
permit direct investment. 
These findings correspond with the conclusions of earlier studies (Contractor and Sagafi-
Nejad, 1981; Contractor, 1981b, 1984, 1985). Although the study did not investigate a 
direct comparison of returns which Contractor found to disfavour the direct investment 
mode, the evidence of perceived benefits of new forms, coupled with the impression 
gained from interviewing the managers, suggests that a mix of entry mode choices is an 
increasingly acceptable corporate strategy. This finding corresponds with that of 
Wright(1981). The establishment of wholly owned foreign subsidiaries (or foreign branch 
banks) can no longer be seen as a primary organizational concern in the 
internationalization process of firms, even the very large ones. Firms are increasingly 
favouring international cooperative arrangements alongside other options. 
Notwithstanding the evidence, any categorical statement suggesting that the new forms 
are a substitute for direct investment will be presumptuous. Rather, one would state that 
under certain circumstances, as outlined above, the new forms may be more efficient 
governance structures than FDI, and hence preferable under those circumstances. 
11.2.2. NEW FORMS AS A COMPLEMENT OF FDI 
The empirical findings here suggest that the strategy choice of new forms made by sample 
multinational firms is largely influenced by host government policies in active conjuction 
with firm-specific factors. The choice of appropriate foreign investment strategy is at the 
core of international business. Therefore, alternative investment strategies must be 
evaluated in terms of their economizing properties or income generating potentials. Even 
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in awkward host country circumstances, a strategy of new forms can be linked with at 
least three types of income or compensation mix: 
1. Joint participation in project returns, 
2. Royalty or technical fees, and 
3. A mark-up or a margin on component/input supplies to the project. 
There is also a potential advantage of transfer pricing. Transfer pricing has conventionally 
been associated with internal (intracorporate) transfer pricing. However, as Arpan and 
Radebaugh (1985 p.257) have observed, transfer pricing can be both intracorporate and 
intercorporate. The former refers to sales among subsidiaries or divisions of a single 
incorporated entity, and the latter refers to sales among different corporate entities 
associated in global pursuits and objectives. In an international context, intercorporate 
transfer pricing refers to "any transfer made within the global corporate family" (ibid.). 
Mere anecdotal evidence suggests the plausibility of intercorporate transfers via the 
mechanism of new forms. Because the notion of transfer pricing connotes manipulative 
pricing tendency and/or a means of accomplishing other unsavoury deeds (e.g. tax 
avoidance) deemed offensive to public policy, the corporate executives interviewed were 
unwilling to discuss the issue. Accordingly, the study did not investigate the possibility 
of using new forms to accomplish transfer pricing. 
Regardless of host government policies however, the above income channels may provide 
stability of earnings which direct investment alone may not yield. Because these types of 
income are linked to turnover rather than profit, they are less volatile than dividends 
which are payable only if and when profits are realized and declared. In this sense, the 
income channels of new forms may smooth out cash flow and reduce risk. Second, 
economic stabilization policies (e.g. balance of payments problems) may force a host 
government into freezing dividends, but may release foreign exchange for necessary 
components imports, royalties and other payments called for under international contracts 
(ibid.). Finally, sales of the product to third country importers through the foreign firm 
would be encouraged by the host government, thereby enabling the firm to earn profits 
thereon. A combination of these factors enhances potentials of new forms as viable 
complements to FDI, in reducing risk and taxes, and stabilizing earnings, which FDI 
alone may not fulfil. 
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11.2.3. THE OBSOLESCENCE OF FDI HYPOTHESIS 
From the findings of this research it is difficult to surmise that FDI is becoming 
obsolescent. What is though clear from the evidence of sample firms is the perception 
of growing popularity of new forms of international investment. The majority of the 
international managers indicated that new forms would become even more popular in 
international business in the future, for the reasons stated in the preceeding two sections 
(see Table 10.9.3). If by increased popularity is implied declining importance of FDI, 
then the results of this study point to the fact that the use of hierarchy is increasingly 
coming under scrutiny both at the firm and national levels. 
The results also lend credence to the fact that the choice of strategy - markets and 
hierarchy - made by sample multinational firms is influenced by firm-specific factors 
(ownership and internalization-incentive factors) as well as host country-specific factors. 
Given that national controls are, and will continue to be a fact of economic life (Hood 
and Young, 1986 p.366), and the fact that these controls are by no means confined to 
developing nations, as the results of this study and those of Contractor (1981) and 
Thompson and Knox (1991) suggest, then it is possible to view the growing popularity 
of new forms by the multinational firms in the survey as reflecting Dunning's (1981) and 
Baranson's (1981) hypothesis that international resource transmission will, over time, 
move towards greater "dis-internalization." 
There is nothing to suggest that international transactions may likely receive less host 
governmental scrutiny in the future. Besides, even large multinational firms (e.g. IBM 
and Germany's Deutsche Bank or French Credit Lyonnais) are willingly entering into 
strategic cooperative alliances or assuming minority-equity positions in Europe and 
elsewhere (See, Hiltrop, 1991; Thompson and Knox, 1991). All these signify the fact 
that the hitherto undue reliance on FDI mode of internationalization may be waning. 
Notwithstanding this observation, because host country policies and environmental 
constraints on foreign investment vary considerably in form, intent and impact on 
multinational firms, it is difficult to make simple generalizations of the kinds suggested 
by the FDI-obsolescence hypothesis or the substitution of FDI by new forms. 
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11.2.4. ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE DYNAMICS OF FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT 
The review of the literature reveals that received microtheories of foreign investment have 
concentrated largely on equilibrium analyses of the firm and the hierarchical mode of 
economic transactions. In both respects, not only are the economizing attributes of 
alternative governance structures insufficiently recognized, if not ignored, but, more 
importantly, the role of entrepreneurship is grossly suppressed. Although this 'neglect' 
has been acknowledged by some authors (e.g. Teece, 1984; Casson, 1985; Buckley, 
1989), the economic theory of entrepreneurship has as yet not been subjected to any 
systematic investigation. 
This study has attempted to bridge the gap by integrating entrepreneurship and the 
eclectic paradigm). In this process, the role of corporate management is acknowledged 
and made central to the analysis of foreign investment decisions. By juxtaposing this with 
an understanding of the circumstances limiting or favouring intrafirm (as well as 
interfirm) transactions, it is possible to develop an economic theory of foreign investment 
which offers insights into international business behaviour. 
While firm-specific characteristics provide firms opportunities to evaluate their strengths 
and weaknesses in relation to a given overseas investment operation, and while host 
country-specific factors offer a complementary platform for assessing the optimum mode 
of entry into a particular country, it is the contention of the study that the assignment of 
transactions between hierarchies and markets (of which new forms are the principal 
constituents) in discriminating ways ought to be seen as the central task of corporate 
management. The congruency between the owner-entrepreneur or the manager-
entrepreneur (Casson, 1985) and foreign investment is explicable from two strands of 
economics: neoclassical economics and institutional economics. 
In both traditions the centrality of corporate management is made conspicuous. The 
manager is deemed to be responsible for deciding upon and implementing operational 
strategies as well as making the choice of institutional arrangements, thereby "determining 
the boundaries of the firm" (ibid.). In relation to foreign investment, decisions have to 
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be made about resource content, the type, how to transfer corporate know-how, to which 
country and in what form to establish the foreign entry. Decisions of this kind cannot 
be satisfactorily addressed under conditions of static equilibrium nor can they be fully 
explored by separating entrepreneurship from control of the firm. The evidence of this 
study tends to suggest that while country characteristics and microeconomic factors are 
important in determining the pattern of foreign entry, the actual choice of mode rests with 
corporate management. In the study, the relative impact of these factors appeared to 
depend heavily on how they were perceived by corporate management, thus confirming 
the findings of earlier studies (e.g. Reid, 1981; Welch, 1983, 1990) on the importance 
of management in the internationalization process. 
11.2.5. CORRESPONDENCE WITH LDCs 
The frequent association of new forms with LDCs has created an aura of correspondence 
of their usage with developing countries. Yet, there is abundant evidence pointing to 
their growth among developed countries. The argument that the move to acceptance of 
minority-equity and/or non-equity forms is due primarily to LDC policies (Franko, 1989) 
may have been exaggerated because, as Contractor (1981) has already pointed out, these 
policies are in no way confined to developing countries. Several developed countries 
(including European countries, U. S. A., Canada and Japan) are found to have policies and 
regulations that are similar in spirit to those of LDCs (ibid.). Even with the evolvement 
of the Single European Market, there is evidence of entry barriers and protective attitudes 
displayed by several European countries against firms of fellow community member 
nations (See, Thompson and Knox, 1991). 
There is little doubt that host country policies are active factors in the internationalization 
process. Whereas host governments employ various regulations and incentives to 
achieve the twin goals of sovereignty and increased net benefits from the operations of 
multinational firms within their borders, the latter, in response, adopt a variety of 
strategies to circumvent such regulations or to optimize the incentives. In both "camps", 
a foreign investment must be seen to profit the foreign firm on the one hand, and 
effective for the realization of the host country's socio-economic objectives, on the other 
hand. Thus, new forms of international investment should be seen in a broader 
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perspective as a set of transactional mechanisms for reconciling the firm's global 
objectives with environmental concerns in ways perceptibly different from hierarchies. 
The behaviour of many LDC governments in the 1970s should be seen in the context of 
international political strains and the economic fortunes of the time. Clearly, there was 
an identifiable move towards a greater acceptance of minority positions by western 
multinational firms, especially those from the U.S. and its 'allies,' but as Franko (1989) 
observed, this move did not appear to have a continuous "trend" rather it occurred "quite 
suddenly" during the period 1973 - 1975. Moreover, the sudden shift was observed in 
few LDCs (e.g. Iran, Mexico, Brazil, India and the Phillipines) (ibid.). 
The political tenor of the 1970s was a seed bed for relevant impulses in the international 
relations between some LDCs, such as Iran, Libya, some Central and South American 
countries (e.g. Brazil, Mexico, Nicaragua, Phillipines) and the U.S.A. The conflictive 
inter-nation political relations generated both increased nationalism and spillover effect 
on the 'allies' of both sides, with western MNEs left as the proverbial grass that suffers 
when two elephants fight. In reality some of the host government reactions were not 
without foundation. For instance, some U.S. FDI activities were reported to be 
instruments of the U.S. government policy (Behrman, 1971). In addition, it has been 
observed that one result of the U.S. government's use of the multinational corporation 
as an instrument of power projection is the host government's increased hostility against 
U.S. firms (Nigh, 1985). Furthermore, U.S. investors realized that their foreign 
subsidiaries were often the most visible U.S. institutions in the host country and, as such, 
targets for anti-U.S. feelings (LaPalombara and Blank, 1977). Generalizations of this kind 
contribute to a host country's perception of a linkage between the interest of foreign 
governments and their national direct investors. Thus, as inter-nation relations degenerate, 
foreign investors view the desirability of investing via the direct route as being 
prospectively dangerous. If complete divestment was not contemplated or feasible in the 
circumstances, the transactional expediency of alternative governance structures would 
become apparent ex post. 
The economic dimension witnessed an unprecedented increase in the wealth of many oil 
producing and exporting LDCs. The governments of these countries pursued policies 
aimed at matching political independence with economic sovereignty. Included in this 
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category are Nigeria, India, Malaysia, Korea and Peru. The feeling of these governments 
in the 1970s was that unlimited access to inward foreign investment might create adverse 
effects on the domestic economy, such as the control of domestic industry by foreign 
firms, which could lead to insecurity or vulnerability in times of external shock 
prospective with massive withdrawals and potentially weaken fabrics of the economy. 
Thus, rather than a developing country-specific phenomenon, it can be postulated in 
general that as inter-nation or intra-nation conflict increases (that is, as the number and/or 
intensity of conflictive inter-nation or intra-nation events increases), the host country's 
hostility towards related foreign investors tends to be high. Conversely, as inter-nation 
cooperation increases the more likely foreign investment will be spurred, ceteris paribus. 
In either scenario, firms operating via new forms are likely to experience greater 
continuity with, and support from, their host country partners, especially where the 
operation has been based upon mutual forebearance, trust and consummate cooperation. 
In conclusion, the findings of this study do not lend a strong support to the hypothesis 
that the new forms of investment are phenomena of LDCs. The results however lend 
credence to the proposition that although host government policies may be largely 
responsible to corporate move towards increased use of new forms, firm strategies and 
managerial perceptions are ultimately instrumental in allowing the policies to succeed in 
evoking firm assent to use of new forms. 
11.3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Studies of new forms of international investment have become important not only for 
firms but also for governments. The historical role of and research focus on FDI have 
tended to blur the significance of emerging changes in corporate foreign investment 
strategies. Yet, such changes have come about as a result of environmental pressures: 
host and home governments, market forces, and internal pressures. All of these are 
variables in the complex equation that determines the choice of form. Such a choice can 
be seen as part of the firm's wealth-maximizing process in which the central role of 
corporate management is decisive. 
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Management choice of form would tend to be influenced by their perceptions of the 
significance of the above pressures. In particular, it is argued that while the inducement 
factors of ownership-specific, internalization-incentive and country-specific advantages 
are important, they must be seen as static configurations in the dynamic equation of 
foreign investment decisions. In essence, the enabling force is corporate management. 
The policy implications of the argument are of three kinds. First, there is a possibility 
that the undue emphasis on hierarchical modes, in transactional terms, may be designed 
to hide the microeconomic utility of alternative modes of economic organization. 
Discussions of alternative governance structures are geared towards highlighting these. 
On the basis of this empirical investigation, new forms can be seen to have economic 
consequences for both the firm and recipient country. An assessment of their 
implications for ownership and control as well as for relationship with host governments 
may be especially important. This is considered as the macroeconomic utility of new 
forms. The third implication relates to multilateral governments such as the OEeD and 
UNO, concerned about the behaviour of multinational firms and their relationships with 
host governments. 
11.3.1 MICROECONOMIC UTILITY OF NEW FORMS OF INVESTMENT 
The organisational failures framework, encompassing market imperfections, has been 
used to justify the shifting of economic transactions out of a market into a firm. A 
symmetrical analysis warrants a converse argument, that is, a presumption of internal 
organisation failure for transactions that are so unshifted (market-mediated). This is one 
way of looking at the microeconomic utility of new forms. However, recognition that 
alternative modes of economic organisation give rise to differing exchange relations which 
are highly valued requires that organizational effectiveness be viewed more broadly than 
the usual efficiency argument would dictate. Thus, modes of organisation which would 
have superior productivity consequences but would raise a range of socio-political issues 
if implemented within the firm, may be modified or rejected in favour of "next best" 
alternatives. A firm's foreign investment pursuit is tailored towards making profit as a 
market seeker, resource seeker or efficiency seeker. As a market seeker, the firm wishes 
to sell in the host country's domestic market; as a resource seeker, the firm wishes to 
establish in a country that offers the desired resources; and as an efficiency seeker, the 
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firm wishes to economize on production costs of labour. In all of these, the firm is 
transfering resources of some sort at a cost and seeks to minimise the cost. The 
flexibility to shift from one objective setting to another or to combine objective settings 
without upsetting host country's macroeconomic goals is a criterion of success in a 
foreign market. Given the unrelenting degree of host governments' control, a careful 
'match' between the foreign firm's entry mode behaviour and local desires and aspirations 
is therefore essential. 
The conventional basis for this decision is profitability. The arguments that firms will 
often prefer FDI to variants of new forms were tenable up to the mid 1970s; such 
arguments are hardly tenable in the contemporary investment environment. The 
arguments of control desire by the MNE, appropriability of returns, market 
imperfections, lack of an institutionalized market for knowledge, etc. are constantly 
projected as the raison d' etre of FD I. However, such arguments are not only inconsistent 
with the realities of the business world but also are self-limiting. If all overseas 
transactions are executed by internal organization, then holding organization form 
constant, a point will be reached where the distinctive powers of hierarchy will be 
impaired and transactional diseconomies incurred as firm size and degree of vertical 
integration are progressively extended. At this point the qualitative implications of the 
FDI pre-eminence are not only upset but those of new forms appropriately recognized. 
Another tentative policy implication that can be drawn on the basis of this study is that 
the whole concept of firm-specific advantages must be questioned (See also, Buckley, 
1983). However, the ground for questioning here is somewhat different from Buckley's. 
He challenges it on the ground that the concept is artificially attenuated at the point where 
the firm first enters a foreign market, or at least where it has the potential to do so. 
Thus, firm-specific advantage reflects this cut-off point in the dynamic process, 
suggesting a short-run notion when endowments of such advantages are fixed. 
Here, however, the notion of firm-specific advantages is questioned from the perspective 
of the economic theory of entrepreneurship. The emphasis throughout this study is that 
assigning transactions between hierarchies and markets in discriminating ways is a central 
task of corporate management. In doing so, management is presumed to be aware of the 
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limits of firm-specific advantages and host country characteristics. In addition, 
management is presumed to have assessed the net benefits (or net costs) of using 
alternative governance structures in a given foreign market. In simple terms, corporate 
management is responsible for deciding upon foreign investment, for choosing 
institutional arrangements for implementing it and for determining the boundaries of the 
firm. The entrepreneur is engaged in purposeful pursuit of steering the firm into global 
profitability. As the firm experiences competition in the process, it is the task of the 
entrepreneur to discover and arbitrate profit opportunities. Yet, the crucial role of 
entrepreneurship is neglected both by policy statements and instruments. 
To this end, a more detailed and constructive policy debate is necessary. Such a debate 
will help in understanding the true determinants of foreign investment and thus add 
dynamism to the theory construction. The firm behaviour may no longer be viewed in 
abstract terms but in the context of the key decision-makers. Finally, policy towards 
international technology transfers should be formulated on the basis of mutual 
forebearance, trust and consummate cooperation between foreign multinational firm and 
the host country partner/so Such a policy should be based on the following premises: 
(1) the transfer must be seen to profit both parties, in terms of their objectives; (2) both 
the multinational firm and the host governments must build satisfactory institutional 
arrangements capable of reconciling the competing interests with minimum friction; and 
(3) both parties must acknowledge and explore the transactional properties of alternative 
governance structures. The combination of these factors may improve the bargaining 
power of the firm and the host country. 
11.3.2 MACROECONOMIC UTILITY OF NEW FORMS: HOST 
COUNTRY IMPLICATIONS 
The findings of this study suggest a relationship between host country policies and mode 
of entry. Such policies are not confined to developing nations, contrary to some studies 
(e.g. Franko, 1989). One implication of this study is that if governments want to restrict 
the inflow of foreign direct investment, the inflow of new forms will increase unless also 
restricted. New forms in their ramifications can, to a large extent, be a substitute for 
FDI in attracting foreign investments. Given host governments' resistance to foreign 
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control of local resources on the one hand, and the contribution of inward foreign 
investment to macroeconomic development, on the other hand, further restrictions on new 
forms will be counterproductive. Developing countries, in general, and those that lack 
the technological and/or managerial skills to harness their resources, in particular, cannot 
afford to be too casual with the policy of creating disincentives to multinational firms 
willing to compromise on total ownership. Besides, sectoral restrictions may be 
compromised where active collaboration with local partners prospectively yields access 
to improved technology as well as to international market. 
In any event, host governments should not be deluded into thinking that economic control 
is necessarily achieved via new forms. Some variants of new forms such as turnkey 
contracts, production-sharing and risk-service contracts or management contracts warrant 
a great deal of foreign responsibility and control. Without commensurate control, foreign 
firms may be reluctant to commit huge resources entailed by such projects. Incentive 
mechanisms such as reduced tariffs or taxes, etc. will both assuage foreign investors and 
encourage them to behave cooperatively in a joint-profit maximizing way. Above all, 
government policy makers should be realistic to the kind of foreign investment and 
investors they can attract through new forms. For example, it would be easy to convince 
a foreign hotel chain to enter into management contracts over a state-sponsored hotel 
enterprise, but it would be difficult to expect the same mode of organization for 
technology-intensive projects, such as petrochemical, pharmaceutical or motor assembly 
plants, since the level or size of resource commitment is relatively high and risky. 
One of the concerns of foreign multinationals is high political risk, especially in 
developing nations. It is important that foreign multinationals engaged in their normal 
business activities are not held hostage to strains in political relations betweeen the host 
nation and their home government. It is within the host country's own sphere of control 
and policy to provide a stable operational environment or, at least, a safe departure of 
foreign multinationals in times of such inter-nation political antagonism. Not only would 
the host country be building a congenial atmosphere to work in, but would be sustaining 
its relations with the international business community which may even attenuate the 
effect of potential deterioration in political relations. 
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11.3.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR HOME GOVERNMENTS 
The results of this study provide evidence to encourage home governments in their 
policies towards outflow of foreign investment. Most governments already have export 
promotion programmes. Such incentive programmes and policies should be widened to 
include cooperative/contractual forms of investment. In other words, foreign investment 
promotion programmes designed to inform existing or potential investors, especially small 
and medium sized firms, of the opportunties and challenges of contractual and cooperative 
modes would improve investors' understanding of the benefits of alternative modes of 
accomplishing foreign transactions. 
A country's competitive position in the international marketplace is greatly enhanced the 
more its home firms are able to match rival firms' behaviour, using a wide variety of 
operational patterns compatible with host countries' economic goals. Japan is a classic 
country example, where the government actively encourages foreign investment outflow 
via the new forms. Firms should be encouraged to invest abroad even if on the so-called 
"defensive reaction" basis, as otherwise they would lose their foreign markets to rival 
firms from other countries. 
Banks should be encouraged to provide better organizational forms of sustaining economic 
transactions abroad. Many businesses depend to a large extent on their bankers' advice 
and services. A critical analysis of many banks' posture, in terms of their undue concern 
over foreign risks with a less symmetrical concern over corresponding returns, leads to 
a conclusion of their lack of interest and/or organizational skill in foreign transactions. 
Most commercial banks show a higher propensity to finance mortgages than to fund 
commercial transactions. This feeling was echoed by some of the respondent company 
executives who noted that lack of proper banking advice and support was stifling their 
competitive position in the international arena. Perhaps, home governments' insurance 
guarantee schemes, similar to export credit guarantees, would help cushion the excessive 
concern of banks over foreign transactions and assist businesses wishing to exploit the 
perceived foreign market opportunities. 
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11.3.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR MULTILATERAL GOVERNMENTS 
The evidence of this study seems to challenge the proposition that the incidence of new 
forms of international investment is a particular phenomenon of developing countries. 
The overriding reason for associating new forms with LDCs is the latter's policies. Yet, 
such policies have been shown to prevail in the developed countries as well. Although 
in the study certain LDC characteristics, such as high political risk and political/economic 
climate, appeared to have a significant relationship with the propensity to use new forms, 
however, in general, host country inward FDI policy was found to be an important 
causative factor in firm assent to non-FDI modes. Since it is in the interest of every 
country to regulate the direction and flow of inward foreign investment and since no 
country is likely to permit such flows uncontrolled, policy statements should address the 
effect of alternative modes of economic organization on the economic welfare of home 
and host countries. It is important that firms' entry mode choices be reconciled with host 
country's socio-economic goals. 
A more detailed and constructive policy debate is necessary to consider the ramifications 
of alternative modes of foreign investment. Alternative governance structures should be 
seen not in terms of correspondence with developing countries' policies, but more broadly 
as mechanisms for reconciling firms' global objectives with environmental considerations. 
In policy-making areas, it is essential to keep in perspective the crucial role of corporate 
management and its relationship to organizational modes of entry. The analysis of the 
impact of entrepreneurial behaviour in the growth and spacial distribution of multinational 
firms, as attempted here, raises important policy issues for the future of foreign 
investment in general, and of new forms, in particular. Furthermore, attempts by 
multilateral bodies, such as the UNCTC and OECD, at making policies should recognize 
the fundamental relationships between managerial behaviour and choice of governance 
structure. Finally, the constant association of new forms with LDCs should make way 
to a policy debate which recognizes that firms need to approach foreign markets from 
diverse routes and need to maintain a flexible operational mode while seeking to secure 
optimum position in such markets. 
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11.4. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further composite research on new forms of international investment would be a useful 
addition to the paucity of empirical investigation of the phenomena of interest. Avenues 
for such research include (1) using sample firms drawn from wider geographic areas than 
those of this study; (2) refining the statistical procedures presented in this study; (3) 
replicating the hypothesized relationships and statistical techniques adopted here, using 
different contextual settings e.g. firms established in North America, other European 
countries, etc., (4) replicating the study, using the same context with a view to 
corroborating or refuting the findings here; and (5) and undertaking industry-specific 
research, either on one-country or multi-country basis. 
The attempt here is the first of its kind to extend the central notion of alternative 
governance structures to the banking industry. Without doubt there is a need for further 
research in this area. Applications of the phenomena to other service areas would be a 
useful addition to the scanty literature. 
One of the exploratory attempts of this study is the incorporation of the economic theory 
of entrepreneurship into a transaction cost analysis of the eclectic paradigm. Such an 
effort is bound to have methodological shortcomings in a comparative literature sense. 
Further empirical investigation will provide such an evidence. Besides, it is highlighted 
here that the role of corporate management has been long suppressed in the foreign 
investment literature. Studies that seek to integrate the theory of entrepreneurship into 
the general theory of foreign investment will be appropriate attempts at recognizing the 
interdisciplinary nature of international business. Operationalizing the role of corporate 
management in such empirical investigations will both add dynamism to the theory and 
further evidence on its relationship in the internationalization process. 
It is difficult to generalize on the evidence of single components of new forms that they 
are substitutes for, or complements of, foreign direct investment. This study, though in 
composite form, did not attempt to investigate the claim either, although on the basis of 
the tangential evidence, it can be said that under certain circumstances, variants of new 
forms can be transactionally superior to FDI, and, in some cases useful complements. 
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Further research in this area is called for. Related to this is the proposition that, in the 
North-South context, foreign direct investment is becoming obsolescent. An investigation 
of this kind was not contemplated here since the premise of the study was not confined 
to a North-South dichotomy. While such a generalization remains contentious, it leaves 
the corridor open for further research. 
The review of the literature on new forms of investment reveals a dearth of publication 
in some components, e.g. turnkey contractual arrangement and its variants, management 
contract, and international subcontract/contract manufacturing. Literature focus has been 
on licensing and joint ventures, with relatively less attention to franchising and other 
modes. Studies on these little researched areas will be a useful contribution in the 
international investment literature. 
In the area of market research, a study of the relationship between international 
diversification, risk reduction and new forms of investment will be an additional avenue 
of research. Specific questions of interest include: (1) Is the risk of profits of firms 
adopting new forms higher or lower than that of purely FDI-firms of similar 
characteristics (e.g. size)? (2) Are the rates of return and stability of earnings of the 
former type firms significantly higher or lower than those of the latter type firms? 
Related to these is the question concerning market perception of risk profiles of firms' 
international investment operations. A test of market valuation of firms adopting non-FDI 
modes of internationalization can be made by comparing the shares of such firms with 
those of FDI-firms. 
Finally, are new forms specific or general phenomena of LDCs? This question is still 
unresolved. The evidence of this study does not appear to lend much credence to that 
proposition. Further studies are required to validate the notion that LDC policies are 
specifically instrumental to corporate assent to new forms of international investment. 
Such studies will add clarity to public policy views of the kinds held by the OECD. 
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Appendix 1 
KEJW BUSINESS SCHOOL Glasgow Business School, Department of Management Studies, University of Glasgow, 
53-59 South park Avenue, Glasgow, G 12 8LF, Scotland. U .K. Tel: 041-339 8855, Telex: 777070 UNIGlA, Fax: 041·330 56c 
Our Ref: WH/KmcC Direct Line: 041-332-2652 
Direct Fax: 041-339-1695 
Date as postmark 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I am conducting a research under the auspices of Glasgow Business School, University of 
Glasgow. The focus of the research is on the alternative forms by which international business 
operations are conducted other than by foreign direct investment (which involves the establishment 
of wholly- or majority-owned foreign subsidiaries). 
These alternative investment strategies refer to: (1) joint international business ventures in 
which foreign-held equity does not exceed 50%, and (2) international contractual arrangements 
under which foreign companies may contribute no equity capital, but which involve some degree 
of investment, control and returns. Examples include licensing and technical assistance contracts, 
franchiSing, turnkey contracts, leasing, management contracts, international sub-contracting, and 
production-sharing contracts. 
The exploration seeks to address the following: 
1. The identification of alternative (to foreign direct investment) organizational modes of foreign 
investment; 
2. The determinants of foreign organizational networks; 
3. The motivational factors that informed the choice of the present corporate modes and 
locational preferences; 
4. The factors that foster incentives for use of minority equity participation, equity and non-
equity joint ventures, and contractual arrangements such as licensing, turnkey, etc. as 
operational entry modes into overseas markets; and 
5. The perception of costs and benefits of these entry modes. 
The study is based on questionnaire administration to a representative sample of companies 
across industries, of which your company has been chosen. It is for this reason that I am writing 
to you. The success of this project depends entirely on the goodwill and co-operation of corporate 
executives like yourself. I would be very grateful if you could spare 10 minutes to complete and 
return to me the attached questionnaire. As you may appreciate, an exploratory study of this kind 
will rely on a lot of quality information, therefore, I would be most obliged to you if you could 
enclose with the .questionnaire any brochures about your company which may assist me in my data 
collection. 
I assure you that absolute confidentiality and anonymity of any information provided is 
guaranteed since results will be analysed in aggregate form with no reference to individual 
companies. Thank you immensely for taking time to complete the questionnaire and, if you wish, 
the result of the study will be made available to you. 
I look forward to the pleasure of your prompt attention and return of the questionnaire. 
Yours faithfully 
~~ 
Wilson Herbert 
Appendix 2 
'2EJW BUSINESS SCHOOL Glasgow Business School, Department of Management Studies, University of Glasgow, 
53-59 Southpork Avenue, Glasgow, G 12 8lF, Scotland. U.K. Tel: 041-339 8855, Telex: 777070 UNIGLA, Fax: 041-330 56c 
Our Ref: WH/KmcC Direct Line: 041-332-2652 
Direct Fax: 041-339-1695 
Date as postmark 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I am conducting a research under the auspices of Glasgow Business School, University of 
Glasgow. The focus of the research is on the alternative forms by which international banking is 
conducted on a long term basis, other than by foreign direct investment (which involves the 
establishment of wholly- or majority-owned foreign subsidiaries or branches). 
These alternative investment strategies refer to: (1) joint international ventures or partnerships 
in which foreign-held equity does not exceed 50%, and (2) international contractual arrangements 
under which foreign banks may contribute no equity capital, but which involve some degree of 
investment, control and returns. Examples include representative offices, agencies, correspondent 
relationships, affiliated/associated banking relationships, consortium banking arrangements, overseas 
cashline services and merchant banking services (incorporating international leasing etc). 
The exploration seeks to address the following: 
1. The identification of alternative (to foreign subsidiaries) organizational modes of foreign 
banking; 
2. The determinants of foreign organizational networks; 
3. The motivational factors that informed the choice of the present corporate modes and 
locational preferences; 
4. The factors that foster incentives for use of minority equity participation, equity and non-
equity joint ventures, and contractual arrangements such as representative offices, 
correspondents, etc., as operational entry modes into overseas markets; and 
5. The perception of costs and benefits of these entry modes. 
The study is based on questionnaire administration and personal interviews with a 
representative sample of banks. It is for this reason that I am writing to you. The success of this 
project depends entirely on the goodwill and co-operation of bank executives like yourself. I would 
be very grateful if you could complete and return to me the attached questionnaire. As you may 
appreCiate, an exploratory study of this kind will rely on a lot of quality information, therefore, I would 
be most obliged to you if I could arrange an interview appOintment, with yourself or your nominee 
to discuss these issues. The length of the interview will not exceed 30 minutes and will be at your 
convenience. I would appreciate any brochures about your bank which may assist me in my data 
collection. 
I assure you that absolute confidentiality and anonymity of any information provided is 
guaranteed since results will be analysed in aggregate form with no reference to individual 
banks. Thank you immensely for taking time to complete the questionnaire and, if you wish, the 
result of the study will be made available to you. 
I look forward to the pleasure of hearing from you as soon as possible. 
Yours faithfully 
~~ 
Wilson Herbert 
APPENDICES 3.1 - 3.4 
QUESTIONNAIRES 
This questionnaire is designed to cover the following four broad categories in four 
different sets: 
1. UK companies (large and small) operating abroad: 
2. Foreign companies operating in UK. 
3. UK banks operating abroad 
4. Foreign banks operating in UK. 
New forms of International Investment are defined in broad terms to include all non-FDI 
organizational forms, excluding spot market and fade-out arrangements. 
The questionnaire is divided, in each case, into five sections (1-5). 
1. Corporate background information. 
2. Scope of International Operations. 
3. Modes of Entry into Foreign markets. 
4. Determinants and Independent Variables. 
5. Impact of Nfl on corporate strategy. 
1. BANK DETAILS 
Appendix 3.1 
FOREIGN BANKS IN THE U.K. 
1.1 Name of Bank: _________________ _ 
1.2 Position of Respondent: _______________ _ 
1.3 Are you: a parent bank? (ie, with subsidiaries & branches) 
a subsidiary !branch bank? 
a branch member? 
a member of an international consortium? 
a joint venture bank (with a UK bank)? 
an affiliate of a UK bank? 
other (please specify) 
1.4 What is the nationality of your bank? ___________ _ 
1.5 Size of parent bank (please complete as per your 1989 Annual Report). 
Group Turnover C£m) Number of Employees 
2. SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 
2.1 What percentage of your bank's total investment is accounted for by your UK 
operations? 
Less than 10 % Between 10 & 20 % Between 20 & 30 % Over 30% 
Tick 
2.2 How much of your global earnings is contributed by foreign investment earnings? 
Less than 10 % Between 10 & 20% Between 20 & 30% Over 30% 
2.3 Is the bulk of your company's current overseas activity in: 
1. West Europe (inel UK)? 
2. North American (USA and Canada)? 
3. Latin America? 
4. Australia and New Zealand? 
5. Far East (inel Japan, Hong Kong, China, etc)? 
6. Asia (incl. India, Singapore, Pakistan, etc)? 
7. Middle East (Israel, South Arabia, etc)? 
8. Africa? 
9. Eastern Block (incl. Soviet Union, Poland, etc)? 
10. Other? (please specify) 
2.4 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Has the position in 2.3. above changed in the last 5 years? 
If Yes, could the reason be due to: (please tick as many as apply) 
Shift in corporate policy /strategy? 
Home government's outward investment policy? 
Host government's inward investment policy? 
Host country's political/economic situation? 
Global competition? 
Other (please specify)? 
3. DETAILS OF MODES OF ENTRY INTO UK MARKET 
YES/NO 
3.1 Which of the following organizational forms best describes your bank's route of entry 
into UK? 
1. Establishment of a subsidiary 
2. Branch banking 
3. Affiliation with UK bank(s) 
4. Representative office 
5. Correspondent banking arrangements 
6. Banking partnership (eg, consortium 
or joint venture banking) 
7. Through financing trade & investments 
(including merchant banking services) 
8. Merger/Acquisition of a UK/foreign bank. 
9. Other (please specify) 
Tick 
(one only) 
3.2 Other than foreign subsidiaries/branches, which of the following operational modes 
does your bank have as part of its international network? (Please tick as many as 
applicable). 
1. Foreign Affiliates/Associates. 
2. Overseas Agency/Representative Offices 
3. Foreign Correspondents 
4. Consortium/Joint Venture Arrangements. 
5. International Merchant banking services. 
6. Overseas Cash Line Services. 
7. Other (please specify) 
3.3 Would the choice of organizational form of entry have been different if you were to 
locate in a less developed country? 
YES/NO? 
Please explain the reason for your answer. __________ _ 
4. DETERMINANTS AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
4.1 Please rank in order of strategic importance the influence of the following factors in 
your bank's choice of UK (1 = most important 10 = least important.) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
LOCATION FACTOR 
Presence of other banks in the UK 
Possession of major corporate customers in the UK 
Size of UK markets (capital, product & factor markets) 
Size of trade between your country and UK 
London as a major international financial centre. 
Strength of pounds sterling as a major world currency. 
Your country's political/economic ties with UK. 
Effective tax and interest rates differentials between your country and UK. 
Socio-cultural similarities with your country 
Other (please specify) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
4.2 How significant is each of the following characteristics to your bank's choice of mode 
of entry into a foreign market? 
A. FIRM CHARACfERISTICS: 
1. Willingness to share ownership & control 
in return for acceas to local marl::eu 
2. Minimization of country riaka 
3. Cost of establishing a foreign subsidiary 
4. Size of bank (denoting financial, 
managerial and technical capabilities) 
.5. E;q>erience in foreign banking 
7. Possession of large international corporate 
customers 
8. Economies of scope & 
geographical diversification. 
9. OIher (Please specify) 
B. HOST COUNTRY-SPECIFIC 
CHARACfERISTICS 
1. Government's policy against foreign control 
2. Level of inter-bank marlcet 
3. Size of your country's tradeJinvestment in host 
country . 
4. Fiscal and monetary policies. 
.5. Economic/Political climate 
6. Technological and Managerial capacity 
7. Psychic distance (language, cultural, 
bUliness, customs, etc differences). 
8. OIher (please specify) 
Very 
Significant Significant 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Neutral 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Insignificant 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Very 
Insignificant 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
5. BENEFITS OF MINORITY-EQUITY (CO-OPERATIVE FORMS) OF FOREIGN BANKING . 
.5.1 Plea~ state the extent of your agreement or disagreement with the following statementJ (Non-oquityl 
co-operative fonna of foreign banking are defined u listed in 3.2 above) 
1. Minority -¢quity I(co-operative) fonna 
of international banking 
enable firDlJ to divenify both 
country and investment rish 
2. Minority-oquity forml of international 
banking enable banks to avoid marlcet 
disabling facton of opportunilm 
uncertainty, entry barrien, etc. 
3. Minority-oquity/co-operativemodes 
of entry into oveneaJI marlceu are 
a superior mean. of exploiting a 
bank' a alleta abroad and foreign 
marlcet opportu nitiea, with 
minimum resources & rish. 
4. Minority-oquity modea offer banks 
the advantage of flexibility 
to adjust to changes in both 
the host economy and the 
international marlcet. 
.5. Minority -equity entry modea may be 
u~ u pre-emptive manoeuvrea 
to gain access to promising 
marlceu and technologies. 
6. Minority-equity entry modea are 
a leaa-<levelopod country 
phenomenon. 
Strongly 
Agree 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Neutral Disagree 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
Strongly 
Disagree 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
5.2 Finally, do you feel that minority-equity/co-operative forms of international banking will become 
popular or less popular as host governments become increasingly concerned about foreign control 
of banks and financial institutions? 
Popular Less Popular Don't Know 
Please explain the reason for your answer ________________ _ 
Thank you for your help in completing thls questionnaire. Please return it in the pre-paid envelope as soon 
as possible, to: 
WILSON HERBERT, ESQ 
GLASGOW BUSINESS SCHOOL 
DEPT OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW 
GLASGOW G 12 8LF 
SCOTLAND 
Appendix 3.2 
U.K. BANKS OPERATING ABROAD 
1. BANK DETAILS 
1.1 NruneofB~: ____________________________________ ___ 
1.2 Position of Respondent: ________________ _ 
1.3 Are you: a parent b~? (ie, with subsidiaries & branches) 
a subsidiary bank? 
a branch bank? 
a member of an international consortium? 
a joint venture bank (with a UK b~)? 
an affiliate of a UK b~? 
other (please specify) 
1.4 If parent b~, how many subsidiarieslbranches have you in: 
U.K? ________ _ elsewhere? __________ _ 
1.5 Size of parent b~ (please complete as per your 1989 Annual Report). 
Group Turnover (£m) Number of Employees 
2. SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 
Tick 
2.1 What percentage of your group's total investment is accounted for by foreign 
investment? 
Less than 10% Between 10 & 20 % Between 20 & 30 % Over 30% 
2.2 How much of your group turnover is contributed by foreign investment earnings? 
Less than 10% Between 10 & 20% Between 20 & 30% Over 30% 
2.3 Is the bulk of your company's current overseas activity in: 
1. W. Europe (excl UK)? 
2. North America? 
3. Latin America? 
4. Australia and New Zealand? 
5. Far East (incl Japan, Hong Kong, China, etc)? 
6. Asia (incl. India, Pakistan, Singapore, etc)? 
7. Middle East (Israel, Saudi Arabia, etc)? 
8. Africa? 
9. Eastern Bloc (incl. Soviet Union, Poland, etc)? 
10. Other? (please specify) 
2.4 Has the position in 2.3. above changed in the last 5 years? YES/NO 
If Yes, could the reason be due to: (please tick as many as apply) 
1. Shift in corporate policy/strategy? 
2. Home government's outward investment policy? 
3. Host government's inward investment policy? 
4. Host country's political/economic situation? 
5. Global competition? 
6. Other (please specify)? 
3. DETAILS OF MODES OF ENTRY INTO FOREIGN MARKET 
3.1 Which of the following organizational forms best describes your bank's route of entry 
into foreign countries. 
Tick (one only) 
1. Establishment of a subsidiary 
2. Branch banking 
3. Affiliation with host country's bank(s) 
4. Representative office 
5. Correspondent banking arrangements 
6. Banking partnership (eg, consortium or joint venture banking) 
7. Through financing trade & investments (including merchant 
banking services) 
8. Mergers and acquisitions. 
9. Other (please specify) 
3.2 Other than foreign subsidiarieslbranches, which of the following operational modes 
does your bank have as part of its international network? (Please tick as many as 
applicable). 
1. Foreign Affiliates/Associates. 
2. Overseas AgencylRepresentative Offices 
3. Foreign Correspondents 
4. Consortium/Joint Venture Arrangements. 
5. International Merchant banking services. 
6. Overseas Cash Line Services. 
7. Other (please specify) 
4. DETERMINANTS AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
4.1 Please rank in order of strategic importance the influence of the following factors in 
your bank's decision to locate in either a developed (DC) or less developed country 
(LDC) (1 = Most important, 13 = Least). 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
LOCA TION FACTOR DC 
Presence of other banks (UK & other countries) in host country. () 
Existence of major corporate customers in the host country. ( ) 
Economic/political situation in host country. ( ) 
Size of host country's banking markets. ( ) 
Interest rate differential between host country and UK. ( ) 
Tax rate differential between host country and UK. ( ) 
Level of industrial development in host country. ( ) 
LDC 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Size of UK's investment in host country. 
Openness of host country towards foreign banks. 
Host country as a major/important financial centre. 
UK's political and economic ties with host country. 
Socio-cultural similarities with host country. 
Other (please specify). 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) ( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
4.2 How significant is each of the following characteristics to your bank's choice of mode 
of entry into a foreign market? 
Very Very 
Significant Significant Neutral Intignificant loIigaIi:at 
A. FIRM CHARACfERISTICS: 
1. Willingneu to share ownership & control 2 3 4 S 
in return for acce .. to local marlceu 
2. Minimization of country risks 2 3 4 S 
3. Coot of eoUhlishing a foreign ouboidiary 2 3 4 S 
4. Size of bank (denoting financial 2 3 4 S 
managerial &. technical capabilities) 
S. Experience in foreign banking 2 3 4 S 
6. Po .. eooion of large international corporate 
cuotomen 2 3 4 
S 
7. Economies of scope & 2 3 4 
S 
geographical divenification. 
8. Competiton' palterru of entry 2 3 4 
S 
9. Other (Please opecify) 2 3 4 S 
B. HOST COUNTRY CHARACfERISTICS 
1. Government', policy againot foreign control 2 3 4 S 
of banlCJ. 
2. Level of inter-bank marlcet 2 3 4 
S 
3. Size of UK trade/investment in hoot country 2 3 4 S 
4. Fiocal and monetary policies. 2 3 4 S 
S. EconomiclPolitical climate 2 3 4 
S 
6. Technological and Managerial capacity 2 3 4 S 
7. Poychic distance (language, cultural. 2 3 4 S 
buoinell, cuotomo, etc differences). 
8. Other (Please opecify) 2 3 4 S 
5. BENEFITS OF MINORITY-EQUITY (CO-OPERATIVE FORMS) OF FO~IGN BANKING. 
5.1 Please state the extent of your agreement or disagreement with the following statements (Non-
equity/co-operative forms of foreign banking are defined as listed in 3.2 above) 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree 
1. Minority-equity/co-operativeforms of 
international banking, enable banks to 
diversify both country and investment 
risks. 2 3 4 5 
2. Minority-equity/co-operativeforms of 
international banking enable banks to 
avoid market disabling factors of 
opportunism, uncertainty, 
entry barriers, etc. 2 3 4 5 
3. Minority-equity/co-operative forms 
of entry into overseas markets are a 
superior means of exploiting a 
bank's assets abroad and foreign 
market opportunities, with 
minimum resources and risks. 2 3 4 5 
4. Minority-equity entry modes offer 
banks the advantage of flexibility 
to adjust to changes in both 
the host economy and the 
international market. 2 3 4 5 
5. Minority-equity entry modes may be 
used as pre-emptive manoeuvres 
to gain access to promising 
markets and technologies. 2 3 4 5 
6. Minority-equity entry modes are 
a less-developed country 
phenomenon. 2 3 4 5 
5.2 Finally, do you feel that shared-equity/co-operativeforms of international banking will become popular or less 
popular as host governments become increasingly concerned about foreign control of banks and financuu 
institutions? 
Less Popular Don't Know 
Please explain reasons for your answers. _______________ _ 
Thank you for your help in completing this questionnaire. Please return it in the pre-paid envelope, as soon as 
possible, to: 
WILSON HERBERT, ESQ 
GLASGOW BUSINESS SCHOOL 
DEPT OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW 
GLASGOW Gl28LF 
SCOTLAND 
APPENDIX 3.3 
UK COMPANIES ABROAD 
1. COMPANY DETAILS 
1.1 Name of company: __________________ _ 
1.2 Position of Respondent: ________________ _ 
1.3 Major industry classification (eg. manufacturing, oil, etc). ____ _ 
1.4 Please tick which of the following best describes your company: 
1. An independent company (ie. without parent or subsidiary) 
2. A parent company (ie. with subsidiaries) 
3. A subsidiary company 
4. An associate/affiliate of another company. 
5. A member of a Consortium. 
6. Other (please specify) 
1.5 Size of Parent company (Please complete as per your 1989 Annual Report). 
Group Turnover (£m) Number of Employees 
2. SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES. 
2.1 How many foreign branches/subsidiaries/affiliates, etc. do you have? __ 
2.2 Is the bulk of your company's current overseas activity in: 
1. West Europe (excl UK)? 
2. North America (USA and Canada)? 
3. Latin America? 
4. Australia & New Zealand? 
5. Far East (incl Japan, Hong Kong, China, etc)? 
6. Asia (inc!. India, Pakistan, Singapore, etc)? 
7. Middle East (Israel, Saudi Arabia, etc)? 
8. Africa? 
9. Eastern Bloc (inc!. Soviet Union, Poland, etc)? 
10. Other (please specify) 
2.3 Has the position in 2.2. above changed in the last 5 years? YES/NO 
If Yes, could the reason be due to: (please tick as many as apply) 
1. Shift in corporate policy/strategy? 
2. Home government's outward investment policy? 
3. Host government's inward investment policy? 
4. Host country's political/economic situation? 
5. Global competition? 
6. Other (please specify)? 
2.4 What percentage of your group's global investment is accounted for by foreign 
investment? (Please tick) 
Less than 10% Between 10 & 20 % Between 20 & 30 % Over 30 % 
2.5 How much of your group turnover is contributed by foreign investment earnings? 
(Please tick) 
Less than 10% Between 10 & 20 % Between 20 & 30 % Over 30 % 
3. DETAILS OF ENTRY MODES INTO FOREIGN MARKETS. 
3.1 Which of the following operational modes do you regard as best describing the 
manner in which your company entered any of these country zones? (Tick one 
mode against each applicable area). 
W.Europe USAf Far East 
exel Canada Incl Japan 
UK Korea 
ENTRY MODE 
Non-Equity Joint 
Venture. 
Equity Joint 
Venture. 
Licensing. 
Franchising. 
Agency. 
Turnkey Contracts. 
International 
Leasing. 
Contract 
Management. 
Production 
Sharing 
Contracts. 
Acquisition & 
Merger 
Other (please specify) 
Australia & Asia incl. Middle 
New Zealand India, East 
Pakistan etc. 
Eastern Africa 
Bloc inel 
Russia 
3.2 How significant is each of the following factors which may be included in 
contractual agreements (eg. licensing, Turnkey, etc)? Please circle. 
Very Very 
Sign if Significant Neutral Insignificant Insignficant 
CONTRACTUAL PACKAGE 
1. Machinery IEquipment supply 2 3 4 5 
2. Technical assistance in 
production. 2 3 4 5 
3. Technical assistance in 
plant design and 
construction. 2 3 4 5 
4. Technical assistance in 
procuring/supplying 
inputs & components. 2 3 4 5 
S. Technical assistance in 
marketing & management. 2 3 4 5 
6. Personnel training. 2 3 4 5 
7. Right for util isation of 
patents/trademarks. 2 3 4 5 
8. Right for utilisation of 
design, formula etc. 2 3 4 5 
9. Right to the use of 
advertising materials. 2 3 4 5 
10. Other (Please specify) 2 3 4 5 
3.3 Is there any specified length of time in such technical agreement. YES/NO 
If yes, how long is it? - years 
4. DETERMINANTS AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
4.1 Please tick, and rartk in order of relative importance, the following motivations 
for adopting non-equity forms offoreign investment. (1 =most important, 10 = least 
important) . 
MOTIV A TIONAL STATEMENT TICK RANK 
i. Achieve international diversification via international ( ) 
co-operative arrangements. 
ii. Host government regulations (restricting foreign direct investment ( ) 
to selected sectors only, and requiring high local equity participation 
in the rest). 
iii. High political risk in host country (eg. risks of expropriation) ( ) 
iv. Risk diveI(si~aatRlrtipmnlgle:cOOtmgds rlfamngooldgj&igtpar.trteMf. technology( ) 
vi. Because competitors adopt non-equity/contractual forms of ( ) 
investment. 
vii. Size of firm too small to finance, manager or market overseas ( ) 
operations. 
viii. Products customized to host/regional market. ( ) 
ix. Protect/support existing foreing business. ( ) 
x. Other (please specify) ( ) 
4.2 Does the size of your parent company have any influence on the choice of entry 
mode? YES/NO 
If yes, what kind of influence does it have? _________ _ 
4.3 Does the entry choice of your competitors influence your company's entry 
strategy? YES/NO 
If yes, please explain the extent of the influence. _______ _ 
4.4 How significant is each of the following in your company's choice of mode of 
entry into a foreign market? (Please circle) 
Very Very 
Significant Significant Neutral Insignificant Insignificant 
A. FIRM CHARACTERISTICS: 
1. Willingness to share ownership & control 
in return for access to local markets 2 3 4 S 
2. Minimization of country risks 2 3 4 S 
3. Experience in foreign markets 2 3 4 S 
4. Size of company (denoting 2 3 4 S 
financial, managerial and 
technical capabilities) 
S. Possession of brand name, 2 3 4 S 
trade marks etc.6. Economies of scope & 2 3 4 S 
geographical diversification. 
7. Other (Please specify) 2 3 4 S 
B. HOST COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Level of ecnomic development 2 3 4 S 
2. Size of host market 2 3 4 S 
3. Government controls on inward 2 3 4 S 
direct investment 
4. Fiscal and monetary policies. 2 3 4 S 
S. Political!Economic climate in 2 3 4 S 
host country. 
6. Psychic distance (language, 2 3 4 S 
cultural, business, customs 
etc. differences). 
7. Transport & communication costs 2 3 4 S 
8. Other (Please specify) 2 3 4 S 
5. BENEFITS OF NON-EQUITY (CONTRACfUAL FORMS) OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT. 
5.1 Please state the extent of your agreement or disagreement with the following statements (Non-equity /contractuaJ 
forms are defined as listed in 3.1 above) 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree 
I. Non-equity (contractual) forms 2 3 4 5 
of international investment 
enable flIllls to diversify both 
country and investment risks 
2. Non-equity forms of international 2 3 4 5 
investment enable firms to 
avoid market disabling factors 
of opportunism, uncertainty, 
entry barriers, etc. 
3. Non-equity modes are a 2 3 4 5 
superior means of exploiting a 
firm's assets abroad and foreign 
market opportunities, with 
minimum resource & risks. 
4. Non-equity modes offer firms 2 3 4 5 
the advantage of flexibility 
to adjust to changes in both 
the host economy and the 
international market. 
5. Non-equity entry modes may be 2 3 4 5 
used as pre-emptive manoeuvres 
to gain access to promising 
markets and technologies. 
6. Non-equity entry modes are 2 3 4 5 
a less-developed country 
phenomenon. 
5.2 Finally, do you think that contractual/non-equity modes of entry into foreign markets would gainllose 
popUlarity in future? 
Gain Popularity Lose PopUlarity Don't Know 
Please explain the reason for your answer: __________________ _ 
Thank you for your help in completing the questionnaire. Please return it in the pre-paid envelope, as soon as possible, 
to: 
WILSON HERBERT, ESQ 
GLASGOW BUSINESS SCHOOL 
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW 
53-59 SOUTHPARK AVENUE 
GLASGOW 
G12 8LF 
Appendix 3.4 
FOREIGN COMPANIES IN UK 
1. COMPANY DETAILS 
1.1 Name of company: __________________ _ 
1.2 Position of Respondent: ________________ _ 
1.3 Major industry classification (eg. manufacturing oil, etc). ______ _ 
1.4 Please tick which of the following best describes your company: 
1. An independent company (ie. without parent or subsidiary) 
2. A parent company (ie. with subsidiaries) 
3. A subsidiary company 
4. An associate/affiliate of a British company. 
5. A member of a Consortium. 
6. Other (please specify) 
1.5 What nationality is your company? (eg, French, Canadian, etc) _____ _ 
1.6 Size of company (please complete) 
Group Turnover (£million) Number of Employees 
2. SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES 
2.1 How many associate companies do you have: 
in the UK? 
elsewhere? 
2.2 Is the bulk of your company's current overseas activity in: 
1. West Europe (excl UK)? 
2. North America? 
3. Latin America? 
4. Australia & New Zealand? 
5. Far East (incl Japan, Hong Kong, China, etc)? 
6. Asia (incl. India, Pakistan, Singapore, etc)? 
7. Middle East (Israel, Saudi Arabia, etc)? 
8. Africa? 
9. Eastern Bloc (incl. Soviet Union, Poland, etc)? 
10. Other (please specify) 
2.3 Has the position in 2.2. above changed in the last 5 years? 
If Yes, could the reason be due to: (please tick as many as apply) 
YES/NO 
1. Shift in corporate policy/strategy? 
2. Home government's outward investment policy? 
3. Host government's inward investment policy? 
4. Host country's political/economic situation? 
5. Global competition? 
6. Other (please specify)? 
2.4 What percentage of your group's global investment is accounted for by foreign 
investment? (Please tick) 
Less than 10% Between 10 & 20 % Between 20 & 30 % Over 30 % 
2.5 How much of your group turnover is contributed by foreign investment earnings? 
Less than 10% Between 10 & 20 % Between 20 & 30 % Over 30 % 
3. DETAILS OF MODES OF ENTRY INTO THE UK. 
3.1 Which of the following organizational forms best describes your company's route of 
entry into UK? (please tick) 
Entry Mode Activity in the UK 
1. Equity Joint Venture with UK company 
2. Non-Equity Joint Venture with UK company 
3. AcquisitioniMerger of UK-based company 
4. Licensing 
5. Franchising 
6. Agency 
7. Turnkey contracts 
8. Assembly/Sub-assembly plant operation 
9. Leasing 
10. Contract Management/subcontracting 
11. Production sharing 
12. Other (please specify) 
3.2 Please rank the following factors in order of their influence on your 
company's decision to locate in UK (1 =most influential, 9=least influential). 
MOTIV A TION FACTORS 
1. Presence of other companies in the UK, including your competitors. () 
2. London as a major international financial centre ( ) 
3. Strength of pounds sterling as a major world currency ( ) 
4. Your country's political ties with UK ( ) 
5. Effective tax & interest rates differentials between your country and U~ ) 
6. Trade/economic relationship between your country and UK ( ) 
7. Size of UK markets (capital, product and factor markets) ( ) 
8. Geo-political and economic status of UK ( ) 
9. Other (please specify) ( ) 
3.3 How significant is each of the following factors which may be included in contractual 
agreements? 
Very Very 
Significant Significant Neutral Insignificant Insignificam 
CONTRACTUAL PACKAGE 
1. Machinery /Equipment supply 2 3 4 S 
2. Technical assistance in 
production. 2 3 4 S 
3. Technical usistance in 
plant design and 
coDlUUction. 2 3 4 S 
4. Technical assistance in 
procuring/supplying 
inputs &. components. 2 3 4 S 
S. Technical ulilLt.nce in 
marlccting &. management. 2 3 4 S 
6. Penonnel training. 2 3 4 S 
7. Right for utilisation of 
pltenu/tradeowb 2 3 4 S 
8. Right for utilisation of 
design. formuls etc. 2 3 4 S 
9. Right to the Ute of 
advertising materiall. 2 3 4 S 
10. Other (pleue rpecify) 2 3 4 S 
3.4 Is there any specified length of time in such technical agreement. YES/NO 
If yes, how long is it? - years 
4. DETERMINANTS AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
4.1 Pleue tiel::, and nnk in order of relative importance, the following motivatioDJ for adopting non-equity forml of foreign 
inveatment ( I = molt impotUnt, 10 = lcut impotUnt). 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
S. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
4.2 
4.3 
MOT NATIONAL STATEMENT 
Achieve international divenification via co-<>pel1ltive UTIU1gementi 
with lou! partDen. 
Reciprou! IICCeII to technologylhigh com of technology. 
Because other countriea' multinationall adopt flexible forma of 
foreign invectment. 
Size of firm too Imall to finance foreign opentioDJ a10De. 
High colt of eatabliabing a foreign aublidiary. 
Strong market competition. 
Entry into UK u a gateway to wider EEC markell. 
Products customized to UKJEEC market. 
Host Government'l Policy. 
Global profitability and iocreaaod market abare. 
Did the entry choice of your competitors into the UK influence your companY'1 entry atntegy? 
If yea, pleue explain the extent of the influeoce .. ________________ _ 
Does the size of your parent company have any influence on the choice of entry 
mode? 
If yes, what lcind of influence does it have? __________________ _ 
Tick Rank 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
YES/NO 
YESINO 
4.4 How significant is each of the following in your company's choice of mode of entry into a foreign market? (please circle) 
Very Very 
Significant Significant Neutral Insignificant wig oificaol 
A. FIRM CHARACTERISTICS: 
I. Willingneas to abare owoerahip & control 
in return for acceal to local markell 2 3 4 S 
2. Minimization of country risks 2 3 4 S 
3. Experience in foreign markell 2 3 4 S 
4. Size of company (denoting 
financial, managerial and 
technical capabilitiel) 2 3 4 S 
S. POlseuion of brand name, 
trade marb etc. 2 3 4 S 
6. Economiea of scope & 
geographical diversification. 2 3 4 S 
7. Other (please specify) 2 3 4 S 
B. HOST COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
I. Level of ecnomic development 2 3 4 S 
2. Size of host market 2 3 4 S 
3. Government controll on inward 
direct investment 2 3 4 S 
4. Fiscal and monetary policiea. 2 3 4 S 
S. Political/Economic climate in 
holt country. 2 3 4 S 
6. Psychic diltance (language, 
cultural, busiDesl, cUlloms 
etc. differencel. 2 3 4 S 
7. Transport & communication COlti 2 3 4 S 
8. Other (please specify) 2 3 4 S 
5. BENEFITS OF NON-EQUITY/(CONTRAcruAL FORMS) OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT. 
5.1 Please state the extent of your agreement or disagreement with the following statements (Non-
equity/contractual forms are defined as listed in 3.1 above) 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree 
1. Non-equity (contractual) forms 
of investment enable firms to 
diversify both country and 
investment risks 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Non-equity forms of international 
investment enable firms to 
avoid market disabling factors 
of opportunism, uncertainty, 
entry barriers, etc. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Non-equity modes are a 
superior means of exploiting a 
firm's assets abroad and foreign 
market opportunities, with 
minimum resources & risks. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Non-equity modes offer firms 
the advantage of flexibility 
to adjust to changes in both 
the host economy and the 
international market. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Non-equity entry modes may be 
used as pre-emptive manoeuvres 
to gain access to promising 
markets and technologies. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Non-equity entry modes are 
a less-developed country 
phenomenon. 2 3 4 5 
5.2 Finally, do you think that the non-equity contractual modes of entry into foreign markets will 
become popular or less popular in future? 
Popular Less Popular Don't Know 
Please explain the reason for your answer. _______________ _ 
Thank you for your help in completing this questionnaire. Please return it in the pre-paid 
envelope, as soon as possible, to: 
WILSON HERBERT, ESQ 
GLASGOW BUSINESS SCHOOL 
DEPr OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW 
GLASGOW GU 8LF 
SCOTLAND 
APPENDICES 4.1 - 4.4 
DATA CODING 
WHl.SYS 
Variable: V5 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 
.00 No 
Variable: V6 
Value labels 
Missing: 
* 
None 
.00 No 
Variable: V7 
Value labels 
Missing: 
* 
None 
.00 
variable: va 
CONSORTIUM 
No 
follow 
* 
follow 
* 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
.00 No 
variable: V9 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 
.00 No 
Variable: V10 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 
.00 No 
Variable: Vll 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 
.00 No 
variable: V12 
Label: A PARENT BANK 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
1. 00 Yes 
Label: A SUBSIDIARY BRANCH BANK 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
1. 00 Yes 
Label: A BRANCH MEMBER 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
1. 00 Yes 
Label: A MEMBER OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
1. 00 Yes 
Label: JOINT VENTURE BANK 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
1. 00 Yes 
Label: AN AFFILIATE OF UK BANK 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
1. 00 Yes 
Label: OTHER BANK 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
1. 00 Yes 
Label: NATIONALITY OF BANK 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
Variable: V13 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
Variable: V14 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
Type: Number Width: 2 Dec: 0 
Label: GROUP TURNOVER 
Type: Number Width: 10 Dec: 0 
Label: NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 
Type: Number width: 7 Dec: 0 
Variable: V15 
INVESTMENT ACC 
Label: PERCENTAGE OF BANKS TOTAL 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Less than 
& 20% 
Type: Number 
10% 
3.00 Between 20 & 30% 
width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 Between 10 
4.00 Over 30% 
Variable: V16 
FOREIGN I 
Label: GLOBAL EARNINGS CONTRIBUTED BY 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Less than 10% 2.00 Between 10 
& 20% 
3.00 Between 20 & 30% 4.00 Over 30% 
Variable: V17 Label: BULK OF COMPANY'S CURRENT OVERSEAS 
ACTIV 
Value labels follow Type: Number Width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 West Europe 2.00 North America 
3.00 Latin America 
and New Zealan 
5.00 Far East 
7.00 Middle East 
9.00 Eastern Block 
4.00 Australia 
6.00 Asia 
8.00 Africa 
10.00 Other 
Variable: V18 Label: POSITION CHANGED IN LAST 5 YEARS 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Yes 
Variable: V19 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: SHIFT IN CORPORATE POLICY/STRATEGY 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
variable: V20 
POLl 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Yes 
Variable: V21 
POLIC 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Yes 
Variable: V22 
SITUAT 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V23 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V24 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V25 
BANK 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V26 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: HOME GOVERNMENTS OUTWARD INVESTMENT 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: HOST GOVERNMENTS INWARD INVESTMENT 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: HOST COUNTRY'S POLITICAL/ECONOMIC 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: GLOBAL COMPETITION 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: OTHER REASON 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS DESCRIBES YOUR 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: FOREIGN AFFILIATES/ASSOCIATES 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
variable: V27 
OFFICES 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
variable: V28 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Yes 
Variable: V29 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
variable: V30 
SERVICES 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Yes 
variable: V31 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V32 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V33 
BEEN D 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
variable: V34 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
Label: OVERSEAS AGENCY/REPRESENTATIVE 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: CONSORTIUM/JOINT VENUE ARRANGEMENTS 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: INTERNATIONAL MERCHANT BANKING 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: OVERSEAS CASH LINE SERVICES 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: OTHER OPERATION MODE 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: ORGANIZATIONAL FORM OF ENTRY HAVE 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: PRESENCE OF OTHER BANKS IN THE UK 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
1. 00 
variable: V35 
CUSTOMERS 
Yes 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Yes 
variable: V36 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Yes 
variable: V37 
AND U 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
variable: V38 
FINANCIA 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
variable: V39 
MAJOR 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V40 
TIES W 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V41 
DIFFERE 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V42 
YOUR CO 
2.00 No 
Label: POSSESSION OF MAJOR CORPORATE 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: SIZE OF UK MARKETS 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: SIZE OF TRADE BETWEEN YOUR COUNTRY 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: LONDON IS A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: STRENGTHS OF POUNDS STERLING AS A 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: YOUR COUNTRY'S POLITICAL/ECONOMIC 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: EFFECTIVE TAX AND INTEREST RATES 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: SOCIO-CULTURAL SIMILARITIES WITH 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 1. 00 Yes 2.00 No 
Variable: V43 Label: OTHER 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 
1. 00 Yes 2.00 No 
variable: V44 Label: WILLINGNESS TO SHARE OWNERSHIP IN 
RETURN 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V45 Label: MINIMIZATION OF COUNTRY RISKS 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V46 Label: COST OF ESTABLISHING A FOREIGN 
SUBSIDIAR 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V47 Label: SIZE OF BANK 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V48 Label: EXPERIENCE IN FOREIGN BANKING 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V49 Label: POSSESSION OF LARGE INTERNATIONAL 
CORPOR 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V50 Label: ECONOMICS OF SCOPE AND GEOGRAPHICAL 
DIVE 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V51 Label: OTHER 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V52 Label: GOVERNMENTS POLICY AGAINST FOREIGN 
CONTR 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V53 Label: LEVEL IN INTER-BANK MARKET 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V54 Label: SIZE OF YOUR COUNTRY'S 
TRADE/INVESTMENT 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V55 Label: FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V56 Label: ECONOMIC/POLITICAL CLIMATE 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V57 Label: TECHNOLOGICAL AND MANAGARIAL 
CAPACITY 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V58 Label: PSYCHIC DISTANCE 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V59 Label: OTHER 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V60 
INTERNATIONAL B 
Label: MINORITY EQUITY FORMS IN 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Strongly 
3.00 Neutral 
Type: 
Agree 
5.00 strongly Disagree 
Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 Agree 
4.00 Disagree 
variable: V61 
BANKING/BAN 
Label: MINORITY FORMS INTERNATIONAL 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 strongly 
3.00 Neutral 
Type: Number 
Agree 
5.00 Strongly Disagree 
width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 Agree 
4.00 Disagree 
Variable.: V62 Label: MINORITY/CO-OPERATIVE MODES INTO 
OVERSEA 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Strongly Agree 2.00 Agree 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Disagree 
5.00 Strongly Disagree 
Variable: V63 Label: MINORITY ENTRY MODES OFFER BANKS 
THE ADV 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Strongly Agree 2.00 Agree 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Disagree 
5.00 Strongly Disagree 
Variable: V64 Label: MINORITY ENTRY MODES USED AS PRE 
EMPTIVE 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 strongly Agree 2.00 Agree 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Disagree 
5.00 strongly Disagree 
variable: V65 
DEVELOP 
Label: MINORITY EQUITY ENTRY MODES LESS 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Strongly 
3.00 Neutral 
Type: Number 
Agree 
5.00 Strongly Disagree 
width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 Agree 
4.00 Disagree 
Variable: V66 Label: MINORITY EQUITY FORM OF INTER. 
BANK. WIL 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 popular 
3.00 Don't Know 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 Less Popular 
WH2.SYS 
Variable: V5 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 YES 
variable: V6 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
variable: V7 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
variable: va 
CONSORTIUM 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
Variable: V9 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
Variable: VI0 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
variable: VII 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
variable: V12 
THE UK 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
variable: V13 
ELSEWHERE 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
variable: V14 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
Label: A PARENT BANK 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 NO 
Label: A SUBSIDIARY BANK 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Label: A BRANCH BANK 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Label: A MEMBER OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Label: A JOINT VENTURE BANK 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Label: AN AFFILIATE OF A UK BANK 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Label: OTHER BANK 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Label: HOW MANY SUBSIDIARIES HAVE YOU IN 
Type: Number Width: 4 Dec: 0 
Label: SUBSIDIARIES/BRANCHES HAVE YOU 
Type: Number Width: 4 Dec: 0 
Label: GROUP TURNOVER 
Type: Number Width: 10 Dec: 0 
variable: V15 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
variable: V16 
INVESTMENT AC 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Less than 
& 20% 
Label: NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 
Type: Number width: 7 Dec: 0 
Label: PERCENTAGE OF GROUPS TOTAL 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
10% 2.00 Between 10 
3.00 Between 20 & 30% 4.00 Over 30% 
variable: V17 
FOREIGN IN 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Less than 
& 20% 
Label: GROUP TURNOVER CONTRIBUTED BY 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
10% 2.00 Between 10 
3.00 Between 20 & 30% 4.00 Over 30% 
variable: V18 
ACTIV 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
variable: V19 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V20 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
variable: V21 
INVESTMENT POL 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
variable: V22 
POLl 
Label: BULK OF COMPANY'S CURRENT OVERSEAS 
Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: POSITION CHANGED IN LAST 5 YEARS 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: SHIFT IN CORPORATE POLICY/STRATEGY 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: HOME GOVERNMENT'S OUTWARD 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: HOST GOVERNMENT'S INWARD INVESTMENT 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
variable: V23 
SITUAT 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V24 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V25 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1.00 Yes 
Variable: V26 
BANK 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V27 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V28 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V29 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: HOST COUNTRY'S POLITICAL/ECONOMIC 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: GLOBAL COMPETITION 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: OTHER 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS DESCRIBES YOUR 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: FOREIGN AFFILIATES/ASSOCIATES 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: OVERSEAS AGENCY/REPRESENTATIVE 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
variable: V30 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Label: 
Type: Number 
CONSORTIUM/JOINT VENTURE 
width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Variable: V31 
SERVICES 
Label: INTERNATIONAL MERCHANT BANKING 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes' 
Variable: V32 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V33 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: OVERSEAS CASH LINE SERVICES 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: OTHER 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
variable: V34 Label: PRESENCE OF OTHER BANKS - DC 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
Variable: V35 Label: EXISTENCE OF MAJOR CORPORATE 
CUSTOMERS I 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
Variable: V36 
HOST COU 
Label: ECONOMIC/POLITICAL SITUATION IN 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
Variable: V37 
MARKETS -
Label: SIZE OF HOST COUNTRY'S BANKING 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
variable: V38 
HOST 
Label: INTEREST RATE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
variable: V39 Label: TAX RATE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN HOST 
COUNT 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
variable: V40 Label: LEVEL OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN 
HOST 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
Variable: V41 Label: PRESENCE OF OTHER BANKS - LDC 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
Variable: V42 
CUSTOMERS I 
Label: EXISTENCE OF MAJOR CORPORATE 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
Variable: V43 
HOST COU 
Label: ECONOMIC/POLITICAL SITUATION IN 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
Variable: V44 Label: SIZE OF HOST COUNTRY'S BANKING 
MARKETS -
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
Variable: V45 
HOST 
Value labels follow 
Label: INTEREST RATE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN 
Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
variable: V46 
ANDU 
Label: TAX RATE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN HOST 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
variable: V47 Label: LEVEL OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN 
HOST 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
Variable: V48 Label: SIZE OF UK'S INVESTMENT IN HOST 
COUNTRY 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
variable: V49 Label: OPENNESS OF HOST COUNTRY TOWARDS 
FOREIGN 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
variable: V50 Label: HOST COUNTRY OF MAJOR FINANCIAL 
CENTRE 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
variable: V51 Label: UK'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TIES 
WITH HO 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
variable: V52 Label: SOCIO-CULTURAL SIMILARITIES WITH 
HOST CO 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
variable: V53 Label: OTHER 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
variable: V54 Label: SIZE OF UK'S INVESTMENT IN HOST 
COUNTRY 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
variable: V55 Label: OPENNESS OF HOST COUNTRY TOWARDS 
FOREIGN 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
variable: V56 
CENTRE 
Label: HOST COUNTRY OF MAJOR FINANCIAL 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
variable: V57 Label: UK'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TIES 
WITH HO 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
Variable: V58 Label: SOCIO-CULTURAL SIMILARITIES WITH 
HOST CO 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
Variable: V59 Label: OTHER 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Most Important 13.00 Least 
Variable: V60 Label: WILLINGNESS TO SHARE OWNERSHIP 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V61 Label: MINIMIZATION OF COUNTRY RISKS 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V62 Label: COST OF ESTABLISHING A FOREIGN 
STUDENTS 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V63 Label: SIZE OF BANK 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V64 Label: EXPERIENCE IN FOREIGN BANKING 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V65 Label: POSSESION OF LARGE INTERNATIONAL 
CUSTOME 
Value iabels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Var iable: V66 Label: ECONOMIES OF SCALE & GEOG. 
DIVERSIFICATI 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V67 Label: COMPETITORS PATTERNS OF ENTRY 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V68 Label: OTHER FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V69 Label: GOVERNMENT'S POLICY AGAINST FOREIGN 
CONT 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V70 Label: LEVEL OF INTER-BANK MARKET 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V71 Label: SIZE OF UKE TRADE/INVESTMENT IN 
HOST COU 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V72 Label: FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V73 Label: ECONOMIC/POLITICAL CLIMATE 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V74 Label: TECHNOLOGICAL AND MANAGERIAL 
CAPACITY 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V75 Label: PSYCHIC DISTANCE 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V76 Label: OTHER 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V77 
BANK I 
Label: MINORITY-EQUITY FORMS OF INTERNAT. 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Strongly Agree 2.00 Agree 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Disagree 
5.00 Strongly Disagree 
variable: V78 
BANK I 
Label: MINORITY-EQUITY FORMS OF INTERNAT. 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Strongly Agree 2.00 Agree 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Disagree 
5.00 Strongly Disagree 
variable: V79 
ENTRY 
Label: MINORITY-EQUITY/CORPORATE MODES OF 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 strongly Agree 2.00 Agree 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Disagree 
5.00 strongly Disagree 
variable: V80 
ADVANTAGE OF 
Label: MINORITY-EQUITY OFFER BANKS 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
1. 00 Strongly 
3.00 Neutral 
5.00 Strongly 
Variable: V81 
MANO 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 1. 00 
3.00 
5.00 
Variable: V82 
DEVELOP 
Strongly 
Neutral 
Strongly 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Strongly 
3.00 Neutral 
Agree 2.00 Agree 
4.00 Disagree 
Disagree 
Label: MINORITY-EQUITY USED AS PRE-EMPTIVE 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Agree 2.00 Agree 
4.00 Disagree 
Disagree 
Label: MINORITY-EQUITY ENTRY MODES LESS 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Agree 2.00 Agree 
4.00 Disagree 
5.00 Strongly Disagree 
Variable: V83 
BECOME L 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Popular 
3.00 Do Not Know 
Label: MINORITY-EQUITY/INTERNAT. BANK. 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 Less Popular 
WH3.SYS 
Variable: V5 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V6 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V7 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: va 
COMPAN 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V9 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V10 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V11 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
Variable: V12 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
Label: AN INDEPENDANT COMPANY 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
.00 No 
Label: A PARENT COMPANY 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
.00 No 
Label: A SUBSIDIARY COMPANY 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
.00 No 
Label: AN ASSOCIATE/AFFILIATE OF ANOTHER 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
.00 No 
Label: A MEMBER OF A CONSORTIUM 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
.00 No 
Label: OTHER 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
.00 No 
Label: GROUP TURNOVER 
Type: Number Width: 10 Dec: 0 
Label: NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 
Type: Number width: 7 Dec: 0 
Variable: V13 
BRANCHES/SUBSIDIARIES E 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
Type: 
Label: HOW 
Number Width: 
MANY FOREIGN 
4 Dec: 0 
Variable: V14 Label: WHAT IS THE BULK OF YOUR COMPANY'S 
CURRE 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 West Europe 2.00 North America 
3.00 Latin America 4.00 Australia/N 
Zel. 
5.00 Far East 6.00 Asia 
7.00 Middle 8.00 Africa 
9.00 Eastern Bloc 10.00 Other 
variable: V15 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V16 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Var iable: V17 
INVESTMENT POL 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V18 
POLl 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V19 
SITUAT 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Label: POSITION CHANGED IN LAST 5 YEARS 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
.00 No 
Label: SHIFT IN CORPORATE POLICY/STRATEGY 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
.00 No 
Label: HOME GOVERNMENT'S OUTWARD 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
.00 No 
Label: HOST GOVERNMENT'S INWARD INVESTMENT 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
.00 No 
Label: HOST COUNTRY'S POLITICAL/ECONOMIC 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
.00 No 
variable: V20 Label: GLOBAL COMPETITION 
Value labels follow Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes .00 No 
Variable: V21 Label: OTHER 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes .00 No 
variable: V22 
INVESTMENT A 
Label: PERCENTAGE OF GROUPS GLOBAL 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Less than 
& 20% 
Type: Number 
10% 
3.00 Between 20 & 30% 
width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 Between 10 
4.00 Over 30% 
variable: V23 
FOREIGN IN 
Label: GROUP TURNOVER CONTRIBUTED BY 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Less than 
& 20% 
Type: Number 
10% 
3.00 Between 20 & 30% 
width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 Between 10 
4.00 Over 30% 
variable: V24 Label: OPERATIONAL MODES FOR W. EUROPE 
EXCL. UK 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Non Equity/Joint 2.00 Equity Joint 
3.00 
5.00 
Contracts 
7.00 
Management 
9.00 
Licensing 
Agency 
International Leas. 
Prod/Share Contract 
11. 00 Other 
4.00 Franchising 
6.00 Turnkey 
8.00 Contract 
10.00 Aquis. /Merger 
Variable: V25 Label: OPERATIONAL MODES FOR USA/CANADA 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Non Equity/Joint 
3.00 
5.00 
contracts 
7.00 
Management 
9.00 
11.00 
Licensing 
Agency 
International Leas. 
Prod/Share contract 
other 
2.00 Equity Joint 
4.00 Franchising 
6.00 Turnkey 
8.00 contract 
10.00 Aquis./Merger 
variable: V26 Label: OPERATIONAL MODES FOR FAR EAST INCL 
JAPA 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 1.00 Non Equity/Joint 2.00 Equity Joint 
3.00 
5.00 
contracts 
7.00 
Management 
9.00 
11.00 
Licensing 
Agency 
International Leas. 
Prod/Share contract 
Other 
4.00 Franchising 
6.00 Turnkey 
8.00 contract 
10.00 Aquis./Merger 
Variable: V27 Label: OPERATIONAL MODES FOR AUSTRALIA & 
NEW ZE 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 1.00 Non Equity/Joint 2.00 Equity Joint 
3.00 Licensing 4.00 Franchising 
Agency 6.00 Turnkey 5.00 
contracts 
7.00 
Management 
9.00 
International Leas. 8.00 contract 
Prod/Share contract 10.00 Aquis./Merger 
11. 00 Other 
variable: V28 Label: OPERATIONAL MODES FOR ASIA INCL. 
INDIA, 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 1. 00 Non Equity/Joint 2.00 Equity Joint 
3.00 
5.00 
contracts 
7.00 
Management 
9.00 
Licensing 
Agency 
International Leas. 
Prod/Share Contract 
11.00 Other 
4.00 Franchising 
6 . 00 Turnkey 
8.00 Contract 
10.00 Aquis./Merger 
Variable: V29 Label: OPERATIONAL MODES FOR MIDDLE EAST 
Value labels follow Type: Number 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Non Equity/Joint 
3.00 
5.00 
Contracts 
7.00 
Management 
9.00 
11.00 
Licensing 
Agency 
International Leas. 
Prod/Share Contract 
Other 
width: 2 Dec: 0 
2.00 Equity Joint 
4.00 Franchising 
6.00 Turnkey 
8.00 Contract 
10.00 Aquis./Merger 
Variable: V30 Label: OPERATIONAL MODES FOR EASTERN BLOC 
INCL. 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Non Equity/Joint 2.00 Equity Joint 
3.00 
5.00 
Contracts 
7.00 
Management 
9.00 
Licensing 
Agency 
International Leas. 
Prod/Share Contract 
11.00 Other 
4.00 Franchising 
6 . 00 Turnkey 
8.00 Contract 
10.00 Aquis./Merger 
Variable: V31 Label: OPERATIONAL MODES FOR AFRICA 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Non Equity/Joint 2.00 Equity Joint 
3.00 Licensing 4.00 Franchising 
5.00 Agency 6.00 Turnkey 
Contracts 
7.00 
Management 
9.00 
International Leas. 
Prod/Share Contract 
11.00 Other 
8.00 Contract 
10.00 Aquis. /Merger 
variable: V32 Label: MACHINERY/EQUIPTMENT SUPPLY 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 'Very Insignificant 
variable: V33 Label: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN PRODUCTION 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V34 Label: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN PLANT 
DESIGN AND 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V35 
PROCURING/SUPPLY 
Value labels follow Type: 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 
3.00 Neutral 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
4.00 Insignificant 
Label: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN 
Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 Significant 
4.00 Insignificant 
Variable: V36 Label: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN MARKETING 
& MANA 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V37 Label: PERSONNEL TRAINING 
Value labels follow Type: Number 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very significant 
3.00 Neutral 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Var iable: V38 
PATENTS/TRADEMA 
Label: 
Value labels follow Type: Number 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very significant 
3.00 Neutral 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 significant 
4.00 Insignificant 
RIGHT FOR UTILISATION OF 
width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 significant 
4.00 Insignificant 
variable: V39 Label: RIGHT OF UTILISATION OF DESIGN, 
FORMULA 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V40 Label: RIGHT TO THE USE OF ADVERTISING 
MATERIAL 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 1.00 Very significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V41 Label: OTHER 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V42 Label: SPECIFIED LENGTH OF TIME IN SUCH 
TECHNIC 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes .00 No 
variable: V43 Label: IF YES, HOW LONG 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
variable: V44 
VIA IN 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
variable: V45 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
variable: V46 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
Variable: V47 
COST/RISK S 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
variable: V48 
TECHNOLOGY/HIGH 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
variable: V49 
NON-EQUITY/CONTRACTUAL 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
variable: V50 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Label: ACHEIVE INTERNAT. DIVERSIFICATION 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Label: HOST GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Label: HIGH POLITICAL RISK IN HOST COUNTRY 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Label: RISK DIVERSIFICATION THROUGH 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Label: RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES OF 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Label: COMPETITORS ADOPT 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Label: SIZE OF FIRM TOO SMALL TO FINANCE 
No value labels Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 
Variable: V51 Label: PRODUCTS CUSTOMIZED TO 
HOST/REGIONAL MAR 
No value labels Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 
Variable: V52 
BUSINES 
Label: PROTECT/SUPPORT EXISTING FOREING 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
variable: V53 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
variable: V54 
INFLUENC 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Type: 
Label: 
Type: 
Label: 
Type: 
Number 
OTHER 
Number 
SIZE OF 
Number 
Width: 1 Dec: 0 
width: 1 Dec: 0 
PARENT COMPANY HAVE ANY 
Width: 1 Dec: 0 
.00 No 
Variable: V55 
INFLUENCE CO 
Label: ENTRY CHOICE OF COMPETITORS 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
.00 No 
Variable: V56 Label: WILLINGNESS TO SHARE OWNERSHIP AND 
CONTR 
Value labels follow Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V57 Label: MINIMIZATION OF COUNTRY RISKS 
Value labels follow Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V58 Label: EXPERIENCE IN FOREIGN MARKETS 
Value labels follow Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V59 Label: SIZE OF THE COMPANY 
Value labels follow Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V60 Label: POSSESSION OF BRAND NAME, TRADEMARK 
ETC 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V61 Label: ECONOMICS OF SCOPE GEOGRAPHICAL 
DIVERSI 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V62 Label: OTHER 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1;00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V63 Label: LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPEMENT 
Value labels follow Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V64 Label: SIZE OF HOST MARKET 
Value labels follow Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V65 Label: GOVERNMENT CONTROLS ON INWARD 
INVESTMENT 
Value labels follow Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V66 Label: FISCAL AND MONETARY POLOCIES 
Value labels follow Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V67 Label: POLITICAL/ECONOMIC CLIMATE IN HOST 
COUNT 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: ~ None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V68 Label: PSYCHIC DISTANCE 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V69 Label: TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION COSTS 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V70 Label: OTHER CHARACTERISTICS 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V71 Label: ENABLE COUNTRY TO DIVERSIFY RISKS 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 
3.00 
5.00 
variable: V72 
OPPORT 
Strongly 
Neutral 
Strongly 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Strongly 
3.00 Neutral 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Agree 2.00 Agree 
4.00 Disagree 
Disagree 
Label: AVOID MARKET DISABLING FACTORS OF 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Agree 2.00 Agree 
4.00 Disagree 
5.00 strongly Disagree 
variable: V73 Label: A SUPERIOR MEANS OF EXPLOITING 
OPPURTUNI 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Strongly Agree 2.00 Agree 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Disagree 
5.00 strongly Disagree 
variable: V74 
ADJUS 
Label: OFFERS ADVANTAGE OF FLEXIBILITY TO 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Strongly 
3.00 Neutral 
Type: Number 
Agree 
5.00 strongly Disagree 
width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 Agree 
4.00 Disagree 
variable: V75 
MANOEVRES 
Label: MAY BE USED AS PRE-EMPTIVE 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Strongly 
3.00 Neutral 
Type: Number 
Agree 
5.00 Strongly Disagree 
width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 Agree 
4.00 Disagree 
variable: V76 Label: LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRY PHENOMENON 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 1. 00 Strongly Agree 2.00 Agree 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Disagree 
5.00 strongly Disagree 
variable: V77 Label: GAIN OR LOSE POPULARITY IN THE 
FUTURE 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Gain popularity 2.00 Lose 
popularity 
3.00 Dont Know 
variable: V4 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
Label: INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION 
Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
WH4.SYS 
variable: V5 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V6 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V7 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
variable: va 
COMPo 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Yes 
variable: V9 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V10 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V11 
No value labels 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 
Variable: V12 
No value labels 
Label: AN INDEPENDENT COMPANY 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: A PARENT COMPANY 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: A SUBSIDIARY COMPANY 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: AN ASSOCIATE/AFFILIATE OF A BRIT. 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: A MEMBER OF A CONSORTIUM 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: OTHER 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: NATIONALITY OF COMPANY 
Type: Number Width: 2 Dec: 0 
Label: GROUP TURNOVER 
Type: Number Width: 10 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
variable: V13 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
variable: V14 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
variable: V15 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
variable: V16 
ACTIVITY 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
Label: NO. OF EMPLOYEES 
Type: Number Width: 7 Dec: 0 
Label: ASSOCIATE COMPANIES IN UK 
Type: Number width: 4 Dec: 0 
Label: ASSOCIATE COMPANIES ELSEWHERE 
Type: Number Width: 4 Dec: 0 
Label: BULK OF COMPo CURRENT OVERSEAS 
Type: Number width: 2 Dec: 0 
1.00 West Europe 2.00 North America 
3.00 Latin America 4.00 Austral. /New 
z. 
5.00 Far East 6.00 Asia 
7.00 Middle East B.OO Africa 
9.00 Eastern Bloc 10.00 Other 
variable: V17 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V1B 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V19 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Yes 
variable: V20 
Label: POSITION CHANGED IN LAST FIVE YEARS 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: SHIFT IN CORPORATE POLICY/STRATEGY 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: HOME GOVT. OUTWARD INVEST. POLICY 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: HOST GOVT. INWARD INVEST. POLICY 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V21 
SITUATION 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V22 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V23 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 1. 00 Yes 
variable: V24 
ACCOUNTED FOR 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Less than 
& 20% 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: HOST COUNTRYS POLIT./ECON. 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: GLOBAL COMPETITION 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: OTHER 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: % OF GROUPS GLOBAL INVEST. 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
10% 2.00 Between 10 
3.00 Between 20 & 30% 4.00 Over 30% 
variable: V25 
EARN 
Label: TURNOVER CONTRIB. BY FOREIGN INVES. 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Less than 10% 2.00 Between 10 
& 20% 
3.00 Between 20 & 30% 4.00 Over 30% 
variable: V26 
ENTRY 
Label: ORGAN. FORMS DESC. COMPo ROUTE OF 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 2.00 No 
variable: V27 Label: PRESENCE OF OTHER COMPANYS IN UK 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V28 
CENTRE 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V29 
CURRENCY 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V30 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V31 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V32 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V33 
Value labels follow 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V34 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Yes 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: LONDON MAJOR INTERNAT. FINANC. 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: POUNDS STERLING MAJOR WORLD 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: COUNTRYS POLITICAL TIES WITH UK 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: EFFECTIVE TAX AND INTEREST RATES 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: TRADE/ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: SIZE OF UK MARKETS 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: GEO-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Variable: V35 Label: OTHER 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: 
* 
None 
* 1. 00 Yes 2.00 No 
Variable: V36 Label: MACHIN./EQUIPT. SUPPLY 
Value labels follow Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V37 Label: TECH. ASSISTANCE IN PRODUCTION 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V38 Label: TECH. ASSIS. IN PLANT DES. AND 
CONST. 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V39 Label: TECH. ASSIS. IN PROC./SUPP.INPUTS 
Value labels follow Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5~00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V40 
MANAGEMENT 
Label: TECH. ASSIS. IN MARKET. AND 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V41 Label: PERSONAL TRAINING 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V42 Label: RIGHT FOR UTILISATION OF PATENTS 
ETC 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V43 Label: RIGHT FOR UTILISATION OF DESIGN 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Var iable: V44 Label: RIGHT TO THE USE OF ADVERT. 
MATERIALS 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V45 Label: OTHER 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V46 
AGREEMENT 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V47 
No value labels 
Missing: * None * 
Variable: V48 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V49 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
variable: V50 
INVEST. 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V51 
OPERAT 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V52 
SUBSIDIA 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Label: SPEC. LENGTH OF TIME IN SUCH 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: IF YES, HOW LONG 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Label: ACHEIVE INTERNAT. DIVERSIFICATION 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: RECIPROCAL ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGY 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: MULTINAT. ADOPT FLEX. FORMS/FOR. 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: FIRM TOO SMALL TO FINANCE FOREIGN 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: HIGH COST OF ESTABLISH. FOREIGN 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
variable: V53 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Var iable: V54 
MARKETS 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V55 
MARKETS 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Yes 
Variable: V56 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V57 
SHARE 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V58 
ENT. ST 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 1. 00 Yes 
Variable: V59 
ENT. MO 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Yes 
Variable: V60 
FOR ACC 
Value labels follow 
Label: STRONG MARKET COMPETITION 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: ENTRY INTO UK CATEWAY TO EEC 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: PRODUCTS CUSTOMIZED TO UK/EEC 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: HOST GOVT. POLICY 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: GLOBAL PROFIT. AND INCREASED MARK. 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: ENT. CHOICE/COMPET. INFLU. COMPo 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: SIZE PAR. COMPo INFLU. CHOICE OF 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 No 
Label: SHARE OWNERSHIP CONTROL IN RET. 
Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V61 Label: MINIMIZATION OF COUNTRY RISKS 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V62 Label: EXPERIENCE IN FOREIGN MARKETS 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V63 Label: SIZE OF COMPANY 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V64 Label: POSSESSION OF BRAND NAME, TRADE 
MARK ETC 
Value labels follow Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Var iable: V65 
DIVERSIFICATI 
Label: ECON. OF SCOPE & GEOGRAPH. 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 1. 00 Very significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V66 Label: OTHER 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 1. 00 Very significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
Variable: V67 Label: LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V68 Label: SIZE OF HOST MARKET 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V69 Label: GOVT. CONTROLS ON INWARD DIRECT 
INVESTME 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V70 Label: FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES 
Value labels follow Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V71 Label: POLITICAL/ECONOMIC CLIMATE IN HOST 
COUNT 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V72 Label: PSYCHIC DISTANCE 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V73 Label: TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION COSTS 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V74 Label: OTHER 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Very Significant 2.00 Significant 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Insignificant 
5.00 Very Insignificant 
variable: V75 Label: NON-EQUITY FORMS OF INVESTMENT 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Agree strongly 2.00 Agree 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Disagree 
5.00 Strongly Disagree 
variable: V76 Label: NON-EQUITY FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVEST 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Agree Strongly 2.00 Agree 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Disagree 
5.00 Strongly Disagree 
Variable: V77 Label: NON-EQUITY MODES ARE SUPER. MEANS 
OF EXP 
Value labels follow Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Agree Strongly 2.00 Agree 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Disagree 
5.00 Strongly Disagree 
variable: V78 Label: NON-EQUITY MODES OFFER FIRMS 
ADVANT. OF 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Agree strongly 2.00 Agree 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Disagree 
5.00 Strongly Disagree 
Variable: V79 Label: NON-EQUITY MODES USED AS PRE-EMPT. 
MANOE 
Value labels follow Type: Number Width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Agree Strongly 2.00 Agree 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Disagree 
5.00 Strongly Disagree 
Variable: vao Label: NON-EQUITY ENTRY MODES/LESS 
DEVELOP. PHE 
Value labels follow Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Agree Strongly 2.00 Agree 
3.00 Neutral 4.00 Disagree 
5.00 Strongly Disagree 
Variable: val 
POP. /LE 
Label: NON-EQUITY CONTRACT. MODES ENTRY 
Value labels follow 
Missing: * None * 
1.00 Popular 
3.00 Do Not Know 
Type: Number width: 1 Dec: 0 
2.00 Less Popular 
APPENDIX 5 
DESCRIPTION OF STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES 
FREQUENCY ANALYSIS 
Data collected by original investigation are generally recorded in the form of raw scores. 
The fundamental method for tabular summarization of a set of data is the frequency 
distribution. It shows a tallying of the number of times each score value (or interval of 
score values) occurs in a group of scores. In a given sample, it presents a compact 
summary of the frequency of occurrence of a particular variable in a survey. Such a 
table quickly conveys much information about the data. Apart from its computational 
ease (although with statistical packages one need not bother about this), its main utility 
lies in the fact that all measures of central tendency and dispersion are based on frequency 
distribution. 
MEASURES OF CENTRAL TENDENCY AND DISPERSION 
Two types of statistics commonly used to describe the distribution of cases over the 
values of a single variable are the measure of central tendency and the measure of 
dispersion. The central tendency of a distribution is a typical or representative score. 
In other words, the measure of central tendency helps us to identify the most typical 
value, the one value or score that best represents the entire set of cases on that variable. 
More specific definitions of central tendency, each with its own set of characteristics and 
implications, include the mean, median, and mode. These three represent different 
levels of measurement. The median is the measure of central tendency for ordinal data, 
while the mode is the measure of central tendency for nominal variables. These two are 
not as powerful and informative as the mean. Interval data provide researchers with the 
most complete information of all, including categorization, rank, and distance. Interval 
values can be subjected to any arithmetic manipulation. The mean - being the measure 
that locates the central part of a distribution in terms of both the number of cases on 
either side of that point and their distance from it - possesses several properties that make 
it very useful and generally employed in "higher" statistical analyses. 
The notion of central tendency is that the "typical" value or score represents the 
tendencies (general characteristics) within the population, but may not accurately reflect 
each individual case. For this reason, once we have identified such a typical score we 
must ask a follow-up question: How typical or representative is it? How good is this 
average score in summarizing the distribution of scores for all the scores on a given 
variable? This question is answered by using a second type of statistic, the measure of 
dispersion. The Variance with its derivative, the standard deviation, is the index that 
reflects the degree of variability in a group of scores. The measure of dispersion 
indicates whether the variation around the mean value identified is limited, in which case 
we can have confidence that the average is a meaningful one, or whether that variation 
is so great that the mean value is not really very representative of the population after all. 
The limitation of these statistics is that they describe the characteristics of individual 
variables, hence they are often called univariate statistics. However, most empirical 
surveys involve relationships between two (bivariate) or more (multivariate) variables, 
and these make further use of both the frequency analyses and the measures of central 
tendency. 
MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION AND SIGNIFICANCE FOR NOMINAL 
VARIABLES 
When the data of research consist of frequencies in discrete categories, the :xz (Chi-
Square) test is often used to determine the significance of differences between two or 
more independent groups. The level of measurement involved may be as weak as the 
nominal scale. Four assumptions underlie the :xz test. First, the two or more (k) samples 
must be independent from one another. This usually implies that different and unrelated 
sets of subjects (sample groups) are selected. In this study, there are four independent 
sample groups. Second, the subjects within each group must be randomly and 
independently sampled. Third, each observation must belong to a discrete category, i.e. 
it must qualify for one and only one category in the classification scheme. Fourth, the 
sample size must be relatively large. The rule of thumb for sample size is that the 
Minimum Expected Frequency should not be less than 5. In general, the chi-square test 
should not be used if more than 20 % of the cells have expected values less than 5 and if 
any of the expected values is less than 1 (Siegel, 1954; Norusis, 1986). However, Siegel 
also suggests a remedy when these conditions are violated. 
Siegel suggests that when there are more than 2 sample groups (and thus the degree of 
freedom greater than 1), the X,2 test may be used if fewer than 20 per cent of the cells 
have an expected frequency of less than 1. If these requirements are not met by the data 
in their original form, the researcher must combine adjacent categories in order to 
increase the expected frequencies in the various cells (p.ll0). Only after this 
combination can the X,2 test be applied. With regard to the statistical power of the X2 
test, Siegel notes that when it is used "there is usually no clear alternative. " 
VA TES' CORRECfION FOR CONTINUITY 
The SPSS/PC+ prints two versions of the chi-square statistic, below every crosstabulation. 
The standard version is the one labelled "BEFORE YATES CORRECTION." The most 
common of all uses of the X,2 test is the test of whether an observed breakdown of 
frequencies in a table with two rows and two columns (known as "2 X 2" contingency 
table) could have occurred under the null hypothesis. For such a table, the approximation 
by the chi-square distribution will be markedly improved if it incorporates a correction 
for continuity (Siegel, 1954, p.64; Norusis, 1986, p.230). This is achieved by the Yates' 
Correction. In other words, the Yates' Correction for Continuity is an adjustment to a 
2 X 2 contingency table, intended to make the approximation to the theoretical chi square 
distribution more precise and thus improve the estimate of the observed significance level. 
Although it is used in almost all Statistical textbooks, statisticians are not in agreement 
as to whether this correction is really necessary (McCall, 1970, p.289; Norusis, 1986, 
p.239). Since the SPSS automatically prints it, it is incorporated in the statistical analysis 
and interpreted accordingly as to its effect on the decision to reject or not to reject the 
hypothesis, of interst. 
THE I-DISTRIBUTION 
The t-distribution is very much like the normal distribution. It just shifts the area in the 
normal distribution to adjust for the uncertainty that surrounds the true values of the 
standard deviations (Norusis, 1986, p.2(0). A heuristic judgement is that when sample 
sizes are large, usually n > 30, the t-distribution looks very much like the normal 
distribution (ibid). Using the t-distribution enables us to test how often we would expect 
to see a difference between the means of two sample variables when there is no difference 
between the two groups in the population. 
The output from the t-test procedure differs depending on whether in the population the 
two groups (in this case, UK companies versus Foreign companies or UK banks versus 
Foreign Banks) can be assumed to have the same variances or not. Norusis (1986, 
p.203) advises that the numbers in the columns labelled: 
1 POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE be used if the researcher can assume that the 
two variances are equal; 
2 SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE be used if such equality cannot be used; 
and 
3 SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE be used if the probability of the F-value 
is small. 
The SPSS prints next to the F-value the probability of seeing a difference at least as large 
as the one observed in the sample if the variances are equal in the population and if the 
distribution of the variable is normal. It should be noted that the F-test for equality of 
variances is quite sensitive to departures from normality, while the t-test is not (Siegel, 
1954). Thus, if the data are not from normal popUlations, the observed significance level 
for the F statistic may not be reliable. But, if the observed significance level is large, 
then there is little to worry about the variances. As stated above, if the observed 
significance level for the F statistic is small, then it is advisable to use the t-test marked 
SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE. 
In general, Norusis notes that it is a good idea to use the separate variance t-test 
whenever the researcher suspects that the variances are not equal. The t-statistic printed 
next is the standardized score for the variable, obtained computationally by dividing the 
difference between the two means by its standard error. The SPSS, of course, prints this 
value au.tomatically. Because the hypothesized parameter for investigation is the 
difference between two population means, that is #-£1-#-£2 =0; the corresponding statistic is 
the difference between two sample means; Just as the standard error for the mean is a 
function of the variability of the raw score, the standard error of the difference between 
mean scores is a function of the variability within each population. For the relation 
between F and t and the analysis of variance, See McCall (1970, pp.241-244). 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (ANOV A) 
ANOVA is a statistical procedure which, as its name implies, is used to examine 
population variances to determine whether the population means are equal. Application 
of this technique requires that three assumptions be satisfied. (1) The samples must be 
independent random samples. (2) The samples must be selected from populations with 
normal distributions, and (3) The populations must have equal variances. In behavioural 
or social science studies, nonparametric analogues of the parametric analysis of variance 
have been found to be extremely useful without having to make the assumption of 
normality (Seigel, 1954; McCall, 1970). The most common approach to this kind of 
analysis is the KRUSKAL-WALLIS ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BY RANKS. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test is described in many Statistics textbooks as an extremely useful 
test for deciding whether several independent samples are from different populations 
(Siegel, 1954, p.184; McCall, 1970, p.298; Matre and Gilbreath, 1980, p.470). It is the 
nonparametric counterpart of the One Way Analysis of Variance. Its purpose is to 
determine the probability that the means of the four groups of scores (Le. UK banks, UK 
companies, Foreign banks and Foreign companies) deviate from one another merely by 
sampling error. According to Siegel (1954, p.194) and many statistics authors, the 
Kruskal-Wallis test seems to be the most efficient of the non-parametric tests for K (Le. 
more than 2) independent samples. It has power-efficiency of 3I1r=95.5 per cent in 
comparison with the F test, the most powerful parametric test. Since sample values 
almost invariably differ somewhat, the question is whether the differences among the 
samples signify genuine popUlation differences or whether they represent merely chance 
variations as might be expected among several random samples from the same population. 
The test requires that the level of measurement of the variable be at least ordinal. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test is an extension of the MANN-WHITNEY U test to more than two 
populations. 
The Mann-Whitney U test (or Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, as it is sometimes called) is 
one of the most powerful of the nonparametric tests, and it is a most useful alternative 
to the parametric 1 test when the latter's assumptions cannot be met or when the 
measurement in the research is weaker than interval scaling (Siegel, 1954, p.116). 
